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Abstract 
 
In the recent fight against terrorism Western liberal democracies have significantly 
expanded pre-emptive measures, such as inchoate and preparatory offences or control 
orders. As these measures rely increasingly on the use of sensitive information, their 
application poses a dilemma. On the one hand, sensitive information may be necessary 
as evidence in an open court to justify the coercive measure or demonstrate the 
innocence of the suspect. On the other hand, states are reluctant to disclose such 
information where there is a risk to national security, preferring either to supress the 
information or to use it in secret. Such practices, however, may seriously violate the 
principle of fairness - and its attached individual right to a fair trial - a principle sitting 
not only at the core of the criminal justice system, but also forming part of the rule of 
law and democracy itself. The thesis poses the questions of what limitations are 
acceptable to the right to a fair trial, and what safeguards are necessary when states 
allow the suppression or use of sensitive information in criminal and related 
proceedings. 
The thesis is therefore concerned with finding an appropriate judicial methodology for 
addressing the dilemma in court. It argues that without a proper process (often generally 
described as balancing), minimum standards of fairness are more likely to be lowered 
due to security pressures. Principles, however, which emphasise the right to a fair trial 
and require justifications for any limitation in the interest of national security are 
capable of retaining higher standards. Hence the thesis suggests that while what is fair 
must be decided in the particular circumstances, what needs to be taken into 
consideration in order to achieve fairness can be defined.  
 iv 
By comparing the case law from Australia and the United Kingdom, the thesis then 
offers an in-depths analyses of various degrees of balancing and principles when 
dealing with sensitive information, as well as the dynamics and interaction that 
accompany the two approaches between the branches of government. The two countries 
are particularly suitable for such an enquiry as they share a legal heritage, but have 
diverged increasingly over the last decades in how to protect human rights. While the 
thesis generally favours a principled approach as now predominantly applied in the UK, 
it does not simply propose a legal transplant for Australia, which so far has rejected any 
legislation including principles. Rather the comparison points out the reasons why 
Australian judges behave differently and challenges the Australian Parliament to amend 
the relevant legislation in accordance with its own values in order to retain high 
standards of fair trial protection in proceedings dealing with sensitive information.  
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Introduction 
 1 
 
The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. 
- Thomas Jefferson1 
He who knows only his side of the case knows little of that. 
- John Stuart Mill2 
 
Introduction (Chapter 1) 
  
1.1   Setting the scene: developments in the context of counter-terrorism 
“The first responsibility of government in a democratic society is owed to the public. It 
is to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens.”3  This duty, described by Lord Hope 
in the landmark case of AF (No 3), is crucial for the functioning of a liberal society. In 
recent times, in which many people feel increasingly insecure, this duty has even been 
interpreted as a positive right to security.4 However, this emphasis deflects from the fact 
that security is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to guarantee the liberties of 
people.5 From such a standpoint security is subsidiary to liberty. At the same time, 
particular threats to the safety of a society may require concessions from its liberties.6 
                                                
1 Although this quote is frequently attributed to Thomas Jefferson, it is actually not confirmed.  
2 On liberty (Longman, Roberts and Green, 1869) II.23.  
3 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[76] (Lord Hope). 
4 Sandra Fredman, “The positive right to security” in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security 
and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 307; see also Liora Lazarus, “The right to security” in Rowan 
Cruft, S M Liao and Massimo Renzo (eds), Philosophical foundations of human rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 423. 
5 Lucia Zedner, “Seeking security by eroding rights: the side-stepping of due process” in Benjamin Goold 
and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 257, 258. 
6 In political theory the trade-off between security and liberty can be traced back to Hobbes and Locke. 
See Fredman, above n 4, 309. 
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How much liberty should be sacrificed for security in a liberal democracy is a matter of 
vivid debate. 
While far from new, this debate has gained momentum since the 9/11 attacks in New 
York and Washington, and throughout the so-called ‘war on terror’.7 Mass casualty 
attacks, such as the ones in Bali, Madrid, London, Sydney or Paris did not only 
demonstrate that there is an increased threat from radical jihadist terrorism in Western 
states,8 but also transported the message that anyone can fall victim to an attack while 
travelling on a train, partying in a nightclub or simply sitting at one’s desk at work – in 
short doing things we all do every day. This perception, both objective and subjective,9 
of our vulnerability to terrorism has had an impact on our understanding of security and 
                                                
7 See for example Nancy Baker, “National Security versus civil liberties” (2003) 33(3) Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 547-567; Ed Bates, “Anti-terrorism control orders: liberty and security still in the 
balance” (2009) 29(1) Legal Studies 99-126; Simon Bronitt, “Balancing security and liberty: critical 
perspectives on terrorism law reform” in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh perspectives on 
the war on terror (ANU EPress, 2008) 65-83; Alexandra Chirinos, “Finding the balance between liberty 
and security: the Lord’s decision on Britain’s Terrorism Act (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
265-276; David Cole, “Their liberties, our security: democracy and double standards” (2003) 31 
International Journal of Legal Information 290-311; Oren Gross, “Security vs. liberty: an imbalanced 
balance” (2009, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No 09-42, University of Minnesota); Oliver 
Lepsius, “Liberty, security and terrorism: the legal position in Germany” (2004) 5(5) German Law 
Journal 435-460; David Luban, “Eight fallacies about liberty and security” in Richard Wilson (ed), 
Human rights in the ‘War on Terror’” (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 242-257; Andrew Lynch and 
George Williams, What price security? Taking stock of Australia’s anti-terror laws (UNSW Press, 2006); 
John Podesta, “More secrets less security” in Richard Leone and Greg Anrig (eds), Liberty under attack: 
reclaiming our freedom in an age of terror (Public affairs, 2007) 87-104; Posner and Vermeule, Terror in 
the balance: security, liberty, and the courts (Oxford University Press, 2007); Geoffrey Stone, “National 
security v. civil liberties” (2007) 95 California Law Review 2203-2212; Jeremy Waldron, “Security and 
liberty: the image of balance” (2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 191-210.  
8 There has been debate about how to refer to this kind of terrorism. As the attacks in question are mainly 
justified by defending Islam - although a version of Islam that would be considered as ‘inauthentic’ by 
most Muslims - the label of ‘Islamic terrorism’ has emerged. Not surprisingly this runs the risk of falsely 
equating Islam with terrorism, which is why the more neutral, but meaningless label of ‘new terrorism’ 
has been used. See for example Robert Cornall, “The effectiveness of criminal laws on terrorism” in 
Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(The Federation Press, 2007) 50. In order to be more precise and still avoid the word ‘Islam’, the thesis 
refers to the phenomenon as ‘radical jihadist terrorism’ (RJT). Although Jihad can equally have multiple 
meanings, the radical Jihad expresses at the most a fight against non-believers, ie non-Muslims. For 
further discussion Steven Greer, “Human rights and the struggle against terrorism in the United 
Kingdom”, (2008) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 163,165; John Strawson, “Islam and the 
politics of terrorism: aspects of the British experience” in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), 
Fresh perspectives on the war on terror (ANU EPress, 2008) 9. 
9 This subjective perception does not have to be accurate. See Luban, above n 7, 247. 
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thus its relationship with liberty. Or as Tony Blair famously said after the 7/7 bombings, 
“[t]he rules of the game have changed.”10 
Most of the terror attacks mentioned above were swiftly followed by a raft of security 
legislation, introducing or widening the powers of the police and other security 
agencies. The emergence of international terror networks, which have benefited from 
the parallel development of modern forms of communication, as well as the 
instantaneous reporting of terror attacks, put pressure on governments to increase their 
capabilities to identify potential terrorists, detect and disrupt plots and thus prevent 
attacks from happening in the first place.11 In order to address these concerns, many 
states have introduced extended inchoate terrorist offences as well administrative 
preventive detention regimes. Such a strategy requires more surveillance, monitoring, 
profiling, and data analysis – ie work that is traditionally associated with intelligence 
agencies.12 Not surprisingly, while intended to guarantee the safety of the citizens, many 
of these preventive measures either intentionally or unintentionally also limit the 
liberties of individuals. 
Within this context the thesis deals with an issue that is emblematic of the tension 
between security and liberty: the use and suppression of sensitive information in 
criminal proceedings (typically but not limited to trials involving terrorism offences) 
and other administrative proceedings termed ‘quasi-criminal proceedings’. For the 
                                                
10 Blair Tony (PM’s press conference, 5 August 2005, National Archives).  
11 See Secretary of State for the Home Department, “CONTEST: the United Kingdom’s strategy for 
countering terrorism” (Cm 8123, July 2011); and Council of Australian Governments, “Australia’s 
counter-terrorism strategy: strengthening our resilience” (2015).  
12 For example, between 2003 and 2006 the budget of the Australian Security and Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) increased from AUD 75 million to AUD 233 million. See Anthony Whealy, 
“Difficulty in obtaining a fair trial in terrorism cases” (2007) 81 Alternative Law Journal 743, 757. In the 
UK the intelligence budged has also doubled to over 2 billion BPS in the ten years after 9/11. See Richard 
Norton-Taylor and Nick Hopkins, “How the shock of 9/11 made MI5 stronger” (The Guardian, 8 
September 2011). In the US the intelligence budged has doubled between 2001 and 2013 to over 50 
billon US$ a year. See Ewan MacAskill and Jonathan Watts, “US intelligence spending has doubled since 
9/11, top secret budget reveals” (The Guardian, 30 August 2013). 
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purposes of this thesis, proceeding are ‘quasi-criminal’, which, while technically 
administrative, permit the state to impose coercive measures against particular 
individuals.13 These administrative measures can be highly coercive, including 
measures restricting personal liberty. Consequently, they have been criticised for 
enabling the state to engage in ‘forum shopping’ to avoid the usual due process 
safeguards entrenched in the criminal trials.14  For this reason, this thesis pays equal 
attention to quasi-criminal proceedings as criminal proceedings.  
Due to the emphasis on prevention in counter-terrorism and the ever-increasing reliance 
on the international cooperation between security agencies, authorities are increasingly 
forced to work with sensitive information during investigations and rely on such 
information as a basis for coercive counter-terrorism measures. The secrecy not only 
protects undercover personnel, covert investigations methods and strategies, it also 
ensures the future flow of information from various sources, such as foreign security 
agencies and informers. While secrecy is often vital to the successful continuation of 
counter-terrorism efforts, once sensitive information has relevance in the course of legal 
proceedings, a conflict with other fundamental interests arises. The extent of conflict 
may vary depending on the degree of disclosure of the sensitive information. In some 
cases, sensitive information is fully suppressed and not available to the defence despite 
potential relevance for its case.15 In other cases, the sensitive information is either used 
ex parte or in an edited version,16 potentially disadvantaging the defendant’s ability to 
challenge the evidence. All of these cases pose a dilemma: either the sensitive 
                                                
13 In quasi-criminal proceedings coercive measures are justified in the name of prevention, rather than 
being punitive. Governments have argued that this distinction allows the application of lower fair trial 
standards. The term is further defined in the Introduction of Chapter 7.  
14 See for example Zedner, above n 5, 257; Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, “Covert derogations and 
judicial deference: redefining liberty and due process rights in counter-terrorism law and beyond” (2011) 
56(4) McGill Law Journal 863. 
15 The term defence is used in this context for an individual threatened with coercive measures 
irrespective of whether part of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings.  
16 The term ‘edited evidence’ is further discussed and defined in the Introduction of Chapter 6. 
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information is disclosed in the interest of fairness, but may pose a risk to national 
security; or the information remains suppressed (used or unused), but may jeopardise 
the fairness of the proceedings. States have amended their rules of evidence to 
accommodate this challenge. The question however remains how these rules impact on 
the right to a fair trial (RFT) and the principle of adversarial justice?17 
As indicated above, the focus of the thesis is the period post 9/11. But neither 
terrorism,18 preventative measures within the field of criminal justice19 nor the use and 
suppression of sensitive information20 are novel. Many of the developments relevant to 
the current legal situation preceded 2001 and thus will be examined as part of the 
historical context. Nonetheless, counter-terrorism efforts post 9/11 have intensified the 
issues and in many instances established principles in relation to fairness have been put 
to the test by counter-terrorism and security legislation, which often seems to prioritise 
security over fairness.  
 
1.2   Research question 
The main question of the thesis is: What are the limitations and safeguards required by 
the principle of fairness when using or supressing sensitive information (in the public 
interest) in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings?  This raises a subsidiary question: 
                                                
17 Within the European context the term ‘equality of arms’ is equally used for these issues. For the 
general requirements and content of the equality of arms see for example Joseph Jacob, Civil justice in the 
age of human rights (Ashgate, 2007) 105 and Mark Janis, Richard Kay and Anthony Bradley, European 
human rights law: text and materials (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) 792. The concept of equality 
of arms is not universally accepted in Australia due to the connotation with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. However, when mentioned in the general discussion of this thesis it is used 
interchangeably with the principle of adversarial justice. 
18 Louise Richardson, What terrorists want (Random House, 2007) 21. 
19 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive justice (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
20 For example in relation to police informers see, Henry Mares, “Balancing public interest and a fair trial 
in police informer privilege: a critical Australian perspective” (2002) 6 International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof 94. 
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How should fair trial standards be protected in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings 
that allow the use or suppression of sensitive information? 
How to answer these questions depends heavily on our understanding of the principle of 
fairness. Although there is near universal commitment to fairness in modern legal 
systems – after all who would argue for unfair trials?21 – such commitments often 
consist of general statements. Describing how fairness is applied to a specific context, 
and how it relates to or qualifies other rights and interests is more challenging, and 
establishing agreement is difficult. This gap between universal support for fairness and 
the vagueness of its application in national security contexts has generated much debate 
about the interpretation of fairness and the methodologies of applying it. Such debates 
are not limited to politicians, but also concern law-makers, judges and academics. 
Defining fairness in legal proceedings is difficult, because fairness is multifaceted and 
operates on multiple levels. What is commonly referred to as the RFT is an umbrella 
term, covering a bundle of principles, privileges, rights and rules, such as the 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the right to be informed of any charges 
and to know the basis of the allegations, the right to be heard, and the right to counsel – 
to name some particularly relevant for this thesis. Rules that impact upon the fairness of 
proceedings range from the pre-trial stage all the way to the final appeal. What these 
norms all share is the objective of guaranteeing a fair trial. However, despite their 
interconnection, these norms all have their own unique history, developed through case 
law within both national and international courts. None of these fair trial guarantees is 
absolute in itself, meaning limitations upon one norm does not necessarily invalidate the 
fairness of an entire trial. 
                                                
21 For example Patrick Robinson, “The right to a fair trial in international law with specific reference to 
the work of the ICTY” (2009) 3 Publicist 1. 
Introduction 
 7 
Another challenge for understanding fairness is distinguishing between procedural and 
substantive forms of fairness. The former requires a court to ensure the judicial process 
follows all appropriate legal rules (which are set out by the legislature or developed by 
the courts under the common law), while the latter substantive form of fairness requires 
sufficient consideration to be given to an individual’s rights and liberties. Attention to 
the interests of substantive fairness may require the court to derogate from the mandated 
procedures, potentially leading courts to act differently from the will of parliament. 
Without a clear mandate, it is difficult for judges to guarantee the application of 
substantive fairness, unless the overall fairness of the trial is violated to such an extent 
that it constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Finally, fairness depends on the perspective 
of an individual litigant, as well as the courts, which, being constituted as courts of 
justice, have the inherent power to protect their own integrity as a judicial institution. 
The position of fairness within the legal framework of a liberal democracy presents a 
further ambiguity. Fairness is considered as a defining principle of the rule of law. Not 
only is RFT recognised in all international human rights treaties,22 but is also given 
legal standing in domestic statutes and constitutions. However, which aspect is 
protected and to what degree often requires extensive interpretation by treaty bodies, 
courts and tribunals.23 
Thus, the large number of components determining the fairness of a trial makes it 
difficult to reconcile each of them with other legitimate interests, such as protecting 
                                                
22 For dualist systems, such as Australia and the UK, the extent to which the common law and statutes 
should be interpreted in light of these international obligations generally remains controversial. See below 
at 2.2.3 for the distinction between dualist and monist countries and Chapter 5 for the application in 
relation to UK and Australia. Most importantly in the UK, the introduction of Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK) has removed much controversy in the field of human rights, as it allows not only the direct 
application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but also requires UK courts to 
consider the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
23 The discussion of whether aspects of the RFT are included in Chapter III of the Australian Constitution 
is exemplary. See below at 6.2.3.  
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national security. It is this complexity, which causes concern that under security 
pressures the legislatures and the courts only provide for proceedings ‘as fair as 
possible/practical in the circumstances’.  
This thesis will not attempt to philosophically define what is fair and what is not, as 
what actually is fair depends upon the particular context. Rather the thesis aims at 
capturing the character of the RFT by reviewing the varying methodologies applied to 
assessing fairness in cases where it conflicts with the interests of national security. It 
examines whether particular methodologies support or weaken our commitment to 
fundamental legal values necessary for a fair and open legal process, such as clarity, 
transparency, consistency and legitimacy. While the values of clarity, transparency and 
consistency seem self-explanatory for strengthening the position of the defence, the 
value of legitimacy is more complex. For the purpose of this thesis, a legitimate process 
should be understood as one that supports its own underlying values, such as fairness 
and justice. The term ‘legitimacy’ is therefore used in this thesis in a moral-
philosophical rather than strictly legal sense:24 in order to promote legitimacy, fairness 
is not only applied ‘according to law’. A fair process must be objectively and in 
substance fair and striving for such an end.25 This can be a difficult task for both law-
makers and judges. But the significance becomes obvious, when it is understood that 
fairness underpins the state’s ability to justify the use of coercive force and democracy 
itself.26 
A number of recurrent themes appear in the thesis. The first theme is the relationship 
between the branches of government, particularly between the executive and the 
                                                
24 Legal legitimacy often only refers to ‘being within the realm of the law’ or ‘according to authority’. 
25 A process can be lawful, but nonetheless illegitimate and unfair. See for example, Dietrich v The Queen 
(1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J) discussed below at 2.2.2. 
26 The issue of legitimacy will be further discussed below at 2.1.3. 
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judiciary, and how this impacts on safeguarding the RFT. As the focus of the thesis is 
on sensitive information in legal proceedings, the relationship is mainly described from 
the position of judges and is influenced by the questions of how judges understand their 
role in government within a liberal democracy? And how much responsibility do they 
claim or defer to the executive?  The second theme concerns the position of individuals 
in legal proceedings who are reliant on sensitive information to defend themselves or 
are limited in their ability to challenge sensitive evidence. Hence, the focus is the 
importance of the principle of adversariness in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. 
Finally, the third theme addresses the tension between a flexible approach to fairness 
and the application of set principles. Although the analogy is not fully adequate, this 
could also be described as a common law approach versus a bill of rights approach.  
All of these themes are heavily influenced by the general human rights framework 
applicable in a particular country. Thus in order to get a better insight into the 
requirements of fairness, the thesis uses a comparative approach, including case studies 
from Australia27 and the United Kingdom (UK).28 It analyses how the dilemma has been 
addressed in these jurisdictions. To what extent do these approaches reflect the 
character and importance of the principle of a fair trial?29 
                                                
27 Australia has eight state and territory jurisdictions and one federal jurisdiction. While criminal law is a 
competence of the state, as it is not listed in s 51 of the Australian Constitution, in relation to counter-
terrorism the states have transferred their powers to the Commonwealth. Hence, the references will be to 
the Commonwealth jurisdiction unless otherwise indicated. 
28 While the UK also consists of different jurisdictions, UK counter-terrorism legislation generally applies 
to all of them; see for example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 130. The same is true for the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK). In legal areas where there are differences between the jurisdictions, such as procedural 
matters, the main references are made to the jurisdiction of England and Wales unless otherwise 
mentioned. While there will be no discussion on Scotland, multiple references will be made to Northern 
Ireland due to its extensive history in the field of counter-terrorism. 
29 Some references will be also made to other jurisdictions, such as Canada, the US or Israel, where 
examples help to clarify or illustrate the argument. However, these jurisdictions will not be discussed in 
any detail due to general differences in approaching counter-terrorism or human rights.   
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There is no shortage of criticism of the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on 
various aspects of fairness within the general human rights literature.30 Some of these 
contributions have also addressed the issue of disclosure. However, what is often 
missing in the analysis is a discussion of why fairness should be protected in a 
particular instance, based on what rationales, rules or principles and to what extent? 
Particularly in Australia, some critics have claimed a more proportionate approach is 
necessary, although they generally stop short of explaining what a more sophisticated 
approach looks like in practice, what principles it should be based on and whether the 
current legal framework potentially supports such an approach?31 This thesis offers a 
deeper analysis and answers to these questions. It will trace the underlying values and 
functions of fairness that are at stake and explain why fairness is increasingly under 
threat in the war on terror. Applying comparative methodologies, it will demonstrate 
why a principled approach is advantageous for retaining minimum standards over time.  
To address these aspects comprehensively the thesis draws heavily from Professor 
Andrew Ashworth’s general work on fairness,32 in particular his argument that the RFT 
cannot be balanced away by other interests in the context of the European Convention 
                                                
30 See for example Stefan Sottiaux, Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights: the ECHR and the US 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2008) Chapter 7; Ben Emmerson et al, Human Rights and Criminal Justice 
(Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2012) Chapter 10; Geoffrey Robertson, “Fair trials for terrorists?” in Richard 
Wilson (ed), Human rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 169; Dyzenhaus 
and Thwaites, “Legality and emergency: the judiciary ina time of terror” Andrew Lynch, Edwina 
MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror (Federation Press, 2007) 
9; David Dyzenhaus, “Cycles of legality in emergency times” (2007) 18 Public Law Review 165; Ed 
Bates, above n 7, 99. 
31 See for example Nicola McGarrity and Edward Santow, “Anti-terrorism laws: balancing national 
security and a fair hearing” in Victor Ramraj et al (eds), Global anti-terrorism law and policy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 122; Patrick Emerton, “Paving the way for conviction without 
evidence: a disturbing trend in Australia’s ‘anti-terrorism’ laws” (2004) 4(2) Queensland University of 
Technology Law Journal 129; Whealy, above n 12, 743. 
32 See in particular Andrew Ashworth, Human rights, serious crime and criminal procedure (The Hamlyn 
Lectures, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002); Andrew Ashworth, “Security, terrorism and the value of human 
rights” in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 
203; Andrew Ashworth, “Crime, community and creeping consequentialism” (1996) Apr Criminal Law 
Review 220. 
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on Human Rights (ECHR)33 is crucial. While there are some general monographs on 
disclosure,34 these do not have a focus on national security or consider preventive 
measures outside the criminal law. Again, the thesis will be able to expand previous 
research to a new arena in which security interests are often claimed to be paramount.  
Hence, the thesis presents a fresh perspective to the area of fair trials in the context of 
national security. Through the analysis of a modern understanding of the rule of law, the 
concept of checks and balances and international human rights law, the thesis will 
deduce relevant criteria, which should underpin and guide a trial when dealing with 
sensitive information in order to be considered fair. Through the cases studies in Part II, 
the thesis further exposes in which instances the law allows the rhetoric around fairness 
to cover limitations to RFT and where the law is conducive to achieving fair outcomes.  
There are two more clarifications in relation to the purpose and scope of the thesis: one 
is that the thesis does not address the principle of open justice specifically. Although 
related,35 open justice entails that justice needs to be seen to be done, making the public 
another instrument for controlling the fairness of proceedings. While this aspect is 
important, it does not directly impact on the standing of the defendant when limited. 
Proceedings that are closed to the public for national security reasons do not necessarily 
exclude the defendant, who is still able to access and challenge all the information.36 
Second, it must be pointed out that the thesis does not consider states of emergencies 
                                                
33 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundament al Freedoms, opened for signature 4 
November 1950, 213 United Nations Treaty Series 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
34 In the UK, see in particular the very comprehensive work of David Corker and Stephen Parkinson, 
Disclosure in criminal proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2009) and John Niblett, Disclosure in 
criminal proceedings (Blackstone Press, 1997). 
35 See Ian Dennis, “The right to confront a witness: meanings, myths and human rights” (2010) 4 
Criminal Law Review 255, 260. 
36 Nonetheless, the issue of open justice has equally caused much controversy in the context of national 
security in both the UK and Australia and some intersections are obvious. See for example Re Guardian 
News and Media Ltd and others [2016] EWCA Crim 11 (9 February 2016); Lodhi v R [2006] NSWCCA 
101 (4 April 2006). 
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that threaten the life of the nation and therefore justify the derogation of rights.37 In fact 
the thesis is set out in particular to enquire how security challenges impact on the 
‘regular’ criminal justice and legal system and the general principles of law.38  
 
1.3   Comparative case study: Australia and the United Kingdom 
There is a general tendency to present comparative perspectives through legal 
encyclopaedia or handbooks, providing descriptive inventories of national law and 
powers,39 leaving the reader to draw her own conclusions. In the field of counter-
terrorism, comparing particular approaches and measures is increasingly used as a 
method.  However, many terrorism scholars have examined national legal systems, such 
as the UK and Australia, without reflecting too deeply about whether a comparison in 
this particular field is valid, or indeed will generate useful insights.40 Given that there is 
a lot of scepticism about this type of comparative research,41 a few remarks on that topic 
can be made to provide justification for the comparisons drawn in this thesis.   
                                                
37 The term “derogation” is used here - and throughout the thesis – in a strictly technical sense within the 
meaning of art 15 ECHR and art 4 ICCPR, ie the deviation from treaty obligations under defined 
circumstances by a state party. For a comment on art 15 ECHR see further Alistair Mowbary, Cases and 
Material on the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 835 and 
Claire Ovey and Robin White, Jacobs and White: the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed, 2006) 439. For a comment on art 4 ICCPR see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: CCPR commentary (Engel, 2nd ed, 2005) 83. 
38 Although the UK claimed a state of emergency after the 9/11 attacks and derogated from art 5 ECHR 
(the right to liberty), it withdrew its derogation in 2005 after the House of Lords declared it incompatible 
with the Convention in A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004). See Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter-terrorism policy and human rights 
(seventeenth Report): Bringing human rights back in” (16th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 111, 25 
March 2010) 9. 
39 See for example K J Heller and M D Dubber (eds), The handbook of comparative criminal law 
(Stanford University Press, 2011). 
40 The option of policy transfer is simply assumed and in the case of Australia and the UK it happens on a 
regular basis. 
41 See for example Jonathan Hill, “Comparative Law, law reform and legal theory” (1989) 9(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 101; Alan Watson, “Legal change: sources of law and legal culture” (1983) 131 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1121; Christopher McCrudden, “Judicial Comparativism and 
human rights” in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: a handbook (Hart Publishing, 
2007) 371; Otto Kahn-Freund, “On uses and misuses of comparative law” (1974) 37(1) Modern Law 
Review 1. 
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It has been pointed out that comparing countries from the same legal family42 offers 
little added value.43 While similarities provide a necessary starting point of a 
comparison,44 assuming the UK and Australia offer little differences of significance is 
erroneous, as this thesis will demonstrate.45 Recent legal histories have shown that 
British colonies never received an exact version of English law. Rather, “English laws 
were either ignored or selectively adopted to meet local societal needs”.46 Especially in 
relation to policing powers and criminalisation, colonial systems have tended to support 
broad intrusive state action over the traditional rights or liberties of the subject.  
In order to fully understand a particular legal problem, it is also necessary to consider 
the significance of local ‘culture’.47 This, in particular, expresses itself through 
history.48 Questions such as, how was a particular problem handled over time, are there 
any previous experiences or events that had an impact on this development, or are there 
any related problems that might explain a particular approach, might help to identify 
certain trends or value judgments. Thus all separate systems will distinguish themselves 
through their own national culture.  
                                                
42 See generally Konrad Zweigert and Heinz Kötz, Introduction to comparative law (translated by Tony 
Weir, Claredon Press, 3rd ed, 1998) 41-42. 
43 Alan Watson, Legal transplants: an approach to comparative law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) 5-6. 
44 See in particular Harold Gutteridge, Comparative law (1946). 
45 Comparative law is mainly about similarities and differences. Whether there is a focus on the one or the 
other is much defined by the object of the thesis and at the same time based of criticism. See Gerhard 
Dannemann, “Comparative law: a study of similarities or differences?” in Mathias Reiman and Reinhard 
Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford handbook of comparative law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 383, 385, 
see also David Nelken, “Defining and using the concept of legal culture” in Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
(eds), Comparative Law: a handbook (Hart Publishing, 2007) 109, 123. 
46 Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in Context (The Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2006) 395. The 
example given there is the very different approach to the indigenous populations of the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
47 See Nelken, above n 45, 109; George Fletcher, “ Comparative law as a subversive discipline” (1998) 46 
American Journal of Comparative Law 683, 691; Zweigert and Kötz, above n 42, 36; Roger Cotterrell, 
“Comparative law and legal culture” in Mathias Reiman and Reinhard Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of comparative law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 709, 711. 
48 Watson considers comparative law simply as a branch of legal history. See Watson, above n 43, 6. 
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Despite these expected differences, a comparison within the same legal family makes 
findings easier to apply and avoids the criticism of hybrid systems as creating legal 
incoherence.49 
It is also important to recognise the limitation of comparative law: comparative research 
does not necessarily lead to direct propositions of reform. While learning about different 
ways to solve a problem, comparative research primarily identifies ‘sore spots’ of one 
system by looking at another system.50 In particular, “comparative law can reveal – 
more vividly than the study of a single system – the relationship between law and 
political and moral values”.51 Hence, the thesis is not concerned with judging which 
jurisdiction has the better human rights regime, but with assessing particular qualities - 
strengths and weakness - they possess in relation to reconciling the competing interests 
in protecting the RTF and national security. 
 
Australia and the United Kingdom 
Australia and UK are part of the same common law legal family. But while they share a 
legal heritage, they have significantly diverged from each other in the way they protect 
human rights. Australia exemplifies a traditional common law model, strongly 
committed to parliamentary sovereignty, and without a comprehensive legislative or 
entrenched constitutional bill of rights. The UK increasingly represents a hybrid-model 
substituting and combining the common law with a more structural approach stemming 
                                                
49 Arguably such criticism is overstated anyway. Hybrid legal systems can also be beneficial as the 
competition creates efficiency. David Nelken, “Comparative law and comparative legal studies”, in Esin 
Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: a handbook (Hart Publishing, 2007) 3, 7. It can also 
be easily underestimated in how far we already deal with hybrid systems, internationally as well as 
domestically.  
50 Peter Gill, “’Knowing the self, knowing the other’: comparative analysis of security intelligence” in 
Loch Johnson (ed), Handbook of intelligence studies (Routledge, 2009) 82, 83. 
51 Hill, above n 41, 114. See also Watson, above n 43, 7: “comparative law is about the nature of law, and 
especially about the nature of legal development”. 
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from its Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA), which gives national effect to its 
obligations under the ECHR. Within these models the courts not only apply different 
approaches to deal with the disclosure dilemma, but measures enacted by the respective 
Parliaments are also now scrutinised against different constitutional settings.  
What makes the comparison also useful and interesting is the fact that some policy 
transfer has occurred from the UK to Australia on counter-terrorism measures.52 For 
example, Australia has adopted the British system of control orders with some 
modifications.53 This poses the question whether in the course of this policy transfer 
enough consideration has been paid to the human rights framework in which the 
measures operate? And, given the fact that some of the adopted measures have been 
subsequently changed in the UK following human rights challenges, the question arises 
whether Australia should similarly take these reforms into consideration? In other 
words, while Australia has adopted a particular “program” in order to reach a similar 
“policy goral”, it is not clear whether it has at the same time also adopted the 
“ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons”.54  
Exploring the themes above, the comparative case studies will identify which approach 
is applied to determine the fairness of the trial? How do the different branches of 
government interact with each other? What is the role of the judge? And what are the 
                                                
52 In the field of political sciences the term “policy transfer” is used as methodology to evaluate the 
adoption of policies in one state from another. See David Dolowitz and David Marsh, “Learning from 
abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making” (2000) 13(1) Governance 5; David 
Dolowitz and David Marsh, “The future of policy transfer research” (2012) 10(3) Political Studies 
Review 339; Karen Mossberger and Harold Wolman, “Policy transfer as a form of prospective policy 
evaluation (2003) 63(4) Public Administration Review 428; John Hudson and Bo-Young Kim, “Policy 
transfer using the ‘gold standard’: exploring policy tourism in practice” (2014) 42(4) Policy & Politics 
495. 
53 See below at Chapter 7. 
54 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, “Learning from abroad: the role of policy transfer in contemporary 
policy-making” (2000) 13(1) Governance 5, 12. There is a debate in the literature, what policy transfer 
actually entails and when it constitutes a failure. See for example Oliver James and Martin Lodge, “The 
limitations of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘lesson drawing’ for public policy research (2003) 1(2) Political 
Studies Review 179. 
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mechanisms available to the defendant to assert a claim that the RFT has been 
infringed?  
 
1.4   Thesis outline 
The structure of the thesis broadly follows the structure of this introduction. Part I looks 
at the issues from a more theoretical point of view. In Chapter 2, I characterise the RFT  
as a constitutional principle, with importance not only to the individual within a trial 
and for claiming rights, but also as public interest. As such the RFT is crucial for 
justifying coercive action and for fostering social cohesion. This Chapter argues that 
such an understanding of the RFT must be reflected in any disclosure regime. Chapter 
3 focuses on the risks associated with the use of untested evidence by looking at the 
type of information regularly suppressed in the interest of national security. This in 
particular puts an emphasis on the importance of adversarial justice. Chapter 4 
evaluates several methodologies for resolving conflicts of interests over the use and 
suppression of sensitive information. Taking a normative approach, the analysis is 
drawn from the case law of the ECtHR. The ECtHR’s focus on review of procedure, 
rather than substantive appeal, makes it possible to deduce several principles important 
for the protection of the RFT. 
Part II of the thesis covers the case studies. An introductory chapter (Chapter 5) sets up 
the case studies by discussing the human rights frameworks in Australia and the UK, as 
well as the relevant major developments in counter-terrorism. It is followed by an 
analysis of sensitive information in criminal proceedings (Chapter 6) and quasi-
criminal proceedings, which focuses on control orders (Chapter 7) in Australia and the 
UK. A distinction emerges between to the two types of proceedings with the latter 
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applying lower fair trial standards, which are more permissive of the limited use of 
secret evidence. Chapter 8 offers a general comparison and analysis between the 
approaches in Australia and the UK, and provides some proposition for law reform.  
The thesis is based on the premises that while what is fair cannot be resolved in 
abstract, what needs to be considered to determine fairness in a specific context can be 
established. It will conclude that in order to do justice to the importance and character 
of the RFT in a field where stakes are high, non-disclosure decisions should be guided 
by principles, which must be considered by all branches of government, namely, the 
Executive, Legislature and the Courts. Applying such a methodology enables the 
safeguard of long-term fair trial standards against erosion from security pressures.  
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Part I. 
Chapter 2: The right to a fair trial: function, scope and 
nature  
 
A strong legal commitment to the right to a fair trial (RFT) is expressed variously in 
international human rights treaties, domestic statutes, as well as the common law. 
However, none of these statements are absolute. Fairness always remains a qualified 
aspiration because of other interests of equal or higher importance to society.1 While 
recognition of this plurality of interests and the need to adjudicate conflicts between 
them is part of all liberal societies, it is important to know exactly what is at stake when 
placing constraints upon the RFT. Unfortunately, because threats to national security 
often seem daunting,2 the danger arises that fairness comes to be seen as a luxury that 
can no longer be afforded to the concerned individual. Such a view is not only short-
sighted, as it neglects the immediate consequences for a society, but also simply wrong, 
because it threatens the very foundations of our legal systems. 
The present Chapter demonstrates the importance of fairness by describing its function 
within Western liberal democracy. The full grasp of fairness requires not reducing it to 
an individual rights (or set of rights), but to recognise it as well as a principle serving 
the public interest, which ensures legitimacy in legal processes. Furthermore, by 
looking at the sources of fairness, it becomes obvious that the principle of fairness is 
                                                
1 For a full characterisation see below at 4.3.1.  
2 David Luban, “Eight fallacies about liberty and security” in Richard Wilson, Human rights in the ‘War 
on Terror’” (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 242, 247. 
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implicit in some of the most significant aspects of public law theory, ie defining the 
relationship between the state and its people, such as the concept of democracy, the rule 
of law (RoL) and fundamental common law rules. Taken collectively, these aspects 
demonstrate that fairness should be recognised as a constitutional principle. 
It is generally accepted that the courts should refuse to apply laws, which explicitly 
abrogate fairness to prevent miscarriages of justice. Thus a claim for ‘fairness’ as a 
constitutional principle is not overly controversial. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to 
explicate this claim, as it arguably has consequences for defining the scope and content 
of fairness, which lacks a clear consensus. Hence, in the conclusion the Chapter makes 
general claims in relation to the treatment of fairness by law, which will create the basis 
for advancing the thesis argument for a need of principled approach to fairness.  
It is noteworthy that there are differences in terminology surrounding fairness as an 
individual rights and in the public interest. Whereas the RFT is generally considered as 
an individual right, the term ‘principle of fairness’ is often preferred to emphasise the 
broader public interest in ensuring fairness in legal processes.3 This dichotomy is 
particularly present in common law systems, where the principle of fairness dictates that 
trials must be fair to protect integrity of the court (and prevent abuse of its process), 
rather than fairness being conceived only as an individual right. As such the term 
‘principle of fairness’ more closely resembles ‘fair trial according to law’ or procedural 
fairness, which preference regard for parliamentary supremacy. 
By arguing - as this Chapter does - that fairness may be conceived as both an individual 
right and collective public interest, neither the term ‘RFT’ nor ‘principle of fairness’ 
accurately express the full scope of fairness. The thesis predominately uses the term 
                                                
3 See James Jacob Spigelman, “The truth can cost too much: the principle of a fair trial” (2004) 78 
Australian Law Journal 29. 
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‘RFT’, as it is the preferred term in human rights literature. Apart from the following 
Sections, where the different aspects are discussed, differences in fairness terminology 
(whether conceived as a principle, right or interest) is not greatly significant for the 
purposes of the thesis.4  
  
                                                
4 In Dietrich the majority accepted the description RFT even under the common law as “convenient, and 
not unduly misleading”. Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 299 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
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2.1   Fairness as an individual right and a collective public interest. 
The RFT is generally portrayed as an individual right. Particularly, when fairness is in 
conflict with security interests, which are considered as public interests. While the RFT 
is certainly important for the individual involved, this characterisation neglects the 
broader function of fairness in also serving the public interest. This section emphasises 
the various functions of fairness, which together characterise fairness both as an 
individual right and a collective public interest. 
 
2.1.1   Fairness as a protection of human dignity 
Since the end of Second World War human dignity has been considered as a prominent 
theoretical foundation of human rights.5 An individual should be treated with respect 
and dignity without exception. As the state exercises significant power over an 
individual during a criminal trial, with potentially huge consequences for personal 
freedom and property, the principle of fairness is crucial in guaranteeing the human 
dignity of the individual concerned.  
As a reaction to the cruelties of the Nazi-regime, human dignity was not only a 
cornerstone in the drafting of the new German Constitution,6 but also played a key role 
in the establishment of the United Nations. In the Preamble to its key human rights 
                                                
5 See generally Aharon Barak, Human dignity: the constitutional value and the constitutional right 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015); Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding human dignity 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Jeremy Waldron, “Is dignity the foundation of human rights?” in Cruft, 
Liao and Renzo (eds), Philosophical foundations of human rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 117; 
Christopher McCrudden, “Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights” (2008) 19(4) The 
European Journal of International Law 655.  
6 In Germany human dignity has a very pronounced role. Due to arts 1 and 79(3) German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), it cannot be balanced against any other constitutional right, nor can the guarantee be 
amended or abolished by any democratic majority in Parliament. Such a ‘legalisation’, which gives the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundersverfassungsgericht) the power to basically remove 
anything from the political agenda once it finds a violation of human dignity, has been criticised. The 
powers given to the Court represented the enormous distrust in the political actors after the failing of the 
Weimar Republic and the Nazi-regime. See Christoph Möllers, “Democracy and human dignity: limits of 
a moralized conception of rights in German constitutional law” (2009) 42(2) Israel Law Review 416. 
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document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), states recognised 
that “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”7 The 
Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is even 
more explicit.8 After referring to the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations and largely replicating the Preamble of the UDHR, it recognises that “these 
rights [set out in the Covenant] derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”.9 
Apart from Germany, a number of countries, such as Canada,10 South Africa,11 Israel,12 
Sweden,13 and Ireland,14 have also introduced the concept of human dignity in their 
domestic constitutions.15 While, human dignity has not traditionally played a role in 
English constitutionalism,16 the idea is not entirely alien to the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
and finds some expression in case law as well as legislation.17  
                                                
7 The UDHR further holds that “the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of 
men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.” Art 1 UDHR then elaborates: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.” 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
United Nations Treaty Series 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
9 Emphasis added.  
10 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), interpreted from s 15 (Equality Rights). 
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), s 1 lists human dignity as a founding value of the 
stage; s 10 expressively list a right to human dignity. 
12 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel 1948; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
(1992), s 2. 
13 Constitution of Sweden (1974), art 2. 
14 Preamble to the Constitution of Ireland (1937). 
15 For a more comprehensive overview on the use of human dignity in international and domestic context 
see McCrudden (2008), above n 5, 664-75. 
16 Möllers, above n 6, 421. 
17 See for example Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, 605 (Baroness Hale); R v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions, ex parte Carson [2005] 1 AC 173, 190 (Lord Walker); Environment 
Protection Authority v Caltex (1993) 178 CLR 477, 545 (McHugh J); Rochfort v Trade Practices 
Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134, 150 (Murphy J). See also Simon Bronitt, “The common law and 
human dignity: Australian perspectives” in Jürgen Bröhmer (ed) The German Constitution turns 60: 
Basic Law and Commonwealth Constitution - German and Australian Perspectives (Peter Lang, 2011) 
77. 
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This widespread reliance on human dignity - particularly in international treaties - has 
been attributed to human dignity being the lowest common denominator of the general 
theoretical foundation of liberalism. Its ideological roots in liberal philosophy 
emphasise not only the aspect of personal liberty, but also the autonomy of the 
individual. As McCrudden noted, the concept turns out to be vague enough to be 
compatible with a range of other religious and ideological views as well as tangible 
enough to be accepted without the requirement of further explanation.18  
With its increasing prominence within human rights instruments and post-war 
constitutions, the range of literature on its meaning and use has grown significantly.19 
One can now claim a minimum consensus that “each human being possesses an 
intrinsic worth that should be respected, that some forms of conduct are inconsistent 
with respect for this intrinsic worth, and that the state exists for the individual not vice 
versa”.20 However, when these broad moral ideas are turned into concrete laws, 
controversies do readily occur. This is particularly the case when judges are required to 
protect a right to dignity. To avoid controversy, the right to dignity is often exercised in 
combination with other rights, such as the RFT or right to life.21 
This thesis does not advocate for the creation of legal obligations based on human 
dignity, but rather presents human dignity as a philosophical concept that is generative 
of other specific rights, such as the RFT. As a consequence, a denial of a fair trial also 
constitutes a violation of the human dignity of the person. 
                                                
18 McCrudden (2008), above n 5, 677-78. 
19 For a discussion of various interpretations of human dignity see Stephen Riley, “Human dignity: 
comparative and conceptual debates” (2010) 6(02) International Journal of Law in Context 117. 
20 McCrudden (2008), above n 5, 723; see also ibid, 679 and Conor O’Mahony, “There is no such thing as 
a right to dignity” (2012) 10(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 551. 
21 For the use of the right to dignity in Germany, see Möllers, above n 6, 423-25. 
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The concept of human dignity in the context to human rights is generally linked to the 
moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who famously expressed the maxim that 
individuals should always be treated as ends in themselves and not as means to an end.22 
In an attempt to offer a modern interpretation Waldron stated: 
“Dignity is the status of a person predicated on the fact that she is recognised as 
having the ability to control and regulate her actions in accordance with her own 
apprehension of norms and reasons that apply to her; it assumes she is capable 
of giving and entitled to give an account of herself (and of the way in which she 
is regulating her actions and organising her life), an account that others are to 
pay attention to; and it means finally that she has the wherewithal to demand 
that her agency and her presence among us as a human being be taken seriously 
and accommodated in the lives of others, in others’ attitudes and actions towards 
her, and in social life generally.”23 
Due to these attributes, a person deserves to be treated respectfully. Any actions by the 
state limiting the respect accorded to a person would constitute a violation of the 
person’s dignity.  
The argument here is that the RFT relates to the concept of human dignity, because the 
state is setting the ‘ground rules’ or legal procedural framework for dealing with 
individuals in any legal proceeding.24 Regarding the autonomous status of a person, one 
can distinguish between two types of autonomy: (1) active autonomy, ie the freedom to 
participate, and (2) passive autonomy, ie the freedom not to participate, such as the right 
to silence. Both aspects are important for accepting an individual as a “competent” 
                                                
22 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (Yale University Press, translated by Allen 
Wood, 2002). 
23 Jeremy Waldron, “How law protects dignity” (2012) 71(1) Cambridge Law Journal 200, 202.  
24 Ibid, 208 and 212. 
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participant in the trial, which qualifies the person as a subject, rather than treating 
him/her as an object.25 
As procedural rules define the relationship between the state and the individual, 
guaranteeing dignity through these rules becomes a cornerstone of liberal democracy 
itself.26 Ashworth characterised this relationship as such:   
“The state is invested with far-reaching powers of investigation, prosecution, 
trial and sentencing, but in a democratic society it is expected to exercise these 
powers according to certain standards that show respect for the dignity and 
autonomy of each individual.”27 
While only few legal decisions discussed in this thesis are directly based on arguments 
from human dignity, its influence is nevertheless apparent in some cases. For example, 
in the Australian terrorism trial of Benbrika, for example, the trial judge accepted the 
defence evidence that the treatment of the defendants in a high-security prison and the 
daily routine of transport and strip-searches would impact on the defendants’ mental 
health and thus on their ability to participate properly in the trial.28 Regarding the 
security procedures as unfair, the judge set a deadline to stay the trial indefinitely unless 
a list of alterations to the defendants’ treatment – set out by the judge – were met. 
 
                                                
25 Markus Dubber, “The criminal trial and the legitimation of punishment” in Anthony Duff et al (eds.), 
The trial on trial (Volume 1): truth and due process (Hart Publishing, 2004) 85, 92-93. 
26 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 379; Möllers, above n 6, 
427; Josiah Ober, “Democracy’s dignity” (2012) 106(4) American Political Science Review 827. 
27 Andrew Ashworth, “Four threats to the presumption of innocence” (2006) 10 International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof 241, 249; see also Ian Dennis, “The right to confront a witness: meanings, myths and 
human rights” (2010) 4 Criminal Law Review 255, 260. 
28 R v Benbrika & Ors (No 20) [2008] VSC 80 (20 March 2008). It has been suggested that this ruling is 
an example of the capacity of the common law, albeit implicitly, to provide high levels of protection for 
the right to human dignity: Bronitt, above n 17, 77.  
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2.1.2   Fairness as a means to secure other rights 
Procedural rights and fair trials also allow the defendant to secure other interests or 
protect rights. The fairness of the trial is therefore an important condition to determine 
whether such other interests are justified or rights legitimately exist. In this sense, the 
principle of fairness correlates directly to the interest/right in question. An obvious 
example is the use of legal process to vindicate the right to physical liberty (habeas 
corpus). Hence, fair proceedings are important to secure any right guaranteed by a legal 
system.  
In the context of counter-terrorism, suspects may have a number of their (human) rights 
violated or denied, which may be corrected through instituting legal proceedings. These 
may include the right against discrimination (missing out on employment opportunities 
after being labelled a terrorist suspect),29 freedom of speech (laws proscribing sedition 
and hate speech), freedom of religion (closure of mosques), or the right to a family life 
(when suspects are deported).30 
One topic that has generated significant controversy in the United States, United 
Kingdom (UK) and Australia is the use of information gained through intrusive or 
‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques and possibly even torture. The right not to be 
subjected to torture has been invoked in UK compensation cases against the 
Government.31  
The link between the RFT and the vindication of these other rights is drawn, because 
under normal circumstances fair trial rights are protected separately. The significance 
                                                
29 See for example Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35 (13 July 2011). 
30 See for example YM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1292 (10 
December 2014). 
31 See for example R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth 
Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 (10 February 2010). See also Andrew Ashworth, Human rights, serious 
crime and criminal procedure (The Hamlyn Lectures, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) 35-36. 
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and importance of this relationship, however, has been discussed in situations of public 
emergency, when trial rights can legitimately be derogated from, but other rights are 
absolutely protected from restriction under international law, such as the right not to be 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.  
Thus it can be argued that certain aspects of the right to a fair trial, which are necessary 
for the protection of other non-derogable rights, must also be regarded as absolute, even 
though these aspects of the RFT are not explicitly listed in international human rights 
treaties. Without these corresponding judicial guarantees, non-derogable rights would 
be mere “empty shells”.32 The connection stems from the inherent character of human 
rights treaties and is necessary for its effectiveness. Although the exact content is far 
from clear, the right of habeas corpus, as well as certain minimum conditions of justice 
and due process, have to be included.  
This approach has been championed by the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR)33 and its oversight body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR).34 Although art 8 ACHR, which protects the right to a fair trial, is not listed 
as non-derogable under art 27 (2) ACHR, this article includes as absolute “the judicial 
guarantees essential for the protection of such [non-derogable] rights”. The wording 
obviously leaves room for interpretation, but it expresses clearly that there are 
corresponding procedural rights to the substantive rights protected from suspension in 
times of public emergency.35 In two famous Advisory Opinions,36 the IACtHR 
                                                
32 Andreas Zimmermann, “The right to a fair trial in situations of emergency and the question of 
emergency courts” in David Weisbrodt and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), The right to a fair trial (Springer, 
1997) 747, 754. 
33 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 21 November 1969, 1144 United Nations 
Treaty Series 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978). 
34 For general aspects see Juliane Kokott, “The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights” 
in David Weisbrodt and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), The right to a fair trial (Springer, 1997) 133.  
35 These are art 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), art 4 (Right to Life), art 5 (Right to Humane 
Treatment), art 6 (Freedom from Slavery), art 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), art 12 (Freedom of 
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elaborated on the scope and meaning of the phrase. The first one was on request of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and was related specifically to the 
protection of the writs of habeas corpus (art 7(6)) and amparo (art 25 (1)) during 
emergency situations.37  Although both articles are not mentioned in art 27(2) ACHR 
explicitly, the question was whether they are part of the ‘essential judicial guarantees’.  
The IACtHR first referred to the imperative in art 29 ACHR not to interpret any 
provision as restricting rights to a greater extent than is provided for, or as precluding 
rights that are inherent in representative democracy and thus to interpret all provisions 
in ‘good faith’;38 and furthermore to the fact that the essential judicial remedies are 
those “that will effectively guarantee the full exercise of the rights and freedoms 
protected by [art 27(2)] and whose denial or restriction would endanger their full 
enjoyment”.39  
In relation to amparo the IACtHR recognises that it can be applied to all rights of the 
Convention, hence also to those considered as non-derogable.40 It further argued that  
“habeas corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a person’s life and physical 
integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his 
                                                                                                                                          
Conscience and Religion), art 17 (Rights of the Family), art 18 (Right to a Name), art 19 (Rights of the 
Child), art 20 (Right to Nationality), and art 23 (Right to Participate in Government). 
36 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Habeas corpus in emergency situations” (Advisory Opinion 
OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Judicial guarantees in states 
of emergencies” (Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987). 
37 Art 25 (1) reads: “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective 
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights 
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such 
violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.” The 
relationship between amparo and habeas corpus is not entirely clear. They can be seen as separate 
instruments or the latter can be understood as part of the former. See Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, “Habeas corpus in emergency situations” (Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987) at 
[34]-[35]. Either way during emergencies they are complementary and both essential to protect against 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
38 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Habeas corpus in emergency situations” (Advisory Opinion 
OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987) [15]. 
39 Ibid, [29]. 
40 Ibid, [32]. 
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whereabouts secret and in protecting him against torture or other cruel, 
inhumane or degrading punishment or treatment.”41  
Following from this, both habeas corpus and amparo are essential to guarantee other 
rights including those deemed as non-derogable.42  
The IACtHR even went further, arguing that during an emergency the suspension of 
particular guarantees does not imply the temporary suspension of the RoL and 
disrespect of the principle of legality “by which [governments] are bound at all times”.43 
Whereas the intensity of legal restraints may differ in times of public emergencies, 
legality can never be reduced to the point where a government acquires absolute powers. 
The IACtHR emphasised that “there exists an inseparable bond between the principle of 
legality, democratic institutions and the rule of law”;44 and consequently, judicial 
oversight is ‘in order’ in a system governed by the RoL and that the writs of habeas 
corpus and amparo “serve, moreover, to preserve legality in a democratic society”.45 
As this Opinion was targeted specifically at habeas corpus and amparo, it still left 
uncertainty in relation to art 8 ACHR, which was then addressed by a further Opinion 
requested by the Government of Uruguay.46 The Opinion was largely based on the 
previous one. It stated that the writ of amparo, which guarantees a simple and prompt 
remedy, also incorporated the principle of effectiveness into the Convention. Thus art 
25(1) ACHR is violated if there is no remedy or the one existent is illusory, which has 
to be decided according to the specific circumstances. In times of emergency this cannot 
be ignored, and “essential judicial guarantees” in art 27(2) ACHR have to be understood 
                                                
41 Ibid, [35]. 
42 Ibid, [42]. 
43 Ibid, [24]. 
44 Ibid.. 
45 Ibid, [40] and [42]. 
46 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Judicial guarantees in states of emergencies” (Advisory 
Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987). 
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in this manner.47 Art 8 ACHR contains procedural measures that, if observed, should 
guarantee such an effective and appropriate remedy. In its totality it expresses the 
concept of due process that is applicable during emergencies to the extent needed to 
fully enjoy the protection of the rights listed as non-derogable.48 
Equally, the IACtHR embraced the principles included in Article 8 as necessary to 
preserve democracy and the RoL.49 
Notwithstanding the above clarifications, it has been argued that the content and scope 
of the judicial guarantees of art 27(2) ACHR remain unclear, since the IACtHR did not 
provide an exhaustive list of minimum guarantees.50 The Court maintained that the 
determination of unfairness is contextual and always depends on the facts of the specific 
case.51 So far the ECtHR has not adopted the IACtHR’s approach, despite some 
additional endorsement by the Human Rights Committee – the treaty body for the 
ICCPR – in its General Comment 29.52  
These developments indicate the important relationship between fair trial rights and the 
enjoyment of other rights.  
 
2.1.3   The role of fairness in promoting legitimacy in the criminal process 
It is widely agreed that (at least one of) the purpose(s) of the criminal trial is to discover 
whether the charges laid on the defendant are true, in the sense of being sufficient to 
                                                
47 Ibid, [23]-[25]. 
48 Ibid, [27]-[29]. 
49 Ibid, [34]-[38]. 
50 Stanislav Chernichenko and William Treat, “The right to a fair trial: Current recognition and measures 
necessary for its strengthening” (Final report to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24, 3 June 1994) [135]. 
51 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Judicial guarantees in states of emergencies” (Advisory 
Opinion OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987) [40]. See also below at 4.3.1. 
52 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 
August 2001) [15] and [16]. 
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justify a guilty verdict in relation to the particular offences charged.53 Hence, procedure 
is heavily geared towards promoting the finding of this legal truth. In particular the law 
of evidence is predominantly justified this way.54  
The criminal trial is not however an autonomous exercise. Rather it forms part of how 
the state - as a liberal democracy - is organised.55 Through its function of declaring 
conviction and determining punishment, the court imposes pain and suffering upon the 
defendant.56 This potential coercive limit on liberty, applied against the will of that 
person, requires justification in order to be legitimate.57 In other words, the verdict 
contains a moral aspect, which will only be respected within the community if the 
process is characterised by certain qualities. One of them is the principle of fairness. 
Although a factually inaccurate verdict can never be legitimate, “a factually accurate 
conviction may not be legitimate because it lacks moral authority”.58 This would occur, 
for example, in cases where the evidence of guilt has been obtained by investigative 
methods, which disclose serious police illegality. In many legal systems the trial judge 
may exclude the evidence in the public interest, however compelling, reliable and 
incriminating it would be otherwise.59 
                                                
53 Cf Ho Hock Lai, “Liberalism and the criminal trial” (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 243, 246 who 
argued that it is not for the court to find the truth about an offence as such. This is the duty of the police. 
If they are not convinced that the charges are true, the case should never make it to the court. 
54 See for a general discussion Heike Jung, “Nothing but the truth? Some facts, impressions and 
confessions about truth in criminal procedure” in Anthony Duff et al (eds.), The trial on trial (Volume 1): 
truth and due process (Hart Publishing, 2004) 147. 
55 Ho described the courts as an “institution of the liberal state” as well as “a liberal institution of the 
state”. See Ho, above n 53, 243. 
56 Antony Duff, Trials and punishments (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 1. For the connection of the 
trial and punishment see also Dubber, above n 25, 85. 
57 See Dennis, above n 27, 259, who refers to Ronald Dworkin that “in a liberal democratic states 
individuals have a special moral right against the moral harm involved in wrongful convictions”. For the 
understanding of legitimacy for the purposes of the thesis see above at 1.2. 
58 Ian Dennis, “Reconstructing the law of criminal evidence” (1989) Current Legal Problems 21, 35. 
59 See for example Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 (14 June 1978). 
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This clearly builds on the idea of treating the individual with respect and dignity.60 But 
the focus here is different. The legitimacy of the outcome (namely the verdict) is 
relevant for the society and needs to be justified to the society as it defines the 
relationship between the state – acting through its institutions - and the individual.61  
 
 A normative theory of the criminal trial 
Traditionally, theorists have focused on particular aspects of the trial, for example, the 
law of evidence, rather than developing normative theories of the criminal trial as a 
whole.62 The aspect of legitimacy as a moral condition in the criminal trial as a whole 
has been particularly emphasised in the work of Professor Antony Duff.63 His key claim 
is that a trial cannot solely be explained or justified by the search for truth. Given the 
importance of this aspect for the thesis, it is worth looking at the project in detail, as it 
best explains the role of fairness between the individual and the state.  
Since the mid-1980s, Duff has argued for justifying punishment through “values which 
are intrinsic to the proper nature of the criminal law and the criminal process”.64 This 
aspirational and normative account is based predominantly, but not exclusively, on 
                                                
60 See above at 2.1.1. 
61 This also includes how norms and procedures are perceived by the concerned individuals and the public 
at large, as discussed in the following Section, below at 2.1.4. 
62 Anthony Duff et al, The trial on trial (Volume 3): towards a normative theory of the criminal trial 
(Hart Publishing, 2007) 4. 
63 Duff first set out this argument in his monograph Trials and punishments first published in 1986, which 
he later elaborated in a co-authored book with Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The 
trial on trial (Volume 3): towards a normative theory of the criminal trial (Hart Publishing, 2007); the 
book followed the edited Volumes 1 and 2 by the authors collecting essays from two workshops around 
the trial on trial project in 2003 and a three year research project funded by the Art and Humanities 
Research Council. 
64 Duff, above n 56, 10. 
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Kant’s proposition that persons, including defendants, have to be accepted as 
autonomous moral agents.65 Duff claims: 
“that the law must make a moral demand on the allegiance and obedience of the 
citizen as a rational agent; that a criminal trial must therefore accord the 
defendant the status of a rational moral agent who is called to answer a charge of 
wrong-doing; and that we can usefully see the criminal trial and its verdict as a 
formal or institutional analogue of a moral process of criticism and blame.”66 
Hence, there is link between the moral blame of a defendant, in the sense of accepting 
his/her wrong-doing, and the moral standards that are applied to judge the criminal 
behaviour, as the latter are justifications for the condemnation should the defendant 
refuse to accept the moral blame.67 Both aspects are part of the same coherent criminal 
law system.68 
Being – and accepting to be - a member of a community creates rights, responsibilities 
and obligations, which are necessary for the proper functioning of the community and 
enforced by the institutions of that community.69 The criminal law defines some of 
these obligations in terms of refraining from particular behaviour. Once an offence is 
laid, the defendant - as a member of the community - has the responsibility to answer 
the charges.70 By doing so the defendant also recognises the court as a legitimate 
authority to assess the charges against him/her.71 Responsibility is therefore a necessary 
condition for liability.72 The defendant can only be persuaded to take responsibility 
                                                
65 Ibid, 6, 102; see also above at 2.1.1. 
66 Ibid, 75. 
67 Ibid, 74. 
68 Ibid, 8. 
69 Duff et al, above n 62, 140. 
70 Ibid, 127-28, 140. 
71 Ibid, 146. 
72 Ibid, 130. 
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when treated and respected as a responsible agent.73 Accepting the defendant as an 
autonomous agent further defines his/her standing during the trial.  
Duff and his colleagues therefore understand the trial as a communicative process 
between the accused and the public with rights and responsibilities on both sides. 74 In 
his earlier work Duff stated: 
“For just as the law itself must be justified to those on whom it is binding, so too 
a criminal verdict must be justified to the defendant on whom it is passed. The 
aim of a criminal trial is not merely to reach an accurate judgement on the 
defendant’s past conduct: it is to communicate and justify that judgment – to 
demonstrate its justice – to him and to others.”75 
The counterpart of a state’s obligations to justify its actions in seeking to punish the 
defendant, is the defendant’s right to participate,76 and equally to “call the state and its 
officials to account”.77 Legitimacy is lacking if the defendant had no chance to properly 
rebut the charges put on him/her.78 In order to do so basic rights have to be afforded to 
the defendant, commonly expressed in the RFT. Hence, limitations to the defendant’s 
participation in the trial, including the non-disclosure of relevant information, which 
impairs rebuttal of the charges, may seriously impair the legitimacy of the trial. 
Importantly, in this theory, the individual has a moral status within that legal system and 
“the common good is the good of a community of rational agents”.79 Consequently, 
institutions of a community, which were created to protect and promote values of that 
                                                
73 Ibid, 138. 
74 Ibid, 3. 
75 Duff, above n 56, 115 (emphasis in original). 
76 However, as part of the defendants’ passive autonomy they cannot be forced. See Dubber, above n 25, 
92-93. 
77 Duff et al, above n 62, 96. 
78 Ibid, 127. 
79 Duff, above n 56, 98. 
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community, also need to respect the very same values in the pursuit of their task.80 
Fairness, as one of these values, is therefore also not only for the benefit of the 
individual, but equally contributes to the proper purpose of the trial.  
 
Contribution to the law of evidence 
Duff’s theoretical framework has had an impact on the theory of the law of evidence. 
For example, it has informed academic debates over the availability of judicial remedies 
(exclusion or stay of proceedings) in cases where the evidence, though otherwise 
contributing to the finding of the truth, was obtained improperly or illegally through 
means such as torture or entrapment.81 Countering a consequentialist approach based on 
the balancing of interests, Duff’s work has shaped a principle of integrity. The question 
of how to remedy for improperly obtained evidence becomes crucially important in 
national security cases, where in the absence of disclosure, it is difficult to determine 
the precise circumstances (including the propriety of investigative methods) used to 
gather the evidence. Apart from questions concerning the accuracy of the information, 
there may be issues of its propriety, which puts a question mark over its integrity.82   
Failure to address these legitimacy concerns poses a risk of corrupting the criminal 
process, creating a slippery slope that will change how the state interacts with its 
citizens. This constitutes a dangerous development in a liberal democratic society. The 
presumption of innocence, as a legal and political statement, demands that a person can 
only be treated as criminal after being convicted through a process which is both fair 
and legal. Undermining the proper treatment of defendants damages the presumption of 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
81 Mike Redmayne, “Theorizing the criminal trial” (2009) 12(2) New Criminal Law Review 287, 302. 
Cases such as R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53 (25 October 2001) or Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 
CLR 19 (19 April 1995).  
82 See further Dennis, above n 27, 258; Dennis, above n 57, 38. 
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innocence and endangers the integrity of the institutions of the liberal state. 
 
2.1.4   The role of fairness in promoting citizen compliance with the justice system 
The fairness of any proceedings, including those before judges, not only has an impact 
on the individual involved, but also on other people within the society, particularly but 
not exclusively those, who associate with the individual involved in the proceedings.83 
In other words, procedural unfairness can have consequences in how far members of the 
public will cooperate with authorities in the future and whether they consider 
institutions as legitimate in general. In extreme cases this can even lead to social unrest 
or radicalisation amongst the associated community.84 Governments want to avoid such 
backlashes given that the cooperation of the community is crucial in the fight against 
terrorism.85 
Research on procedural fairness dates back to the 1970s, when Thibaut and Walker 
assessed the nature of procedural justice in legal decision-making through social-
psychological methods.86 Although their approach has been primarily applied in 
researching interactions between citizens and police, recent findings from the police 
environment may have implications for unfairness experienced within court processes, 
                                                
83 Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy, “Policing terrorism with procedural justice: the role of police 
legitimacy and law legitimacy” (2013) 46(3) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 403, 
405-406. Studies also indicate that people react to injustice even if it does not directly concern their ethnic 
group or community. See Tom Tyler and Kristina Murphy, “Procedural justice, police legitimacy and 
cooperation with the police: a new paradigm for policing” (CEPS Briefing Paper, May 2011) 4. 
84 Examples can be found in Northern Ireland during the troubles. See for example Louise Richardson, 
“Britain and the IRA”, in Robert Art and Louise Richardson (eds), Democracy and counter-terrorism: 
lessons from the past (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007) 63, 85-87. In the current context see 
Waleed Aly, “Axioms of aggression: counter-terrorism and counter-productivity in Australia” (2008) 
33(1) Alternative Law Journal 20. 
85 See for example Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Counter-Terrorism White Paper: 
Securing Australia – Protecting our Community” (2010) 67. The White Paper does not mention the 
Muslim community as such. It rather refers to “families and friends of those vulnerable to violent 
extremism”. 
86 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural justice: a psychological analysis (L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1975). 
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given the basic criteria for procedural justice were originally derived from research on 
legal proceedings.87 
Thibaut and Walker identified two main aspects of how individuals can influence a 
procedure: process control and decision control.88 Another influential study by 
Leventhal distinguishes six indicators of procedural justice: consistency, representation, 
ability to suppress bias (impartiality), decision quality (accuracy), correctability and 
ethicality.89 Somewhat surprisingly, the criteria of the two studies do not overlap 
significantly apart from the criteria of representation,90 which relates to a certain extent 
to both process control and decision control.91  
These criteria used in social-psychological studies can be translated into the language of 
legal rights. They can be particularly found in the right of the defendant to participate, 
the principle of equality of arms, the right to an independent and impartial court, the 
presumption of innocence, and the right to appeal and review. Given that all these rights 
are part of the current legal systems in question, the lesson may be simply not to neglect 
these rights without risking dissatisfaction amongst associating members of the public. 
Nonetheless, given that these rights are also in conflict with other interests, the question 
remains how to protect them sufficiently to avoid counter-productive effects.92 
                                                
87 What might differ are some of the criteria, as different processes emphasise different aspects of 
procedural justice. See Tom Tyler, “What is procedural justice?: criteria used by citizens to assess the 
fairness of legal procedures” (1988) 22(1) Law & Society Review 103, 107. Nonetheless the causal link 
between the experience of unfairness and the consequences mentioned above would be arguably very 
similar.  
88 Thibaut and Walker, above n 86. 
89 Gerald Leventhal, “What should be done with equity theory?” in Kenneth Gergen, Martin Greenberg 
and Richard Willis (eds) Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research (1980) as discussed and 
cited in Tyler, above n 87, 104-110. 
90 Tyler, above n 87, 105. 
91 Although it is not clear in how far these categories really match. See ibid, 105. While representation 
takes up an important position, Tyler also adds that it is “but one of a number of concerns that define fair 
process. See ibid, 129. 
92 For the issue of balancing interests see below Chapter 4. 
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In a study analysing the cooperation of Muslim Americans in counter-terrorism policing, 
it was found that procedural fairness of police activities was a crucial factor determining 
perceptions of legitimacy and willingness to comply for the participants of the study.93 
Other aspects that were expected to have featured similarly strong, such as “the severity 
of terrorist threats”, “police effectiveness”, and even “religiosity, cultural differences, 
and political background”, were of only little significance.94  
Subsequent studies on the importance of procedural justice and legitimacy have come to 
similar results.95 Hence, it is the rational perception of differential treatment and the 
failure to provide reasons for that treatment, rather than the association of religion, ie 
being Muslim, that reduces cooperation.96 Equally it seems deterrence (through threats 
of more severe punishment) has little benefit for promoting cooperation with the police. 
In Northern Ireland, for example, severe coercive measures were usually followed by 
increased acts of Irish Republican Army (IRA) violence and resistance to the legitimacy 
of British rule.97  
In sum, social-psychological studies indicate that the “vicarious experience”98 of 
procedural unfairness by members of the public leads to a higher risk of terrorism due to 
a reduction of cooperation with the police. Furthermore, there is a likely risk that a lack 
of fairness in counter-terrorism procedures damages the legitimacy of the courts as 
                                                
93 Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer and Aziz Huq, “Legitimacy and deterrence effects in counterterrorism 
policing: a study of Muslim Americans” (2010) 44(2) Law & Society Review 365, 368-69 and 385-86. 
Cooperation in the study included a range of activities from reporting crimes to assisting in counter-
terrorism investigations. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Aziz Huq, Tom Tyler and Stephen Schulhofer, “Mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in 
counterterrorism policing: evidence from the United Kingdom” (2011) 8(4) Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 728; Cherney and Murphy, above n 83, 403. 
96 Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq, above n 93, 386. 
97 Garry Lafree, Laura Dugan and Raven Korte, “The impact of British counterterrorist strategies on 
political violence in Northern Ireland: comparing deterrence and backlash models” (2009) 47(1) 
Criminology 17. See also Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly, “Making war on terror? Global lessons from 
Northern Ireland” (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 935. 
98 A term used by Kristina Murphy in this context.  
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perceived by members of the public. Most people might not have much experience with 
the courts, but counter-terrorism cases are widely publicised. Unfairness and 
miscarriages of justice might be taken as a pars pro toto by many people. The series of 
flawed terrorism cases in the UK during the 1980s serve as a good example.99 
Another important but more general lesson from social psychology is that people are 
rational when it comes to counter-terrorism measures. Muslim citizens are not 
automatically opposed to intrusive measures, provided that they are perceived as fair. It 
follows that procedures must aim at avoiding crude consequentialism, in the sense of 
privileging the pursuit of convictions over respect for fundamental rights.  
 
2.1.5   Conclusion 
The four aspects discussed in this Section, which traversed theoretical as well as 
practical considerations, combine to present a diverse picture of fairness. It 
demonstrated the importance of fairness, not only for the individual, but also for society 
at large. The Section establishes that the degree of commitment to fairness characterises 
the relationship between the state and its citizens: upholding fairness in the legal 
proceedings respects the defendant as an autonomous participant in the trial process, 
and the need for the state to justify coercive measures that may follow from that process.  
                                                
99 For a discussion of these cases see for example John Niblett, Disclosure in criminal proceedings 
(Blackstone Press, 1997) Chapter 3. See also below at 6.1. 
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2.2   The principle of fairness in legal theory and the law 
Fairness is a fundamental concept shaping our modern understanding of liberal 
democracies and arguably intrinsic to law itself. Consequently, fairness in the law has 
featured prominently in public law theory and within the jurisprudence surrounding 
legal norms, and the relationship between values, principles and rules in particular. This 
cornerstone function of fairness shows that the RFT should be understood as a 
constitutional principle. 
 
2.2.1   Fairness as a value 
The basic principle of a democracy is that the people elect its government. However, a 
modern understanding of a liberal democracy transcends this basic description.100 Lord 
Steyn, for example, stated ex curiae: 
“The democratic ideal involves two strands. First, the people entrust power to 
the government in accordance with the principle of majority rule. The second is 
that in a democracy there must be an effective and fair means of achieving 
practical justice through law between individuals and between the state and 
individuals.”101 
The second strand Lord Steyn refers to is the judiciary’s task of solving conflicts 
between individuals, and individuals and the state. This relates not only to the 
interpretation of the rules expressed by the majority, but also concerns the application of 
                                                
100 Rather, a purely majoritarian rule is often described as the rule by the mob. On why a simple 
majoritarian rule is undemocratic, see for example Christopher Eisgruber, Constitutional self-government 
(Harvard University Press, 2001); Christopher Eisgruber, “Dimensions of democracy” (2003) 71 
Fordham Law Review 1723. 
101 Lord Steyn, “Democracy through law” (2002 Robin Cooke Lecture, New Zealand Centre for Public 
Law, Occasional Paper No 12, 18 September 2002) 2; see also Ahron Barak, The judge in a democracy 
(Princeton University Press, 2006) 24-26. 
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the ground rules of a democracy, which can also limit the power of the majority.102 This 
limitation on majority rule is justified for a number of reasons. First, it is assumed that 
all individuals are equal within a democracy, not only in having an equal say in the polls, 
but also that everyone has equal rights and freedoms. Some protection of individual 
fundamental rights is necessary to prevent these rights and freedoms being suppressed 
by the majority.103 Second, in a democracy it is assumed that the government only holds 
power for the people as a trustee,104 and thus must administer all powers for the benefit 
of the people.105 Without such a requirement there would be tyranny.106 While the scope 
of such a benefit will always cause controversy, there must be a branch to decide over 
conflicting interests, such as the use of coercive state power. Courts need to be involved 
both in determining whether the exercise of the power is justified and/or once it has 
been exercised whether it has been done so properly.107 In R v Looseley, Lord Nicholls 
described the role of the courts as being to protect citizens from the state abusing its 
coercive powers:  
“Every court has an inherent power and duty to prevent abuse of its process. 
This is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. By recourse to this principle 
courts ensure that executive agents of the state do not misuse the coercive, law 
enforcement functions of the courts and thereby oppress citizens of the state. 
[…] That would be a misuse of state power, and an abuse of the process of the 
                                                
102 These principles are also often protected by super-majoritarian amendment rules or even assumed to 
be unchangeable without a revolution.   
103 Rights must be understood here in its basis sense as legal claims of an individual, not as an aspirational 
claim. For a view that courts should not be able to interfere with Parliament cf Jeremy Waldron, “A right-
based critique of constitutional rights” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18. 
104 John Laws, “Beyond rights” (2003) 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 265, 271; see also 
Guillermo O'Donnell, “The quality of democracy: why the rule of law matters” (2004) 15(4) Journal of 
Democracy 32, 38. 
105 O'Donnell, above n 104, 38. 
106 Laws, above n 104, 272. 
107 Barak, above n 101, 56. 
Chapter 2: The right to a fair trial: importance, scope and nature 
 43 
courts. […] The role of the courts is to stand between the state and its citizens 
and make sure this does not happen.”108 
Finally, some judicial protections must be in place to protect democracy itself.109 This 
can also include the protection of rights, which are considered crucial for the proper 
functioning of the democracy.110  
Hence, in order to exercise the function of “achieving practical justice” in a democracy, 
as Lord Steyn put it, the courts themselves need to assume certain characteristics, such 
as independence and impartiality. And these characteristics in turn require to the courts 
to act fairly. 
So while it can be argued that democracy automatically entails particular values and 
respect for rights,111 others have distinguished more clearly between ‘democracy’, 
conceived as a majority rule, and ‘the constitution’ of a state, which determines the 
basic values of the state and regulates the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.112 
If so, the vindication of such basic rights and values is something that necessarily 
precedes democracy. As the English judge, Lord Justice Laws, observed extra-curially, 
                                                
108 R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53 (25 October 2001) [1] (Lord Nicholls). In Australia see for example R v 
Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380-381 (Kitto J). 
109 There is certainly no agreement on a definition of democracy and on how far judges can actually go in 
order to defend democracy. Ahron Barak recognises that there is a ‘spectrum’ between majority rule and 
what he calls a rule of values. But he concludes that there is a minimum of both types of rules without a 
regime cannot be considered democratic. See Barak, above n 101, 26. Hence, some came up with 
definitions such as ‘defensive democracy’ and ‘militant democracy’ that particularly emphasise the duty 
of the judges to defend democratic values and the rule of law. See also John Laws, “The good 
constitution” (Sir David Williams Lecture, Cambridge, 4 May 2012). 
110 O'Donnell, above n 104, 33. 
111 As modern democracy emerged together with the ideas of liberalism, these concepts are closely 
connected. “Democracy without civil liberties, the rule of law, or constitutionalism is not, in fact, 
democracy, but instead most likely rule of the mob by politically manipulative elites. The same can 
probably be expected of a democracy in which the citizenry lacks effective legal restrains on executive 
emergency action.” William Scheuerman, “Survey article: emergency powers and the rule of law after 
9/11” (2006) 14(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 61, 74; see also Ho, above n 53, 243. 
112 This definition is borrowed from Laws, above n 109, 1; see also Lord Hailsham, The dilemma of 
democracy: diagnosis and prescription (Collins, 1978) 34. 
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the constitution is therefore logically prior to democracy,113 and its quality is determined 
(separately) by consideration of the competing values of the parliamentary supremacy 
(the morality of government) and constitutional supremacy (the morality of law).114 The 
role of fairness within the courts is therefore the same, but rather than stemming from 
democracy itself, according to Lord Justice Laws, is based on the “good 
constitution”.115  
The relationship between fairness in general and the separation of power within a 
democracy has been recognised by the High Court in Australia in a number of cases.116 
Lacking a bill of rights, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution - which vests judicial 
power within the High Court and thus establishes a separation of powers117 – implies 
that courts cannot act in a manner inconsistent with the essential character of a court.118 
While this may seem tautological, it infers that the court must act impartial and fairly.119 
Justice Gaudron has made one of the strongest statements to this effect in the High 
Court decision of Dietrich:  
                                                
113 Without such values democracy can turn out as the tyranny of the majority, see John Laws, “Law and 
democracy” (1995) Spring Public Law 72. 
114 Laws, above n 109. 
115 John Laws, “The constitution: morals and rights” (1996) Winter Public Law 622, 623. See also for 
example Philip Joseph, “The demise of ultra vires: a reply to Christopher Forsyth and Linda Whittle” 
(2002) 8(2) Canterbury Law Review 463, 471. 
116 See for example Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J); Chu Kheng 
Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 26; Dietrich v 
The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J); Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 
(Brennen CJ), 208 (Gaudron J), 226 (McHugh J).See C5. 
117 For the significance of the separation of powers as a feature of democracy in Australia see Haig 
Patapan, Judging democracy: the new politics of the High Court of Australia (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) 171. 
118 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 
(Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
119 see also Michael McHugh, “Does Chapter III of the Constitution protect substantive as well as 
procedural rights?” (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235; Wendy Lacey, “Inherent jurisdiction, judicial 
power and implied guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution” (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57; 
Fiona Wheeler, “The doctrine of separation of powers and constitutionally entrenched due process in 
Australia” (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248; Fiona Wheeler, “Due process judicial power 
and Chapter III in the new High Court” (2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 205. 
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“The fundamental requirement that a trial be fair is entrenched in the 
Commonwealth Constitution by Ch. III's implicit requirement that judicial 
power be exercised in accordance with the judicial process.”120  
These statements were not adopted by the majority in that case, though in the 
subsequent High Court decision of Leeth Deane and Toohey JJ stressed that Chapter III 
not only vests judicial power in the judiciary, but that the relevant provisions also 
“dictate and control the manner of its exercise. They are not concerned with mere labels 
or superficialities. They are concerned with matters of substance”.121 Although no 
further decision has sought to draw a RFT implication from Chapter III, its 
constitutional significance has been accepted122 as protecting some procedural rights.123  
All the concepts and principles discussed above in the context of Chapter III are 
complex, and likely to generate significant controversy when examined in detail.124 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline these issues in detail, it is sufficient 
to state that once it is accepted that judges have a democratic duty to solve conflicts 
between individual and the state, ensuring fairness becomes a crucial task for judges in 
the conduct of their proceedings. Although fairness may be better described as a value 
in this context, given the level of abstraction, it arguably has constitutional significance 
in the sense that it is important in a democracy to define the relationship between the 
                                                
120 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J); see also 326, (Deane J). 
121 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-87. 
122 Roberts v Blass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 55 (Kirby J); James Jacob Spigelman stated: “The dominant view 
now appears to be that some form of protection of procedural rights is inherent in Ch III, although there is 
no clear majority decision to that effect”: Spigelman, above n 3, 32; the High Courts has also never 
accepted a free standing RFT: see Lodhi v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 360 (20 December 2007) [74] 
(Spigelman CJ). For more detail see below at 6.2.3.and 7.3. 
123 McHugh, above n 119, 237; James Stellios, The federal judicature: Chapter III of the Constitution 
(LexisNexi Butterworths, 2010) 304; Winterton discussed that judicial power should include substantial 
rights, as they would be difficult to declare them without relying on political philosophy. George 
Winterton, “The separation of judicial power as an implied bill of rights” in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future 
directions in Australian constitutional law (Federation Press, 1994) 185, 207. See also Lacey, above n 
119, 60. 
124 For a detailed analysis of Chapter III of the Australian Constitution see Stellios, above n 123. 
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rulers and ruled. As the role of the courts is commonly defined by law and their 
behaviour is shaped by judicial understandings of the RoL, fairness is often described as 
a legal principle.  
 
2.2.2   Fairness as a legal principle 
It is commonly accepted that the RoL is a fundamental principle of the Australian and 
British legal system. The RoL is even considered as having a constitutional quality or 
status,125 though its meaning and scope is much debated and contested.126 As Brian 
Tamanaha, a leading scholar in the field, has observed, “everyone is for it, but have 
contrasting convictions about what it is”.127 
The question is how much substance the RoL provides for the judges when they 
interpret legislation. According to AV Dicey, in his seminal writings on the topic in the 
19th century, there are two key constitutional principles: parliamentary sovereignty and 
the RoL.128 The orthodox view is that the former is the dominant one, but the latter has 
to be observed when exercising the former. Whether this can actually constrain 
Parliament or simply gives guidance is thus controversial.  
From a positivist tradition the RoL is presented as a political ideal rather than a legal 
principle.129 Once the RoL is perceived as a political aspiration, it can at times be 
outweighed by other ideals. Hence, despite the fact that Parliament is bound by the RoL, 
                                                
125 Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 [UK] refers to the rule of law as a constitutional 
principle. 
126 Jonathan Rose, “The rule of law in the Western world: an overview” (2004) 35(4) Journal of Social 
Philosophy 457 
127 Brian Tamanaha, On the rule of law: history, politics, theory (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 3. 
Apart from these dogmatic debates, the phrase has also suffered from misuse. For example, in the Latin 
American context the rhetoric of promoting the rule of law has been exploited in order to foster 
authoritarian ideologies. See O'Donnell, above n 104, 45. 
128 Jeffrey Jowell, “The rule of law and its underlying values” in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), 
The changing constitution (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2011) 11. 
129 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Legislative sovereignty and the rule of law” in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing 
and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical essays on human rights (2001) 61. 
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it is up to its members to define it. Jeffrey Goldsworthy summarised this conception of 
the RoL as follows, 
“while the rule of law is more than the rule of the law, it must be less than the 
rule of good law. A conception of the rule of law that incorporated every 
political virtue, properly weighted and balances, would be useless for practical 
purposes.”130 
As such, the RoL is value neutral as much as democracy can be reduced to majoritarian 
rule. Equality and rights must therefore be enacted in order to be applied by the 
courts.131 All the RoL has to do is to make sure the law is “capable of guiding the 
behaviour of its subjects”.132 From such a point of view, fairness - as an important part 
of the RoL - has to be reduced to ‘procedural fairness’. However, this view is not 
universally shared, with some judges doubting that such a procedural conception of 
fairness is sufficient. In Dietrich, Gaudron J famously recognised that:  
“The expression ‘fair trial according to law’ is not a tautology. In most cases a 
trial is fair if conducted according to law, and unfair if not. If our legal processes 
were perfect that would be so in every case. But the law recognizes that 
sometimes, despite the best efforts of all concerned, a trial may be unfair even 
though conducted strictly in accordance with law.”133 
Based on such an understanding, the significance of the RoL as a substantive principle 
is gaining ground in academic circles.134 Dyzenhaus, in the course of his “rule of law 
project”, argues that AV Dicey has been misinterpreted in relation to the representation 
                                                
130 Ibid, 65. 
131 Tamanaha, above n 127, 27. 
132 Goldsworthy, above n 129, 66 (referring to Joseph Raz’s work). 
133 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J). 
134 Jowell, above n 128, 12; for this trend see below common law constitutionalism. 
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of the two principles of parliamentary supremacy and the RoL. According to Dyzenhaus, 
there are indications that even Dicey regarded the principles as equals.135  
Judges have also become increasingly critical about legislation limiting individual rights. 
Lord Bingham, one of the most distinguished and influential judges of his generation,136 
dedicated the Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture to the RoL.137 Lord Bingham suggested 
that the core of the RoL involved the following, 
“[t]hat all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publically and 
prospectively promulgated and publically administered in the courts.”138  
Lord Bingham was aware that his definition would need “exception and qualification”, 
but insisted that any deviation from the principles involved would call for “close 
consideration and clear justification”.139 For more guidance, he identified sub-rules 
included within the RoL, one of which is that “adjudicative procedures provided by the 
state should be fair”.140 The word ‘should’ indicates that the concept is normative and 
that it may not always be absolute. Lord Bingham elaborated on the attributes of 
fairness, which in addition to the requirement that the adjudicator be independent and 
impartial, requires that,  
“a matter should not be finally decided against any party until he has had an 
opportunity to be heard; that a person potentially subject to any liability or 
                                                
135 David Dyzenhaus, The constitution of law: legality in a time of emergency (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 54-58; David Dyzenhaus, “Schmitt v Dicey: are states of emergency inside or outside the 
legal order?” (2006) 27(5) Cardozo Law Review 2005, 2031. 
136 Lord Bingham, Lives of the law: selected essays and speeches 2000-2010 (Oxford University Press, 
2011) v (introduction by Jeffrey Jowell).  
137 Lord Bingham, “The rule of law” (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67. 
138 Ibid, 69. 
139 Ibid (emphasis added). The need for justification should be an indication that when in conflict with 
other interests, rule of law principles cannot be simply balanced away. It would need positive evidence 
that deviation is necessary and would otherwise have significant negative consequences.  
140 Ibid, 80. 
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penalty should be adequately informed of what is said against him; that the 
accuser should make adequate disclosure of material helpful to the other party 
or damaging to itself; that where the interests of a party cannot be adequately 
protected without the benefit of professional help which the party cannot afford, 
public assistance should so far as practicable be afforded; that a party accused 
should have an adequate opportunity to prepare his answer to what is said 
against him; and that the innocence of a defendant charged with criminal 
conduct should be presumed until guilt is proved.”141 
His inclusion of the right to be heard, the necessity of disclosure, as well as providing 
adequate, opportunity to answer charges are important for the purposes of this thesis.142 
In this context Lord Bingham also criticised the increasingly used method of dealing 
with certain issues outside the “strictly criminal sphere” in order to avoid disclosure to 
anyone other than the decision maker.143  
Taking up such an important aspect of the RoL, fairness itself should be recognised as 
constitutional. While as a principle there may be wide agreement for such 
constitutionality, there will certainly be less agreement in relation to the scope and 
details as set out by the description of Lord Bingham.  
The implication of a constitutional status would make it harder for parliament, 
politically, to abrogate the RFT in the interests of national security. It may also ‘tip the 
balance’ for the courts who may be called upon to weigh and balance, and sometimes 
even choose, between countervailing interests. 
 
                                                
141 Ibid, 80-81. (emphasis added) 
142 Lord Bingham also stated other sub-rules, which are related to the right to a fair trial but are of a more 
general nature. They include that government agents ought to exercise their powers in good faith (ibid, 
78) and according to law (ibid, 72); see also Jowell, above n 128, 20-22. 
143 Lord Bingham, above n 137, 81. 
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2.2.3   Fairness as a legal rule 
Based on the principles described above, several aspects of the RFT have found their 
ways into legal sources, ranging from international human rights treaties to domestic 
statutes and rules developed under the common law. As a complete overview of the 
legal sources relating to fairness is beyond the scope of this thesis, and those sources 
relevant specifically to the rules of disclosure in Australia and the UK will be discussed 
in Part 2, only a few general remarks will be made here supporting the characterisation 
of the RFT as a constitutional principle.   
 
Fairness under International law 
All major international human rights instruments cover rights relating to the fairness of 
the trial. Particularly relevant are the two main human rights treaties: the ICCPR and the 
ECHR.144 Although art 14 ICCPR and art 6 ECHR are central for the protecting the 
RFT,145 other articles must be taken into consideration to understand the protection in 
its entirety.146 Furthermore, articles governing limitations and derogations of these 
rights can gain significance,147 as the RFT is generally not considered to be an absolute 
right under those instruments. But while derogations are permissible during declared 
periods of “public emergencies threatening the life of the nation”, any derogation must 
                                                
144 Despite the focus on these two treaties, others can gain relevance, as the international courts tend to 
acknowledge and influence each other.  
145 For commentary on art 14 ICCPR see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
CCPR commentary (Engel, 2nd ed, 2005) 302 and David Weissbrodt, The right to a fair trial under the 
UDHR and the ICCPR (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001); for commentary on art 6 ECHR see Alistair Mowbary, 
Cases and Material on the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2007) 341 and Claire Ovey and Robin White, Jacobs and White: the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2006) 158. 
146 The protection from arbitrary and delayed detention (art 9 ICCPR; art 5 ECHR), from torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (art 7 ICCPR; art 3 ECHR), the prohibition of retrospective 
criminal laws (art 15 ICCPR; art 7 ECHR), and the right to an effective remedy (art 2 ICCPR; art 13 
ECHR) all complement the art 14 ICCPR and art 6 ECHR.  
147 Arts 4 and 5 ICCPR and arts 15 and 18 ECHR 
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be strictly necessary.148 Hence, there is also the general understanding that a full 
derogation of due process during emergencies would not be justified in any case.149   
The relevance of international law in both Australia and the UK is limited as both 
countries are considered to be dualist rather than monist.150 Dualism means that 
international and domestic law are regarded as two separate systems of law, and that in 
order to be enforced by the national courts, obligations under international law must 
first be enacted through domestic legislation.151 Hence, not only is it within the hands of 
the national parliament to decide what status a rule has within that jurisdiction, but the 
international norm can also be subject to local interpretation or modification after it has 
been enacted into domestic law. The dualist limitation is however softened to some 
extent by a common law presumption for courts to interpret ambiguous legislation in 
line with the country’s international obligations.152  
 
Fairness under the common law 
Without question, a majority of the attributes considered today to be essential to the 
RFT has been developed under the common law. These include important innovations 
such as the presumption of innocence,153 the rule against double jeopardy,154 and the 
                                                
148 Art 15 ECHR. See A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004) [121]-[133] (Lord Hope). 
149 Jaime Oraá, Human rights in states of emergency in international law (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
88-90. 
150 Given the introduction of the HRA in the UK, which incorporated most of the ECHR into the UK legal 
system, the dualist approach lost most of its significance in relation to human rights. For more details see 
C5. 
151 See Malcolm Shaw, International law (Cambridge University Press,5th ed, 2003) 122. This is in 
contrast to monoist countries, where international law is directly applicable and does not have to be 
enacted as domestic law. 
152 For example Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 384 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J). 
153 Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462 (23 May 1935). 
154 Cullen v The King [1949] SCR 658 (9 May 1949). 
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rules in relation to hearsay and anonymous witness155. Although the common law has 
lost much of its importance in the modern law of evidence and procedure, due to 
codification and consolidation legislation, the common law remains crucial for the 
purposes of this thesis.156 This concerns in particular the inherent common law power of 
judges to stay proceedings in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Put simply:  
“The central thesis of the administration of criminal justice is the entitlement of 
an accused person to a fair trial and wherever this is not met there will be a 
miscarriage of justice.”157 
However, despite such an “entitlement”, the common law approach to fairness does not 
focus on the rights of the individual, but rather on the integrity of the court and the 
fairness of the procedures as such. In Dietrich the majority held that,  
“the accused’s right to a fair trial is more accurately expressed in negative terms 
as a right not to be tried unfairly or as an immunity against conviction otherwise 
than after a fair trial, for no person can enforce a right to be tried by the 
State.”158 
Hence, the RFT ensures the trial itself must not be unfair, rather than providing an 
individual accused with specific rights (such as the right to legal representation). 
However, as the majority conceded, “it is convenient, and not unduly misleading, to 
refer to an accused’s positive right to a fair trial”.159 The approach of the High Court in 
Dietrich coheres with the common law’s general attitude to rights. As all governmental 
                                                
155 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 11281, 1137. 
156 References are predominately made to Australian cases. While in the UK the HRA serves now as the 
primary source for the RFT, in Australia the common law is still relevant to much larger extent. However, 
the RFT recognised as a constitutional law even before the introduction of the HRA: see for example R v 
Brown (Winston) (1994) 1 WLR 1599, 1606. 
157 McKinney v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 468, 478; see also R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, ex 
parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 68 (Lord Oliver). 
158 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 299 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
159 Ibid. 
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action should be based on law, individual liberty is residual – it is the result of the 
residue of liberty remaining when what has been expressively prohibited by law is taken 
into account. As Doyle and Wells explained, “[o]ur thinking does not proceed from 
rights to results – rather, our rights are the result.”160 
The consequences for judicial decision-making become clear when examining the 
relationship between abuse of process and fairness. In Dietrich, Brennan J clarified that 
“[a]lthough unfairness is a characteristic of an abuse of process, not every case of 
unfairness amount to an abuse of process”.161 This stems from the fact that “courts 
cannot, by declaring a novel rule of the common law, create a justification for refusing 
to exercise their jurisdiction”.162 In other words courts cannot stay proceedings where 
there is no abuse of process. In this respect, distinguished constitutional scholar, Zines 
commented that,  
“[w]hile the Court has continued to affirm that Chapter III restricts the power of 
Parliament to interfere with due process in the courts, it has left open the 
question of what common law rules are essential to the judicial process and 
which can be modified or changed by Parliament.”163  
Apart from the tensions between Parliament and the courts over what is fundamental, 
another reason for refusing to lay down specific rules can be found in the inherent 
functioning of the common law. Spigelman J observed ex curiae that the fair trial 
principle emerged through the common law method of induction.164 It is a paramount 
                                                
160 John Doyle and Belinda Wells, “How far can the common law go towards protecting human rights” in 
Philip Alston (ed), Promoting human rights through bill of rights: comparative perspectives (Clarendon 
Press, 1999) 17. 
161 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 342. Although this statement was made in dissent, it is 
still the predominate view within the Australian judiciary.  
162 Ibid. 
163 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 274. 
164 Spigelman, above n 3, 29. 
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feature of the common law that every case is judged, and relevant rule determined, by 
reference to its particular facts. The identification of principles in the common law 
emerge only by the same decisions in similar cases over long periods of time.165 As a 
consequence a common law principle is never paramount; it is the particular precedent, 
expressing the binding legal rule that is applied, distinguished or simply ignored 
through a process of desuetude. This analytical method based on induction guarantees 
the common law its high degree of flexibility.166 
Why courts should be allowed to interfere with the will of Parliament has been also a 
matter of debate within public law theory. In the last decade, common law 
constitutionalism (CLC) has emerged as a new theoretical framework proclaiming the 
constitutionality of settled rules and principles stemming from the common law.167 
Based on the strength of the common law to create rational rules, which also represent 
society’s fundamental values, CLC requires lawmakers and the executive to act in line 
with certain ‘fundamental’ common law principles. The courts can review the 
compliance and thus CLC challenges absolute parliamentary supremacy. This does not 
question the legitimacy of statutes and the fact that the legislator can override the 
common law more generally, provided that it does not form part of the constitutional 
fabric.168  
                                                
165 Ibid, 29-30. 
166 Ibid, 30: “It is continually adapted to new and changing circumstance.” 
167 For a comprehensive general overview see Thomas Poole, “Back to the future? Unearthing the theory 
of common law constitutionalism” (2003) 23(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 435. 
168 Cooke P (as he was then) in Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121: some 
common law rights which go “so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted but he courts to have 
destroyed them”. See also Doyle and Wells, above n 160, 64; T R S Allan, “Text, context and 
constitution: the common law as public reason” in Douglas Edlin (ed), Common law theory (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 185. 
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CLC draws its legitimacy primarily from the quality of the common law process, both 
in terms of its development and substance.169 This stems from the fact that common law 
judges not only state a rule and outcome, but also seek to explain and justify its 
decisions based on reason.170 The role of reason has a venerable pedigree - 
distinguished jurist, Sir Edward Coke, famously argued in the 17th century (ultimately 
unsuccessfully) for a form of common law supremacy over statute in Doctor Bonham’s 
Case: “for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, 
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act 
to be void”.171  
Drawing on such pedigree, CLC continues to gain some degree of acceptance in the 
UK.172 Indeed, some aspects of CLC are not entirely foreign to Australia. Dixon CJ 
wrote ex curiae that the common law was the “ultimate constitutional foundation” 
including the Australian (written) Constitution.173 If accepted, CLC is a powerful tool 
for promoting higher levels of rights protection within a system lacking any 
constitutional bill of rights. But it has to be stated clearly that CLC is not in line with 
the Australian judicial tradition of deference to parliament, in which judges are reluctant 
                                                
169 Arguments of that sort often refer back as far as to Aristotle and Cicero. See Tamanaha, above n 127, 
7. cf Tom Campbell, “Emergency strategies for prescriptive legal positivists: anti-terrorist law and legal 
theory”, in Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the limits of legality (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
221. 
170 Douglas Edlin, “Introduction” in Douglas Edlin (ed), Common law theory (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 1, 3. Although there is actually no legal obligation for common law judges to provide 
reasons for their decision, the convention is well established: see English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd 
[2002] EWCA Civ 605 (30 April 2002) [15]. 
171 (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b at 118a; although at the time the courts generally did not accept the opinion.  
172 For example International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] EWCA Civ 158 (22 February 2002 [71] (Lord Laws). 
173 Sir Owen Dixon, “The common law as an ultimate constitutional framework” in his Jesting Pilate 
(Law Book Co, 1965) 203 as cited in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “The myth of the common law constitution” 
in Douglas Edlin (ed), Common law theory (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 205. 
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to apply general and abstract principles to limit or confine unambiguous commands of 
the legislature.174 
This discussion shows that the common law will intervene in cases where unfairness not 
only disadvantages the defendant, but is considered sufficiently serious to threaten the 
integrity of the judicial process. While the judges recognise Parliament’s supremacy in 
relation to regulating the judicial process, there is a ‘gap’ in which serious unfairness to 
the defendant may occur. However, judges may not be prepared to characterise this 
‘legislatively approved’ unfairness as an abuse of process. 
 
Fairness under domestic statutes 
The overview of legal sources of fairness so far clearly indicates the recognition of 
fairness as a general principle of law. However the substance or content of this principle 
requires further elaboration. Enacting specific provisions in domestic statutes is 
arguably the most effective means of giving effect to the general principle of fairness. 
Statutes regulating the judicial process have the advantages of defining the scope of 
protection more clearly and regulating its application in more detail. Furthermore, the 
relationship of these fairness rules to other rules are easier to determine: for example, 
although particular methods of gathering evidence may be unfair and presumptively 
inadmissible, legislation may grant a residual discretion to admit the evidence in the 
interests of justice. Apart from general human rights statues, as has been introduced in 
the UK with the HRA, other rules in relation to fairness are common with the law of 
evidence and general procedures.  
                                                
174 For a more critical analysis of common law constitutionalism see Thomas Poole, “Constitutional 
exceptionalism and the common law”, (2009) 7(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 247, 263-
69. 
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While specific fairness rules often provide clearer guidance for the judge, they can also 
be easily amended by parliament. Particularly in times of crisis, exceptions may be 
introduced without necessarily considering how the reforms relate to the wider 
principles involved. The impact of counter-terrorism legislation on the RFT certainly 
falls into this category. The tensions involved will be at the core of the discussion in 
Part 2 of the thesis.  
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2.3   Applying fairness as a constitutional principle 
In the UK there is a lively debate of whether the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA) 
has created a “new British constitution”.175 It is argued that, when passing the 
legislation, Parliament intentionally attributed the power to judges to review all 
governmental action in accordance with the HRA, interpret any legislation in line with 
the Act, and make declarations of incompatibility once violations occurs.176 Hence, 
while Parliament gave up some of its sovereignty, it still can ignore declarations of 
incompatibility, thus leaving the traditional notion of parliamentary supremacy intact.177 
And, as the legislation is not entrenched, parliament may repeal the HRA at any time!  
While the HRA includes the RFT, even under the common law the principle of fairness 
had been regarded as constitutional.178 In Australia, lacking a bill of rights, general 
principles as discussed in this Chapter retain greater significance.179  
The discussion in this Chapter has not only portrayed fairness as crucial part of the 
fabric of a liberal democracy, but also as integral part of the RoL. These 
characterisations strongly suggest that the principle of fairness must be regarded as 
constitutional. In other words, an entitlement of citizens to be treated with fairness is 
characteristic of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled in a liberal democracy 
governed by the RoL. While it is important to clarify this status as a base to build on 
further arguments, the constitutionality of fairness as a principle may not be highly 
                                                
175 See Vernon Bogdanor, The new British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009). See below at 5.1.1. 
176 Ibid, 59-62. 
177 See for example R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 132 
(Lord Hoffmann).  
178 R v Brown (Winston) (1994) 1 WLR 1599, 1606. 
179 See below at 5.2.1. 
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controversial. This is also indicated by its inclusion in international human rights 
catalogues180 as well as accepted as being ‘fundamental’ under the common law. 
However, while fairness as a general principle may enjoy the status of constitutionality, 
the rules which are often associated with the RFT, such as the right to participate in the 
trial, to confront witnesses or retain a lawyer of one’s own choosing, are not included. 
While it can be said that these rules are critically important for the fairness of the trial, 
the RFT is not absolute and not every limitation on these rights would necessarily 
render the trial process unfair. These specific rules may be better described as 
aspirations of a complete RFT. Hence, in reality it may appear that the principles 
fairness is rather a principle guiding politics than one that is constitutionally binding. 
Such a view is however misguided, as this Chapter has demonstrated.  
Defining a more substantive (and comprehensive) version of RFT is still problematic 
for a number of reasons. One recurring argument of critics of a substantive RoL or CLC, 
rather than procedural version, is that while agreement can be easily found at the level 
of general principles, filling these principles with substance through judicial 
development inevitably courts controversy. This is why elaboration of specific 
substantive rights should be left to Parliament. Furthermore, in order to allow for the 
development of the RFT through precedent under the common law requires the 
flexibility to adjust to the circumstances of the particular case. But most importantly, 
certain aspects of the RFT can conflict with other legitimate interests or rights, such as 
national security. 
What can be concluded at this stage is that accepting that fairness has (to some degree) 
a constitutional foundation adds a particular value, weight and significance to the 
                                                
180 In most countries, international treaties can be applied directly be the courts and take precedent over 
regular statutes. See Shaw, above n 151, 122. 
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principle,181 which surpasses mere rhetoric. This concession to its ‘constitutional’ 
quality has a number of implications for the application of the specific RFT rules (even 
if not absolute), as well as the overall approach to fairness: 
• First, in recognising a constitutional principle of fairness the courts must apply 
the same methodology for protecting, and resolving conflicts with other 
constitutionally protected rights and interests.  
• Secondly, at all times, respect for the RFT must be maximised, and any 
limitation to the RFT must be justified.  
• Thirdly, as a constitutional principle, the duty to ensure fairness is not only a 
matter for the courts, but must apply to other branches of government, including 
parliament and the executive.  
These implications will be crucial for building my overall argument of the importance 
of fairness principles in the remaining parts of the thesis.  
This Chapter has discussed the various rationales behind the RFT, revealing that its 
importance transcends the interest of individual accused, and extends equally to the 
collective public interest: not only is fairness crucial for individuals standing trial as 
responsible autonomous agents and a means to secure other rights, it also supports the 
broader public interest by securing the legitimacy of state coercion (at the pre-trial, trial 
and sentencing phases) and upholding public confidence in the courts and legal process 
more generally. While these various aspects explain why fairness is reflected in such a 
broad range of legal sources, it is equally a reminder for government officials, 
lawmakers and judges to consider when seeking to impose limits on fairness in the 
interest of national security. 
                                                
181 Lord Steyn, above n 101, 12. 
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This Chapter has reviewed the history and role of the fairness as a legal principle within 
liberal democracies and as an attribute of the RoL. The principle has been shaped by the 
common law, which has conceptualised fairness as a vital ingredient in protecting the 
integrity of the judiciary and maintaining public confidence in the legal process. This 
explains why fairness under the common law has traditionally focused on procedural 
rights. This can be contrasted with post war human rights instruments, which have 
tended to emphasise the importance of fairness, conceived as a right of the individual 
that has become the object of state action.  
But in order to assert fairness as a starting point in assessing a conflict between 
competing interests, the specific interest has to be accepted as a right in the first place. 
Fundamentally, fairness will only be a legal right where it is granted to individuals 
along with an effective remedy to enforce it. With its focus on protecting the integrity of 
the court, the common law does not provide specific rights or remedies to individuals – 
which is commonly accepted as part of the RFT under international law. The only 
remedy is the general power of the court to prevent the abuse of its processes (the abuse 
of process doctrine), which triggers, at the discretion of the court, a stay of proceedings.  
This analysis demonstrates the importance of clarifying what is meant by fairness in a 
particular circumstance and, in practical terms, what aspects of fairness can and cannot 
be enforced. This also explains the common criticism that while there is much rhetoric 
around the fundamental importance of fairness, the principle readily gives way to other 
compelling interests, such as the needs to control crime or protect national security.182 
                                                
182 See for example Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: law, the state and the construction of justice 
(Macmillan Press, 1984). Even in the case law the RFT has been described as absolute (see for example 
Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC D1 (29 January 2002) [73] (Lord Hope)), but then added limitations 
nonetheless.  
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A final observation relates to the means of protecting fairness. It is well established that 
courts have a duty to protect fairness in legal processes by virtue of their constitution as 
courts of justice within a liberal democracy. That said, precision of legislation rather 
than rhetoric of the common law provides a better mechanism for giving effect to the 
principle of fairness in specific contexts. Unlike the common law, specific legislation 
avoids the inevitable conflict over which organ of government has paramount authority, 
since the legislature can clarify (with greater precision and certainty) both the scope, 
content and limits of fairness in counter terrorism cases. This approach also fits better 
into the legal tradition, evident in the UK and Australia that maintains a strong 
commitment to parliamentary supremacy. But in the absence of such legislation fully 
recognising fairness as a constitutional principle, the courts have to step up whenever 
fairness is degraded to mere rhetoric.  
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Chapter 3: The protection of sensitive information and the 
associated risks of disclosure  
   
Since terrorist attacks are capable of causing many deaths and destroying property, as 
well as causing fear and panic in the community, governments generally aim to prevent 
attacks before they occur. The policy preference for preventive measures has spawned a 
range of new criminal terrorist offences targeting preparatory and supporting conduct. 
Parliaments have also introduced executive measures authorising coercive measures 
against terrorism suspects. These measures are usually restricted in duration, but are 
available without the state having to prove the commission of, or even attempt to 
commit, an actual terrorist offence. These developments have effected both the 
investigation methods used by police and security forces, and the evidence used and 
arguments made in counter-terrorism proceedings. In particular, in order to intervene 
before offences occur authorities increasingly rely on ‘intelligence’, being material 
gathered through clandestine methods, rather than evidence. The main purpose of 
intelligence is to guide law enforcement investigations rather than as evidence in open 
court.   
This Chapter examines these developments, analysing their impact on the rules of 
evidence. While the law arguably had to adjust to the post 9/11 security environment, 
the Chapter argues that the use of ‘intelligence-type’ information as evidence bears 
inherent risks to fair trial standards. The term ‘intelligence-type evidence’, for the 
purposes of this thesis, refers to information that meets the thresholds of admissibility, 
according to the (modified) rules of evidence applied to the particular proceedings, 
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though in basic character being closer to ‘intelligence’ than ‘evidence’ as traditionally 
understood.1  
Identifying some of the differences between ideal-types of evidence and intelligence 
reveals the distinct aims, priorities and values that underpin intelligence methodologies. 
These methodologies are generally not conducive to fairness when the gathered 
information is used by the state in legal proceedings. From the perspective of fairness it 
is logical that tendered evidence should be open to scrutiny and challenge when doubt 
exists about its quality. Instead, given the need for secrecy about sensitive intelligence-
based information the state typically seeks to prevent the defence from gaining access to 
that material and thus from challenging it. 
The research in this Chapter supports the thesis argument: understanding the risks 
stemming from the use of intelligence-type evidence in counter-terrorism proceedings is 
important for the process of non-disclosure decisions in both criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings.2 In particular, it can contribute to answering the question of what 
safeguards are required in order to avoid unfairness to the defendant. 
But to start with, the next Section examines the growth of intelligence post 9/11, and the 
legal trend toward earlier intervention (in ‘pre-crime’ societies) that blur traditionally 
distinct categories of evidence and intelligence.  
                                                
1 The term will be further discussed below at 3.2. 
2 An associated issue is the question of whether special proceedings, with lowered standards of fairness, 
even fulfill the requirements of the principle of legality, ie that the law is clear and predictable and framed 
in such a way that it can be subjected to judicial review. However, an enquiry into the issues is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of the principle and its application to counter terrorism law, see 
David Dyzenhaus, The constitution of law: legality in a time of emergency (Cambridge University Press, 
2006); “The compulsion of legality” in Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the limits of legality 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 33; David Dyzenhaus, “Cycles of legality in emergency times” 
(2007) 18 Public Law Review 165. 
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3.1   Pre-crime and counter-terrorism 
This Section traces the increased use and suppression of sensitive information in 
terrorism proceedings, and how this trend has increased conflicts with the right to a fair 
trial (RFT). This trend must first be placed in the wider context of developments of 
counter-terrorism measures and offences post-9/11.  
Since 9/11 the main policy goal in countering terrorism in Australia and the UK has 
been to concentrate proactively on the prevention of terrorism, rather than merely 
facilitating its prosecution following the commission of terrorist attacks. Given the 
devastating effects of terrorist attacks, and the likely death of the perpetrators during 
attacks, the prioritisation of prevention is not surprising. Consequently, the focus of the 
police and security forces has therefore shifted from ‘post-crime’ (the point after the 
attack has been committed), which is the predominant approach within criminal justice, 
to ‘pre-crime’ (the point before the anticipated attack).3  
This shift to pre-crime has changed the understanding and approach to security in 
general. Lucia Zedner, one of the leading scholars in researching the phenomenon of 
prevention within the field of criminal justice, explained: 
“Security is less about reacting to, controlling or prosecuting crime than 
addressing the conditions precedent to it. The logic of security dictates earlier 
and earlier interventions to reduce opportunity, to target harden and to increase 
surveillance even before the commission of crime is a distant prospect.”4  
                                                
3 This concept and term “pre-crime” first appeared in the 1956 sci-fi short story, The Minority Report by 
P.K. Dick. The story inspired the 2002 Hollywood movie of the same title starring Tom Cruise in which a 
specialist ‘Precrime’ Division’, drawing on intel from mutants, seeks to arrest suspects prior to any 
infliction of public harm. Minority Report (Directed by Steven Spielberg, Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation et al, 2002).  
4 Lucia Zedner, “Pre-crime and post-criminology” (2007) 11(2) Theoretical Criminology 261, 265. 
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In order to pursue such a strategy, risk assessments have become a central tool in 
fighting crime and terrorism.5 Security agencies therefore identify risks and assess the 
likelihood and degree of a future harm. Assessments not only direct investigations, but 
also can become the basis for preventive measures in order to avoid anticipated harm.6  
In some instances policies may go even further in their effort to prevent crime, driven 
by the principle of precaution,7 which aims at protecting the population from situations 
where irreversible damage is suspected notwithstanding the uncertainty about the 
precise level of threat.8 This approach reflects what Donald Rumsfeld famously 
described as dealing with “unknown unknowns”.9 Measures that are based on the 
precautionary principle include mass data collection and profiling of larger groups 
suspected of engaging in particular harmful behaviour. Data stemming from such 
methods can then again be used to develop other risk assessments.10 
                                                
5 Lucia Zedner, Security (Routledge, 2009) 78; Lucia Zedner, “Neither safe nor sound: the perils and 
possibilities of risk” (2006) 48(3) Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 423, 424. 
6 In this regard the term “prevention” may be misleading as it already has a defined meaning within the 
field of criminology. There, it refers to measures “which reduce opportunities for the commission of 
crimes or address the broader context in which people commit crimes through social and environmental 
strategies.” (Angus McCullough and Sharon Pickering, “Counter-terrorism: the law and policing of pre-
emption”, in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-terrorism and 
beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 13,15.) Hence, prevention in this 
sense does not use coercive or punitive measures. However, in the context of counter-terrorism states 
often go further and authorise surveillance, interference or disruption and even preventive detention in 
cases, where the actual threat has not yet materialised. McCulloch and Pickering therefore suggest that 
the term “pre-emption” is more appropriate. (Ibid, 13) This term, which they borrow form the theory of 
international relations and international law, describes an anticipatory self-defence, which does include 
direct action. See for example Anthony Anghie, “The war on terror and Iraq in historical perspective” 
(2005) 43(1)(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 45. But given the widespread inaccuracy, the thesis will 
equally use the terms interchangeably. 
7 This concept originated in the context of environmental damage; see Stephen Gardiner, “A core 
precautionary principle” (2006) 14(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 33. 
8 Lucia Zedner, “Fixing the future? The pre-emptive turn in criminal justice” in Bernadette McSherry, 
Alan Norrie and Simon Bronitt (eds), Regulating deviance: the redirection of criminalisation and the 
futures of criminal law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 35, 44; Zedner (2009), above n 5, 83. 
9 Department of Defense news briefing on February 12, 2002. The transcripts has since been removed 
from the website. The comment made reference to the fact that there are thinks we know that we know 
and things we know that we do not know.  
10 A distinction can be drawn between risk management, which can be driven by the precautionary 
principle, and risk assessment, which aims as using objective criteria for its predictions. See Zedner 
(2006), above n 5, 423. 
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Crime prevention has always been part of traditional police strategies and thus pre-
crime measures are not entirely new within the field of criminal justice. On the one 
hand, there are long standing offences within the criminal law that target actions pre-
dating the commission of the ‘actual crime’. They include the inchoate offences of 
conspiracy, incitement and attempt,11 as well as certain forms of complicity, such as 
counselling and procuring. More recently, administrative measures have appeared in 
various areas of the law to prevent future harms. One prominent example is the regime 
to detain sex offenders, who have served a sentence, but are still considered to be a 
danger to the community.12 While development towards pre-crime did not start with the 
9/11 attacks, it is undisputable that counter-terrorism has contributed enormously to this 
development further enhancing pre-crime measures.  
In order to prevent terrorist attacks, states have introduced a wide range of offences 
penalising preliminary, preparatory or supporting actions not falling within the scope of 
traditional inchoate offences.13 Worth mentioning are property offences, such as owning 
or possessing certain items regularly used for attacks;14 financing and supporting 
offences;15 training offences;16 and status offences penalising membership or 
                                                
11 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of criminal law (Thomas Reuters, 3rd ed, 2010) 
443. 
12 For example Sexual Offences Act 2002 (UK), s 104; Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 
(Qld), s 13; for a comprehensive discussion about preventive measures in the UK see Ashworth and 
Zedner, Preventive justice (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
13 Bernadette McSherry, “Expanding the boundaries of inchoate crimes: the growing reliance on 
preparatory offences” in Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie and Simon Bronitt (eds), Regulating 
deviance: the redirection of criminalisation and the futures of criminal law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 141. 
14 For example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 57(1) (Possession for terrorism purposes); Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth), s 101.4 (Possessing things connected with terrorist acts). 
15 For example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 16 (Use and possession); Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), s 5 
(Preparation of terrorist acts); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 101.6 (Other acts done in preparation for, 
or planning, terrorist act); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 102.6 (Getting fund to, from or for a terrorist 
organisation); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 103.1 (Financing terrorism). 
16 For example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 54(5) (Weapons training); Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), s 6 
(Training for terrorism); Criminal Code (Cth), s 101.2 (Providing or receiving training connected with 
terrorist act). 
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association with proscribed groups.17 Even parking in a restricted area can amount to a 
criminal offence.18 Many of these offences criminalise acts below the traditional 
‘attempt’ threshold, namely conduct that is “more than merely preparatory” for the 
commission of the full offence.19Another difference is that pre-crime offences need not 
be linked to a particular attack in the future. For example the offence Preparation of 
terrorist acts in the United Kingdom (UK) expressively states:  
“It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and 
preparations relate to one or more particular acts of terrorism, acts of terrorism 
of a particular description or acts of terrorism generally.”20 
This type of criminal offence is clearly distinguishable from ordinary complicity 
liability, where liability is derivative, being dependent on the conviction of the primary 
offender and requiring actual knowledge of the essential matters of the particular 
offence.21 Pre-crime offences may even criminalise actions beyond the standard 
conspiracy offence. 22 The actus reus for conspiracy offences must surpass the 
negotiation stage and often, in many common law jurisdictions, requires proof of an 
‘overt act’ following agreement by the accused to act unlawfully.23 It has even been 
noted that inchoate liability may apply to these ‘pre-crime’ terrorist offences, leading to 
the prospect of a “pre-pre-crime offence”!24 
Another distinctive feature is that the mental element (mens rea) becomes less relevant 
in pre-crime offences. A number of these offences impose strict liability and provide the 
                                                
17 For example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 11 (Membership); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 102.3 
(Membership of a terrorist organisation). 
18 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 51. 
19 Britten v Alpogut [1987] VR 929, 938; see also Bronitt and McSherry, above n 11, 446. 
20 Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), s 5(2); see also Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 101.6(2)(b). 
21 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473 (18 April 1985). 
22 Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306 (10 July 1868): conspiracy requires an aagreement between 
two or more people to commit an unlawful act and the intention to commit that act. 
23 For example Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 11.5(2)(c). 
24 McCulloch and Pickering, above n 6, 19. 
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defendant with limited defences with which to contest liability.25 Hence, the 
blameworthiness is largely inherent in the act itself, with innocence being a matter to be 
established by the defence by proving, typically on the balance of probabilities, a valid 
and available defence.26 
Pre-crime measures are not limited to offences. Executive pre-crime measures in 
counter-terrorism, such as terrorism control orders or preventative detention orders, 
have also exceeded previous measures.27 In very general terms, such orders can restrict 
the liberties of the individual, who are assessed as having engaged previously, or are at 
risk of engaging, in terrorist activities. In relation to this determination, the issuing 
authority has to engage in a risk assessment of the individual being involved in 
terrorism, and also whether the proposed order is capable of preventing an attack. This 
is to some extent different to the above-mentioned restrictions on sex offenders. There, 
the court not only makes an assessment of ‘dangerousness’, which is a psychological 
evaluation aiming at predicting a person’s future behaviour on the basis of an 
individual’s past behaviour, they also require a previous criminal conviction.28  
The developments described in this Section explain why the shift to pre-crime has an 
impact on the investigation methods of such offences and measures and consequently 
on the type of evidence increasingly used in counter-terrorism proceedings. This 
includes the use of sensitive information, not only as direct evidence relevant to the 
matter in issue, but also as circumstantial evidence. The significance of sensitive 
                                                
25 For example For example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 57(1)(2) 
26 However, as this reverse burden of proof impacts on the presumption of innocence, the English courts 
have interpreted the standard of proof for the defence as only raising a doubt before the burden returns to 
the prosecution to rebut the defence beyond reasonable doubt. See for example Attorney General's 
Reference No 4 of 2002 [2004] UKHL 43 (14 October 2004). 
27 So for a more detailed description and discussion on these measures see Chapter 7. 
28 See Zedner, above n 8, 38-39; for a discussion on the Australian sex offender regimes see Patrick 
Keyzer and Bernadette McSherry, “The preventative detention of sex offenders: law and practice” (2015) 
38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 792. While intelligence analysts are also using 
psychological markers in the suspect’s past behavior, if such information is available, their methods are 
much broader. See below at 3.2. 
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information, although only providing circumstantial evidence, is apparent from the 
examination of the use of sensitive information in the Lodhi case, discussed in the next 
section.   
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3.2   Intelligence in counter-terrorism proceedings.  
The further removed pre-crime measures (criminal offences and administrative 
measures) are from an anticipated attack, the harder it is for the prosecution to present 
persuasive evidence that actions that may appear generally innocent are actually 
terrorism-related. For example, in Lodhi, the accused, an architect, was charged inter 
alia with being in the possession of two maps of the Sydney electricity supply system.29 
While possession of such documents by an architect, in isolation, would not be 
suspicious, the prosecution built its case on circumstantial evidence, including ASIO 
evidence that linked Lodhi to the French terrorist Willie Brigitte, in order to prove that 
his possession of these documents were indeed part of terrorist plot.30  
In order to get information capable of predicting developments and assessing risks, the 
police increasingly rely on methods and strategies traditionally associated with the work 
of intelligence agencies, such as wire-tapping, surveillance, data analysis, and the 
exchange of information with foreign intelligence agencies.31 For these purposes, the 
police have introduced or developed their own intelligence units.32 These so-called 
“special branches” also represent a further institutional melding.33 Much of the 
information generated is also often referred to as criminal intelligence, and is protected 
                                                
29 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 691 (23 August 2006). 
30 For further discussion see McSherry, above n 13, 143. 
31 For a historical overview of such methods see Zedner, above n 8, 35. 
32 Clive Walker, “Intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom” (2005) 44 Crime, 
Law & Social Change 387. See also Jean-Paul Brodeur, “High and low policing in post-9/11 times” 
(2007) 1(1) Policing 25; Clive Walker, “The pursuit of terrorism with intelligence” in Jon Moran and 
Mark Phythian (eds), Intelligence, security and policing post-9/11: the UK's response to the 'war on 
terror' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 54. However, this tactic is not limited to counter-terrorism. See Jerry 
Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led policing (Willan Publishing, 2008). 
33 While these “special branches” were originally establish to increase cooperation with the intelligence 
community, the intelligence culture seems to have spilled over to such an extent that they are now 
themselves often removed from the rest of the police force. See Nina Cope, “Intelligence led policing or 
policing led intelligence?” (2004) 44 British Journal of Criminology 188. However, this study into 
intelligence-led policing has been made in 2004 and improvements are likely to be expected. See also 
Kent Roach. “The eroding distinction between intelligence and evidence in terrorism investigation” in 
McGarrity et al (eds.), Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (2010) 56-
59. 
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in a similar fashion and for the same reasons as the work of the national security 
intelligence agencies.34  
Hence, it can be said that pre-crime measures regularly rely on sensitive information. 
However, admitting such intelligence into counter-terrorism proceedings can have an 
adverse impact on the fairness of the proceedings. To understand the consequences Kent 
Roach suggested comparing ‘ideal-type evidence’ and ‘ideal-type intelligence’.35 Such 
an enquiry can reveal the values choices associated with the different types of 
information and thus allow conclusions in relation to the risks of that value in a trial. 
The following section will further examine the differences between intelligence and 
evidence that may pose a risk to the RFT, particularly in cases where intelligence is not 
properly scrutinised through an adversarial process.  
 
3.2.1   Intelligence versus evidence 
The term ‘intelligence’ can be understood both as a process and a product where one 
leads to the other.36 As a process, intelligence in the national security realm has been 
defined as what “states do in secret to support their efforts to mitigate, influence, or 
merely understand other nations (or various enemies) that could harm them”.37 To do so 
intelligence agencies are traditionally tasked with monitoring and collecting information 
for the purpose of risk assessments, which is intelligence as a product. While the 
                                                
34 Exemplary is the Australian statutory definition of criminal intelligence in relation to serious crime 
orders in a number of Australian jurisdictions: see Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 
(SA), s 3 (definition); Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 59; Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA), s 4; 
Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW), s 3. The definition has been developed under 
the Counsel of Australian Governments (COAG) in relation to the restriction of particular firearms. For 
further discussion and the definition of criminal intelligence below at 7.3.2. 
35 Kent Roach. “The eroding distinction between intelligence and evidence in terrorism investigation” in 
Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture 
of law and justice after 9/11 (2010) 48, 50. 
36 For all the meanings of intelligence see Loch Johnson, “Introduction” in Loch Johnson (ed), Handbook 
of intelligence studies (Routledge, 2009) 1, 1-5. 
37 Michael Warner, “Sources and methods for the study of intelligence” in Loch Johnson (ed), Handbook 
of intelligence studies (Routledge, 2009) 17; see also Johnson, above n 36, 1. 
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definition above suggests that intelligences agencies concentrate on foreign threats, they 
also operate domestically to identify subversive elements within their own 
populations.38 However, importantly for this thesis, the process and product of 
intelligence were never intended for prosecuting individuals. Rather intelligence 
assessments would be communicated to the government or other law enforcement 
agencies to develop security policies.39 While only indirectly relevant to the argument 
of the thesis, it should be mentioned briefly that in the post 9/11 environment the 
collection and secret use of intelligence within these agencies has equally increased to a 
worrying extent. The lack of proper overview of these uses has opened up another area 
of potential human rights abuses as prominently evidenced by the leaks of Edward 
Snowden.40 
When comparing the ideal-type of evidence and the ideal-type of intelligence, 
differences become apparent in three main aspects. They concern secrecy, quality and 
their relation to politics. The thesis will now examine each of these aspects in turn.  
 
3.2.1.1   Open justice versus Secrecy 
Legal proceedings are generally guided by the principle of open justice, which requires, 
as famously been described by Lord Hewart CJ, that “justice should not only be done, 
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.41 Hence, any evidence to be 
relied upon should be presented in open court.  
                                                
38 This concerned in particular the political left. See for example Frank Cain, “Australian intelligence 
organisations and the law: a brief history” (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 296. 
39 See for example ASIO Act 1979, s 17 has an advisory role. 
40 See David Anderson QC, “A question of trust” (Report of the Investigatory Powers Review by the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, June 2015); Royal	United	Services	Institute,	“A 
democratic	licence to operate”	(Report of the Independent Surveillance Review, July 2015). 
41R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259; see generally Joseph Jaconelli, Open 
justice: a critique of the public trial (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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This is contrasted by the tendency for intelligence (both processes and products) to 
remain secret. Secrecy is important for two sets of reasons: one is political, the other 
practical. As intelligence is used to shape policies and divert resources, governments 
prefer this information be kept out of the public eye. The exchange of information with 
foreign agencies, regularly accompanied with the mutual assurance from one 
government to another not to disclose the information involved, provides another 
political dimension for secrecy.42 When states do not abide to their commitments they 
run the risk of damaging their sources and good relations with allies. Furthermore, there 
are practical reasons for secrecy:  the disclosure of intelligence may endanger operatives 
and other human sources, such as informers, and may reveal the methods of intelligence 
collection and tactics used.  
The value of maintaining informational secrecy within the intelligence community is 
best indicated by the ‘mosaic theory’. This theory assumes that a “scrap of information 
which, in itself, might seem to have no bearing on national security may, when put 
together with other information, assume a vital significance”.43 Hence, this theory, 
which informs agency approaches to information gathering and management, runs a 
high risk of over-classification. 
The prevailing culture of intelligence is that information need only be disclosed on a 
‘need-to-know’ basis, ie to disclose only as much information as strictly necessary for 
any particular (agency-approved) purpose. In order to keep sources secret, agencies are 
even in the habit of destroying raw intelligence once a report has been written.44 
                                                
42 Roach, above n 35, 60. 
43 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 51; Watson v AWB Limited (No 2) [2009] 
FCA 1047 (17 September 2009) [33]; Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and others 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1148 (17 October 2008) [24]: “the closed material is comprised of a mosaic of 
information drawn in various combinations, depending on the particular case, from a variety of sources 
such as (1) intercept evidence, (2) covert surveillance evidence and (3) agent reporting”. 
44 Roach, above n 35, 50.  
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Intelligence which is retained otherwise is protected by classifying the information and 
penalising any form of unauthorised disclosure of such ‘official secrets.45 
Although there is no question about the need to keep some information secret, the 
extensive classification of information has been criticised as having negative effects. 
Most prominently the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights pointed out that the secrecy stemming from the increased use of 
intelligence gathering, storing and sharing “can sometimes be no more than a cloak to 
avoid proper accountability”.46 In the UK, special advocates involved in control order 
procedures have criticised the over-classification of information, claiming that there was 
hardly any case in which they were involved where additional information was not 
requested and subsequently disclosed in the course of the proceedings.47 
In the US context, Podesta has argued that the high level of secrecy robs the public of 
important information regarding the nature of current security threats and what to do if 
they materialise.48 Further, the tendency to keep information secret “to be on the safe 
side” creates a vast amount of secret information that is hard to analyse or administer, or 
indeed protect from unauthorised disclosure.49 He therefore suggests that governments 
should rather adopt clear guidelines for classification and declassification and thus limit 
the range of information that needs to be kept from the public eye for justifiable reasons. 
                                                
45 The system only grants limited access to persons with the appropriate security clearance, and under the 
modern law, such security clearances may need to be first obtained for lawyers and court personnel in 
order to participate. See below at 6.2.3.2 and 7.2.2. 
46 International Commission of Jurists, Assessing damage, urging action: executive summary (Report of 
the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 2009) 10. 
47 Martin Chamberlain, “Special advocates and procedural fairness in closed proceedings” (2009) 28(3) 
Civil Justice Quarterly 314, 320. See also below at 7.2.2. 
48 John Podesta, “More secrets less security” in Richard Leone and Greg Anrig (eds), Liberty under 
attack: reclaiming our freedom in an age of terror (Public affairs, 2007) 87, 94-97. 
49 See below the comments in relation to the 9/11 Report. 
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This would allow the agencies to be more efficient in terms of keeping information 
secret and enable greater data-sharing between agencies.50  
Secrecy around intelligence-type information may create a number of fair trial issues. 
Finding the right approach might be difficult, but there is a strong indication that more 
information is deemed classified than is actually necessary.51 
 
3.2.1.2   Minimum standards of accuracy 
All information obtained by state officials in the course of crime prevention or 
investigation is done so in order to determine whether or not a suspected ‘fact’ is likely 
to exist. One of the main differences between intelligence and evidence is that the latter 
information, in order to be admissible to legal proceedings before a court of law, should 
comply with the rules of evidence. The purpose of these rules is to improve the quality 
and accuracy of the process of gathering evidence and thus of the evidence itself.52 The 
police, as the main actor for gathering evidence, should consider these legal criteria, and 
many of the rules are reflected in the police guidelines and codes of practice. A 
prominent example is the requirement that arrested persons are given police caution 
(relating to their legal rights, including the right to remain silent) before being 
interviewed.  
Intelligence on the other hand, since it is not gathered to be adduced in a legal 
proceeding, is not subject to this body of law. While it is still subject to the rule of law, 
which imposes some minimal restriction on state action through the operation of human 
rights, such as the right to liberty and the freedom from torture, the principle does not 
                                                
50 Podesta, above n 48, 103-104. 
51 See also Ann Beeson, “The secrecy trump” in Richard Leone and Greg Anrig (eds), Liberty under 
attack: reclaiming our freedom in an age of terror (Public affairs, 2007) 235 (in the US context). 
52 Jeremy Gans and Andrew Palmer, Australian principles of evidence (Cavendish Publishing Ldt, 2nd ed, 
2004) 1. 
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effectively regulate state action, particularly when agencies are operating abroad.53 If 
intelligence stems from foreign sources, it will sometimes be impossible to test the 
accuracy of the information.54 Thus, information obtained by illegal, improper or 
unethical methods, while not being admissible as evidence in a court of law, can still be 
provide intelligence relevant to the process of risk assessment.55  
Another aspect of procedural rules that have an impact on the accuracy of the 
information stems from the role and effect of independent scrutiny. Evidence is 
presented in an open court and challenged by the defence, often with the help of expert 
witnesses. Ultimately, it will be evaluated as being true or false, reliable or unreliable, 
by an independent fact-finder (either a jury or magistrate) and can only be relied upon 
where it meets the relevant standard of proof.56 Again, intelligence is also not subject to 
such an independent process of evaluation. In particular intelligence officers are 
themselves assumed to be the experts. While there is some internal governmental 
oversight in order to avoid an abuse of power,57 given the need for secrecy, intelligence 
agencies have not viewed such oversight as a priority.58 This has improved to a certain 
extent in recent decades through the use of specialist monitors and the subjection of 
                                                
53 See for example the interviews in Thomas conducted by AFP and ASIO officers in Pakistan, but which 
were ultimately deemed inadmissible due to a non-compliance with Australian law: R v Thomas [2006] 
VSCA 165 (18 August 2006); see generally Brian Forst, Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 368. 
54 The International Commission of Jurists raised some concern about the sharing of information. 
Although vital for the prevention of attacks, “[t]he Panel was informed that [the trend of sharing 
intelligence between countries] often results in government action being taken on the basis of 
unsubstantiated intelligence (sometimes gathered by dubious or unlawful methods), and that many abuses 
have been documented”. See International Commission of Jurists, Assessing damage, urging action: 
executive summary (Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human 
Rights, 2009) 10. 
55 Roach, above n 35, 53. 
56 In criminal proceedings the standard of proof is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and in civil proceedings ‘the 
balance of probabilities’. 
57 For risks stemming from a lack of oversight see Andrea Wright, “Casting a light into the shadows: why 
security intelligence requires democratic control, oversight and review”, in Nicole LaViolette and Craig 
Forcese (eds), The human rights of anti-terrorism (Irvin Law, 2008) 327, 329-331; McCulloch and 
Pickering, above n 6, 22; Ian Leigh, “The accountability of security and intelligence agencies” in Loch 
Johnson (ed), Handbook of intelligence studies (Routledge, 2009) 67; Daniel Baldino (ed), Democratic 
oversight of intelligence services (Federation Press, 2010). 
58 Leigh, above n 57, 67. 
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intelligence agencies to independent supervision by parliamentary committees.59 The 
extent to which this system operates effectively as a safeguard against abuse remains 
controversial. 
Lack of accuracy of any kind of information – whether evidence or intelligence - is a 
good reason for limiting its use. However, the critique developed in this Section must be 
understood in line with the particular purposes and methods of intelligence. Intelligence 
work is essentially ‘forward looking’ in the sense that it aims to identify future risks and 
trends. For this purpose, complete accuracy of information is not necessarily a high 
priority. As the mosaic theory dictates, individual pieces of information form only one 
of a multitude of sources relevant to a risk assessment and/or development of security 
strategies. As a result, none of them are required to reach the criminal standard of 
beyond reasonable doubt. Some pre-crime measures did not even require the civil 
standard of proof, the balance of probabilities. For example, in the first generation of 
control orders in the UK measures could be based merely on the reasonable suspicion of 
the Minister.60 In the light of the principle of precaution as outlined above, the general 
approach taken is that the greater the suspected irreversible damage (despite any 
uncertainty about the threat), the more prepared governments are to rely on less reliable 
information in order to shed light on the particular threat or even to act.  
Some of the methodologies applied to gain intelligence can also lower the level of 
information accuracy. As noted above, significant amounts of intelligence is created by 
“bringing a vast body of information, often meaningless in isolation, together in the 
hope of discerning links and underlying patterns that, over time, create a meaningful 
                                                
59 See for example Ian Carnell and Neville Bryan, “Watching the watchers: how the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security helps safeguard the rule of law” (speech at the Safeguarding Australia 2005 
Conference, Canberra, July 2005). 
60 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 2(1). 
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picture”.61 Information stems from the surveillance of individuals; monitoring bank 
accounts and credit cards; telecommunication interception of live and stored 
communications, such as e-mails; uses of covert surveillance devices, exchange of data 
with other organisations; use of informers and covert operations to infiltrate groups; 
acquisition and analysis of other personal information such as criminal, financial, health, 
travel, professional and family records; monitoring movement including the tagging of 
cars and motorcycles; and the surveillance of passengers lists from planes and ferries; 
and monitoring access to health facilities. Much of this information does not disclose 
criminal behaviour per se, particularly when it concerns the monitoring of politically 
subversive activities. Intelligence also links open sources, such as newspaper articles or 
statistics, with information that is intended to be secret.62 This process creates what has 
been described as “information with value-added analysis”.63 Thus, intelligence as a 
product is by its nature “‘patchy’ and ‘circumstantial’ information about perhaps remote 
risks to national security.”64 
In this respect new technologies of surveillance, as well as new techniques of analysis, 
are both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, they allow the access to new sources 
of information and increase the amount of available information. This in turn widens the 
scope of intelligence work. On the other hand, this ‘success’ has also created new 
challenges, as the sheer amount of information generated by agencies becomes 
increasingly difficult to manage. Intelligence agencies are challenged by distinguishing 
real information (signals) from distracting information (noise).65 The vast amount of 
low level intelligence may even lead to a ‘white-out’ effect meaning that the valuable 
                                                
61 Angus McCullough and Sharon Pickering, “Pre-crime and counter-terrorism: imagining future crime in 
the ‘war on terror’” (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 628, 634. 
62 Johnson, above n 36, 2. 
63 Walker (2005), above n 32, 409. 
64 Roach, above n 35, 48 (footnotes omitted). 
65 Wesley Wark, “Introduction: ‘learning to live with intelligence’” (2003) 18(4) Intelligence and 
National Security 1, 3. 
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information is obscured by the less valuable information.66 It has been argued that even 
the 9/11 attacks partly fell victim of this effect. The subsequent investigations have 
shown that there was a lot of relevant information known to the intelligence community 
about the hijackers and their plot, but agencies were unable to connect the 
information.67 Despite the justified criticism, which has already been addressed in the 
US by creating a Director of National Intelligence,68 it is important not to forget that 
forward-looking intelligence work is always handicapped by the fact that agents do not 
precisely know for what they are looking.69  
 
3.2.1.3   Politicisation  
The final aspect that distinguishes between ideal-types of evidence and intelligence, is 
their relationship to, and dependency upon, politics. While there is no doubt that there is 
politics in many areas of criminal justice (particularly in relation to ‘law and order’ 
politics), intelligence traditionally maintains close ties to politics and more specifically 
to the interests of the government of the day. Again this can be easily explained by its 
purpose of informing public policies. However, there is a particular risk of politicisation 
within intelligence work, ie, the risk that intelligence agencies selectively gather and 
interpret information in order to ‘fit’ policy or political objectives of the current 
government.70 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) even defines politicisation of 
                                                
66 McCulloch and Pickering, above n 6,16. 
67 Other aspect concerned the lack of communication between the various US intelligence agencies at the 
time. See Podesta, above n 48, 93; Forst, above n 53, 368. For a similar discussion in relation to UK 
terror attacks see Mark Phythian, “In the shadow of 9/11: security, intelligence and terrorism in the 
United Kingdom” in Jon Moran and Mark Phythian (eds), Intelligence, security and policing post-9/11: 
the UK's response to the 'war on terror' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 32; James Wirtz, “Déjà vu? 
Comparing Pearl Harbor and September 11” (2002) 24(3) Harvard International Review 73; Melvin 
Goodman, “9/11: the failure of strategic intelligence” (2003) 18(4) Intelligence and National Security 59. 
68 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004 (US), s 102. 
69 David Luban, “Eight fallacies about liberty and security” in Richard Wilson, Human rights in the ‘War 
on Terror’” (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 242, 247. 
70 Leigh, above n 57, 68; Walker (2005), above n 32, 390; Wright, above n 57, 331.  
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intelligence as the “unprofessional manipulation of information and judgment by 
intelligence officers to please what those officers perceive to be policy makers’ 
preferences”.71 The secrecy around intelligence work, combined with limited official 
scrutiny, makes intelligence to a certain degree susceptible to such a risk of 
politicisation.  
A priori it is not clear whether politicisation is a negative occurrence or a process of 
prioritisation of finite intelligence resources in which elected governments have a 
legitimate role in determining the type and scale of response to these threats. The reality 
is that intelligence agencies work closely with policy makers and senior government 
officials, who to some extent depend on each other. On the one hand governments need 
the information from such agencies to keep their policies informed, on the other hand 
agencies orientate themselves to what is needed in order to stay relevant.72 Hence, while 
politicisation can distort the intelligence process, it is questionable whether it can be 
entirely avoided.  
Apart from fixing policy priorities for security agencies, politicisation can also occur on 
very subtle levels and to an inconspicuous degree, partly due to the increasing amount 
of information available. Selecting information, therefore, can subconsciously be 
influenced by perceived governmental priorities. As Wesley Wark put it: 
“As the mass of raw intelligence grows, it spawns worrisome problems for 
intelligence warning, analytical failures, and politicisation and manipulation of data 
and assessments by decision-makers. If ‘cherry picking’ has to be the norm inside 
                                                                                                                                          
For an example how this issue has impacted on policing in the Haneef case see McCulloch and Pickering, 
above n 6, 21. 
71 Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, 2005, Report to the President of the United States, 31 March at 188 as cited in Michael 
Wesley, “The politicisation of intelligence” in Daniel Baldino (ed.), Democratic oversight of intelligence 
services (2010) 187. 
72 Wesley, above n 71, 199. 
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intelligence communities, because of informational plenty, what resistance can 
there be to cherry picking of the intelligence product by political decision-makers 
intent on confirming pre-conceptions and finding support for policies determined 
on grounds other than that of intelligence judgements?”73 
Selecting pieces of information from a pool of available options is not something totally 
alien to the criminal justice process. McConville, Sanders and Leng suggest that cases 
are essentially constructed and that once the police have made up their minds about the 
guilt of a suspect the process of case construction is used to hide or highlight 
evidentiary shortcomings.74 Although the process evolves and the case is reassessed at 
each stage, evidence is added or removed to fit the construction, rather than prepare an 
objective picture.75 According to the authors, “courts do little more than endorse 
constructions according to the quality of workmanship, the combativeness of the 
defence lawyer and the hand of Fate”.76 What is important to point out is that the case 
construction theory is not meant as a critique of policing methods,77 and any discretion 
used by the police should always be exercised in accordance with the law.78  
While the theory could be used in any criminal justice system “the adversary system 
[…] makes case construction a particularly partial and partisan process”.79 But if a trial 
is then necessary to assess the construction of the case, then equality of arms and other 
fair trial guarantees are crucial tools for testing the validity of the charges. 
If McConville, Sanders and Leng are right and case construction is a socio-legal 
phenomenon it would certainly also apply to the construction of pre-crime measures. 
                                                
73 Wark, above n 65, 3. 
74 Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng, The case for the prosecution (Routledge, 1991). 
75 Ibid, 12. 
76 Ibid, 172. 
77 Ibid, 11. 
78 Ibid, 18.  
79 Ibid, 11 
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But if intelligence-type evidence is used, which is a selection of a much wider pool of 
available information, and if the use of sensitive information or edited evidence 
necessitates some limitations to the adversarial process, there must be some concern 
with regards to the quality of the proceedings in the sense of accuracy and ultimately 
fairness.  
 
3.2.2    Summary 
This comparison shows that ideal-type intelligence values fairness to a lesser extent 
than ideal-type evidence. Apart from the fact that the sensitivity of intelligence often 
does not permit disclosure and thus adversarial scrutiny, it also does not aim for the 
highest possible standard of accuracy customarily expected in the criminal justice 
system. Furthermore, the fact that intelligence often consists of synthesising and 
interpreting fragments of information from a vast pool  - which may be represented as a 
process of construction - suggests that intelligence will rarely constitute the ‘best 
evidence’ available in legal proceedings, capable of realising the paramount rationale of 
the rules of evidence, namely finding the truth.80  It is worth noting again that the 
comparison in this Section only concerns the ideal-types of intelligence and evidence. 
Hence, not all of the issues flagged here automatically apply in counter-terrorism 
proceedings. But being aware of these distinct characteristics may be crucial when 
dealing with information that is only scrutinised in a limited fashion or not all in an 
adversarial proceeding.81 
                                                
80 See above at 2.1.3. 
81 This is true for both cases where information is used in whole or in part, and where information is 
tested in non-disclosure proceedings in terms of its relevance for the trial. 
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While there is scope for improvement in intelligence as a discipline and profession,82 it 
must be also mentioned in this respect that intelligence agencies have already started to 
adjust to the increased demands imposed by higher ‘evidential’ standards.83 The UK’s 
lead security agency, MI5, for example, states on its website: 
“Our officers, working closely with members of law enforcement agencies, 
ensure that operations are properly co-ordinated with a view to the possible use 
of the resulting intelligence as evidence in court.”84  
Roach is also optimistic that the next generation of police and intelligence officers will 
be more suited to deal with and evaluate different types of information.85   
                                                
82 Clive Walker, “The pursuit of terrorism with intelligence” in Jon Moran and Mark Phythian (eds), 
Intelligence, security and policing post-9/11: the UK's response to the 'war on terror' (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) 54, 74; Walker (2005), above n 32, 409-10. 
83 See for example HM Government, "Consolidated guidance to intelligence officers and service 
personnel on the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas, and on the passing and receipt of 
intelligence relating to detainees" (London, July 2010) and Mark Waller, “Report of the Intelligence 
Services Commissioner for 2015” (HC 459, July 2016) 40-45. 
84 MI5 website: www.mi5.gov.uk/evidence-and-disclosure. 
85 Roach, above n 35, 62. 
Chapter 3: The protection of sensitive information and the associated risks of disclosure 
 85 
3.3   Amending the law of evidence 
Any information that meets the conditions imposed by the law of evidence, ie is 
relevant and admissible in a trial, must be considered evidence. Arguably, this should 
provide for a clear distinction between evidence and intelligence. However, as noted 
above, the lines between these two categories have become increasingly blurred for a 
number of reasons. 
First, the convergence between evidence and intelligence may be viewed as a 
consequence of the trend towards ‘pre-crime’ measures, which demand state 
intervention at earlier stages of terrorist activity.86 Secondly, the rules of evidence 
themselves have been amended to adapt to particular security needs, departing from the 
traditional evidential rules in order to facilitate the admissibility of information 
generated by intelligence methods. The most obvious example is the reforms enacted to 
facilitate the use of secret information in designated administrative proceedings.87 Even 
in standard criminal proceedings the scope of admissibility of sensitive documents has 
been extended through the use of anonymous witness statements or redacted versions 
and summaries.88 The longstanding refusal to admit information obtained through 
telecommunications interception as evidence in the UK still prevails. 89 In Australia, 
however, there is increasing pressure to adopt this practice, as federal legislation already 
authorises the admission of information obtained through interception as evidence in a 
range of legal proceedings, including terrorism proceedings.90 These examples will be 
discussed in detail within the case studies of Part 2 of the thesis.  
                                                
86 See generally Ibid, 48; Zedner (2009), above n 5, 117. 
87 See below at Chapter 7. 
88 See below at 6.3. 
89 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s 17; with the exceptions of s 18, which includes 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, but not any criminal proceedings. 
90 Despite the general exclusion of the use of intercept evidence in legal proceedings in s 63(1)(b) 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), it does not apply to except proceedings 
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The third reason for this convergence is that the type of information commonly used as 
evidence in counter-terrorism proceedings has changed, with heavy reliance upon both 
circumstantial evidence and selective evidence, ie evidence where some parts are 
disclosed while other parts suppressed. Circumstantial evidence may now also be 
admitted in place of stronger direct evidence, that cannot be disclosed, or form part of 
an intelligence product stemming from covert methods described above. In the absence 
of direct evidence, jurors and judges must discharge their duties drawing on an 
extensive body of circumstantial evidence, which increases the complexity and length 
of trials. In Lodhi, Whealy J pointed out:  
“As I understand the Crown case, there will be a considerable body of 
circumstantial evidence providing a substantial background to the evidence 
relating to the accused’s alleged collection and making of documents and the 
doing of acts, which are said to be in preparation for a terrorist act.”91 
The expectation that decision-makers must accept the interpretation of such 
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution by simply ‘joining the dots’ can be 
misleading and potentially create miscarriages of justice.92 The secrecy and potential 
unreliability of intelligence-type evidence, combined with complex processes of ‘case 
construction’ in counter-terrorism trials based on circumstantial evidence, raises 
questions about the adverse impact upon the fairness of the trial and the position of the 
judge in general. The impact on the judicial office and individual judges will be 
examined in the next Section.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
(s74), which include the divs 104 and 105 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), dealing with terrorism offences 
(s 5B(1)(bb)(bc)). 
91 R v Lodhi [2005] NSWSC 1377 (23 December 2005) [13]. See also for example Benbrika & Ors v The 
Queen [2010] VSCA 281 (25 October 2010) [6]. 
92 McCulloch and Pickering, above n 61, 634. 
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3.3.1   The court and uncertain evidence: 
As mentioned above, the rules of evidence are important tools for promoting the 
reliability of evidence. If a particular category of information is presumed to be 
unreliable (for example, confessions obtained as a result of torture), the law rules that it 
is inadmissible. Presumptions may be rebuttable: for example, information gained from 
hearsay may be inadmissible unless otherwise there is proof of its reliability.93 
Another way of dealing with potentially unreliable categories of information is to deem 
them admissible, though require fact-finders (typically the jury) to be warned of the 
dangers associated with those categories of evidence.94 However, it is debateable 
whether jurors are always in the position to adjudge the probative value of the 
information after being warned, or whether it would be better to exclude the information 
as a whole.95 Arguably such a situation occurs when intelligence-type evidence is 
adduced in an amended or summarised form. While it certainly depends on the type of 
information, the thesis argues below that in national security cases jurors are placed in a 
difficult position, where they rather have to choose between the lingering doubt 
generated by the incomplete information adduced, or simply assuming that there is more 
information of an incriminating nature that cannot be disclosed.96  
Although accuracy is an important objective of the law of evidence, it must also 
accommodate other interests, such as the protection of national security and often 
requires adjustment in order to reflect these various interests.97 An example of such 
adjustment is the modifications to the right to silence in the UK, which permits drawing 
adverse inferences of guilt from a suspect’s silence in the face of official questioning 
                                                
93 On the issue of hearsay see below at 6.3. 
94 Simon Bronitt, “Preface” in Gabriele Bammer (ed), Dealing with uncertainties in policing serious 
crime (ANU EPress, 2010) ix; Gans and Palmer, above n 52, 6. 
95 Gans and Palmer, above n 52, 7-8. 
96 See the discussion below at 6.2.3.3. 
97 Gans and Palmer, above n 52, 2. 
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under particular circumstances. Introduced first in Northern Ireland, as a counter-
terrorism measure, this modification to the right to silence has been extended to all 
criminal proceedings, and since 1994, has applied throughout the UK.98 Similar reform 
in Australia has been rejected as an unnecessary and serious departure from a long 
standing right and inconsistent with the principle of fairness.99  
Under the common law, judges have discretion to exclude evidence in cases where the 
prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.100 In general, probative value is a 
question of fact and thus has to be decided by the fact-finder. Admissibility, on the 
other hand, is a question of law and has to be decided by the judge. Thus, it is unclear in 
how far a judge can take reliability into account when determining the probative value 
of some information. According to the dictionary section of the Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth), “probative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could 
rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”. 
McHugh J held in Papakosmas that reliability has to be considered when determining 
the probative value.101 This view is controversial. Others argue that the probative value 
can only be assessed once the evidence is accepted as admissible. Judges therefore have 
no discretion to exclude evidence on the basis of unreliability.102 Despite this debate, it 
is clear that the law of evidence aims at high standards of reliability and credibility. 
Another area where admissibility could be controversial is in relation to evidence that is 
tainted by illegality. For example, while police may obtain evidence illegally by 
                                                
98 See Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (UK), ss 3-6 and Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (UK), ss 34-38. 
99 That said, the strict prohibition at common law on drawing adverse inferences from silence has been 
modified by legislation in NSW in 2013, a reform that has provoked significant controversy: see Victor 
Chu, “Tinkering with the right to silence: the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 
(NSW)” (2013) 17 University of Western Sydney Law Review 25-40. 
100 R v Christie [1914] AC 545, 559-560. Since then this rule has founds its way into statutory 
regulations. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), s 78 and Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s135. 
101 Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 169 CLR 297, 323.  
102 See for example Adam v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 96; Rozens v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 (14 
November 1994). 
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overstepping their powers, the evidence may still be both highly reliable and 
incriminating. This could be the case when an illegal search discovers a large amount of 
drugs in the suspect’s home. It may be difficult to justify the exclusion of this evidence, 
which is significantly probative of guilt, where the breach of the law by police involves 
only a minor violation of a regulation.103 Given that what is a minor violation, and what 
is not, can only be decided in the particular circumstance, leading evidence scholar, Ian 
Dennis argues that exclusion of evidence should be based on a discretionary power 
vested in the judges rather than the basis for a mandatory exclusionary rule.104 While in 
national security cases, judicial discretion seems desirable for the reasons identified by 
Dennis, there is a danger that the judges in balancing these interests will favour the 
needs of security over legality, removing any incentive for security forces to act within 
their legal boundaries.105  
Finally, there is the question of whether judges are in the position to correctly evaluate 
evidence in relation to national security risks and whether it is even legitimate for 
judges to do so rather than placing this task in the hands of elected public officials 
(Ministers) responsible directly to the people through parliament. These questions will 
be returned to on a number of occasions throughout the rest of the thesis.  
The above discussion underscores that the judge holds a key position in determining the 
admissibility of evidence. If judges are expected to fulfil the same duties when dealing 
with ‘intelligence-type’ evidence, the question arises whether any adjustment to the 
proceedings may be necessary both in interests of fairness and national security. The 
next section examines to what extent amendments to the rules of evidence impact upon 
                                                
103 T R S Allan, “The concept of fair trial”, in Elspeth Attwooll and David Goldberg (eds), Criminal 
Justice (Franz Steiner Verlag, 1995) 27, 30. 
104 Ian Dennis, “Reconstructing the law of criminal evidence” (1989) Current Legal Problems 21, 29. This 
is also the approach taken in the US. 
105 Kerri Mellifont, Fruit of the poisonous tree: evidence derived from illegal or improperly obtained 
evidence (Federation Press, 2010). 
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or adversely affect procedural fairness. 
 
3.3.2   The rules of evidence and procedural fairness 
Amending the law in order to accommodate the use of intelligence-type evidence may 
promote compliance with the rules of evidence. The effect of such reform is that the use 
of ‘intelligence-type’ evidence now also appears to comply with the basic requirements 
of procedural fairness, as defined by legislation, even though such reforms were 
motivated entirely by security concerns. In this way, it may be argued that ‘due process 
is for crime control’.106 
This insight, that ‘due process is for crime control’, was first offered by Doreen 
McBarnet, in her empirical study of the UK criminal justice system.107 She posed the 
question of why there were so many convictions notwithstanding the pervasive rhetoric 
of due process protection in the courts?108 McBarnet’s radical research suggested that 
there is a general and pervasive misperception that the law – and in particular of 
procedural law (due process) - includes all necessary features to protect the rights of a 
defendant. Rather, in her view, due process, upon closer empirical scrutiny, often 
favours the interests of crime control, in particular the main actors in the field of 
criminal justice – the police and prosecution. Often what looks like discretion 
favourable to the accused, actually operates in the interests of the state. Thus, the police 
                                                
106 Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: law, the state and the construction of justice (Macmillan Press, 1984) 
156. The dichotomy between due process and crime control has been introduced by Herbert Packer in 
“Two models of the criminal process (1964) 113(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
107 McBarnet, above n 106. 
108 Ibid, 2-3. Of course there is the option that only the best cases are brought to the courts, but this 
neglects the way cases are constructed. A case is a particular version put forward by the police and the 
prosecution of what happened. Whenever the defendant rejects this version and pleads not guilty, a 
contest emerges. At least in theory this means that there has to be a good chance that the prosecution is 
not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been committed in that way. 
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and prosecution do not need to bend, break or circumvent the law to promote crime 
control, they simply need to apply it! 
While McBarnet’s study dates back to the early 1980s, her insights are still relevant and 
have offered scholars another lens for critically examining both investigative and 
judicial practices.109 McBarnet’s thesis reminds us of the importance of developing a 
deeper appreciation of the procedural context of law, testing the rhetoric of due process 
and legality through empirical research, and adopting a sceptical approach as to whether 
safeguards that purportedly promote fairness and respect for the rule of law in fact 
deliver on their liberal promise. Distinguishing between the rhetoric and substantive 
effect of the law is important in practice, since as McBarnet observed,  “one can observe 
defendants losing their case precisely because they are arguing on the basis of the 
rhetoric rather than the law.”110 
The structure of criminal law, combined with terrorism related moral panics, prioritises 
the interests of crime control (security) over due process (fairness).111 Judges have a 
dual role: they must decide questions of substantive law, while at the same time have to 
question the legality of the investigative methods used by the state. Sometime these 
roles can be contradictory and, as we shall explore in the next Chapter, may lead to 
conflicts between the courts and other branches of government.  
The amendments to the rules of evidence also make it difficult - if not impossible - to 
clearly demarcate between ‘intelligence-type’ evidence and other types of evidence. 
And while it cannot be said that any convergence of evidence and intelligence 
                                                
109 McBarnet’s work has been influential in informing the comparative study of the law governing 
policing in the UK and Australia: David Dixon, The law in policing: legal regulation and police practices 
(Clarendon Press, 1997). 
110 McBarnet, above n 106, 159 
111 Ibid, 157. 
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necessarily leads to an unfair trial,112 some additional measures are needed. This thesis 
supports both a culture of justification between the branches of government,113 as well 
as institutional support to the judges,114 whenever the means to test the credibility and 
reliability of the evidence is obstructed by a need to secrecy in order to protect sensitive 
information.  
  
                                                
112 Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands [ECtHR] applications nos 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 
and 22056/93 (23 April 1997) [50]. 
113 For a detailed discussion on the “culture of justification” see below at 4.2.3. 
114 See below at 8.2.2 and 8.2.4.1. 
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3.4   Conclusion 
The trend in counter-terrorism away from conventional reactive criminal investigations 
towards proactive pre-crime measures has altered investigation methods, as well as the 
way terrorism cases are argued in court. The emphasis in pre-crime measures upon risks 
assessment and using broad preparatory and inchoate terrorism offences leads to a 
greater reliance on more intelligence-type evidence, with cases often based on 
circumstantial rather than direct evidence. 
This review of the differing values underlying ideal-types of intelligence and evidence 
reveals that the former values fairness to a much lesser degree than the latter. Given the 
origins and purpose of intelligence, this is neither surprising nor necessarily undesirable 
since intelligence processes and products (as originally conceived) were never intended 
for use in legal proceedings. However, where intelligence ‘crosses the line’ and is used 
to direct the course of police investigations, construct the case for the prosecution and, 
in some instances, to justify a range of pre-crime measures, it poses some serious risks. 
While many types of evidence pose risks in particular proceedings and contexts, this 
Chapter argues that intelligence-type evidence warrants a higher level of scrutiny, and 
that the particular risks of unfairness associated with its use in terrorism proceedings 
must be taken into consideration when developing or assessing non-disclosure regimes.  
Intelligence agencies have started to make important adjustments to their mandate to 
accommodate the new evidential role for intelligence in the criminal justice system. For 
example, in 2011 ASIO’s mandate was broadened to allow the cooperation with a law 
enforcement agency.115 While such developments are reassuring, some risks to the RFT 
are inherent in the task of assessing and predicting security threats. In particular, the risk 
of inaccuracy - stemming both from the process of producing intelligence-type evidence 
                                                
115 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 19A(1)(d). 
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as well as the extensive use of circumstantial evidence – can only be addressed through 
retention of, and respect for, the principles of adversarial justice and the equality of 
arms. Hence, the position of the defendant will be a key indicator in the case studies in 
Part 2 of the thesis. 
Finally, this Chapter has demonstrated that recent amendments to the rules of evidence 
are placing judges in a challenging and conflicted position: the judicial impetus to 
comply with lawful procedures – the main guarantee for due process or procedural 
fairness – may actually circumvent, in the pursuit of crime control, the ‘obstacle course’ 
of due process.116 When parliament deprioritises fairness within the law, it becomes 
much harder for judges to maintain their traditional commitment to it when discharging 
their roles. In other words, if the internal structure of the law promotes crime control (or 
national security), substantive fairness is drawn into direct conflict with the procedural 
conception of fairness defined by the legislature. This challenge for judges and its 
impact upon the relationship between the branches of government, will be further 
discussed in the following Chapter. 
 
                                                
116 This imagery of due process as an ‘obstacle course’ placed in the way of the ‘assembly line ‘of crime 
control was applied in Herbert Packer’s seminal article, “Two models of the criminal process (1964) 
113(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 13. 
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Chapter	4:	Balancing	liberty	and	security?	
 
  
In assessing non-disclosure requests covering sensitive information from the 
government, the trial judge is faced with a conflict between interests. On the one hand, 
sensitive information needs to be protected to avoid harm to the state and the 
community. On the other hand, defendants may require access to that information to 
defend themselves properly in criminal procedures. In administrative proceedings, the 
suppressed information may even constitute the basis of the public official’s decision, 
which is difficult or impossible to challenge without access to the suppressed material.1 
While in some cases, the risks and interests at stake in non-disclosure applications are 
clearly apparent, in others they are not, which creates even greater challenges to the 
actors involved (namely the defence, prosecution, government lawyers and the judges). 
This Chapter discusses processes and methods used to resolve the conflict between the 
interests above and the relative weight of these competing interests. While some of the 
discussion can inform the legal approaches to conflicts between individual liberty and 
security generally, the Chapter particularly emphasises the specific requirements of the 
right to a fair trial (RFT). 
Court review can interfere with security assessments made by the government, which 
raises questions on the limits of judicial power. To answer them, some reflections on 
how the different branches of government (executive, legislature and judiciary) interact 
with each other generally are necessary. This Chapter briefly highlights two aspects of 
																																								 																				
1 See below at Chapter 7 on the use of secret evidence in control order proceedings.  
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the separation of powers, which, while seemly contradictory, reflect a modern 
understanding of responsible government.  
The first aspect of the separation of powers is that systems of responsible government 
rest on the importance of ‘checks and balances’. As pointed out above, there is a 
constitutional duty on the courts to defend individuals against arbitrary and improper 
behaviour of any state official.2 Simply deferring to the security decisions of the 
government would nullify or limit an important safeguard for individual rights.3 In 
constitutional theory the orthodox view of parliamentary supremacy is that courts 
should always enforce an (validly) enacted statute by Parliament, including any powers 
given to Ministers.4 Because of the absence of a constitutional bill of rights or system of 
‘checks and balances’ that effectively limits parliamentary supremacy in the United 
Kingdom (UK), Lord Hailsham famously characterised the Westminster system as “an 
elected dictatorship”.5 As this Chapter will demonstrate, judicial and political attitudes 
have changed in recent decades in both Australia and the UK. Nonetheless the topic of 
the proper limits of judicial power within a democracy - and in particular how judges 
perceive their own role constitutionally - is an ongoing debate. And, as this thesis 
reveals, the topic is never more controversial than in the context of disclosure of 
sensitive information in legal proceedings in a climate of serious security threats. 
The second aspect of separation of powers is that decisions cannot (and should not) be 
fairly made by a single branch of government. There needs to be some cooperation 
between the organs of government, with recognition of their respective responsibilities. 
																																								 																				
2 See above at 2.3. 
3 It should be pointed out that given the strong influence the executive has over the legislature in the 
Westminster system, the term ‘government’ includes both of these branches, unless specified otherwise. 
See Lord Brown, “The unaccountability of judges: surely their strength not their weakness” in 
Christopher Forsyth et al (eds), Effective judicial review: a cornerstone of good governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 208. 
4 Lord Hailsham, The dilemma of democracy: diagnosis and prescription (Collins, 1978) 125.  
5 Ibid, 126. 
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Thus, each branch has responsibility for ensuring fairness in decision-making and 
should reflect upon this concern. To promote fairness in such decisions, legislation is 
required that reminds decision-makers of this duty and require sufficient justification of 
any restrictions imposed on fairness. Of course, there may well be reasonable 
disagreement on what is fair in a specific case, but as long as each of the branches is 
working towards the same aim, any tension should simply be part of a robust 
deliberative process that characterises an effective justice system in a liberal 
democracy.6  
The Chapter concludes the first Part of the thesis in providing a theoretical basis for the 
case studies that follow in Part 2. It closes by identifying a number of key guiding 
principles for non-disclosure decisions, which also take the constitutionality of the RFT 
(Chapter 2) and the inherent risks of using intelligence-type evidence (Chapter 3) into 
consideration. 
  
																																								 																				
6 See David Feldman, “Human rights, terrorism and risk: the roles of politicians and judges” (2006) 
Summer Public Law 364, 383. 
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4.1 - Liberty versus security: methodologies for a fair balance 
4.1.1 - The metaphor of balancing  
The metaphor of ‘balancing’ has been used widely by courts, politicians and academics, 
when dealing with competing interests or arguments such as the tension between liberty 
and security. Its appeal stems not only from its wide applicability and the general belief 
that “we all share a common intuitive grasp of, or at least are in agreement about, what 
the metaphor of balancing interests entails”.7 Hence, while balancing appears to be a 
concrete task, it leaves the decision-maker a wide margin of discretion.  
In the field of criminal justice, it has been argued for a long time that the system seeks 
to accommodate liberty (due process) and security (crime control) through the method 
of balancing. The traditional model, outlined by Herbert Packer in the 1960s, presents 
the two concepts of due process and crime control as being in a hydraulic relationship, 
with liberty being sacrificed for a gain in security (and vice versa).8  
Since 9/11, it has been argued that a new balance must be struck between liberty and 
security reflecting the increased threat of terrorism. The proponents of such an approach 
are numerous, particularly amongst politicians. For example, the former 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, the Hon Philip Ruddock, addressing a forum on 
terrorism and the rule of law, stated that  
“there is an appropriate balance between the preservation of national security and 
human rights, which is reflected in the range of safeguards that apply to control 
orders, preventative detention orders and ASIO questioning and detention. 
																																								 																				
7 Vincent Luizzi, “Balancing of interests in courts” (1980) 20 Jurimetrics Journal 373. 
8 The debate within the field of criminal justice has been stimulated by the work of Herbert Packer in the 
1960s. See Herbert Packer, “Two models of the criminal process” (1964) 113(1) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1; Herbert Packer, The limits of the criminal sanction (Stanford University 
Press, 1968). For an overview of lessens from the field of criminal justice for the fight against terror see 
Lucia Zedner, “Securing liberty in the face of terror: reflections from criminal justice” (2005) 32(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 507. 
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However, I would make the point that these matters are not static: the protection 
must be commensurate with the risk, at all times.”9 
This need for ‘balancing’ post-9/11was extensively discussed in the media,10 as well as 
debated in academic writing. In Australia and the UK, for example, Golder and 
Williams continue to advocate for a balancing model,11 while in the United States, 
Posner and Vermeule have prominently argued that both security and liberty are 
valuable goods, which stand in such an inverse relation to each other that neither can be 
maximised without an impact on the other.12 Given the limited resources, governments 
must spread the goods in an optimal way from a social point of view, meaning to 
maximise welfare for all.13 A simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that a rational and 
well-motivated government, when facing a terrorist threat, would trade off (individual) 
liberty against (collective) security, “because the value gained from the increase in 
security will exceed the value lost from the decrease in liberty”.14 
																																								 																				
9 Philip Ruddock, “Law as a preventative weapon against terrorism” in Andrew Lynch, Edwina 
MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror (Federation Press, 2007) 
3, 6; see also Philip Ruddock, “The Commonwealth response to September 11: the rule of law and 
national security” (Speech, National Forum in the War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law, New South 
Wales Parliament House, 10 November 2003) [25]-[26]. 
10 See for example Editorial, “Balancing security and liberty” (The Australian, 14 June 2013). 
11 Ben Golder and George Williams, “Balancing national security and human rights: assessing the legal 
response of common law nations to the threat of terrorism” (2006) 8(1) Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis 43. Although Williams acknowledged the difficulties associated with the balancing metaphor, he 
claimed that it helps to engage the public in difficult discussions about public policy. Clarified in a 
personal email from George Williams to Christopher Michaelsen, 15 May 2005, as cited in Christopher 
Michaelsen, “Balancing civil liberties against national security? A critique of counterterrorism rhetoric” 
(2006) 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 20. 
12 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the balance: security, liberty, and the courts (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 22 and 28; cf Jeremy Waldron, “Security and liberty: the image of balance” 
(2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 191, 195. 
13 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Emergencies and democratic failure”, (2006) 92(6) Virginia Law 
Review 1091, 1098-99. 
14 Ibid, 1099. In this sense ‘rational’ means that “the government makes no systematic errors in its 
empirical estimates and causal theories when assessing the likely effects of increase or decrease in 
security and liberty”; and ‘well-motivated’ refers to a government that “acts so as to maximise the welfare 
of all persons properly included in the social welfare function”: see Posner and Vermeule, above n 12, 29-
30.  
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While balancing features extensively in discussions about terrorism responses, it is not 
always clear who should be tasked with undertaking this balancing exercise.15 
Politicians (within both the executive and the legislature) often imply that striking the 
right balance is a matter exclusively for the government, namely the executive working 
with the legislature.16 It is assumed that these two organs of government enjoy the 
democratic legitimacy to translate values into law and have access to relevant expertise. 
This position, though, fails to acknowledge the role of the courts and the traditional 
mandate of the judiciary to maintain a balance between the state and the citizen. Hence, 
new terrorism legislation and executive decisions may cause difficulties for the 
judiciary once this ‘new balance’ is drawn into conflict with accepted general principles 
protecting individual liberties, such as the RFT.  
As a tool for resolving conflicts between competing interests, the concept of ‘balancing’ 
projects an aura of moderation, precision and objectivity. However, as scholars have 
pointed out, balancing as a process for guiding decision-making often lacks content and 
over-simplifies complex questions.  
For the purposes of this thesis, balancing refers to a process that does not include any 
specific rules on how much weight to attach to the interests involved – for example to 
prioritise security over liberty or vice versa. Rather, balancing simply confers discretion 
to the decision-maker and identifies the range of interests in play. This can lead to 
confusion, such as when judges or politicians refer to balancing as a synonym for other 
																																								 																				
15 The tension between the branches will be further discussed below at 4.2. 
16 In Australia see, for example, Attorney General’s Department, “Equipping Australia against emerging 
and evolving threats” (Discussion paper, July 2012) 23. This approach was not been altered under the 
Labour Government between 2007 and 2013. See Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Counter-
Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia – Protecting our Community” (2010). Similar views have 
been expressed in the UK and the US: see James Brokenshire, “National security and civil liberties: 
getting the balance right” (Speech to National Security Summit at Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, 
London, 3 July 2013); In a speech President Obama also declared, “in the years to come, we will have to 
keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those 
freedoms that make us who we are”: see “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University” 
(Speech at the National Defense Force University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2013). 
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methodologies, such as proportionality, which actually do include such rules of 
prioritising one interest over another.17 The pervasive use of balancing in legal 
thought,18 and the extensive acknowledgement of its limitations, is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
4.1.2 - A critique of balancing 
	
Does less liberty actually mean more security? 
Despite the assumption of a hydraulic relationship, or a ‘zero-sum’ game, between 
security and liberty, the question is whether reductions of individual liberty actually 
produce the security gains typically foreshadowed by government.19 Given that rights 
and interests are being traded, resulting in the demonstrable infringement of individual 
liberty, empirical evidence of the security pay-off should be required to justify this 
limitation – both from the individuals affected, as well as from a public policy priority 
attached to ‘evidence-based’ reform.20 Jeremy Waldron has argued, for example, that 
lowering due process rights might effectively lead to an easier conviction. However, the 
prospect of conviction and punishment may have limited general deterrent effect on 
potential terrorists, and any intended security benefit in relation to this aspect might be 
low.21 Commentators have even pointed out that enhancing the protection of liberty 
(due process) may offer significant equally beneficial outcomes from a security (crime 
																																								 																				
17 In particular the term ‘balancing’ is often used synonymously for what will be described below as 
proportionality in the narrow sense; see below at 4.1.3. 
18 It even has been claimed that Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law entails some sort of a balancing test: 
“The shielded-interest theory holds only that utilitarian justifications must have sufficient weight to 
overcome rights, and it is consistent with balancing tests. In a sense, the theory is a balancing test.” Paul 
Yowell, “Critical examination of Dworkin's theory of rights” (2007) 52 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 93, 98. 
19 cf Simon Bronitt, “Constitutional rhetoric v criminal justice realities: unbalanced responses to 
terrorism?” (2003) 14 Public Law Review 76, 80. 
20 See Andrew Ashworth, “Security, terrorism and the value of human rights'”, in Benjamin Goold and 
Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 203, 208-209. 
21 Waldron, above n 12, 209-10; see also above at 2.1.4 for counterproductive effects of trials that are 
perceived as unfair. 
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control) standpoint.22 Admittedly, these ‘win-win’ situations are difficult to achieve, but 
their existence certainly indicates a deficiency in traditional way in which the balance of 
liberty versus security is represented. 
Furthermore, the lack of evidence that limitations on individual rights are justified also 
exposes alternative motivations for security legislation. At times, the primary function 
of security legislation is to offer comfort or reassurance to the general population, and 
be seen as responding to the calls that ‘something needs to be done’. Any actual security 
gain is subsidiary to that reassurance offered by the expanded powers of the state. The 
Australian preventative detention and control order regimes have often been criticised 
for this symbolic quality.23 There is no doubt that such measures may have a positive 
effect on the psyche of the nation, which explains the great pressure on politicians to act 
accordingly.24 Nonetheless, it seems unacceptable that some people (often minority and 
marginalised groups) must give up ‘real’ liberties in order to satisfy the needs of the 
majority for a sense of security that may be ‘fake’ or at least offer non-verifiable gains 
in security. Hence, from a moral perspective such symbolic legislation seems highly 
questionable.25  
At times, policy interests for different areas can align and push governments into 
passing tougher security legislation. For example, in Australia it has been argued that 
the federal government has overemphaisied the connection between terrorism and 
																																								 																				
22 For example, Bronitt points to the example that law enforcement agencies have benefitted from the 
introduction of compulsory taping of police interviews, which equally protects suspects and prevents false 
allegations of police impropriety by suspects: Simon Bronitt, “Balancing security and liberty: critical 
perspectives on terrorism law reform” in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew (eds), Fresh perspectives on 
the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 65, 70. 
23 See for example Bret Walker, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Declassified 
Annual Report” (20 December 2012) 4, 44. 
24 Bronitt, above n 22, 68-69. 
25 Waldron, above n 12, 209; Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Prevention of Terrorism Bill” (10th 
Report of Session 2004-05, HC 334, 4 March 2005) [16]. 
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asylum seekers to justify new immigration regualtions.26  Further, the enormous 
financial amounts involved result in ‘behind closed doors’ lobbying in the capital cities 
by security agencies and the private security industry. In the decade after 9/11, the US 
spent, cumulatively, over a trillion USD on homeland security, with a significant 
portion directed to the private sector.27 In Australia the number has been estimated at 
AUD 16.7 billion.28 
Finally, there is an additional security paradox: while certain measures can increase 
security in relation to terrorism threats, they can at the same time decrease the security 
of citizens in relation to potential abuse. As a state expands its powers, it also tends to 
lower its standards for checks and balances, which in turn increases the possibility for 
abuses of powers and miscarriages of justice.29   
It is important to remind ourselves that the history of human rights tells the story of a 
struggle of individuals against the (sometimes oppressive) state.30 Ironically, the 
original use of the word terror, in the context of the French Jacobin regime, referred to 
the state violence directed against its own citizens!31 Hence, whereas people, who live 
in more or less functioning liberal democracies, may have greater trust in the state 
today, we have to bear in mind that one set of securities is often traded against another. 
In addition, even powers that were originally meant to fight terrorism may also spill 
over into other areas of law enforcement, and become ‘normalised’ as part of the regular 
security set-up. For example, after the right to silence was abrogated in Northern 
																																								 																				
26 Angus McCullough and Sharon Pickering, “Counter-terrorism: the law and policing of pre-emption”, in 
Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture 
of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 13, 17. 
27 John Mueller and Mark Steward, Terror, security, and money: balancing the risks, benefits, and costs 
of homeland security (Oxford University Press, 2011) 1. 
28 Bernard Keane, “The winners from the war on terror” (Crikey, 17 June 2011). 
29 Waldron, above n 12, 205. 
30 Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in context (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2006) 21. 
31 Ben Golder and George Williams, “What is ‘terrorism’? Problems of legal definition” (2004) 27 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 270; Jonathan Weinberger, “Defining terror” (2003) 
Winter/Spring Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 65. 
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Ireland, the limitation was then implemented throughout the rest of the UK.32 In 
Australia, the use of counter-terrorism measures in the fight against organised crime, 
targeting outlaw motorcycle gangs, is just another example of extraordinary measures 
leaking into the mainstream criminal justice system.33 
 
What are the interests involved and how can we determine their relative weight? 
The metaphor of balancing implies that the two opposing interests - security versus 
liberty - can be clearly defined. For the purposes of the thesis, this balancing process 
pits non-disclosure in the interest of national security against disclosure in the interest of 
a defendant’s fair trial. This view seems overly simplistic. The ‘public interest’ cannot 
be reduced to one singular public interest.34 Rather, there will always be multiple public 
interests at work. Without question, safety and security of the population is an important 
public interest, but having fair and just criminal proceedings is equally a public 
interest.35 And a defendant - enjoying the presumption of innocence until proven guilty 
– as a member of the society might equally have an interest in protecting national 
security. 
																																								 																				
32 The right to silence has been effectively abolished in Northern Ireland by the introduction of the 
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (UK), which allows adverse inferences to be drawn 
from the silence of the accused under particular circumstances. These provisions were then adopted under 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), ss 34-38, which not only expended the geographical 
scope to England and Wales, but also took a measure considered necessary in the particular context of 
Northern Ireland into a general and thus permanent setting. 
33 See Simon Bronitt, “Ten years on: critical perspectives on terrorism law reform in Australia” (CEPS 
Public Lecture, Griffith University, 9 September 2011) 21; Andrew Lynch, “Terrorists and bikies: the 
constitutional licence for laws of control” (2009) 34(4) Alternative Law Journal 237, 239; Nicola 
McGarrity and George Williams, “When extraordinary measures become normal: pre-emption in counter-
terrorism and other laws” in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-
terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 131. See below at 7.3.2. 
34 Ian Dennis, “Reconstructing the law of criminal evidence” (1989) Current Legal Problems 21, 30-31; 
Andrew Ashworth, Human rights, serious crime and criminal procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 70. 
35 See above at 2.1; Some judges also recognise the fact that there are multiple public interests at work:  
see for example Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, 940 (Lord Reid), which was also referred to positively 
in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 38 (Gibbs CJ). 
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Even if interests could be expressed in a simple binary way, the question of how to 
determine the relative weight remains? This is easier to answer in cases where the 
public interest aligns with another individual right, such as the protection of the identity 
of a witness, or police or security personnel deployed undercover. Defining the weight 
of more general security risks, particularly when applying the mosaic theory,36 is 
considerably more difficult.37 In either case, we are dealing with risks and therefore 
with probabilities. Defining and understanding risks requires expertise and is not an 
exact science. It has been demonstrated in psychological research that risks are regularly 
overestimated and competing interests underestimated.38 Furthermore, the risk analysis 
is often not communicated publicly in detail due to security reasons, which inhibits 
proper public discourse. Most of the population only knows or assumes that there is a 
‘great risk’.39 This in turn can put pressure on politicians, who often feel the need to 
favour security in order to retain popularity with the electorate.40 In such cases the 
‘public interest’ becomes a mere reflection of a political climate perceived by the 
politicians in charge.  
Even assuming that the relative weight of interests can be determined with reasonable 
precision, discrepancies remain on two levels when they are compared. On the one 
hand, collective interests are balanced against individual interests, and on the other 
hand, known and certain interests are weighed against future interests of uncertain 
																																								 																				
36 See above at 3.2.1.1. Watson v AWB Limited (No 2) [2009] FCA 1047 (17 September 2009) [33]. 
37 Zedner, above n 8, 512-13.  
38 See for example David Luban, “Eight fallacies about liberty and security”, in Richard Wilson (ed), 
Human rights in the ‘war on terror’ (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 242, 247; Lucia Zedner, 
“Neither safe nor sound: the perils and possibilities of risk” (2006) 48(3) Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 423, 426. 
39 In Bersinic, Connolly J pointed to the front pages of newspapers to establish the high risk of terrorism: 
R v Bersinic [2007] ACTSC 46 (6 July 2007) [6]. 
40 Brian Forst, Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 323; see also 
Alison Brysk, “National insecurity and human Rights”, in Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir (eds), 
National insecurity and human rights: democracies debate counterterrorism (University of California 
Press, 2007) 1; Philip Thomas, “September 11th and good governance”, (2002) 53 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 366, 368. 
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extent.41 In the context of open justice, Spigelman J regarded these opposing interests as 
incommensurable. He used the comparison of “asking whether one object is longer than 
another object is heavy”.42 Equally Ian Dennis stated that “[i]ndividual rights and public 
interests in truth-finding do not seem to be commensurable values which can be 
meaningfully ‘balanced’. The effort to do so simply produces an unsatisfactory theory 
which makes life difficult”.43 
Finally, even defining the particular interests is not as straightforward as it often seems. 
Imprecision stems from the fact that some of the negative consequences caused by 
security measures are not equally distributed within the general population.	Waldron 
stresses that there needs to be greater accuracy in identifying the interests being 
balanced: it is not merely security versus liberty, but rather the interests of the majority 
in their security versus the interests of the minority in relation to their liberty.44 The 
latter group tend to be drawn from particular segments of the population or those 
populations that have become suspect - both groups being most in need of human rights 
protection. Hence, the cost of security is not spread equitably across the community, but 
externalised to parts of the population that lack political power (being a minority) or the 
means to lobby against such security measures.45  
 
Sloppy reasoning and the danger of consequentialism 
As the critique outlined above suggest, there is a general danger that balancing leads to 
																																								 																				
41 Zedner, above n 8, 516. 
42 The Honourable James Jacob Spigelman, “The principle of open justice: a comparative perspective” 
(2006) 29(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 147, 158. 
43 Dennis, above n 34, 31. 
44 Waldron, above n 12, 201. 
45 This phenomenon is also described as a democratic failure. See for example David Cole, “Their 
liberties, our security: democracy and double standards”, (2003) 31 International Journal of Legal 
Information 290; Luban, above n 38, 243. Waldron, above n 12, 203. For an opposing view see Posner 
and Vermeule, above n 13, 1091. 
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“sloppy reasoning”.46 Decision-makers are at risk of undertaking – consciously or 
unconsciously - a weighing exercise according to their personal preferences or 
subjective value. Judges have been exposed to the criticism of whether the balancing 
process places constraints on governmental decisions by reference to community values 
or the public interest,47 or defers to the needs of the executive, thereby avoiding difficult 
questions.  
The lack of structure in balancing processes may also open doors to consequentialism. 
The proposition that ‘ends justify the means’ is commonly based on the philosophy of 
utilitarianism. According to Jeremy Bentham, any measure could be justified as long as 
it brings the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people.48 In the calculus of utility, 
the positive consequences that flow to the majority from enhanced security outweigh 
negative consequences for the minority whose reduction in liberty is perceived as a less 
significant cost or burden. As a result, policy decisions are all too often in favour of 
utility rather than equal distribution of costs and benefits.49 The most controversial 
manifestation of pure consequentialism in counter-terrorism is the proposal for ‘torture 
warrants’ that would legalise torture by state officials if done for the purpose of 
preventing serious terrorist attacks.50  
																																								 																				
46 Andrew Ashworth, “Crime, community and creeping consequentialism” (1996) 4 Criminal Law Review 
220, 229. 
47 J D Heydon, “Judicial activism and the death of the rule of law” (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 110. 
48 For brief discussion on utilitarianism in law see Bottomley and Bronitt, above n 30, 45.  
49 Waldron, above n 12, 201-3. 
50 Such warrants would lawfully permit torture provided the executive could persuade a judge there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that the torture would yield critical information necessary to prevent a 
serious attack. See Alan Dershowitz, Why terrorism works: understanding the threat, responding to the 
challenge (Yale University Press, 2002); Alan Dershowitz, “The torture warrant: a response to Professor 
Strauss” (2003) 48 New York Law School Law Review 275. Such proposals, however, depart from 
longstanding opposition to torture in both international and domestic law: See for example John Kleinig, 
“Ticking bomb and torture warrants” (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 614; Desmond Manderson, 
“Another modest proposal: in defence of the prohibition against torture”, in Miriam Gani and Penelope 
Mathew (eds), Fresh perspectives on the War on Terror (ANU E Press, 2008) 27. 
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The concept of human rights is however inherently anti-consequentialist and non-
utilitarian. Ronald Dworkin in his classic book, Taking rights seriously, argued that 
rights should gain priority over other interests, in particular those of the community - in 
Dworkin’s terms, individual rights should trump the collective/public interest.51 An 
enforceable right against the state and other individuals would lose its meaning if it 
ceased to have effect as soon as it imposed burdens or inconvenience upon the majority. 
Hence, in Dworkin’s view, consequentialist claims undermine the very concept of 
individual rights.52 Although the theory of rights as trumps is often equated with 
undemocratic non-majoritarian rule, Dworkin maintains that rights protection should be 
viewed as an expression of equality between individuals, who should enjoy the same 
rights on the same terms, and is therefore inherently democratic.53 This theory however 
does not insist that individual rights are always absolute. Rather rights can – and shall - 
be limited under specific circumstances. Even Dworkin accepted some exceptions to his 
main claims.54 At this point, it is enough to say that limitations on rights need to be 
properly justified, and cannot simply be balanced or traded away in the interest of the 
majority.55 
In sum, the analysis in this Section leads to the conclusion that the method of balancing 
must be rejected. All of the aspects discussed relate in some way or another to a lack of 
clarity. But in particular the lack of process may promote personal preferences of the 
decision-maker and may lead to a ‘creeping consequentialism’; and the missing 
requirement for justifying the limitation of rights creates the risk of watering down the 
standard of protection. These issues can be addressed to a certain extent by the concept 
																																								 																				
51 Ronald Dworkin, Taking rights seriously (Duckworth, 1977). 
52 Ibid, 201; see also Ashworth, above n 34, 71. 
53 Dworkin, above n 51, 199; see also Ronald Dworkin, “The threat of patriotism” (2002) 49(3) New York 
Review of Books 44, 48. 
54 Dworkin, above n 51, 198. See discussion below. 
55 See Yowell, above n 18, 95 and 97. 
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of proportionality, which is examined in the next Section. 
 
4.1.3 - Proportionality: a fair and more sophisticated way of balancing 
Although balancing and proportionality are often used synonymously and 
interchangeably in colloquial language, once properly defined, one crucial difference 
emerges: the principle of proportionality contains rules on how to weigh the competing 
interests, which balancing does not. The principle of proportionality cannot avoid 
balancing entirely, in the sense that the decision-maker exercises discretion, but it seeks 
to organise the process in a way that supports policy-makers, authorities and judges in 
situations where the interests involved are complex or even seem to be 
incommensurable.56 The application of proportionality does not make particular 
outcomes more predictable, but rather provides “a conceptual framework for defining 
the appropriate relationship between [human rights] and considerations that may justify 
their limitation in a democracy”.57 
The principle of proportionality has its roots in the Prussian administrative courts, 
where it was developed to regulate police behaviour.58 After the Second World War, it 
was adopted by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) to 
define permissible limitations of constitutional rights by regular statutes. Although the 
principle has no textual basis within the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), German judges 
simply justified its application as being part the rule of law itself.59 Today it is well 
																																								 																				
56 Comparing proportionality to the traditional grounds of review, Lord Steyn described the criteria as 
clearly “more precise and more sophisticated”. R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for The 
Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 (23 May 2001) [27]; see also Dieter Grimm, “Proportionality in 
Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence” (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 383, 
396-97. 
57 Aharon Barak, “Human rights and their limitations: the role of proportionality” (Annual lecture in law 
and society, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, Oxford, 9 June 2009) 4. 
58 Grimm, above n 56, 384-85. 
59 Ibid, 385-86. 
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accepted as a principle of German constitutional law, and forms an integral part of a 
wider theory of constitutional rights.60  
From its roots in Germany, the concept has spread considerably.61 In particular it has 
been picked up by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to interpret the 
permissible limitations of those human rights, which recognise limitations provided 
these are prescribed by “law and […] necessary in a democratic society”.62 Furthermore, 
it has been adopted in common law jurisdictions such as Canada,63 New Zealand64 and 
Israel.65 After a number of cases before the ECtHR concerning the level of appropriate 
judicial review in administrative law,66 as well as the introduction of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK) (HRA), the principle of proportionality has now been equally accepted 
as a principle of public law in the UK.67 However, there is still debate about what it 
entails.68 
In Australia, there has been some limited use of proportionality in constitutional law.69 
However, as Justice Kiefel of the High Court observed ex-curia, “it has never achieved 
the status of a general legal principle having application to questions of legislative 
																																								 																				
60 Robert Alexy, A theory of constitutional rights (Translation Julian Rivers, Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
61 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, “Proportionality and the culture of justification” (2011) 59 
American Journal of Comparative Law 463, 465. 
62 See arts 8-11 ECHR.  
63 See for example, R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 (28 February 1986). 
64 See for example, Ministry of Transport v Noort CA 369/91 [1992] 3 NZCA 51 (30 April 1992). 
65 See for example, Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of Israel HCJ 2056/04 (2 May 2004). 
For a very detailed description of the dispersion of the principle of proportionality see Aharon Barak, 
Proportionality: constitutional rights and their limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) Chapter 7. 
66 See in particular Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications nos 33985/96 and 
33986/96 (27 September 1999) [138]. 
67 R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for The Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 (23 
May 2001). 
68 See for example Mark Elliott, “Proportionality and deference: the importance of a structured 
approach”, in Christopher Forsyth et al (eds), Effective judicial review: a cornerstone of good governance 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 264; Tom Hickman, “The substance and structure of proportionality” 
(2008) Winter Public Law 694. 
69 See for example Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 (8 July 1997); 
Cunliffe v The Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272; Leask v The Commonwealth; Re Woolley (2004) 225 
CLR 1 (7 October 2004). 
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power”.70 Similarly, as then Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, Justin Gleeson SC 
has pointed out there are not many constitutional rights that would be open to a 
proportionality analysis.71 In the few cases where proportionality had been discussed, 
the High Court did not agree on a particular test for a long time.72 In the recent case of 
McCloy the majority of the High Court set out a proportionality test, which comes much 
closer to the German approach.73 While this decision is some indication that 
proportionality is gaining increased acceptance in Australia, it is far from being a settled 
principle in constitutional rights adjudication. One important aspect here is that a 
proportionality analysis requires an accepted right to begin with. McCloy concerned 
freedom of speech and political communication, now an accepted implied constitutional 
right. At present the principle must be seen as being confined to that particular context. 
In relation to the separation of powers, which may be a basis for an implied RFT, 
McHugh J explicitly stated, “questions of proportionality cannot arise in the context of 
Ch[apter] III [of the Constitution]”, which regulates judicial power.74 This is because a 
law that confers judicial power to a body other than a court is an infringement of the 
Chapter III. Being proportionate cannot heal such a violation.75  
In terms of structure, the principle of proportionality can be split up into five steps or 
sub-rules:  
• first, there has to be a prima facie infringement of a protected right;  
• second, the policy objective of the measure must be legitimate, ie the purpose of 
the law must be compatible with the constitutional setting;  
																																								 																				
70 Susan Kiefel, “Proportionality: a rule of reason” (2012) 23 Public Law Review 85, 86. 
71 Justin Gleeson, “Getting the balance right: proportionality and the Constitution” (Speech at the AGS 
Constitutional Law Forum, 22 November 2013) 4. 
72 Ibid. 
73 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 857, 862-863; see also Anne Towney, “Proportionality 
and the Constitution” (Speech, ALRC Freedom Symposium, University of Sydney, 8 October 2015). 
74 Re Woolley (2004) 225 CLR 1, 34. 
75 Ibid. 
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• third, the measure must be capable of achieving the policy objective – this is 
also known a rational connection or suitability;  
• fourth, the measure must be necessary in comparison with alternative 
hypothetical acts, which excludes inefficient measures; the step therefore aims at 
identifying the least restrictive measure (or minimal intrusion) to achieve the 
purpose of the law; 
• fifth, the measure must be proportionate in the narrow sense (proportionality 
stricto sensu): this is a discretionary judgment by court that the benefit of the 
law outweighs the restriction on the particular right. 
In this last step, balancing becomes again relevant in the form of a cost-benefit analysis. 
Therefore some of the criticism discussed above may apply. In particular it has been 
admitted that determining the relative benefits and the costs is still “neither scientific, 
nor precise”.76 However, balancing only occurs at the final stage making it more 
targeted. It does not consider liberty versus security, but the marginal advantage of the 
public interest versus the marginal damage to the right caused by a particular measure.77 
Furthermore, the last two steps must be clearly distinguished. As Elliott summarised, 
“whereas the necessity test is ultimately concerned with whether a given policy 
objective may be pursued in a particular way, the narrow proportionality test 
determines whether it may, given its impact on rights, be pursued at all.”78  
The structure set out above however is not commonly agreed on. There are sometimes 
considerable differences in how the courts apply the principle of proportionality in 
																																								 																				
76 Barak, above n 57, 7. Julian Rivers commented: “Our problem is not that the values are 
incommensurable, but that relative assessments can only be carried out in a rude manner.” Julian Rivers, 
“Proportionality and variable intensity of review” (2006) 65(1) Cambridge Law Journal 174, 201. 
77 Barak, above n 57, 8; see also Alexy, above n 60, 102-103. 
78 Elliott, above n 68, 267 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). 
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particular contexts.79 Most notably in the UK, the fourth and fifth steps are often 
conflated.80 Some have even argued that the reason for the wide acceptance of 
proportionality is due to the fact that it can be used as an instrument of restrictive as 
well as progressive forms of judicial review.81 
Julian Rivers has argued that differences in the formulations of proportionality stem 
from the differing attitudes judges have to their role in protecting rights.82 In the 
common law world, judges understand themselves as protecting rights against the 
intrusions from the other branches of government. Accordingly there is a clear divide 
between rights on the one hand, and the public interest on the other. Rivers describes 
this attitude as “state-limiting” and proportionality has to be put into this context. In 
contrast, the continental European approach of proportionality is more open: it does not 
distinguish formally between rights and other interests. Further, the principle is 
applicable to all branches of government. According to the leading study by German 
scholar, Robert Alexy, rights are generally principles, representing values, which should 
“be realised to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities”.83 
Objectives expressed in statutes often advance equally valuable principles. However. 
when it comes to a conflict between principles, one principle must ultimately prevail. 
																																								 																				
79 For example, under German constitutional law there are only three tests (suitability, necessity and 
proportionality stricto sensu). This omits the first two steps, which may have more relevance in common 
law systems, where rights are not necessarily constitutional and Parliament is not guided by a constitution 
in terms of policy objectives. Also proportionality in the narrow sense presupposes a legitimate end, as 
there would be no gain otherwise. Aharon Barak proposes four steps in his book, Proportionality: 
constitutional rights and their limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 3. 
80 See de Freitas v The Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
and Others (Antigua and Barbuda) [1998] UKPC 30 (30 June1998) [25]; which has been confirmed 
amongst others in R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for The Home Department [2001] 
UKHL 26 (23 May 2001) [27] and Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 
11 (21 March 2007) [19]. It is not even clear from these cases in how far the last step is considered at all. 
See Elliott, above n 68, 266. 
81 Ian Leigh, “The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act”, in Helen Fenwick, Gavin 
Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 174, 182. 
82 Rivers, above n 76, 179-182. 
83 Alexy, above n 60, 47. Principles are distinguished from rules, which are not variable, but either 
fulfilled or not fulfilled. Any norm is either a principle or a rule. Some parts of a right can also be 
expressed a rule. 
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As both are relative, principles are not simply to be balanced against each other. Rather 
the question asked is under which conditions should the consideration of one principle 
precede the other, leading to an optimisation of both principles.84 Inherent in this law of 
competing principles is the principle of proportionality.85 
One could assume that rights are more strongly protected under a state-limiting 
approach to proportionality, but this is not necessarily the case. This is because in many 
systems the principle of parliamentary supremacy is also a privilege. As long as the 
public policy objective is legitimate and sufficiently important, and the measure is 
considered to be necessary to fulfil that objective, the courts are more reluctant to 
interfere in policy decisions that have received both a legislative and executive 
mandate.86   
In the UK, Rivers analysed that balancing often happens earlier, and the fourth step is 
sometimes ignored entirely.87 This comes much closer to what common law judges 
applied previously in English administrative law under the Wednesbury test of 
‘unreasonableness’,88 and is an expression of how judges still understand their 
relationship to the other branches.  
While this overview is brief, it is important to recap at this stage that the structured 
approach to proportionality can guarantee that all critical aspects are considered and 
applied consistently in different cases. Proportionality operates to increase the clarity, 
																																								 																				
84 Ibid, 50-54. 
85 Ibid, 66-69. 
86 Rivers, above n 76, 179-180. 
87 Ibid, 187-190: Rivers discusses in particular A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004); see also for example Smith & Others v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 1013 (Admin) (3 May 2007) [50] (Williams J). 
88 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1 (10 
November 1947). Under the doctrine, UK courts would only set aside administrative decisions that were 
so unreasonable that no sensible authority would have decided in such a way. It demonstrates judicial 
restraint, as courts would not review the merits of a decision, as long as it did not amount to an abuse of 
power.  
Chapter 4: Balancing liberty and security?   
   115 
consistency, predictability, and thus legitimacy, of a decision. In the context of counter-
terrorism, many commentators have argued for a proportionality approach in order to 
ensure high standards of human rights protection.89  
																																								 																				
89 Feldman, above n 6, 364; Nicola McGarrity and Edward Santow, “Anti-terrorism laws: balancing 
national security and a fair hearing”, in Victor Ramraj et al (eds), Global anti-terrorism law and policy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 122, 150; Michaelsen, above n 11, 20; Christopher 
Michaelsen, “The proportionality principle, counter-terrorism and human rights: a German-Australian 
comparison” (2010) 1(2) City University of Hong Kong Law Review 19. 
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4.2 – National security and the need for due deference 
Applying the proportionality principle to question of non-disclosure of information, 
judges need to address the question of whether its suppression is necessary and 
appropriate for achieving the stated aim, namely, to achieve increased public safety. 
Furthermore, any cost imposed upon the defendant needs to be proportionate (in the 
narrow sense) to the benefit gained from non-disclosure. In all of these steps the judges 
will encounter complex questions of national security, including some sort of risk 
assessment. Given the complexity of security assessments and their lack of experience 
in evaluating security information, judges may have difficulties in mastering this task.  
Avoiding the situation of making a wrong decision, which could cause serious damage 
to national security, judges have traditionally refrained from interfering with 
governmental measures taken in the interest of national security.90 Ministers, supported 
by the public service and its expertise, claim to be best placed for making security 
assessments and deciding what is necessary to address effectively threats.91 	Posner and 
Vermeule have even described judges as “amateurs playing at security policy”,92 
convinced from a legal and political perspective that they should not interfere with 
executive decisions. In legal terms this zone, which is deemed to be beyond judicial 
competence, is often expressed in spatial metaphors, such as an area of discretion for the 
																																								 																				
90 In the UK, famous cases such as R v Halliday, ex parte Zadig [1917] AC 260 (1 May 1917); Liversidge 
v Anderson [1942] AC 206 (3 November 1941); Rehman v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2001] UKHL 47 (11 October 2001) clearly express this attitude. In Australia see also for example Al 
Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 (6 August 2004). 
91 “Deference is a rational response to uncertainty”: Aileen Kavanagh, “Deference or defiance? The limits 
of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication” in Grant Huscroft (ed), Expounding the Constitution: 
essays in constitutional theory (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 184, 186 and 208; cf  Fiona De 
Londras and Fergal Davis, “Controlling the executive in times of terrorism: competing perspectives on 
effective oversight mechanisms” (2010) 30(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19. 
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executive or non-justiciability.93 As a consequence, in this zone judges simply defer to 
the primary decision-maker on questions such risk assessment. 
The recognition of a judicial exclusion zone in security cases, however, is at odds with 
the demands of a liberal-democratic state governed by the rule of law, which requires 
that all governmental action be reviewable under the law. By unconditionally deferring 
to the executive, judges surrender their duty to protect constitutionally protected rights, 
weakening not only the system of checks and balances, but also depriving individuals 
adversely affected by executive action of any review or recourse.94  
There is a manifest tension between making sound national security decisions and the 
need for the protection of human rights. When applying a proportionality analysis to 
executive decision-making, the courts are resolving both legal and policy questions.  
This Section explores the relationship between the executive and judiciary when 
reviewing decisions in general, and national security decisions in particular. There is 
increasing judicial and academic support for the position that outright non-justiciability 
is not acceptable. One solution for upholding higher standards of scrutiny, while also 
acknowledging the expertise of the executive in matters of security is the concept of 
‘due deference’. Here judges may still defer to the executive, but the deference must be 
earned, with judges providing reasons for the degree and motivation of this deference. 
The scope of due deference, however, is still controversial. This is not surprising given 
that the scope of deference is closely connected with the dogmatic understanding of the 
																																								 																				
93 See for example Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 703(C), (Lord Bingham); R (on the application of 
Begum) v Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (22 March 2006) [63] (Lord Hoffmann); Leghaei v 
Director-General of Security [2007] FCAFC 37 (23 March 2007) [65]. 
94 It is often recognised in retrospect that wartime measures have been extreme and that judges have 
neglected their duty to protect rights. At the same time, the dissenters are applauded in the aftermath. See 
for example David Dyzenhaus, “Cycles of legality in emergency times” (2007) 18 Public Law Review 
165, 169; in the US context see David Cole, “Enemy Aliens” (2002) 54 Stanford Law Review 953, 993. 
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separation of powers, and thus the overall relationship between the branches of 
government.  
The following Section will highlight these tensions by discussing two models of judicial 
deference in security cases, one advocated by Aileen Kavanagh, and the other by David 
Dyzenhaus. The two models can be distinguished not only by the role of the judges, but 
also by what is expected from primary decision-makers in justifying the decision, and in 
taking rights into account in the first place. The importance of the Section in relation to 
the Chapter is that it will identify the conditions that are crucial for judges to engage 
properly and meaningfully in a proportionality analysis.  
 
4.2.1 - Defining deference: two models  
Aileen Kavanagh, who has written extensively on the topic, defines judicial deference 
as the process of “judges assign[ing] varying degrees of weight to the judgments of the 
elected branches, out of respect for their superior expertise, competence or democratic 
legitimacy”.95 For Kavanagh deference is always a matter of degree, it is partial rather 
than absolute, and not determined by any subject matter.96 These characteristics 
distinguish deference from abasement or non-justiciability, and make this approach 
even “compatible with an interventionist role for judges”.97 
Kavanagh distinguishes between minimal and substantial deference.98 The former 
category of minimal deference is not relevant for the purposes of this Section, as it 
represents a general acknowledgement of the legitimacy and authority of the primary 
																																								 																				
95 Aileen Kavanagh, “Defending deference in public law and constitutional theory”(2010) 126(4) Law 
Quarterly Review 222, 223. 
96 Ibid, 223-226; see also Rivers, above n 76, 174. 
97 Kavanagh, above n 95, 248. 
98 Kavanagh, above n 91, 191. 
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decision-maker. According to Kavanagh minimal deference does not need to be earned 
by the executive, and cannot be dismissed without proper justification.99 The more 
relevant category in the counter-terrorism context is substantial deference, which in 
Kavanagh’s view, “has to be earned by the elected branches and is only warranted when 
the courts judge themselves suffer from particular institutional shortcomings with 
regard to the issue at hand”.100 This is done in two separate steps: first, the judge makes 
an institutional evaluation, in which he/she determines the degree of deference. In a 
separate process, the judge then engages in the substantive evaluation of the issue.101 It 
is only at this stage that the context is added. 
Criteria that may increase the degree of deference given are institutional, ie the degree 
of authority is intentionally delegated to that institution,102 superior expertise in the 
subject area,103 the degree of democratic legitimacy,104 the degree of accountability of 
the primary decision-maker, alternative checks and balances, and efforts made to 
conduct a compatibility inquiry, which may involve consultation with stakeholders. 
This can be contrasted with another model of deference, put forward by Dyzenhaus. He 
distinguishes two conceptions of deference: ‘deference as submission’ and ‘deference as 
respect’. In relation to the latter, “[d]eference as respect requires judges to pay 
respectful attention to the reasons offered by the primary decision maker as justification 
																																								 																				
99 Ibid, 191. 
100 Ibid, 192. 
101 Ibid, 190; Kavanagh, above n 95, 231; cf also T R S Allan, “Human rights and judicial review: a 
critique of ‘due deference’” (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 671, 675. 
102 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
158 (22 February 2002) [85]; cf R v British Broadcasting Corporation; ex parte ProLife Alliance [2003] 
UKHL 23 (10 April 2003) [76] (Lord Hoffmann).  See also Kavanagh, above n 91, 193. 
103 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
158 (22 February 2002) [87] (Laws LJ); Jeffrey Jowell, “Judicial deference: servility, civility or 
institutional capacity?” (2003) Winter Public Law 592, 598; Kavanagh, above n 91, 194. 
104 The criterion of democratic legitimacy is controversial as it touches the very essence of the 
relationship between the branches. The issues involved will be discussed in detail below at 4.2.4. 
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for a particular decision”.105 While taking both the process and the quality of the 
decision into account, the court decides for itself.106 Where Dyzenhaus draws the line of 
what should be the task of the judge becomes obvious when looking at the other 
category of deference by submission: 
“[S]ubmissive deference requires judges to submit to the intention of the 
legislature, on a positivist understanding of what constitutes that intention. If the 
legislature’s intention is to delegate authority to an official to interpret and 
implement a statutory mandate, this conception of deference transfers the 
submissive stance it requires from the legislature to the offices. Judges should defer 
to the primary decision maker’s decision, as long as the decision maker does not 
stray beyond the limits of his statutory authority, positivistically construed.”107 
Within those parameters the court does not have to determine for itself, based on 
judicial reasoning, whether a right has been violated or not. Such interpretation creates 
an area of discretion based on a strict view of parliamentary supremacy, which denies 
the existence of constitutionally protected rights. Hence, whereas deference as respect 
requires adequate reasons from the primary decision maker, submissive deference does 
not pay attention to the quality of the reasoning or whether there are reasons provided at 
all.  
It is now widely accepted within academia that creating areas of non-justiciability is 
inappropriate judicial behaviour and that judges are democratically authorised to review 
governmental decisions. In the UK there is a trend within the judiciary to support this 
																																								 																				
105 David Dyzenhaus, “Deference, security and human rights” in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus 
(eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 125, 131. 
106 See for example Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 (21 March 
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107 Dyzenhaus, above n 105, 131. 
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view.108 In A and others, Lord Bingham defended the judges’ function of interpreting 
and applying the law independently in a democracy underpinned by the rule of law.109 
Lord Rodger added that any form of deference has its limits: 
“Due deference does not mean abasement before those views [of the Government 
and Parliament], even in matters relating to national security […]. The legitimacy 
of the courts’ scrutiny role cannot be in doubt.”110 
In Roth, Lord Brown (then sitting as Brown LJ in the Court of Appeal) held that:  
"[T]he court's role under the Human Rights Act is as the guardian of human 
rights. It cannot abdicate this responsibility. If ultimately it judges the [anti-people 
smuggling] scheme to be quite simply unfair, then the features that make it so 
must inevitably breach the Convention."111 
Hence, in order to fulfil the court’s duty under both the HRA and the rule of law, in 
theory, there should be no area ‘off limits’ to judges.  
In relation to Australia, it is worth emphasising that Lord Bingham’s comments on the 
judicial legitimacy to engage in the interpretation and application of the law were not 
based on the HRA, but rather on the nature of the democratic state itself built on the rule 
of law. Although, the courts must observe the limitations of judicial authority, they 
																																								 																				
108 In this respect “Lord Hoffmann’s judgement in Rehman swims against the judicial tide: Kavanagh, 
above n 95, 242. 
109 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004) 
[42]. 
110 Ibid, [176]. 
111 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
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cannot be entirely excluded from any area on the basis of the (purported) superior 
democratic legitimacy of the other branches of government.112 
Despite increased acceptance of due deference,113 in practice it is still difficult to 
determine how much scrutiny must be applied by the courts. In other words, at what 
point does ‘deference as respect’ turn into ‘deference as submission’. The difficulties 
will become particularly apparent in the discussion of national security cases below.  
What is particularly dangerous is where judges purport that an area is justiciable, but 
effectively keep deferring to such an extent that any effective scrutiny for rights 
violations has been forfeited. Dyzenhaus, who dedicated much of his scholarship to this 
phenomenon – which he describes as “legal grey holes” - warns that such a shallow 
understanding of deference is no more than a smokescreen of submission.114 For 
Dyzenhaus this is even worse than the proper acknowledgement by a judge of not 
engaging at all, as it suggests a commitment to legality where there is in fact none.  
The two-step system towards determining deference, proposed by Kavanagh, supports 
the notion of legal grey holes. Having a separate process of evaluating institutional 
qualities, the court may neglect the substantial analysis that is supposed to follow. Put 
differently, where a court relies heavily on the inherent qualities of another branch and 
so neglects to review the persuasiveness of the reasoning behind the primary decision, 
deference becomes a substitute for legal analysis, or at least a short cut.115 The court 
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effectively gives up its neutrality and sacrifices necessary checks and balances on 
governmental authorities. In such cases deference would be tantamount to non-
justiciability,116 and due deference collapses into submission.  
 
4.2.2 - Deference in national security cases 
The differences between the approaches to deference discussed in the previous section 
are particularly apparent in national security cases, where judges have been required to 
confront and assess security risks and disclosure of sensitive information. These cases 
reveal the executive’s expectation of the judicial role in such contexts, and the risk that 
due deference collapses into deference as outright submission. 
Analysing national security cases in the UK, Kavanagh undertook an institutional 
evaluation of why judges defer to the executive in such matters, identifying three 
reasons.117 The first reason related to judicial awareness of the risk of potentially 
catastrophic consequences – leading judges to a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach; the 
second related to the courts’ lack of capability to predict risk, and the third related to the 
need to protect sensitive information. The latter two reasons obviously go to the heart of 
this thesis and one of its main questions, namely: how can judges engage in a proper 
risk assessment in cases where they are being denied necessary information relevant to 
the legal issue in issue.  
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Kavanagh continues: 
“[The] fact [of limited information] alone will (rightly) lead [the court] to pay 
more deference to the primary decision-maker because it will be less confident 
that it could arrive at a better decision than the primary decision-maker.”118   
Without access to the relevant information or its own intelligence service, the court has 
no choice other than to defer to the authority that has access to the relevant information. 
Therefore, “deference is a rational response to uncertainty”.119 Kavanagh also accepts 
that sometimes courts simply have to bow to political realities.120 She concludes that in 
national security cases  
“the court will only interfere with a governmental or legislative decision if it is 
clearly wrong, or there is a very strong reason to do so. In general, the greater the 
degree of uncertainty, the more judicial restraint may be required”.121  
This approach to ‘due deference’ in these cases suggest there is a slippery slope along 
which deference collapses into submission. It seems that within this approach 
institutional evaluation trumps the substantive evaluation, as it is accepted that the 
substantive review of the merit of the security risk assessment is beyond judicial 
competence. It also creates a rule/exception situation in favour of deference, which is 
rather reminiscent of the Wednesbury approach to reasonableness.122 Finally, any 
judicial reference to potentially catastrophic consequences, an assertion which is often 
accepted without clear proof, indicates an unwillingness to engage in substantive 
judicial review.  
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Kavanagh finds support for her arguments above relating to deference in the Belmarsh 
case.123 In the decision, the House of Lords rejected the idea of complete deference in 
national security cases. However, it applied different degrees of deference on the 
questions of whether (a) there was an emergency and (b) the measure was proportionate 
to that emergency. On the former question, where the House of Lords was unable to 
access the necessary information, it deferred to the Executive. The crucial statement in 
this respect came from Lord Scott, who remarked that without having seen any of the 
closed (classified) material, the Secretary of State should profit from “the benefit of the 
doubt”.124 On the latter question, where information was made available to the court, the 
matter could be decided without deferring to the Executive.125.   
Critics of the decision argue that the need for plausible and convincing arguments to 
justify deference and non-disclosure apply equally to national security questions.126 If 
substantive review or quality control of security risk assessments were the main 
objective, the lack of certainty about these matters would demand that the courts to 
refrain from forming a judgment. Rather than resort to deference borne from an 
institutional rationale (ie lack of competence), the judges should either demand the 
necessary information in order to make a substantive decision, or expressly 
acknowledge that they are not in a position to make any decision. Expertise, 
competence or legitimacy, alone or collectively, do not prevent abuse of power – only 
proper processes of review will do this. On the contrary, the approach to deference in 
Belmarsh creates an incentive for the Executive to expand its claims of secrecy, seeking 
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more suppression of sensitive information simply in order to avoid legal scrutiny of the 
court, rather than for genuine security reasons!  
Belmarsh suggests, on one reading, that judges are more willing to engage in review in 
national security cases, although the decision reveals there are some structural problems 
with the different degrees of deference. Dyzenhaus pointed out that the fact that the 
majority was prepared to defer though to various degrees - as outlined above – suggest 
doctrinal inconsistency.127 In order for a court to apply the principle of proportionality 
to determine the question of an appropriate response, it must inevitably address the 
extent of the claimed state of emergency.128 It is equally problematic that their 
Lordships did not label the first question as non-justiciable, but rather set the standard of 
review so low that requiring proper justification for the Government’s decision seemed 
redundant.129 
Adopting a stricter approach to deference, however, does not deny the significant 
difficulties judges face in such situations. Even where the state provides sufficient 
information, judges may struggle to determine the quality of the primary decision 
without expert assistance. In this respect Dyzenhaus suggested that substantive review 
may require institutional adjustments and legislative support. Otherwise, grey holes 
seem unavoidable and it would be unfair to blame judges for creating them. Here it is 
important to stress again that judges do not need to answer the question themselves, but 
simply be able to question the primary decision if necessary and thus allow for an 
effective system of checks and balances even in national security cases.  
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4.2.3 - Deference as a defining characteristic of the relationship between the 
branches of government 
It is worth taking a step back at this point and putting deference into a larger 
constitutional picture. The degree of judicial deference to the Executive often correlates 
to the theoretical beliefs underpinning the democratic system, particularly the 
interaction between the branches of government. In a system with a strong emphasis on 
parliamentary supremacy, courts must defer out of respect for the principle of popular 
sovereignty. On the other hand, where liberal constitutionalism is accepted as an aspect 
of democracy, ‘deference as submission’ has no legitimate space.130 There is to some 
extent a sliding scale between non-justiciability and the legal obligation to engage in 
substantive review – even in national security cases – which arguably also corresponds 
with the national human rights culture and whether rights are protected constitutionally.  
But rather than adopt an idea of government, based on either parliamentary supremacy 
or liberal constitutionalism, there is a more conciliatory interpretation of this 
relationship.131 Murray Hunt has termed this idea of government ‘democratic 
constitutionalism’: 
“The conceptual neatness of sovereignty-derived thinking too readily seduces 
[English lawyers] into a conceptualisation of public law in terms of competing 
supremacies, which in fact bears little relation to the way in which public power 
is now dispersed and shared between several layers of constitutional actors, all 
of which profess an identical commitment to a set of values which can loosely 
be termed democratic constitutionalism.”132 
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This interpretation may fit better in an age of increased human rights consciousness and 
doubts regarding the integrity of politicians. Once all constitutional actors recognise that 
they are on equal footing and working towards the same goal of democratic 
constitutionalism, the prominent question becomes how this is achieved in any given 
context. This in turn should allow for more respect for their mutual responsibilities. 
Rather than looking at competing competences, the focus from a public interest 
perspective is how to achieve optimal decisions guaranteed by a functioning system of 
checks and balances.133 In such a system “[n]either branch has legitimacy without the 
independent existence and functioning of the other. They are Siamese twins, separate 
personalities but joined at the hip”.134 
There is also growing recognition from within the judiciary itself of the importance of 
enhancing its constitutional standing as a branch of government. In Roth it was held that 
“in its present state of evolution, the British system may be said to stand at an 
intermediate position between parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy 
[…]”.135 But rather than understanding this as a continuous process of legal evolution 
from the former to the latter, one should perceive the ‘settlement’ between the two as 
recognising the important roles played by both concepts.136 The introduction of the 
HRA has facilitated such recognition in the UK, as Lord Brown held in Roth: 
“Certainly [the case] raises questions as to the degree of deference owed by the 
courts to the legislature and executive in the means used to achieve social goals. 
But judges nowadays have no alternative but to apply the Human Rights Act. 
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Constitutional danger exists no less in too little judicial activism as in too much. 
There are limits to the legitimacy of executive or legislative decision-making, just 
as there are to decision-making by the courts.”137 
Despite the significant influence of the HRA in the UK, such a position is equally 
defensible in systems without explicit human rights legislation. The HRA did not 
completely change the behaviour of the judges in the UK, or their tendencies to defer 
(or not): “[English judges] have always had to decide cases in areas of political 
controversy. The Human Rights Act has ushered in only a difference of degree, not of 
kind”.138 This stems from the claim that in the UK the English common law has long 
endorsed ideas of constitutional freedoms and liberties, and that the independent rights 
recognised under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) cover similar 
ground to those protected under the common law.139 Furthermore, Dyzenhaus has 
pointed out that, even for AV Dicey writing in the 19th century, the rule of law and the 
principle of legality were central to the unwritten common law constitution, and that in 
exceptional situations, could restrict Parliamentary sovereignty.140  
Seeking this equilibrium, rather than allowing one branch of government to dominate 
others, has a number of consequences: 
First, it recognises that every branch of government has its strength and weaknesses. In 
the context of this thesis, it is acknowledged that the executive possesses the expertise 
on national security issues, and that parliament bears the prime responsibility to make 
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sure that security legislation does not impact excessively on individual liberties. On the 
other hand, it should be acknowledged that, notwithstanding its limited expertise in 
assessing security risks, the courts are better placed to assess violations of rights and the 
fundamental values of a liberal democracy.141 Their qualities of independence, openness 
and the obligation to give reasons for their decisions, which can be scrutinised by any 
party, places the courts in a strong position to perform that task.142  
Second, no branch of government has the exclusive responsibility for guaranteeing 
individual liberties, or more specifically, to determine the outcome of cases where 
liberty and security interests are in conflict. Rather, the branches are all part of the same 
system, upholding the same values and underpinned by the rule of law.143 Each branch 
has specific and distinct constitutional duties and powers, which correspond with their 
respective strength and weaknesses. Therefore, questions of proportionality are a 
concern for both primary and the secondary decision-makers.144 Such a shared 
responsibility is also reflected in the HRA, in so far as the courts may issue a 
declaration of incompatibility and the relevant Minister has a power of remedial 
action.145 
A valid criticism relates to the inevitable controversy about the content and scope of 
these shared values and how to interpret them. Trevor Allan doubts that it is possible to 
define these values precisely through legislation, and speculates that they would be 
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“rather invoked as an aid to correct interpretation in particular circumstances”.146 As a 
consequence, legislation cannot help with the judicial task of applying the values to the 
facts, which inevitably requires moral judgement.147 It follows from this insight that, 
according to Allan, the system is characterised either by democratic positivism or liberal 
constitutionalism. Everything in between would be ‘unstable’.148 This, however, 
position overlooks the fact that parliament may clarify over time the meaning of such 
values, including fairness, without necessarily usurping the proper judicial function of 
applying such values in the process of adjudicating particular disputes. Such a 
‘conversation’ between the courts and legislature can be productive as long as it is based 
on rational legal and moral arguments, which also leads to the final point.  
Third, acknowledging each other’s respective institutional competences also requires 
respecting each other’s decisions. At the same time, in order to earn that respect, 
decisions by the various branches of government must be adequately justified. Hence, 
the concept of due deference to the executive must include this additional requirement 
of justification. As Dyzenhaus argued,  
“an effective principle of legality requires the institutions and legal culture that 
make deference possible. […]And such a legal culture can only come into being 
and thrive, if all the institutions of legal order are committed to what I will call, 
following the late South African lawyer Etienne Mureinik, a ‘culture of 
justification’.”149 
Lord Steyn shares this approach. Ex curiae he described the changes to the English legal 
system after the enactment of the HRA as follows: 
																																								 																				
146 Allan, above n 101, 673. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid, 674. 
149 Dyzenhaus, above n 105, 137. 
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“Now there has been a decisive shift towards a rights based system. A legal 
culture of demanding justification for inroads on fundamental rights and 
freedoms now prevails.”150 
A culture of justification is a necessary condition for any effective system of post hoc 
review of primary decision-makers. It also promotes dialogue between the branches of 
government.151 On the other hand, systems, where no justification is required or given, 
imply that deference is determined simply through an institutional evaluation of which 
branch holds supremacy.152  
As this section has explored, where fairness and security interests clash, there appears to 
be a dilemma. However, as long as the claims about security need not be empirically 
demonstrated, such a dilemma does actually not exist.153 This is why a culture of 
justification is critical to the application of the principle of proportionality. In particular, 
the more serious the interference with a right is, the higher is the threshold requirement 
for evidence and thus the need for justification.154 
 
‘Checks and balances’ as a protector of liberty 
Characterising the relationship between the judicial, legislative and executive branches 
of government in terms of sharing responsibilities underpinned by a culture of 
justification, puts less emphasis on the concept of separation of powers, than on the 
concept of ‘checks and balances’. The concepts are closely related, but actually 
																																								 																				
150 Lord Steyn, “Democracy through law” (Occasional Paper No 12, New Zealand Centre for Public Law, 
September 2002) 14. 
151 Barak, above n 57, 17. 
152 See Allan, above n 101, 676 and 682-683. 
153 Ashworth, above n 20, 208; in the context of police informers see Henry Mares, “Balancing public 
interest and a fair trial in police informer privilege: a critical Australian perspective” (2002) 6 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 94, 105. 
154 Alexy, above n 60, xxxv. A similar point has been made in the context of counter-terrorism: Bronitt, 
above n 22, 65. 
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distinct.155 Whereas it is important to distinguish between the kinds of tasks attributed to 
the branches, it has been argued that the protection of liberties is best served by 
“prevent[ing] actors from conclusively determining the reach of their powers”, which is 
at the heart of ‘checks and balances’.156 
Democracy depends upon controlling power through its dispersion.157 ‘Checks and 
balances’ are a cardinal feature to avoid arbitrary and abusive governmental action by 
putting constraints on all actors. Lord Hailsham, in his critique of the Westminster 
system in the late 1970s, equally called for 
“limit[ing] the unlimited powers of the legislature, partly by establishing a new 
system of checks and balances, partly by devolution, and partly by restricting the 
power of Parliament to infringe the rights of minorities and individuals.”158 
Nonetheless, even if all these above propositions were accepted, it is arguable that when 
it comes to security-related decisions, courts are not well positioned or adapted to 
making such evaluations. In security situations, where decisions need to be made 
rapidly without details being revealed to the public, openness is dangerous and 
following a process of deliberation and procedure too slow.159 This criticism is valid 
and should not be dismissed quickly. But abandoning ‘checks and balances’ entirely 
should not be the solution, and so far there is little evidence to support this position 
from those countries that have adopted a blanket exclusion of national security matters 
																																								 																				
155 See James Stellios, The federal judicature: Chapter III of the Constitution (LexisNexi Butterworths, 
2010) 63. 
156 Laurenz Claus, “Montesquieu's mistakes and the true meaning of separation” (2005) 25(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 419, 420. The founding fathers of the United States were more conscious of that 
fact and elevated the judiciary from the British system to a position where it would be able to check and 
put limits on the powers of parliament. 
157 See Haig Patapan, “Court’s conception of democracy” in Tony Blackshild, Michael Coper and George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
201, 203. 
158 Lord Hailsham, above n 4, 132. 
159 Posner and Vermeule, above n 12, 31. 
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from judicial scrutiny. The preferred position must be to amend processes, procedures 
and institutions in a way they can achieve both ends. Judges need assistance in 
evaluating the risk to national security, if sensitive information were disclosed. This 
may even require what could be conceived as a violation of the separation of powers in 
a commitment to checks and balances. 
Dyzenhaus calls for greater imagination to create appropriate institutional systems or 
amend their procedure to address current deficiencies in order to conduct meaningful 
review without jeopardising national security. To be successful, Dyzenhaus stresses the 
importance of adopting a common approach to security matters across all branches of 
government. Such an approach would involve the enactment of legislation that courts 
and key decision-makers can apply consistently, and that would minimise the risk of 
unjustified suppression of any important information to the defence.160 
As this approach to assessing security issues potentially involves all branches, the 
process should be placed on a legislative footing. Input from the legislature in how to 
steer the behaviour of the other branches is vital. The articulation of the particular 
values and the respective roles in legislation, adds certainty in the application of the 
statutes, avoiding lengthy legal argument and delayed adjudication. The fact that it is 
entrenched in legislation also promotes legitimacy. Parliament should play the lead role 
in driving any institutional changes, as necessary and appropriate. In a system that is 
based on responsible government, the primary way of solving conflicts between liberty 
and security should be through political deliberation in parliament followed by 
																																								 																				
160 Dyzenhaus, above n 114, 205-220. This is supported by Kent Roach, “Ordinary laws for emergencies 
and democratic derogation from rights” in Victor Ramraj (ed), Emergencies and the limits of legality 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 229, 256. Kavanagh also hints at a similar approach by mentioning 
specialist courts or install some other specialist design as a possibility to overcome judicial deficiencies. 
Aileen Kavanagh, “Constitutionalism, counterterrorism and the courts: changes in the British 
constitutional landscape (2011) 9(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 172, 178. 
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legislative action.161 
 
4.2.4 - Judicial determination of deference  
In sum, the competence of the judiciary to review governmental action as a means to 
protect guaranteed liberties of the individuals must be acknowledged, respected and 
even facilitated by the other branches. Consequently, any decision that is subject to 
judicial scrutiny must be justified to an extent that enables the courts to fulfil their 
constitutional duties. There will always be debate over where this line should be drawn 
between fairness and security, but it is submitted here that blindly deferring, on the sole 
‘say-so’ of a primary decision-maker, is never good enough. Requiring the executive to 
offer justification to the courts and accept scrutiny by the courts will avoid the collapse 
of due deference into slavish submission. At the same time, it must be accepted that a 
court should never overrule a reasoned decision by a competent decision-making 
authority without convincing legal justification. This Chapter has proposed that 
decisions in security cases may be congruent with ‘deference as respect’ supported by a 
robust ‘culture of justification’. But there is danger that the term ‘deference’ is 
misunderstood as submission, an application which is misleading and should be 
avoided. Once a decision is accepted as being sufficiently justified by the appropriate 
authority, the court confidently should confirm the decision, rather than ‘defer’ to or 
submit to a ‘higher’ authority of the Executive in national security cases. The term 
deference should be reserved for any judicial act that includes a submissive element. 
   
																																								 																				
161 See for example Tom Campbell “Human rights: a culture of controversy” (1999) 26 Journal of Law 
and Society 6. A similar argument has been made by Stribopoulos within the criminal justice debate of 
due process versus crime control. See James Stribopoulos, “Packer's blind spot: low visibility encounters 
and the limits of due process versus crime control” in François Tanguay-Renaud and James Stribopoulos 
(eds), Rethinking criminal law theory (Hart Publishing, 2012) 193, 196 and 216. 
Chapter 4: Balancing liberty and security?   
   136 
4.3 – The right to a fair trial and the public interest 
As much as national security can cause challenges in the application of the principle of 
proportionality, the RFT also requires some additional analysis. Most human rights are 
not absolute in the sense that they may be subject to limits in the public interest. This 
type of limitation is part of all major international human rights treaties and even 
opponents of balancing accept some concessions may be required in ‘extra-ordinary’ 
circumstances. For example, Dworkin, whose language of rights as trumps initially 
gives the impression of an absolute position,162 argued that limitations to rights are 
acceptable in the public interest when the cost to society “would be to a degree far 
beyond the cost paid to grant the original right, a degree great enough to justify 
whatever assault on dignity or equality might be involved”.163 To illustrate such a case, 
Dworkin commented on the freedom of speech: 
“Of course the Government may discriminate and may stop a man from 
exercising his right to speak when there is a clear and substantial risk that his 
speech will do great damage to the person or property of others, and no other 
means of preventing this are at hand […].”164 
It is also noteworthy that Dworkin did not distinguish between rights, thus rejecting the 
idea of a hierarchy of rights.165 However, it is often argued that not all human rights 
carry the same weight. This can be due to the nature of the right as well as a varying 
importance, which it might acquire in a particular cultural setting. Hence, when limiting 
																																								 																				
162 Joseph Raz commented on Dworkin that “[n]owhere does he say clearly and unambiguously anything 
more than that rights have some weight however little and may override some considerations which aren't 
themselves rights”. Joseph Raz, "Professor Dworkin's theory of rights," (1978) 26 Political Studies 126, 
as cited in Yowell, above n 18, 98. 
163 Dworkin, above n 51, 200. 
164 Ibid, 204. 
165 cf Ashworth, above n 34, 74-77. 
Chapter 4: Balancing liberty and security?   
   137 
rights in the public interest attention must be paid to the specific right in question.166 For 
example, the right not to be subject to torture is widely accepted as an absolute right that 
cannot be limited in the public interest. As already pointed out in Chapter 2, the RFT 
has a particular character, which also needs to be taken into consideration when in 
conflict with the public interest, which this Section will explore further.167 
Understood as a hydraulic process, balancing security and fairness suggests that if one 
interest is substantially heavier, the other interest may be outweighed in its entirety.	
When it comes to the RFT, there are indications that such an approach is inappropriate. 
This is because although the RFT is not absolute, there may still be limitations on how 
far fairness can be restricted in the public interest. To demonstrate this characteristic, 
this Section will discuss the case law of the ECtHR in relation to non-disclosure. The 
cases are particularly instructive, as the ECtHR - with its approach of a ‘fourth instance’ 
- is not concerned with a particular procedure of the national courts, but with the 
application of principles in order to determine whether the decision-making procedure 
as a whole conforms with art 6 – meaning whether an adequate level of procedural 
justice has been afforded.168 Furthermore the ECtHR case law, as noted above, is 
directly relevant to the UK through the passage of the HRA, and indirectly influencing 
the standards of international human rights law.169 
 
																																								 																				
166 Barak, above n 57, 11. 
167 This is particularly obvious under the common law, where unfairness can be declared a miscarriage of 
justice and may lead to the temporary of full stay of proceedings. 
168 For example Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 28901/95 (16 February 
2000) [62]; Schenk v Switzerland [ECtHR] Application no 10862/84 (12 July 1988) [46]; see also Claire 
Ovey and Robin White,, Jacobs and White: the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed, 2006) 159.  
169 See for example Michael Kirby, “The Australian debt to the European Court of Human Rights” in 
Breitmoser et al (eds), Human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Dike, 2007) 391. 
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4.3.1 - Limitations of the right to a fair trial under the ECHR  
Within the ECHR, art 6 holds a particular position straddling the categories of absolute 
and qualified rights. It is not listed under art 15 as a non-derogable (or absolute) right, 
which would mean that no limitations could be imposed even during a state of 
emergency.170 Neither does the article contain any qualifying clause, such as expressly 
included in arts 8-11 ECHR, which permits imposing limitations provided they are 
“necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety and national security”. 
Although not expressively mentioned in the ECHR, imposing limitations on these 
qualified rights must still comply with the principle of proportionality.171  
This particular position of the RFT between the two categories of absolute and qualified 
rights has been recognised by the UK Courts.172 In Dyer, Lord Hope specifically 
distinguished the RFT from the set of expressly qualified rights in the ECHR by stating 
that “it can be taken to be a fundamental principle that, where rights are provided for 
expressively by the Convention, there is no room for implied restrictions on those 
rights”.173 As a consequence of this decision, the RFT, as guaranteed in art 6(1), has 
been described as being ‘absolute’ in the sense that it “does not permit the application of 
any balancing exercise, and that the public interest can never be invoked to deny that 
right to anybody under any circumstances”.174 An a priori question arises whether the 
																																								 																				
170 These are arts 2, 3, 4(1), and 7 ECHR. However, the description as absolute may not be fully justified. 
Even those absolute rights suffer from relativism as people might disagree about the scope of the rights. 
For example, what constitutes torture or degrading treatment? Is hitting a child for educational purposes 
degrading? Does waterboarding constitute torture? Where is the line to coercive interrogation? 
171 Aron Ostrovsky, “What's so funny about peace, love, and understanding? How the margin of 
appreciation doctrine preserves core human rights within cultural diversity and legitimises International 
Human Rights Tribunals” (2005) 1(1) Hanse Law Review 47, 50. See for example Klass v Germany 
[ECtHR] Application no 5029/71 (6 September 1978). 
172 See for example Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC D1 (29 January 2002) [73] (Lord Hope). 
173 Ibid; Dyer concerned the right to a hearing within reasonable time. See also Delcourt v Belgium 
[ECtHR] Application no 2689/65 (17 January 1970) [25].  
174 Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC D1 (29 January 2002) [73] (Lord Hope), also referring to Brown v Stott 
[2003] 1 AC 681, 719. 
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RFT can be limited at all, and whether the principle of proportionality, which plays 
such a prominent role in relation to qualified rights, has any scope for application? 
Shortly after Dyer, the House of Lords gave further consideration to this question in 
Brown v Stott, one of first leading cases on art 6 after the introduction of the HRA, in 
which Lord Bingham, delivering the leading judgement in a unanimous House of Lords 
decision, held: 
“The jurisprudence of the European court very clearly establishes that while the 
overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be compromised, the constituent rights 
comprised, whether expressly or implicitly, within article 6 are not themselves 
absolute. […] The court has also recognised the need for a fair balance between 
the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, 
the search for which balance has been described as inherent in the whole of the 
Convention.”175 
In other words, despite the apparent absolute character of the RFT, as expressed in the 
wording and structure of the ECHR and the early indications in Dyer, under the HRA, 
the components of the RFT can be balanced against the public interest. This is also 
where the principle of proportionality becomes relevant.176  
Clearly Dyer was not a long-lived approach to the RFT. In Roth, the  English Court of 
Appeal (CA) also rejected the term ‘absolute’ right in relation to art 6 as being 
misleading. As the requirements under each aspect of the RFT depend on the 
																																								 																				
175 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 704 (emphasis added); see also Dyer v Watson [2002] UKPC D1 (29 
January 2002) [74] (Lord Hope); Home Office v Tariq [2011] UKSC 35 (13 July 2011) [139]-[140] (Lord 
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circumstances, there cannot be a uniform standard, which is what the term implies.177 
Given that no further guidance from the text or structure of the ECHR itself, the 
ECtHR’s case law is crucial for determining the scope of the RFT in relation to non-
disclosure of information. 
 
ECHR case law 
The ECtHR has decided an extensive number of cases on art 6, making it the most 
litigated right under the ECHR.178  When it comes to limitations of the RFT in general, 
there are some inconsistencies in the approach taken by the ECtHR.179 In particular, in 
several cases the ECtHR has indicated that a balancing approach is permissible.180 
However, such a balancing approach appears to be an exception to the higher standard 
applied in the majority of cases by the Court.181 Furthermore, particular aspects of art 6 
are not obviously affected by such inconsistencies.182 Understanding the Court’s 
approach is aided by examining the cases on non-disclosure of information, as well as 
anonymous and absent witnesses.183 
 
																																								 																				
177 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
158 (22 February 2002) [84] (Lord Laws). As these remarks were made in the context of discussing the 
degree of deference that the courts are required to give to the other branches of government (see above at 
4.2.1.), the CA also emphasised the special nature of the RFT describing it as “unqualified and cannot be 
abrogated”, which also clarifies that certain aspects are not entirely up for discussion. Ibid.  
178 Ovey and White, above n 168, 158. 
179 Ryan Goss, Criminal fair trial rights (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
180 Salabiaku v France [ECtHR] Application no 10519/83 (7 October 1988) [28], which concerned the 
presumption of innocence and the applicability of a presumption of fact combined with a reverse burden 
of proof. 
181 Ashworth, above n 34, 62; Andrew Ashworth, “Criminal proceedings after the Human Rights Act: the 
first year” (2001) November Criminal Law Review 855, 871. 
182 Ibid, 872. 
183 Within this thesis both anonymous and absent witnesses are considered as edited evidence. See for the 
definition of edited evidence see below in the Introduction of Chapter 6.  
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4.3.1.1   Anonymous and absent witnesses 
Cases based upon the evidence of an anonymous or absent witness not only concern the 
collective public interest to continue the trial, but also to a large extent the individual 
interests of that witness (who in some cases, may also be the victim of the accused’s 
alleged offence) not to be subject to violence or distress. Despite this widened public 
interest, the ECtHR has equally applied a high standard of protection of the defendant’s 
RFT.  
The ECtHR takes a principled approach, stressing that,  
“all the evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused at a public 
hearing with a view to adversarial argument […] As a rule, these [Article 6] 
rights require that an accused should be given an adequate and proper 
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either at the time 
the witness was making his statement or at some later stage of the 
proceedings.”184 
The right to confront one’s accusers is certainly not absolute, but any restrictions on the 
right need to be limited and, as the ECtHR has held, “[the right] cannot be scarified to 
expediency”.185 The process of determining whether such a limitation is permissible 
involve a number of considerations. First, the court must determine whether the 
restriction is strictly necessary. Difficulties in obtaining evidence in order to fight 
organised crime186 or drug trafficking187 do not in itself justify inroads into the right to 
confront a witness (unless sufficiently counterbalanced). Examining the law 
enforcement claim of the necessity of supressing a witness’ identity, there must be at 
																																								 																				
184 Kostovski v the Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) [41]; see in 
particular art 6(3)(d).   
185 Ibid, [44]. 
186 Ibid, [44]. 
187 Saïdi v France [ECtHR] Application no 14647/89 (20 September 1993) [44]. 
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least some degree of harm anticipated from disclosure in open court. In Doorson the 
reasons for the anonymity of the witnesses were considered sufficient, and not 
unreasonable. In that case, while the defendant had not directly threatened any of the 
witnesses, police records indicated that there was a real possibility that threats or 
retaliation would occur.188 One witness had already been threatened by other drug 
dealers, and another witness had suffered retaliation for providing evidence in a 
previous similar case. In Van Mechelen the ECtHR held the explanation for why the 
defendant was not allowed to be present during the examination of the witnesses, who 
happened to be police officers, in an open court session was not satisfactory. Thus, ‘fear 
of retaliation’ was held not to be a sufficient ground for limiting the right of the accused 
to hear the evidence against him/her, and ECtHR found a violation of RFT.189 Although 
fear of retaliation can be a reason for limiting the defendant’s right to confrontation, the 
court must be satisfied that the fear is based on objective grounds supported by 
evidence.190 Police officers in particular, as ‘professional’ witnesses who are not a 
disinterested class of witnesses or victims, should only testify anonymously in 
exceptional circumstances. The ECtHR observed that although police officers deserve 
protection, they have a “duty of obedience to the State’s executive authorities and 
usually have links with the prosecution”.191 However, the ECtHR has also accepted that 
the identity of an undercover officer may be withheld if disclosure would seriously 
threaten him/her future work.192  
																																								 																				
188 Doorson v. the Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 20524/92 (26 March 1996) [71]. 
189 Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands [ECtHR] applications nos 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 
and 22056/93 (23 April 1997) [58]-[60]. 
190 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 (15 
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191 Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands [ECtHR] applications nos 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 
and 22056/93 (23 April 1997) [56]. 
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The ECtHR grants a wide discretion to national laws on whether a witness must be 
called or not.193 Ashworth critically argued that assumptions about risk of retaliation 
alone should not permit anonymity, arguing instead that  
“[o]nly where the risk is shown to be sufficiently imminent to be regarded as 
more probable than not to materialise, it is submitted, is there sufficient ground 
to consider even the minimal curtailment of Article 6 that Doorson 
permitted.”194 
Ashworth observed that as long as the system continues to value the presumption of 
innocence, it is inappropriate to value the rights of a witness higher than the right of the 
accused to a fair trial.195 
Some limitations are, however, permissible if the defendant’s RFT is sufficiently 
counterbalanced. Courts can implement adjustments to standard trial procedures to 
ensure the defendant can challenge the evidence and therefore ‘compensate’ for any 
limitations on the fair trial rights that would otherwise apply. 
In Doorson, the defendant was excluded from a hearing during which the judge 
interviewed a witness, and was not informed about the witness’s identity. This 
limitation on his RFT was however, not considered a violation of art 6 because the 
judge knew the identity of the witness and the defence lawyer was present and also able 
to examine the witness.196  
However, in a number of cases the ECtHR has found violations of art 6. In Kostovski, 
the only examining magistrate heard the witness without knowing the identity of the 
																																								 																				
193 See for example Vidal v Belgium [ECtHR] Application no 12351/86 (22 April 1992) [33]. 
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person, and without the defendant or defence advocate being present.197 In Windisch, 
the witnesses were initially questioned in the pre-trial phase by police officers, who then 
testified during the trial. The ECtHR held that this procedure did not sufficiently 
counterbalance the limitations to the defendant’s RFT under art 6.198 
Different from the cases of Windisch199 or Saïdi,200 Doorson was held to be compliant 
with art 6, because there was additional corroborating evidence of guilt, in addition to 
the anonymous witness testimony. Crucially, these two aspects are cumulative 
requirements: corroboration does not replace counterbalancing. Rather the Court 
requires a conviction not to be “solely or to a decisive extent” based on a witness that 
the defendant was unable to question properly.201  
Although this rule seemed to be well established, the Grand Chamber changed its 
approach slightly – without claiming that this would contradict earlier decisions202 - 
after the UK Supreme Court took issue with the ‘sole or decisive’ rule in Horncastle,203 
and refused to follow the ECtHR’s earlier line of authority case law. While these cases 
concerned absent rather than anonymous witness, the principles in question are 
identical.204  
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In the joint cases of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
followed the UK approach and held that the sole or decisive rule is not absolute.205 
Rather a violation of art 6 can be avoided by sufficient counterbalancing through 
installing appropriate procedural safeguards. In particular, the Court needs to look for 
indications that the evidence seemed reliable despite the lack of actual cross-
examination.206 In Al-Khawaja the counterbalancing was considered sufficient, because 
apart from procedural safeguards supervised by the judge, the statement of a deceased 
witness had been considered reliable. The deceased had given a largely consistent 
account of events to both the police and two friends.207 In contrast, the anonymous 
witness statement in Tahery was not considered demonstrably reliable. A fight had 
taken place and all persons present had been interviewed by the police. Originally no 
witnesses claimed to have seen the applicant stabbing the victim, however, two days 
later an anonymous witness testified to the contrary, which was not corroborated by any 
of the other witnesses. Furthermore, the applicant’s theoretical opportunity to call 
witnesses to challenge the statement, as well as the judge’s warning to the jury were not 
considered to be sufficient counterbalancing measures.208 
The two dissenting Judges Sajó and Karakaş in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United 
Kingdom strongly criticised the new approach as departing from established case law 
and watering down the protection guaranteed in previous cases. In particular, the case 
opens the door for a ‘holistic approach’, with the courts assessing the overall impact on 
fairness and thus reverting to balancing. This eliminates the important requirement of 
mandating procedural counterbalancing to neutralise forensic disadvantage to the 
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defendant. Hence, a trial can be still held to be fair despite one fundamental aspect, the 
equality of arms/adversarial nature, being violated in its essence.209 
As mentioned above, the ECtHR’s role is not to assess the evidence itself or how it has 
been admitted, but rather to examine the circumstances under which it can be 
assessed.210 Under current case law regarding the equality of arms, counterbalancing 
requires at least some opportunity for the defendant to address the issues (contained in 
the evidence of the witness) relied upon by the prosecution. This may happen at any 
stage of the trial or through a legal representative, which did not take place in Al-
Khawaja. The Court has recognised the inherent dangers of the reliability of statements 
that have only been tested by one side.211 Even additional enquiries about the value of 
such a statement will not negate the risk of unreliability.  
 
4.3.1.2   Suppression of documents  
The ECHR does not contain an express right to disclosure of information held by the 
prosecution under art 6. However, the ECtHR has implied such a right from the 
principle of equality of arms.212 In terms of potential limitations to that right, it adopted 
the approach as expressed in Doorson.213 Hence, despite a general duty for the 
prosecution to disclose all relevant documents and not merely those which support the 
prosecution,214 the right of the defendant to access these documents is not absolute.215 
																																								 																				
209 Ibid, joint partly dissenting and partly concurring opinion of Judges Sajó and Karakaş. 
210 Kostovski v the Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) [39]. 
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212 Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 28901/95 (16 February 2000) [60]; 
Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application No. 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [51]. 
213 Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 28901/95 (16 February 2000) [61] 
referring to Doorson at [70] that the right to disclosure is not absolute and at [72] that it must be strictly 
necessary and sufficiently counterbalanced by procedure. 
214 Ibid, [60]; Edwards v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 13071/87 (16 December 1992) 
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Rather, public interests, such as national security, or other individual rights, must be 
“weighed against the rights of the accused”.216 However, the term ‘weighed’ should not 
be misunderstood as an endorsement of the balancing model. The ECtHR clarified that 
any limitation must be also “strictly necessary” and “any difficulties caused to the 
defence […] must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the 
judicial authorities”.217 
When it comes to the first criteria, the ECtHR applies a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ 
that is, the ECtHR does not perceive its role as deciding whether the suppression of 
information, in a particular case, was strictly necessary or not.218 As the ECtHR held in 
Rowe and Davis: 
“Instead, the European Court's task is to ascertain whether the decision-making 
procedure applied in each case complied, as far as possible, with the 
requirements of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated 
adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused.”219  
In doing so, one of the crucial aspects of the procedure is that the trial judge is in the 
best position to make an informed judgment on the grounds for non-disclosure as well 
as the impact on fairness of the procedures.  
In Rowe and Davis, the prosecution withheld some relevant material from the defence, 
on grounds of sensitivity, without the knowledge of the court. The ECtHR held that 
keeping information secret from the court cannot satisfy the procedural standards 
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216 Ibid. 
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required by the Convention.220 The procedure before the CA also could not remedy or 
counterbalance this unfairness for several reasons. First, the CA only examined the 
sensitive material ex parte, and secondly it had to rely on the trial’s transcripts to 
determine its relevance. Only the trial judge, who had heard all the witnesses, would 
have been able to gauge the need for disclosure in order to guarantee the fairness of the 
trial.221 The applicant to the ECtHR further claimed that the interests in conflict could 
be addressed through the appointment of a special advocate.222 However, the ECtHR 
did not consider such an appointment as necessary, and concluded that the trial judge is 
in the best position to weigh the various interests.223 
In the earlier case of Edwards, the ECtHR held that the unfairness of not disclosing 
relevant material to the trial judge or defendant had been remedied, as the defendant had 
been made aware of the existence of that information, and had the opportunity to raise 
concerns on appeal: in this case the CA was able to take the suppressed information into 
account when reviewing the safety of the conviction.224 The ECtHR confirmed in 
subsequent judgments that in order to avoid a violation of art 6 in such cases, it is 
necessary for a defendant to have access to the previously supressed information ahead 
of the appeal hearings in order to make submissions.225 This can include disclosure of a 
detailed summary of the document in question.226 Without such an opportunity, the 
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assessment of the suppressed information by the CA alone will not counterbalance the 
violation of art 6.227  
Rowe and Davis was also distinguished from two other cases, Jasper228 and Fitt.229 In 
those cases, handed down on the same day, material was similarly withheld from the 
defendant. However, the judge, as well as the defence, were informed about the public 
interest immunity (PII)230 claims to supress information. This enabled the judge to be in 
control and gave the defence – at least in theory – the opportunity to make 
submissions.231 Therefore these cases concentrated on whether the ex parte hearings 
offered sufficient safeguards to the defendant in order to comply with art 6. In Jasper 
the defence was told that there had been an application for non-disclosure, but was not 
advised of the category within which the information fell. In Fitt, the defence knew 
about the category of the information and was even provided with an edited summary of 
the document. In both cases the defence was invited to outline its case to assist the judge 
making a decision on the disclosure request. However, in Jasper the defence was not 
provided with the reasons for the judge’s decision in favour of the prosecution’s 
request.232 By contrast, the defence in Fitt was provided with a summary of reasons by 
the trial judge.233 By the narrowest majority (9:8) the ECtHR Court did not find a 
violation of the fair trial in either case. The Court argued that the defence was “kept 
informed and permitted to make submissions and participate in the […] decision 
making process as far as possible without revealing to them the material”.234 Again the 
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ECtHR did not consider that the appointment of special advocate was necessary to 
ensure a fair trial.235 Further, in both Fitt and Jasper the Court held that it was a crucial 
procedural safeguard that disclosure remained a matter for the judge to assess at all 
times.236 The ex parte review by the CA has been considered as an additional 
safeguard.237  
In Edwards and Lewis the ECtHR held that art 6 had been breached because the 
defendants were not informed about the nature of the evidence and the closed hearing 
did not meet the standards of an adversarial hearing.238 The case was distinguished from 
its predecessors on the ground that the defendants argued that they had been subject to 
entrapment by police, and thus the indictment should have been stayed. If the 
entrapment had occurred, the defendant would have had a right to argue that the 
relevant evidence should have been excluded or the proceeding been stayed as it 
constituted an abuse of process.239 Evidence on this question was only discussed in an 
ex parte hearing, in which the trial judge rejected the entrapment claim. Thus the PII 
claim related to material which formed the basis of an ‘issue of fact’, namely whether 
the defendants had been in fact entrapped. In such circumstances, the ECtHR held 
unanimously, the defendant, in order to avoid an infringing art 6, must be in a position 
to make submissions on the material.240 This goes further than previous ECtHR 
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decisions, which had held that a closed hearing would be legitimate provided the trial 
judge (rather than the defence) was in a position to evaluate, uphold or reject the 
prosecution’s PII claim.  
The ECtHR further indicated that appointing a special advocate could re-introduce an 
adversarial element – discussing the Auld Report, which had recommended the 
introduction of special advocate in PII hearings – but did not go as far as to say that it is 
necessary in all such cases.241 
In McKeown, the sensitive information was only shown to a ‘disclosure judge’, 
unconnected with the proceeding, and not to the trial judge, who had only read a 
summary.242 A disclosure judge was used because the case operated under the Northern 
Irish Diplock system, where the judge sits without a jury and therefore is also the trier 
of fact. Because of these circumstances, the applicant complained that – by contrast to 
the trial judges in Jasper and Fitt - the trial judge in McKeown was not in the position to 
monitor the need for disclosure throughout the trial, as the judge had not seen the 
documents itself. The disclosure judge, on the other hand, was not informed of the 
developments occurring during the trial. The ECtHR, however, placed the emphasis on 
the disclosure judge’s ability to decide whether all relevant documents, including highly 
sensitive ones, had been disclosed in the first place.243 The disclosure judge was again 
consulted by the trial judge for the question of whether a special advocate is necessary, 
giving the disclosure judge another opportunity to evaluate the relevance of the 
suppressed material.  
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Although the ECtHR examines the particular requirements of art 6(3) when considering 
whether a defect has been sufficiently counterbalanced, the overall fairness of the 
process, which extends beyond the trial to include the appellant decision, is relevant.244 
Generally, the ECtHR stresses - either to sufficiently counterbalance or avoid a 
violation in first place – that, first, the judge has to be in the position to make an 
informed judgement on the disclosure and thus the fairness of the trial, and second that 
that the defendant has to have at least some opportunity to make submissions on the PII 
claims. In cases where the material has also been withheld from the trial judge, only full 
- or virtually full - disclosure ordered by the CA will remedy the original unfairness.245 
Furthermore, no material that has not been disclosed can form a part of the 
prosecution’s case or be put before the jury.246  
Table 4.1. below illustrates how violations of art 6 can be avoided. In all cases, where 
information had been withheld from both the defendant and the trial judge, a violation 
was only avoided by the disclosure of that information on appeal (Edwards, IJL, GMR 
and AKP and Botmeh & Alami). The Table also shows that some involvement of the 
defendant during the trial at first instance will be sufficient to uphold the fairness of the 
trial. The question of what level of involvement by the defendant (in the process) is 
necessary to avoid unfairness, both in first instance and on appeal - in other words, what 
is actually fair in this context - has not been answered by the ECtHR. The ECtHR has 
deferred this issue to the domestic courts, accepting that these courts are better placed 
make such judgments.   
																																								 																				
244 Edwards v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 13071/87 (16 December 1992) [34]; Jasper v 
the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [55]; Dowsett v the United 
Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 39482/98 (24 June 2003) [40]; McKeown v the United Kingdom 
[2011] Application No 6684/05 (11 January 2011) [44]; Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom 
[ECtHR] Applications nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 (15 December 2011) [118]; Taxquet v Belgium 
[ECtHR] Applications no 926/05 (16 November 2010) [84]. 
245 Botmeh and Alami v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no. 15187/03 (7 June 2007) [43]-[44]. 
246 Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [55]. 
Chapter 4: Balancing liberty and security?   
   153 
CASE	 TRIAL	 APPEAL OUTCOME 
 
Information 
suppressed 
and trial 
judge not 
informed 
Information 
suppressed 
and trial judge 
informed & 
defence (not) 
informed247 
No access to 
suppressed 
sensitive 
information 
Ex parte 
examination 
of sensitive 
evidence 
Disclosure of 
suppressed 
information 
Violation of 
art 6 
Edwards	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 no	
Rowe and 
Davis	 x	 	 	 	 	 x	 	 yes	
Jasper	 	 	 x	 	 	 x	 	 no	
Fitt	 	 x	 	 	 x	 	 	 no	
Atlan	 x	 	 	 	 	 x	 	 yes	
IJL, GMR 
and AKP	 x	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 no	
Dowsett	 x	 	 	 	 x	 	 	 yes	
Edwards 
and Lewis	 	 	 	 	 	 x	 	 yes	
Botmeh & 
Alami	 x	 	 	 	 	 (x)
248	 x	 no	
McKeown	 	 x249	 	 	 x	 	 	 no	
 
Table 4.1: procedural reasons for art 6 violations in trials suppression information 
 
The narrow majority of one vote in Jasper and Fitt, makes the dissenting judges’ 
opinions relevant. Seven out of the eight dissenting judges found that the ex parte 
procedure, as outlined above, violated the principles of adversarial proceedings and the 
equality of arms. They did not accept that being able to make submission would have 
had a real impact on the disclosure decision “as the defence were unaware of the nature 
of the matters they needed to address. It was purely a matter of chance whether they 
																																								 																				
247 Note: In the second column, indicating when the judge has been informed about the information, three 
further distinctions have to be made: first, the defence is informed about the category of the evidence 
discussed in the ex parte hearing and therefore is able to make submissions; second, the defence is 
informed about the ex parte hearing, but not about the category as this would give away the evidence 
discussed; third, the defence is not even informed of the ex parte application, as the knowing about the 
hearing would reveal the evidence. 
248 In Botmeh and Alami the CA first held a disclosure hearing ex parte and then issued a summary of the 
material ahead of appeal hearings enabling the defence to make submissions on the issue.  
249 In this case only the disclosure judge had been informed. 
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made any relevant points”.250 The fact that the trial judge was making the non-
disclosure decisions, as well as monitoring the need for disclosure, could not 
sufficiently counterbalance the defect since the judge only received submissions from 
the prosecution.251  
In Edwards, the two dissenting judges pointed out (although separately) that the CA 
should not have assumed that provision of the additional information would not have 
influenced the jury, indicating that the procedure before the appeal court did not remedy 
the original defect.252 Judge Pettiti also took a principled approach arguing that any 
suppression of evidence during the trial would be a ground for quashing the verdict.253 
 
4.3.1.3   Non-disclosure in administrative procedures 
The RFT in art 6(1) applies both to criminal and civil proceedings, while arts 6(2) and 
(3) deal with fairness requirements exclusively related to criminal charges. However, 
the ECtHR has implied requirements of the equality of arms listed in the sub-s (2) and 
(3) to also apply in civil proceedings as part of the essence of the RFT. Consistent with 
the approach in criminal proceedings, a violation of one of these requirements does not 
automatically constitute a violation of art 6. Reflecting the well-established distinction 
between criminal and civil standards of proof, the ECtHR also accepts that lower 
standards of proof are acceptable in civil procedures.254  
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The use of civil proceedings to deal with or prevent serious crime has become an issue 
in the context of counter-terrorism. Governments enjoy a wide discretion of how to 
characterise their procedures under domestic, which Zedner notes creates the danger of 
‘jurisprudential context-shopping’.255 Given the differences in due process protection 
for persons subject to civil and criminal proceedings, particularly the standard of proof, 
the criteria for characterising civil and criminal processes becomes important. In order 
to apply the same standard across all member states, as well as to avoid misuse of 
jurisdiction, the ECtHR has developed an autonomous meaning for the classification of 
proceedings.256 Although the starting criteria is always the classification under domestic 
law, the court additionally takes into account “the nature and purpose of the measure in 
question; its characterisation under national law; the procedures involved in the making 
and implementation of the measure; and the severity”.257 This approach should avoid 
the circumvention of the usual high standards of due process for criminal trials by the 
state simply by labelling a particular procedure to be civil/administrative rather than 
criminal.258  
To determine the nature and purpose of the proceedings in question, the ECtHR 
considers the extent to which it is punitive rather than preventative.259 For example, in 
the cases of administrative (indefinite) detention based on a reasonable suspicion of the 
relevant Minister, where lower standards of the art 6 guarantees may be accepted, the 
ECtHR, nevertheless has applied a similar formula. Because such measures may lead to 
lengthy periods of detention, involving the deprivation of liberty, the Court held that the 
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guarantee of art 5(4), which entitles detainees to obtain judicial review of the lawfulness 
of the detention, “must import substantially the same fair trial guarantees as Article 6 § 
1 in its criminal aspect”.260 Although there is a wider scope for the use of secret 
evidence in such proceedings, the ECtHR still urges the national governments to 
provide the detainee with as much information as possible:  
“Where full disclosure was not possible, Article 5 § 4 required that the 
difficulties this caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant 
still had the possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him.”261  
Counterbalancing is necessary in this case to permit the effective challenge of the 
Minister basis - the reasonable belief or suspicion – supporting detention. Additionally, 
the ECtHR held that any detention based on solely or decisively on closed material 
would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of art 5(4).262  
In A and others the relevant information was suppressed, similarly to Edwards and 
Lewis discussed above. A criminal proceeding which relies on closed information to 
determine the guilt of a defendant will constitute a violation of art 6. But within an 
administrative proceeding, appropriate counterbalancing measures may be able to 
remedy this defect. Although, neither the defendants nor their representatives were 
provided access to the sensitive information, a number of special advocates were 
entitled to view the material on behalf of the defendants.263 Under those measures, the 
special advocates could make submissions seeking further disclosure, as well to the 
substance of the case. The ECtHR held that, as with criminal proceedings, the judge (in 
this case a member of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)) would be 
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in the best position to ensure that “no material was unnecessarily withheld from the 
detainee” and thus needs to be in control of what is or is not disclosed.264 One of the 
shortcomings of the special advocate system is that once the special advocates have 
seen the suppressed information, they are unable to contact the defendants for further 
instructions. 265 The ECtHR held that a special advocate system would indeed be a 
measure capable of counterbalancing the disadvantages facing the defendants, as long as 
enough information was disclosed to enable them to instruct the special advocate 
effectively in the first place. Although this was considered to be the case in A and 
others, the Court clarified that  
“[w]here […] the open material consisted purely of general assertions and 
SIAC’s decision to uphold the certification and maintain the detention was based 
solely or to a decisive degree on closed material, the procedural requirements of 
Article 5 § 4 would not be satisfied.“266 
It is important to emphasise that while secret evidence can never be the basis of a 
criminal conviction, it may be the basis of an administrative decision as long as some 
safeguards are in place. The main question remains, what measures are required to 
adequately counterbalance the disadvantage suffered by the individual when he or she is 
excluded from accessing the suppressed information? Again, this needs to be answered 
by the trial judge in each case.  
 
4.3.2 - A minimum standard of fairness 
In sum, when it comes to the suppression of information, the ECtHR has adopted a 
broadly consistent approach: the RFT can only be limited where it is strictly necessary; 
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any disadvantage to the defendant must be sufficiently counterbalanced by appropriate 
procedures; and a conviction cannot be solely, or to a decisive extent, based on the 
suppressed information. Although some restrictions are permissible to a certain extent, 
the ECtHR does not apply the conventional principle of proportionality to resolving the 
matter. As Ashworth noted, the ECtHR has been quite vigilant in upholding the fair trial 
rights of the defence in assessing the merit of such restrictions:  
“[T]here is a significant difference between allowing limited restrictions on a 
right and holding that any restriction that can be said to be proportionate to 
public interest considerations is permissible. What is noticeable about the 
relevant decisions is that they emphasise that the essence of the right must be 
preserved, even where limited restrictions are allowed.267 
This approach has also been described as ‘proportionality sui generis’ protecting the 
essence of the right.268 Nonetheless, there is some overlap between these approaches, in 
particular the requirement for evidence to show that the restriction to the RTF was 
“strictly necessary”.269 The two approaches also share the overall objective of 
maximising the right in question and put restrictions on the limitation according to 
particular principles. 
The proportionality sui generis principle, which serves to protect the ‘essence’ of the 
RFT at all times, has two main requirements: first, that the judge remains in control and 
therefore in the position to detect any defect of the procedure; and, secondly, that the 
defendant has at least some opportunity to be actively involved in challenging the 
suppression (of potentially relevant information). Compliance with the latter is 
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dependent on the circumstances of the particular case, and at times the opportunity for 
involvement of the defendant may be tokenistic.270 Nonetheless, this aspect is important 
to respect the defendant’s role as the subject of the trial.271 It is also noteworthy that 
although balancing is accepted when the RFT is in conflict with another individual’s 
rights (generally, the rights of a witness not to be subject to violence for example), the 
ECtHR has retained the requirement of counterbalancing in order to protect the fair trial 
rights of the defendant. Hence, while protecting the witness’s rights as far as possible, 
the court still applies the principle of minimum interference with the rights of the 
defendant.272 
Looking at the ECtHR approach as a whole, protection of the RFT is treated separately 
from the questions of how to protect national security. Although intrinsically connected 
(particularly when it comes to counterbalancing), as a first step ECtHR favours the least 
intrusive measure in order to protect the public interest or the interests of another 
person, for example a witness. Only then as a second step, the ECtHR assesses how this 
measure impacts on the defendant and whether there are enough safeguards in place to 
still consider the trial fair: perceiving these questions as distinct may help to understand 
the particular character of the RFT. It demonstrates that the impact on fairness must be 
judged, as the paramount and primary concern, first on its own. Although concessions 
may be necessary in some circumstances, it cannot be balanced away in its entirety. 
Otherwise the trial would only be as fair as possible under the circumstances, which 
does not correspond with basic concept of the RFT developed in liberal democracies.  
Despite the severe security challenges facing member states, the ECtHR did not grant 
any further margin of appreciation in cases where the member states have been 
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presented with a grave threat of terrorism. This is in line with the ECtHR’s general 
approach of not allowing the abrogation of established principles in complex cases such 
as organised crime,273 corporate fraud274 or drug trafficking.275 In relation to terrorism in 
Northern Ireland the ECtHR held in Brogan that:  
“The undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicants were inspired 
by the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is 
not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of 
Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3).”276 
In Northern Irish cases, this was also confirmed in relation to the rights to silence and 
against self-incrimination protected under art 6(1).277  
Furthermore, in Hulki Güneş, the applicant was charged with murder, as well as other 
offences of separatism and undermining the integrity of the State (Turkey) as a member 
of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). He complained that he was unable to confront 
the person who had allegedly identified him as a member of the PKK and thus had not 
been tried fairly. The ECtHR agreed, noting that 
“[it] is fully aware of the undeniable difficulties of combating terrorism – in 
particular with regard to obtaining and producing evidence – and of the ravages 
caused to society by this problem, but considers that such factors cannot justify 
restricting to this extent the rights of the defence of any person charged with a 
																																								 																				
273 Kostovski v the Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) [44]. 
274 Saunders v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications no 19187/91 (17 December 1996) [74]. 
275 Saïdi v France [ECtHR] Application no 14647/89 (20 September 1993) at [44]; Teixeira de Castro v 
Portugal [ECtHR] Application no 25829/94 (9 June 1998) [36]. 
276 Brogan and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application nos 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 
11386/85 (29 November 1988) [62]. 
277 Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland [ECtHR] Application no 34720/97 (21 December 2000) [58]; 
referring to Brogan and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application nos 11209/84; 11234/84; 
11266/84; 11386/85 (29 November 1988). 
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criminal offence. In short, there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 
(d).”278 
Hence, in the context of counter-terrorism the ECtHR also follows the general approach 
that prioritises the importance of the RFT with the implication that it cannot be limited 
merely for the sake of “expediency”.279 This avoids the situation that one class of 
suspects – those accused of terrorist acts - will be subject to a lesser standard of due 
process than others, which would manifestly violate the principle of equality. Due 
process purports to protect the innocent as well as the guilty. It is vital that those who 
commit serious crime are, for the sake of legitimacy, subject only to punishment 
following due process of law. Therefore, independent of the seriousness of the 
particular offence charged, any wrongful conviction would create the same kind of 
injustice.280 A fortiori, it has been argued that the greater the crime, the greater the 
safeguards should be to avoid a wrongful conviction.281 
Despite pursuing this reasonably consistent approach and being resistant to deviating in 
the context of counter-terrorism, the ECtHR still does not answer the question 
conclusively as to what extent restrictions are in fact permissible? Or in other words, 
how much counterbalancing is necessary to retain the essence of art 6(1)? As a ‘fourth 
instance’,282 the ECtHR focuses on whether particular aspects have been addressed. 
This leaves the national judges to determine what is fair in the circumstances, as only 
																																								 																				
278 Hulki Güneş v Turkey [ECtHR] Application no 28490/95 (19 June 2003) [96]; see also Sadak and 
others v Turkey [ECtHR] Applications nos 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96 (17 July 2001). 
279 For example Kostovski v the Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) 
[44]; see also Ashworth, above n 34, 55; Brice Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press, 2010) 202. 
280 Dworkin, above n 53, 48. 
281 This even presents a paradox: “the more serious the crime and the greater the public interest in 
securing convictions of the guilty, the more important the constitutional protection of the accused 
becomes”. R v Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28 (22 May 2003) [49] (per Lord Nicholls) citing Sachs J in State 
v Coetzee [1997] 2 LRC 593, 677, at [220]; see also Bronitt, above n 22, 71-72. 
282 See above at 4.3. 
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trial judges are in the position to assess the evidence directly. This could be described as 
‘the ultimate fairness question’.283  
In conclusion, the key question for the court is to distinguish between the questions of 
‘what is fair’, and what processes need to be applied in order to ensure fairness. The 
former can never be answered in the abstract; the latter can be and should be addressed 
in liberal democracies, which have a duty to pursue justice for both victims and 
offenders. 
Finally, although the duty of common law judges to stay proceedings in the ‘interests of 
justice’ (or to avoid an abuse of process) seems, on the surface, to apply similar 
requirements to those recognised under the ECHR to preserve the ‘essence’ of the RFT, 
this chapter has identified a number of differences. In particular the two systems 
approach the minimum standards of fairness from opposite directions. Under the 
common law system, the government may suppress information in the public interest 
unless this would render a trial unfair. As a consequence, the legal discussion revolves 
around the question of how much needs to be done to ensure that a trial is not unfair. In 
contrast, under the Convention, upholding the RFT is the starting point. As a 
fundamental principle, the ECtHR requires limitations to the RFT to be justifiable; 
restrictions are only allowed in a particular case to the extent absolutely or strictly 
necessary, and must also maximise respect for the ‘essence’ of the RFT. This shifts the 
focus to assessing whether the limitation violates the essence of the right, with 
consideration of whether counterbalancing measures put in place to protect that 
minimum fairness standards arises at the later stage. While the ECHR requires a process 
																																								 																				
283 This discretion of the ECtHR has been occasionally misinterpreted. While the ECtHR’s judges avoid 
making decisions on the ultimate fairness question, the national judges have an obligation to engage. 
They are not supposed to leave this question to the executive as a national equivalent of the margin of 
appreciation. Otherwise counterbalancing can become symbolic or as discussed above submissive. See 
Sangeeta Shah, “The UK's anti-terror legislation and the House of Lords: the first skirmish” (2005) 5(2) 
Human Rights Law Review 403. 
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to respect these principles and minimal fairness standards, the common law does not 
impose strict duties on the judge in how to structure this evaluation of unfairness, 
leaving judges to reconcile these competing interests through a simple balancing 
process, an approach which has been rejected by the ECtHR.    
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4.4 Guiding principles for non-disclosure decision of judges  
This Chapter examined how judges should deal with situations where the RFT is in 
potential conflict with the public interest, such as national security. A common judicial 
approach to resolving the conflict is the resort to a ‘balancing’ of interests. The concept, 
however, is a misleading metaphor: it implies that the interests are inherently 
oppositional, a ‘zero sum’ relationship where promoting security weakens due process 
and vice versa; also the balancing process lacks any structured approach that would 
assist decision-makers decide how potential conflicts should be resolved. As Ashworth 
noted, when these two aspects are combined, it may lead to “sloppy reasoning”284 and 
ultimately an outcome that is influenced by preconceived and often irrational value 
judgments, rather than by legal principles and decisions based on evidence. 
Furthermore, the model of balancing does not live up to the rhetoric of a liberal human 
rights culture, where limitations to individual rights and liberties must be demonstrably 
justified by the state. An alternate approach to resolving conflicts between interests, 
which displays more sophistication and is gaining increasing prominence in human 
rights adjudication, is the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality 
addresses the deficiencies of balancing, providing more structure to the adjudication 
process, and requiring further justification as any limitation must be strictly necessary. 
Hence, it promotes maximisation of the protection of the particular right in issue. 
Nonetheless, the conflict between the interests of national security and RFT poses 
particular challenges, which I submit, cannot be effectively overcome by either 
approach of balancing or proportionality. To avoid the tendency for the gravity of 
national security risks to always trump the RFT, judges need further assistance in order 
to determine the relative weight of the competing interests at stake. Acknowledging the 
																																								 																				
284 Ashworth, above n 46, 229. 
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expertise of the executive in assessing security risks, the concept of ‘due deference’ can 
be helpful. Understood correctly, judicial deference to this expertise is earned through 
reasoned justification, in terms of process and substance. It allows the judges to fulfil 
their constitutional duty, while having a better-informed idea of the specific security 
challenges in question. In order to facilitate a ‘culture of justification’, as has described 
in this Chapter, some innovative institutional adaptation may be required to adjust legal 
processes to maximise respect for the RFT in the face of national security challenges. 
Furthermore, the specific character – or ‘essence’ - of the RFT has to be taken into 
consideration when in conflict with the public interest of protecting national security. In 
light of development under the common law, as well as human rights treaties such as 
the ECHR, it is now possible to identify a set of universal ‘minimum standards’ for 
securing fair trials. Described as the ‘essence’ of the RFT, these essential elements 
cannot be simply balanced away in the name of national security. Rather these non-
derogable characteristics need to be acknowledged within an adapted or sui generis 
proportionality approach.  
Based on these findings, and considering the constitutional nature of the principle of 
fairness set out in Chapter 2, any regime governing the suppression of information 
(including use of edited information),285 should be guided by the following principles: 
P1. A Rule/Exception Model of Disclosure: disclosure is the rule, with non-
disclosure the exception requiring justified. This is not only considered a ‘golden 
rule’ in the law of evidence as developed under the common law, but also follows 
from an application of the principle of proportionality. The aim of maximising 
disclosure and therefore the RFT has three main consequences: 
																																								 																				
285 ‘Edited information’ for the purposes of this thesis includes any alteration of information such as 
redacting text or providing summaries. It also includes the measures that would constrain any witnesses in 
disclosing their identity or discuss a particular subject area. 
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• First, the state has to adopt a method that discloses as much relevant information 
as possible. 
• Second, any non-disclosure requires justification based on expert evidence, not 
generalised assertions. 
• Third, any substantial forensic disadvantage to the defendant must be 
‘compensated’, if possible, by special procedures that give maximum protection 
to the RFT.  
P2. No Balancing Permitted. Due to the nature of the RFT,286 it cannot be balanced 
away. Hence, the trial cannot be considered as fair, if the ‘essence’ of the RFT has 
been violated. This assessment has to include the effect of any counterbalancing. 
Answering this question obviously becomes increasingly difficult the more pieces of 
information are suppressed. 
P3. Corroboration required in cases based on edited evidence. It has been held 
consistently – although not without exceptions – that using edited evidence as the 
sole or decisive basis of a criminal conviction, or using suppressed evidence as the 
sole or decisive basis for an administrative measure, would automatically violate the 
essence of the RFT. 
P4. Judicial Control over Disclosure Process. In order to guarantee these 
standards, it is crucial that the judges remain in control of the disclosure 
proceedings. In particular, this requires that the prosecution does not withhold from 
the judge or otherwise supress information relevant to the defendant’s case. Only the 
judge, as the person in the possession of all the information, will be able make a 
competent judgment on the overall fairness of the trial. 
																																								 																				
286 See above at Chapter 2. 
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P5. Unfairness must be compensated through institutional adjustments. In 
certain situations the fairness of the procedure may require the use of institutional 
adjustments, reflecting what judges require in order to fulfil their duties as described 
above. In particular, the adjustments should enable the judges to receive: (1) 
information, (2) expertise, (3) legislative support (ie properly drafted laws), and (4) 
respect from the other branches in discharging these functions.  
Observing these five principles not only increases the protection of the RFT and 
strengthens the legitimacy of the decisions (through placing limits on judicial 
discretion), but also promotes a more effective system of ‘checks and balances’. The 
principles will support judges, as well as other authorities in their decision-making 
process. The fact that a non-disclosure decision occurs in the context of counter-
terrorism is considered within the process, but does not fundamentally alter that process.  
Finally, it needs to be emphasised again that nothing excuses decision-makers from 
their duty to adjudicate upon the ultimate question of fairness! This standard of fairness 
admittedly changes over time due to our evolving values and understanding of justice, 
but the process of how to address this ultimate question – whether or not a legal process 
is unfair - does not necessarily need to change. 
In the next chapter, the following case studies examine to what extent these principles 
have been observed or ignored in the UK and Australia. Where deviations from these 
principles have occurred, what reasons were invoked and how did these tensions 
manifest in particular cases? The final chapter will outline proposals for reform and 
consider what sort of legislative regime would reflect these principles. 
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Part II. 
Chapter 5: Comparing Australia and the United Kingdom 
  
This Chapter provides the context, and serves as a brief introduction, for the following 
case studies. For both the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, there will be an 
overview of how the right to a fair trial (RFT) is generally protected against the 
backdrop of the general human rights framework. The Chapter presents, for each 
jurisdiction, the main national counter-terrorism policies relevant to the legal issues 
explored in the case studies. The purpose of the Chapter is to define key terms and 
describe general developments that will be discussed in the subsequent Chapters. 
 
5.1   An introduction to the United Kingdom  
5.1.1   The right to a fair trial in the UK 
The UK has a long tradition of developing fair trial standards, which dates back to the 
Magna Carta of 12151 and has given substance to them through the common law.2 This 
rich body of law has led English judges to generally regard it as 
“axiomatic that a person charged with having committed a criminal offence 
should receive a fair trial and that, if he cannot be tried fairly for that offence, he 
                                                
1 An early version of the presumption of innocence can be found in Clause 38 of the Magna Carta, which 
states that, “No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put anyone to his ‘law’, 
without credible witnesses brought for this purpose.” 
2 To stay with the example of the presumption of innocence, the gradual development of the common law 
eventually led to landmark cases such as Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462 (23 May 1935). 
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should not be tried for it at all."3 
By signing the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1951, the RFT 
received further recognition in the UK. Although the Convention rights only applied 
indirectly until the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA), the UK 
claimed that its domestic laws had already provided an equivalent, or higher, standard 
of protection as the ECHR. With the HRA, the UK judges can now directly apply the 
RFT found in art 6 ECHR,4 which provides a comprehensive list of fair trial rights that 
a defendant may claim. Section 2 HRA also requires UK courts to take into 
consideration the extensive European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence in 
relation to art 6. While the UK courts are not strictly bound to follow ECtHR decisions, 
they tend to do so unless the ECtHR has failed to consider particular aspects or its 
interpretation lacks clarity.5 Furthermore, the ECHR has always exerted an indirect 
influence on the common law as an independent source of law. As Lord Laws observed 
in Roth: 
“The common law has come to recognise and endorse the notion of 
constitutional, or fundamental rights. These are broadly the rights given 
expression in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”), but their recognition in the common law is autonomous.”6 
                                                
3 R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42, 68 (Lord Oliver); see also R v 
Brown (Winston) (1994) 1 WLR 1599, 1606 describes the RFT as a fundamental right. 
4 The HRA did not incorporate the ECHR into the British legal system in the sense that it refers to it as 
part of the substantive legal system. Rather it gives effect to certain provisions of the Convention, which 
are referred to as the ‘convention rights’. Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 1; For a general discussion on 
the first decade of the HRA see Ian Leigh and Roger Masterman, Making rights real: the Human Rights 
Act in its first decade (Hart Publishing, 2008); Sangeeta Shah and Thomas Poole, “The impact of the 
Human Rights Act on the House of Lords (2009) April Public Law 347. 
5 Aileen Kavanagh, “Special advocates, control orders and the right to a fair trial” (2010) 73(5) Modern 
Law Review 836, 845. 
6 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
158 (22 February 2002) [71] (Lord Laws). 
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Despite the HRA being an ordinary statue, repealable by the legislature, debate has 
continued in the UK on its legal status in general and in particular the extent of the 
judicial power to interpret UK legislation to conform with rights in the ECHR.7 Section 
3 HRA states:  
“So far as possible to do so, both primary legislation and delegated legislation 
are to be read and given effect to in a way which is compatible with Convention 
rights.” 
The UK courts have interpreted this section as applying, not only where the meaning of 
a statutory provision is ambiguous, but also where the meaning of a provision is 
otherwise clear. Hence, as long as courts assumed that Parliament did not intend to limit 
the human right in question, courts may ‘read down’ legislation in order to retain 
compatibility, and thus in some cases rule against the plain meaning of the statute.8  
In cases where the violation of a Convention right cannot be remedied by statutory 
interpretation, judges can make a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 HRA. In those 
cases, the legislation is not void or struck down. Until amended by Parliament, the Act 
(though incompatible with the ECHR) remains good law and must be enforced. The fact 
that Parliament has the last word – it may remedy the defect or not – ensures that 
parliamentary supremacy over the courts is not affected.9  
                                                
7 For a discussion of these provisions see K D Ewing, “The Human Rights Act and parliamentary 
democracy” (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 79. 
8 See for example R v A [2001] UKHL 25 (17 May 2001) [44] (Lord Steyn); R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 
37 (5 July 2001) [80] (Lord Hope). 
9 Hence, the HRA does not provide for a remedy to enforce a declaring of incompatibility. Art 13 ECHR 
is intentionally not included as a convention right. The only remedy an individual has is to take the case 
to the ECtHR.  
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Given the breadth of these new interpretative and declaratory powers of the courts, it 
has been widely argued that the HRA has constitutional significance.10 That said, there 
has been much criticism about the HRA from both politicians and media. The criticisms 
include the following: the HRA focuses strongly on ‘rights’ to the neglect of 
corresponding ‘responsibilities’; the HRA confers rights on people who do not deserve 
them; and the ECHR strengthens the influence of the ECtHR on the British law.11 A 
number of UK governments have expressed plans to abolish the HRA in favour of a UK 
Bill of Rights, though this has not yet happened.12 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that after the passing of the HRA, the UK Parliament 
also installed a new Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), which scrutinises 
proposed legislation for its compatibility with the HRA, fundamental common law 
rights and the UK’s international obligations.13 The JCHR has raised the awareness of 
human rights,14 but despite its regular reports concerns remain about its effectiveness in 
influencing amendments to proposed legislation.15 This is particularly the case in the 
field of counter-terrorism, 16 though the JCHR’s reports have indirectly had an impact 
                                                
10 See for example Vernon Bogdanor, The new British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009) 53; Anthony 
Lester, “Human rights and the British Constitution” in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds), The 
changing constitution (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2011) 70; Jeffrey Jowell, “Parliamentary 
sovereignty under the new constitutional hypothesis” (2006) Autumn Public Law 562; Lord Steyn, 
“Dynamic interpretation amidst an orgy of statutes” (2004) 35(2) Ottawa Law Review 163, 174. 
11 Liberty, “Human Rights Act mythbuster”, available at www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-
rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/human-rights-act-mythbuster. 
12 See for example Commission on a Bill of Rights, “A UK Bill of Rights? The choice before us” (Paper, 
Volume 1, December 2012); BBC online, “Human Rights Act versus a British Bill of Rights” (11 May 
2015) available at www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/32692758/human-rights-act-versus-a-british-bill-of-
rights. 
13 Website of the Joint Committee of Human Rights: 
www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/role/  
14 Murray Hunt, “The impact of the Human Rights Act on the legislature: a diminution of democracy or a 
new voice for Parliament?” (2010) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 601. 
15 Michael Tolley, “Parliamentary scrutiny of rights in the Unite Kingdom: assessing the work of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights” (2009) 44(1) Australian Journal of Political Science 41. 
16 See for example Janet Hiebert, “Parliamentary review of terrorism measures” (2005) 68(4) Modern 
Law Review 676; Janet Hiebert, “Parliament and the Human Rights Act: can the JCHR help facilitate a 
culture of rights?” (2006) 4(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 27; Tolley, above n 15, 51-
52.  
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through their use by the courts in a number of cases.17  
 
5.1.2   Counter-terrorism measures in the UK 
The UK has been faced with the threat of terrorism for the most of the second half of 
the 20th century.18 Between 3300-3600 people were killed in the violent conflict in 
Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998, and slightly less than 50,000 people were 
wounded. During this period Britain deployed up to 30,000 troops in Northern Ireland, 
which cost the British treasury £3.3 billion annually.19 
During that period the British Government deployed a number of counter-terrorism 
measures within its territory with varying success. They included search powers,20 
curfews, detention without trial,21 harsh interrogation methods,22 and military 
                                                
17 See for example A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004; or Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 
2007). 
18 For a comprehensive overview on terrorism in the UK and UK terrorism legislation see for example 
Clive Walker, Blackstone’s guide to anti-terrorism legislation (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2014); 
Clive Walker, Terrorism and the law (Oxford University Press, 2011); Steve Hewitt, The British war on 
terror: terrorism and counter-terrorism on the home front since 9/11 (Bloomsbury Academic, 2008); 
Kent Roach, The 9/11 effect: comparative counter-terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 238; 
Leandro Martínez-Peñas and Manuela Fernández-Rodríguez, “Evolution of British law on terrorism: from 
Ulster to global terrorism” in Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the state of permanent legal 
emergency: security and human rights in counter terrorism (Springer, 2012) 201. 
19 For a general overview of the conflict sees R F Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (Allen Lane, 1988); 
J Boyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: a generation of violence 1927-1992 (St Martins Press, 1993); Tim 
Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s ordeal, 1966-1996, and the search fro peace (Museum of Denver, 
1996); Hewitt, above n 18, Chapter 1. 
20 See for example Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (UK), part 2. 
21 The measure was based on the Special Powers Act, which was first introduced in 1922 but regularly 
renewed, and introduced with the consent of the British Government.  It was finally integrated in the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. See also Hewitt, above n 18, 18; R J Spjut, 
“Internment and detention without trial in Northern Ireland 1971-75”, (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 
712, 736. 
22 These methods were later declared inhuman and degrading treatment violating art 3 ECHR. Ireland v 
the United Kingdom, Application no. 5310/7 (18 January 1978). The five techniques in question were 
hooding, wall-standing, food deprivation, sleep deprivation and the subjection to noise.  
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deployment.23 These severe methods engendered significant criticism and accusations 
that the limitation of human rights would violate Britain’s international commitments.24  
Given the difficulties for prosecuting suspected terrorists, the RFT was also limited 
significantly through a number of measures. The Diplock courts in which judges sat 
without a jury became synonymous with the Northern Ireland conflict.25 Furthermore, 
evidential standards were lowered to enable extensive use of confessions.26 The right to 
silence was abolished,27 the burden of proof reversed for many offences,28 and for a 
                                                
23 The use of the military had its sad climax on ‘Bloody Sunday’, when British troops opened fire on civil 
rights activist demonstrating peacefully in Derry. The incident not only left 14 dead and wounded 26 
people, but the attempts to cover up the over-reaction on behalf of the military by the British 
Government, including a judicial inquiry, also caused considerable political damage to the peace process. 
The troops claimed that the protesters were armed and that the use of force was justified. The Widgery 
Tribunal originally backed this version. It took nearly 4 decades to prove that these claims were false, 
resulting in an official apology by Prime Minister David Cameron. See Bloody Sunday Inquiry, “Report 
of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry” (Saville Report, 29 January 1998); McDonald, Bowcott and Mulholland, 
“Bloody Sunday report: David Cameron apologises for 'unjustifiable' shootings” (guardian.co.uk, 15 June 
2010); see also Louis Blom-Cooper, “What went wrong on Bloody Sunday: a critique of the Saville 
inquiry”, (2010) January Public Law 61. 
24 Both the ICCPR and the ECHR were already in force and applicable to the UK from 1976 and 1951 
respectively. However, it has been noted that in many respects the case law of the ECtHR was not settled 
and many of the cases from Northern Ireland were regarded as test cases. See Brice Dickson, The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 3, 15. 
25 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (UK), s 2. The measure was named after an inquiry 
led by Lord Dipock into how to deal with the terrorism in Northern Ireland other than by detention 
without trial. See Diplock Commission, Report of the Commission to consider legal proceedings to deal 
with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5185, December 1972). The measures were legislated 
in Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. See also John Jackson and Sean Doran, 
“Conventional trials in unconventional times: the Diplock Court experience”, (1993) 4(3) Criminal Law 
Forum 503; Laura Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom 1922-
2000 (Irish Academic Press, 2001) 126; John Jackson, “Many years on in Northern Ireland: the Diplock 
legacy”, (2009) 60(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 213. 
26Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, s 5. See Donohue, above n 25, 131; Steven Greer, 
“The admissibility of confessions under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act” (1980) 31(3) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 205. 
27 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (UK), arts 3-6. For a general critique see John 
Jackson, “Curtailing the right of silence: lessons from Northern Ireland”, (1991) June Criminal Law 
Review 404. Jackson characterised the Order as neither fair nor effective; John Jackson, “Inferences from 
silence: from common law to common sense” (1993) 44(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 103; K A 
Cavanaugh, “Emergency rule, normalcy exception: the erosion of the right to silence in the United 
Kingdom” (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 491. 
28 For example Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (UK), s 2(2) introduced a presumption 
against bail; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, s 6 expressed a presumption that 
admissions by defendants were made voluntarily; see also below at 7.2.3. 
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period of time strong reliance was placed on informers, which become known as the 
supergrass system.29 
After it became clear that the supergrass system not only was hugely expensive, but also 
did not deliver the expected conviction rates due to the low quality of the evidence 
adduced at these trials,30 the strategy changed. Instead greater emphasis was placed on 
intelligence work, resulting in a significant expansion of the security and intelligence 
forces, and a focus on pre-emptively interfering with terrorist attacks, rather than 
relying on prosecution.31 Scotland Yard introduced a Special Branch, which 
transformed eventually into the Anti-Terrorist Branch, and MI5 and MI6 also refocused 
on terrorism.32  Intelligence gathered through technical surveillance, or through 
informers, became the major focus of counter-terrorism.33  
Towards the end of the violent conflict, the UK Government conducted a review of all 
the pre-existing counter-terrorism legislation and Parliament passed new comprehensive 
legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK),34 which sought to address a much wider and 
international threat of terrorism.35 After 9/11 the UK was well prepared compared to 
many other countries that lacked specific counter-terrorism policies, powers and laws. It 
had a well-developed counter-terrorism infrastructure, with comprehensive legislation 
                                                
29 Steven Greer, Supergrasses: a study in anti-terrorist law enforcement in Northern Ireland (Clarendon 
Press, 1995). 
30 Ibid, 252-53. 
31 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA” in Art and Richardson (eds), Democracy and counter-
terrorism: lessons from the past (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007) 63, 83.  
32 By 1994 MI5 used half of its resources for Irish counter-terrorism. This of course had also do with the 
end of the cold war. Hewitt, above n 18, 22. 
33 Particularly the infiltration of terrorist groups was important, not only to gain information about 
organisation, structure and planned attacks, but also to act as agent provocateur, sabotage, cause dismay 
and dispute within the terrorist group and spread paranoia about who could be an informer. Hewitt, above 
n 18, 23-24. 
34 The Act was a response to the inquiry into terrorism legislation conducted by Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
(Cm 3420) and published in October 1996. See Terrorism Act 2000 (Explanatory memorandum) (UK) 
[4]. 
35 Terrorism Act 2000 (Explanatory memorandum) (UK) [8]. 
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in place, and arguably had gained valuable experience in how to deal with the new 
threats.36 It has been suggested that there are only a limited number of methods for 
countering terrorism.37 However, any initial advantage UK diminished after it emerged 
that the ‘new’ terrorist organisations used different methods and strategies. Comparing 
the Irish terrorists to radical Jihadist organisations, Greer identified numerous 
differences, which necessitates adjustments to older strategies.38 In particular, the IRA 
was secular with clear political and military aims; it consisted of a more or less 
homogenous and hierarchical group of people, and it had a political counterpart, Sinn 
Fein, providing a channel for ongoing negotiations with the British government.39 None 
of these characteristics are applicable to radical jihadist terrorism. 
In light of the history of Northern Ireland, it is not surprising that the UK Government 
quickly expanded its counter-terrorism powers to address these threats. The Anti-
Terrorism, Crimes and Security Act (2001) was swiftly drafted and passed after only 16 
hours of debate.40 However, the Act was soon criticised as being an overreaction.41 Its 
most controversial measure allowed the indefinite (immigration) detention of 
foreigners, in situations when a person was believed to be a threat to national security, 
                                                
36 Steven Greer, “Human rights and the struggle against terrorism in the United Kingdom”, (2008) 2 
European Human Rights Law Review 163, 171; Hewitt, above n 18, 11; Richardson, above n 31, 94. 
37 Hewitt, above n 18, 11;  
38 Greer, above n 36, 165-167. 
39 For the purpose of this short overview it is neglected that during the troubles there were a number of 
organisations on each side of the conflict, such as the Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 
Provisional IRA, the Real IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army on the republican side; and such as 
the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force on the unionist side. For a summary on the 
different parties and paramilitary groups involved see Richardson, above n 31, 67. 
40 Philip Thomas, “September 11th and good governance”, (2002) 53 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
366, 381. 
41 Mark Elliott, “Developments: United Kingdom” (2003) 1(2) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 334, 336. Helen Fenwick, “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: a proportionate 
response to 11 September?” (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 724, 725: “11 September appears to have 
provided the government with an excuse of introducing coercive, illiberal provisions reaching well 
beyond those who have […] connections [to al-Qaida]”; Thomas, above n 40, 385. 
There was also criticism for including measures only remotely related to terrorism: Fenwick, ibid, 725-
26; In the House of Commons it was stated “most of the Bill has simply come out of the Home Office 
back lobby. It has a lot of stud that it wants to put before Parliament and it has attached it to this Bill.” 
Hansard, House of Commons, 19 November 2001, col 94 (Hogg). 
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but deportation of the person was impossible.42 The measure was declared incompatible 
with arts 5 (right to liberty) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) ECHR by the House 
of Lords in the landmark case of A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.43 Due to the political pressure, these measures were replaced by a control 
order regime introduced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) (PTA), which 
did not distinguish between foreigners and British nationals and limited coercive 
measures to 12 month (albeit renewable indefinitely). The control orders were replaced 
in 2011 by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, which remains the current 
regime of executive orders in the UK.44 
The London bombing on 7 July 2005, the 7/7 attacks, took the lives of 52 people, and 
gave another impetus for extending counter-terror legislation. In particular the 
Terrorism Act 2006 (UK), which was drafted in the aftermath of the bombings 
introduced new preparatory and sedition offences.  
There has also been no shortage of investigative and prosecution action in relation to 
countering the terrorism threats. In June 2014, the UK Home Office released data that 
since 9/11 2,586 people had been arrested in relation to terrorism, of which 391 were 
convicted.45 In March 2014 the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has 
reported that since the introduction of control orders, 62 people were subjected to such a 
                                                
42 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), Part 4; for a discussion of the Act see Fenwick, 
above n 41, 724. 
43 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004). For 
a case comment see David Feldman, “Terrorism, human rights and their constitutional implications? 
(2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 531. 
44 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK). The regime will be discussed in 
detail below at 7.1 and 7.2. 
45 Alan Travis, “UK terrorism arrest fall” (The Guardian, 5 June 2014). 
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measure.46 As explored in the next Section, Australia has responded in similar ways, 
influenced by the UK legislative models.  
  
                                                
46 As per March 2015, see Anderson, David QC, “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 
2014” (Third report of the Independent Reviewer on the operation of Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011, March 2015) 2. This includes both control orders and Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures. 
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5.2   An introduction to Australia 
5.2.1   The right to a fair trial in Australia 
In Australia, the RFT is protected by a combination of common law and statutory 
principles, rules and procedures.47 The rationale for the RFT lies in the general 
principles of fairness, justice and non-discrimination.48 However, from a legal point of 
view, its standing as a fundamental right is rather vulnerable. Most of these principles, 
rules and procedures may be easily overridden by other legislation. Moreover, although 
Australia is subject to international human rights law, the RFT as recognised in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cannot directly be invoked in 
domestic proceedings unless it forms part of domestic law. Hence, in Australia, human 
rights protection is heavily dependant on the continuing support and will of 
Parliament.49 In a political system that has been described as “deeply utilitarian”50 with 
a judiciary that follows a “strong positivist tradition”,51 there is concern that in times of 
crisis governments and lawmakers will succumb to majoritarian pressures to sacrifice 
the protection of rights and liberties in order to enhance security.52   
                                                
47 For the general common law approach to rights see above at 2.2.3. 
48 For a general overview on the right to a fair trial in Australia see O'Neill, Rice and Douglas, Retreat 
from injustice: human rights law in Australia (The Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2004) 224; Gans et al, 
Criminal process and human rights (Federation Press, 2011) Chapters 9-11; Anthony Mason, “Fair Trial” 
(1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 9; James Jacob Spigelman, “The truth can cost too much: the principle 
of a fair trial” (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 29. 
49 George Williams, “The constitutional role of the courts: a perspective from a nation without a bill of 
rights” (2004) 2 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 25. 
50 Hilary Charlesworth, “The High Court and human rights” in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary essays for the 
High Court of Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) 356, 358. 
51 Andrew Lynch, “Legislative and Executive branch vs. the Constitutional Court and the Judiciary: 
conflict or cooperation?” in Jürgen Bröhmer (ed) The German Constitution turns 60: Basic Law and 
Commonwealth Constitution - German and Australian Perspectives (Peter Lang, 2011) 167, 168. 
52 George Williams, “The constitutional role of the courts: a perspective from a nation without a bill of 
rights” (2004) 2 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 25, 30; Brian Galligan and F L 
Morton, “Australian exceptionalism: rights protection without a bill of rights” in Tom Campbell, Jeffery 
Goldsworthy and Adrianne Stone (eds), Protecting rights without a Bill of Rights: institutional 
performance and reform in Australia (Ashgate, 2006) 17, 27. 
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Australia is one of the few Western liberal democracies without a comprehensive 
constitutional bill of rights or human rights legislation.53 Traditionally, there has been a 
strong reluctance in both the population and among politicians to entrench rights.54 This 
stems not only from belief in a strong Parliament, but also from the ‘competition of 
competence’ between the Commonwealth and States that exists within the federal 
system – human rights charter would be another far reaching federal law that could 
overrule State and Territory legislation.55  
There are signs that traditional rights scepticism in Australia is changing. In 2009 the 
Federal Government undertook a National Human Rights Consultation, led by Fr Frank 
Brennan, into the need for better human rights protection in Australia. In its final report 
the committee recommended the introduction of a federal human rights Act based on 
the strong feedback from the population.56 However, the federal government’s reaction 
was reserved, only accepting the recommendation to establish a new legislation scrutiny 
committee in the federal parliament – the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights - tasked with scrutinising proposed legislation and providing a compatibility 
statement on human rights for each new statute.57 There is of course the general concern 
that without a stronger judicial role in giving effect to human rights, there may be 
                                                
53 On state level there are now the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (Vic). However, they do not play a significant role for the purpose of this thesis. 
For general information on these two Acts see Andrew Byrnes, Hilary Charlesworth and Gabrielle 
McKinnon, Bills of Rights in Australia: History, Politics and Law (UNSW Press, 2009) 73-138.     
54 Leeser and Haddrick (eds), Don’t leave us with the Bill: the case against an Australian Bill of Rights 
(Menzies Research Centre, 2009). 
55 Hilary Charlesworth, “The Australian reluctance about rights” (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
195. 
56 The website www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au and with it the final report have since been removed 
from the Internet. In the consultation 87% of 35,000 submissions supported a human rights act and 57% 
of people interviewed in a telephone survey supported such an idea, with only 14% being opposed. See 
Frank Brennan, “The practical outcomes of the National Human Rights Consultation” (Address to 
Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, Sydney, 12 October 2013) 10. 
57 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth); the Act provides in s 3 a definition of human 
rights, which refers to seven core international human rights treaties Australia is a signatory to, and 
include most significantly the ICCPR.  
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limited incentives for the legislature to take a strong stand on human rights issues.58 In 
relation to counter-terrorism legislation, there is evidence that in many instances careful 
parliamentary deliberation and scrutiny was missing.59 While there are hopes for the 
new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights to grow into an efficient scrutiny 
mechanism, they have not yet been fully realised.60 
One of leading Australian cases in relation to the common law governing the RFT is 
Dietrich v The Queen.61 In that case the High Court held that the accused, who was 
indigent and had been refused legal aid, should not have been convicted following a 
trial for a serious offence at which he was not legally represented. The High Court 
confirmed that the appropriate remedy was a stay of proceedings, on the ground that 
persisting with the trial of an unrepresented indigent accused, would be unfair and 
constitute an abuse of process. The decision was hailed as strong message for the RFT 
at a time when the High Court seemed generally more rights focused and prepared to 
curb the other branches’ powers.62 However, it is important to understand the scope of 
the case and not get distracted by the rhetoric that surrounded it. The court emphasised 
                                                
58 George Williams, “The constitutional role of the courts: a perspective from a nation without a bill of 
rights” (2004) 2 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 25, 43. 
59 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, The Australian approach to enacting counter-terrorism laws (Doctor of 
Philosophy Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2010).  
60 See for example George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, “The operation and impact of Australia's 
parliamentary scrutiny regime for human rights” (2015) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469. 
William Phillips, “Great expectations, hard times: Reflections on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
human rights” (2015) 37(4) Law Society of South Australia Bulletin 28.  
Since the establishment of the Committee in 2012, the most substantial amendments to security 
legislation were introduced in 2014. However, neither the drafting of the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 (Cth), the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014 (Cth) nor the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 (Cth) were 
influenced to any considerable extent by the Committee.  
61 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (13 November 1992). 
62 See for example Peter Bailey, “’Righting’ the Constitution without a Bill of Rights” (1995) 23 Federal 
Law Review 1. 
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that it did not create a new common law right to legal counsel. In the words of Mason 
CJ, “[t]he High Court does not legislate”.63 Rather it was held,  
“in the absence of exceptional circumstance, a trial should be adjourned, where 
an indigent accused charged with a serious offence lacks legal representation, 
not due to any conduct on the accused’s part.”64 
Under such circumstances Mr Dietrich had been denied a “real chance of acquittal”.65  
The scope of what can be considered a violation of the RFT becomes more obvious 
when comparing Dietrich to the earlier case of McInnis,66 in which the High Court did 
not find a violation of the RFT despite strong factual similarities between the two cases. 
Mr McInnis was charged with rape, also a serious crime, and unable to secure legal 
representation. However, the proceedings were not adjourned and the fact that he was 
unrepresented was not by itself considered a miscarriage of justice. The fact that 
Dietrich did not explicitly overrule the findings in McInnis demonstrates that the High 
Court did not intend to create a rule that could be seen as a right to legal counsel. Rather 
the particular circumstances of the trial will determine whether it should be considered 
unfair or not.67 This shows that Dietrich did not further clarify the factors that lead to an 
unfair trial and remained well in its common law tradition of being disinclined towards 
rights development.68  
The decision in Dietrich hinted at some constitutional foundations for the RFT – 
                                                
63 Mason, above n 48, 9. 
64 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 357 (Toohey J). 
65 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 298 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); cf McInnis v R (1979) 143 
CLR 575 (19 December 1979) where it was held that the fact that McInnis had no real chance of acquittal 
was considered such an exceptional circumstance. 
66 McInnis v R (1979) 143 CLR 575 (19 December 1979). 
67For example Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 331 (Deane J), 343 (Dawson J). 
68 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 317 (Brennan J). See also Anthony Mason, “Fair Trial” 
(1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 9; O'Neill, above n 48, 28. 
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Gaudron and Deane JJ as members of the majority, suggested that the RFT could be 
even implied from Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.69 As Gaudron J observed:  
“The fundamental requirement that a trial be fair is entrenched in the 
Commonwealth Constitution by Ch. III's implicit requirement that judicial 
power be exercised in accordance with the judicial process.”70 
Although the term ‘right to a fair trial’ was used throughout the decision,71 it was 
pointed out in the decision that it more properly characterised as the right not to be 
subject to a trial that is unfair.72 It is also misleading as it implies that the Constitution, 
not the common law duty of judge to control legal processes provides the legal 
foundation for courts to determine when the continuation of a process would constitute 
a miscarriage of justice.73 As the High Court reiterated in a number of subsequent cases, 
Parliament cannot interfere, in absence of a clear expression by legislation to the 
contrary, with its judicial duty to ensure the trial is fair (or more precisely not unfair).74 
Dietrich raised the prospect of further development of the RFT within the framework of 
the common law, and that the High Court would progressively elaborate on the essential 
                                                
69 An implied constitutional right was successfully argued in relation to the freedom of political 
communication and based on the principle of representative government. See Australian Capital 
Televisions Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (30 September 1992); Nationwide News Pty 
Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (30 September 1992). 
70 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J); to the same effect Deane at 326. 
71 Mason CJ and McHugh J described it as “convenient, and not unduly misleading, to refer to an 
accused’s positive right to a fair trial.” Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 299 (Mason CJ and 
McHugh J). 
72 See above at 2.2.3. 
73 See Fiona Wheeler, “The doctrine of separation of powers and constitutionally entrenched due process 
in Australia” (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248, 265-266.  
74 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 26; 
Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208 (Gaudron J), 226 (McHugh J). 
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elements and scope of that right in subsequent cases.75 However, this development of 
the RFT has not happened.76  
Despite extensively engaging with the RFT in cases and academic commentary, the 
High Court has never recognised the RFT as an autonomous free-standing right with its 
own set of remedies.77 The impact of Chapter III on the fairness of proceedings has 
been limited.78 As a constitutional right, the RFT was stillborn – the Australian 
Constitution was never meant to be depository for rights. George Williams identified 
another impediment to this development, 
“judicial and political battles over questions such as the right to a fair trial are 
[…] mediated according to the structural features of the Constitution. These 
include federalism, the separation of judicial power […] and, to a lesser extent, 
representative government. This can transform concerns over human rights in 
Australia into debate about the relative powers of the Commonwealth and the 
States […] or about whether the courts are being asked to exercise functions 
appropriate to their role.”79 
Certainly, constraining fair trial jurisprudence to the particular concerns of Chapter III is 
not the most productive way to develop solid human right standards.  
Finally, it must be briefly mentioned that international law (in cases where it has not 
been transposed into domestic legation) exerts some, albeit limited influence on 
                                                
75 See for example Fiona Wheeler, “Due process judicial power and Chapter III in the new High Court” 
(2004) 32(2) Federal Law Review 205; Michael McHugh, “Does Chapter III of the Constitution protect 
substantive as well as procedural rights?” (2001) 21 Australian Bar Review 235. 
76 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008) 274; Wendy Lacey, 
“Inherent jurisdiction, judicial power and implied guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution” 
(2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57. 
77 Lodhi v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 360 (20 December 2007) [74] (Spigelman CJ).           
78 See discussion in the case studies below in Chapters 6 and 7. 
79 George Williams, “The constitutional role of the courts: a perspective from a nation without a bill of 
rights” (2004) 2 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 25, 42. 
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Australian law. Nothing precludes judges from relying on international law when 
interpreting statutes or developing the common law.80 In Mabo Brennan J even stated 
that, 
“international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of 
the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of 
universal human rights.”81 
However, it seems that such use remains the exception rather than the rule in Australia, 
inspiring use among a minority of senior judges.82  
 
5.2.2   Counter-terrorism measures in Australia 
Before 9/11, Australia did not have in place any counter-terrorism legislation at the 
national level based on the notion of an ‘act of terrorism’.83 Such behaviour would have 
been treated under general (typically state or territory) criminal offences, with the 
gravity and motive of the offences being considered in determining the appropriate 
sentence. The absence of such legislation reflected not only the rarity of terrorism in 
                                                
80 This also includes indirectly the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. While the ECHR is a regional human 
rights treaty, the prominence of its Court in developing a modern understanding of human rights has had 
and continues to have an impact on international human rights standards. See Michael Kirby, “The 
Australian debt to the European Court of Human Rights” in Breitmoser et al (eds), Human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law (Dike, 2007) 391 
81 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (Brennen J). 
82 Charlesworth, above n 50, 367. One of the exceptions is Kirby J. See for example Michael Kirby, “The 
Australian use of international human rights norms: from Bangalore to Balliol – a view from the 
antipodes” (1993) 16(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 363; Michael Kirby, “Domestic 
implementation of international human rights norms” (1999) 5(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 27; 
Kristen Walker, “International law as a tool of constitutional interpretation” (2002) 28(1) Monash 
University Law Review 85; Gerald Brennan, “Human rights, international standards and the protection of 
minorities” in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2004) 333.  
83 Australia has, however, enacted several statutes giving legal expression domestically to international 
Conventions is a party to and which are dealing with terrorism. These Conventions and subsequent 
statutes do not aim at defining terrorism, but rather punish certain acts, which are generally an expression 
of terrorism, such as the high-jacking of aircrafts, proliferation of nuclear material or offences in relation 
to internationally protected persons. See Golder and Williams, “What is ‘terrorism’? Problems of legal 
definition” (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 273-75. 
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Australia, but post-Hilton bombing, a commitment to dealing with terrorism by use of 
the ordinary criminal law, rejecting ‘special’ war-time powers and offences 
controversially enacted in the UK to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland.84 This 
approach changed of course following the 9/11 attacks. The initial response was the 
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth), which introduced new 
terrorism offences into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).85 Both of these new offences 
as well as the wide definition of terrorism were strongly influenced by the Terrorism 
Act 2000 [UK]. 
The official motivation for counter-terrorism legislation was to bring Australian laws 
into accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which required 
Member States to ensure terrorists would be prosecuted and that domestic laws reflected 
the seriousness of terrorism.86 However, there was additional concern that Australia 
would become a target given the close alliance with the United States and its 
involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. After 88 Australians were killed in the 
the Bali bombings, Australia felt directly threatened by global terrorism. In 2003 a 
public alert system was introduced, which originally set the threat level at ‘medium’ 
(that an attack could occur), but rose to ‘high’ (that an attack is likely to occur) in 
September 2014.  It remains at that level today. 
What followed the initial response had been described as ‘hyper-legislating’.87 Between 
2001 and 2014 the Australian Parliament passed over 60 pieces of legislation in relation 
                                                
84 O’Donnell and Bronitt, “Philips’ brief: the Hilton bombing, calling out the troops and turning points in 
history” (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 59-62. 
85 Bernadette McSherry, “Terrorism offences in the Criminal Code: broadening the boundaries of 
Australian criminal law” (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 354. 
86 UN SC Res 1373, UN SCOR, 56th sess, 4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). 
87 Kent Roach, The 9/11 effect: comparative counter-terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 309. 
Chapter 5: Comparing Australia and the United Kingdom   
 187 
to terrorism,88 by far exceeding the legislative efforts of the United States, UK and 
Canada.89 Not only were the number of legislative measures adopted excessive,90 but 
many of these measures have been criticised as unjustified, harsh and disproportionate 
infringements of human rights.91 They were often rushed through Parliament and 
suffered from poor drafting and inadequate scrutiny from academics or law reform 
bodies.92 As a proper overview of counter-terrorism measures would exceed the scope 
of this section only those relevant to case study will be introduced.93 
In line with the trend to strengthen preventive ‘pre-crime’ policies,94 the Australian 
Government has placed a strong emphasis on the importance of intelligence-gathering. 
This has resulted in both an expansion of intelligence institutions and their powers, 
including new (and highly controversial) ASIO detention and questioning powers.95 
                                                
88 While there is no official list of counter-terrorism legislation, George Williams, a leading researcher in 
the field, has counted 62 pieces of federal legislation up to October 2014. George Williams, “Does 
Australia need new anti-terror laws?” (Lionel Murphy Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 22 October 2014). 
89 Roach, above n 87, 310. 
90 Just in 2002 it was estimated that more than 100 new criminal offences were introduced, many of 
which carried a life sentence. See McSherry, above n 85, 354. 
91 There has also been extensive debate over whether the increased threat level required the adoption of 
all these measures, or whether terrorism was a proxy for other political purposes, such as toughening 
border control and immigration policy: Angus McCullough and Sharon Pickering, “Counter-terrorism: 
the law and policing of pre-emption”, in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), 
Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 13, 17. 
92 Andrew Lynch, “Legislating with urgency: the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act [No 1] 2005” 
(2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 747; this has also been criticised by Martin Scheinin, 
Australia: study on human rights compliance while countering terrorism (Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism, UN Doc A/HRC/4/26/Add.3, 14 December 2006) [65]. 
93 For further overview and discussion of counter-terrorism measures in Australia see Lynch, McGarrity 
and Williams, Inside Australia’s anti-terrorism laws and trials (UNSW Press, 2015); George Williams, 
“A decade of Australian anti-terror laws” (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1136; Roach, 
above n 87, 309; McSherry, above n 85, 354; Edwina MacDonald and George Williams, “Combating 
terrorism: Australia’s Criminal Code since September 11, 2001” (2007) 16 Griffith Law Review 27; 
Nicola McGarrity, “‘Testing’ our counter-terrorism laws: the prosecution of individuals for terrorism 
offences in Australia (2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 92. 
94 See above at 3.1. 
95 See for example Lisa Burton, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, “The extraordinary questioning 
and detention powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation” (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 415; Jenny Hocking, Terror laws: ASIO, counter-terrorism and the threat to 
democracy (UNSW Press, 2004) 212; Joo-Cheong Tham, “Casualties of the domestic 'war on terror': a 
review of recent counter-terrorism laws” (2004) 28(2) Melbourne University Law Review 512, 514; 
Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, ASIO’s questioning and Detention Powers (Review 
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Concerned about the protection of sensitive information in criminal proceedings, the 
Government introduced the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 
2004 (Cth) (NSIA), which became effective on 11 January 2005.96 While NSIA was not 
specifically targeting terrorism trials, its Explanatory Memorandum clearly identified 
terrorism as the main justification for the measure. It was introduced not only to control 
the management of sensitive information, but also to permit the limited use of sensitive 
information in trials without requiring full disclosure. Not surprisingly, NSIA raised 
concern that it would introduce the use of ‘secret evidence’ into the field of criminal 
law. The leading human rights lawyer and advocate, Julian Burnside, described the 
NSIA as “perhaps the most draconian piece of legislation ever passed by an Australian 
Parliament in time of peace.”97  
The 2005 London bombing, which claimed the life of one Australian, was yet another 
trigger for further counter-terrorism measures in Australia. The Anti-Terrorism Act [No 
2] 2005 (Cth), passed after only six and a half hours of debate, introduced a control 
order regime,98 which was modelled on the UK regime under the PTA, but included 
                                                                                                                                          
of the operation, effectiveness and implications of Division 3 of Part III in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, November 2005). 
96 The Act was originally only applicable in criminal proceedings, but amended in 2005 to also included 
civil proceedings. See National Security Information Legislation Amendment Act 2005. Since then its full 
title is National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
97 Julian Burnside, “The Dreyfus affair” (2006) 137 Victorian Bar News 29, 31; see also Patrick Emerton, 
“Paving the way for conviction without evidence: a disturbing trend in Australia’s ‘anti-terrorism’ laws” 
(2004) 4(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 129. 
98 The regime was inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as Division 104. See generally Geoff 
McDonald, “Control orders and preventative detention” why alarm is misguided” in Andrew Lynch, 
Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror (Federation Press, 
2007) 106; Andrew Lynch and Alexander Reilly, “The constitutional validity of terrorism orders of 
control and preventative detention” (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 105; Lisa Burton and 
George Williams, “What future for Australia's control order regime?” (2013) 24 Public Law Review 182. 
Alongside the control order regime, the Government also introduced provisions for preventative detention 
as Division 105 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The measure is directed towards persons, who are 
suspected to commit a terrorist attack in the near future or have done so and need to be prevented from 
destroying evidence. Under these provisions a person can be held for up to 14 days. So far the measure 
has never been used. For a comment on their usefulness Svetlana Tyulkina and George Williams, 
“Preventative detention orders in Australia” (2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
738; See also Margaret White “A judicial perspective: the making of preventative detention orders” in 
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some significant modifications.99 While only a handful of people have been subjected to 
control orders in Australia,100 the system has seeped into other areas of serious crime 
prevention causing a normalisation of measures that were justified as a response to 
extraordinary circumstances.101  
Given the severity and breadth of counter-terrorism measures, the Government sought 
to appease concern through a commitment to periodically review national security 
legislation.102 The annual reviews conducted by the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor (INSLM) are particularly relevant to this thesis.103 The INSLM 
position, created as a part time post in 2010, submits Annual Reports to the Australian 
Government on the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia’s counter-
terrorism and national security legislation.104 
                                                                                                                                          
Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(Federation Press, 2007) 116; James Renwick, “The constitutional validity of preventative detention” in 
Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(Federation Press, 2007) 127; Claire Macken, “Preventative detention in Australian law” issues of 
interpretation (2008) 32(2) Criminal Law Journal 71; Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, “Preventative detention 
orders and the separation of judicial powers” (2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
756. 
99 See below at 7.1; see also Andrew Lynch, “Control orders in Australia: a further case study in the 
migration of British counter-terrorism law” (2008) 8(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 
159.  
100 To date only six control orders have been issued. On the question of necessity see Burton and 
Williams, above n 98, 184-187; Lynch, above n 99, 180. 
101 Nicola McGarrity, “From terrorism to bikies: control orders in Australia (2012) 37(3) Alternative Law 
Journal 166; Gabrielle Appleby and John Williams, “The anti-terror creep: law and order, the States and 
the High Court of Australia” in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-
terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 150. 
102 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia – 
Protecting our Community” (2010) 56. 
103 Another feature that was inspired by the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation: see 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk. 
104 Mr Bret Walker SC was the first Monitor from April 2011 to April 2014. Currently the Hon Roger 
Gyles AO QC holds the position. For more information see the INSLM’s website: 
http://www.inslm.gov.au. The INSLM Annual Reports examine specific pieces of legislation: the 2012 
and 2016 INSLM Reports dealt to large extent with control orders: Bret Walker, “Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor’s Declassified Annual Report” (20 December 2012); Roger Gyles, 
“Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into control order safeguards: Part 2” (13 
April 2016); the INSLM 2013 Report included an in-depth review of the NSIA: Bret Walker, 
“Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Annual Report” (7 November 2013). 
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In 2013, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) conducted another 
comprehensive review of all Australian counter-terrorism laws, examining their 
operation and effectiveness.105 The COAG Committee was chaired by the Hon Anthony 
Whealy QC, who had been a sitting judge in a number of terrorism trials in New South 
Wales, included the constitutional challenge to the NSIA.106 
Despite these reports, and other review mechanisms, as well as the use of ‘sunset 
clauses’ in a number of statutes, the Government has shown little willingness to repeal 
or even scale-back unused or harsh legislation. The introduction of more recent 
legislation, such as the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth), which grants security agencies access to metadata, 
suggests to the contrary, that the expansion of counter-terrorism laws continues without 
abatement. 
 
  
                                                
105 Council of Australian Governments, “Review of counter-terrorism legislation” (Final Report, 2013). 
106 Justice Whealy had been the trial judge in R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 691 (23 August 2006). 
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5.3   Conclusion 
While the present Chapter provides the background for the following case studies, it 
also points to some general conclusions. In relation to the RFT, Australia’s main 
protection mechanism remains the common law, and the leading case of Dietrich 
demonstrates that the Australian judges, by and large, adhere to the traditional 
constitutional position that Parliament is vested with the power to expand the scope of 
protected rights, rather than the courts. In the UK, the introduction of the HRA brought 
ECHR rights into the UK domestic legal system for the first time. It signalled legislative 
willingness to give more power to the judges in reviewing governmental action and 
legislation. Public scepticism about the ECHR, however, means that the judiciary is 
careful about not over-stepping its new powers to (re)interpret domestic law in an 
ECHR-compliant fashion. Since the common law approach to rights protection has not 
been entirely cast aside in favour of constitutionalising rights, it is perhaps preferable to 
view this as a “hybrid” system.  
The Chapter also revealed significant differences in relation to each country’s 
experience with terrorism. The UK had extensive experience in counter-terrorism over 
the last half century. Australia had little experience of dealing with terrorism before 
9/11, an event precipitating a wide range of new terrorism legislation over the last 15 
years. Many of the new measures were inspired by or adopted from the UK. While 
Australia became increasingly a target for radical jihadist terrorism, it seems that the 
severity of these measures were not suitable for countering the actual terrorism threat, 
nor consistent with the human rights safeguards in Australia. In particular, the impact of 
the HRA on the UK counter-terrorism legislation had arguably not been sufficiently 
considered in Australia. 
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Traditionally, in both Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), issues surrounding non-
disclosure of sensitive information in criminal proceedings have been resolved through 
the application of common law rules and discretions. Judges have relied upon their 
inherent jurisdiction to regulate their own processes that serve to uphold values of 
fairness and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. At the same 
time, the courts have extended protection, in the public interest, to sensitive classes of 
information. This information includes state secrets and the content of government 
documents, as well as the identity of police informers and vulnerable witnesses. The 
immunity from production of certain material in open court, known as ‘public interest 
immunity’ (PII), has developed on a case-by-case basis, and has been subject to many 
changes over time. Amendments to these rules have been driven, not only by security 
needs to which the courts have always exercised some degree of deference, but also by 
an evolving understanding of fair trial standards.  
Over the last three decades, legislation governing PII has increased significantly. In 
most cases, the legislation has aimed to codify the common law and clarify the scope of 
legal principles as well as create new public interest exceptions where necessary. This 
notwithstanding, common law precedents have remained significant aids to interpreting 
statutes and for this reason, the Chapter explores in depth the historical development of 
the common law doctrine. 
In criminal proceedings, a distinction can be drawn between sensitive information that 
the prosecution intends to suppress in its entirety, and information intended to be 
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produced at trial, albeit in an edited form. In the former case the prosecution does not 
intend to rely on the material (this is termed ‘unused material’), whereas in the latter, 
the prosecution intends to rely upon the sensitive information at trial.  
Under the umbrella of ‘suppressed information’, further distinctions can be drawn 
between information deemed irrelevant and information which is material to issues in 
dispute, and therefore potentially vital to the defence case. If the information objectively 
considered is immaterial, it follows that no damage to the fairness of the trial will result 
from its suppression. This gives rise to the questions of what constitutes ‘material’ 
evidence?; and who determines whether or not particular information meets that 
threshold of materiality? These questions are discussed in Section 6.1. On the other 
hand, where information is considered to be relevant, at least to some degree, but its 
disclosure would threaten national security, the court has to assess this factor in light of 
any impact non-disclosure would have on the fairness of the trial. This is examined in 
Section 6.2. 
In cases where the state intends to adduce and rely on sensitive information, this thesis 
distinguishes between, ‘edited evidence’ and ‘secret evidence’. ‘Edited evidence’ is 
defined as any evidence that is redacted and/or stripped of parts of its content, which 
clearly imposes limits the defence to fully test that evidence. This broad definition has 
the effect of including the issue of anonymous and absent witness evidence, which, 
although not always treated in the category of sensitive information, presents the same 
dilemma for the parties involved and is regularly justified in the interest of national 
security. As the court’s judgment ultimately relies on such edited information, the 
impact on procedural fairness may be even more pronounced.1 The crucial question is, 
                                                
1 The issue is not limited to courts in the strict sense. The same is true for all institutions and actors, who 
have to rely on edited information, such as tribunals or if applicable juries.  
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whether there is sufficient information, in its edited form, to be meaningfully challenged 
by the defence. This is examined in Section 6.3. 
Where ‘secret evidence’ is concerned, the court may rely on material that the defendant 
has not had the opportunity to access and challenge. This lack of access constitutes a 
serious departure from the general principles and practices in criminal proceedings 
granting the defendant a right of ‘full answer and defence’. To date, however, the use of 
secret evidence has only been authorised in administrative proceedings. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
How these distinctions will translate into the structure of this Chapter is visualised in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: overview Chapter 6  
 
For completeness, it is important to mention that there is a final category of evidence, 
which concerns sensitive information initially provided to the defendant, but later 
sought to be suppressed by the state during a public trial. The defendant may have been 
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made aware of the information, by virtue of being a state employee (a public servant or 
contractor) or by having been entrusted with it, legally or illegally, and knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe that the information is classified. In both Australia and the 
UK, knowingly passing on or disclosing such information constitutes a criminal 
offence.2 While full disclosure in such cases creates a similar security dilemma for the 
state, which sits at odds with the right to a fair trial (RFT), unlike the previous 
categories of sensitive information, here the defendant’s knowledge of the information 
means that the he/she can participate in any in camera proceedings. Given that the 
focuses on situations where the defendant suffers from a lack of information, the 
scenario will not be further discussed in the Chapter.3 
 
This Chapter reveals a trend in both Australia and the UK of expanding use of edited 
and secret evidence in criminal proceedings. It will examine the ways in which the 
judiciary in both jurisdictions has attempted to reconcile this trend with established 
principles of fairness. This Chapter argues that any differences in resolving non-
disclosure requests, including the role envisioned for the defence, do not simply stem 
from diverging human rights frameworks and public law principles but rather reflect the 
differing understandings of the role of judges, and the separation of powers. As a result, 
the discussion routinely refers to Chapter 4 where the alternative approaches to 
balancing, and the application of these principles, have been discussed. Ultimately, this 
Chapter draws upon case studies to suggest that the differing methodologies have a real 
                                                
2 Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK), ss1-6; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 79; there are also more specialised 
offences, for example Naval Discipline Act 1957 (UK), s 34 (Unauthorised disclosure of information); 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 34ZS (Secrecy relating to warrants and 
questioning). In Australia, there are now additional offences under the NSIA (ss 42-45), which do neither 
depend on a classification of the document prior to the trial nor on an prior obligation of the defendant to 
protect the information. 
3 However, the Australian case Lappas, in which the accused was charged with espionage for disclosing 
national security documents, had a strong impact on the development of the law in relation to disclosure 
in Australia. See below at 6.2.3.1. 
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impact on the level of protection accorded to the fair trial and that without the 
application of principles specifically developed for these ‘hard cases’, the RFT risks 
becoming seriously damaged.   
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6.1   General disclosure duties of the prosecution 
Before a court can rule on disclosure, the prosecution must bring the information 
concerned to the attention of both the court and the defence, irrespective of whether or 
not it is intended to be relied upon in the prosecution’s case. In this respect, recent 
developments in the UK have triggered significant changes to the disclosure regime as a 
whole, and will be reviewed below.  
In the leading English case of Ward, Glidewell LJ held that any “[n]on-disclosure is a 
potent source of injustice”.4 Although it is generally accepted that any information, 
including unused material, should be disclosed where it is capable of shedding light on 
matters in dispute, indiscriminate disclosure of all information can equally impede the 
fairness and efficiency of the trial. There is clearly a public interest in deterring 
defendants from pursuing ‘fishing expeditions’, requesting any and all types of 
information, that would result in the delay of proceedings and waste resources.5 From a 
practical point of view, imposing such extensive disclosure obligations would put a 
cumbersome burden on the prosecution, who would be constantly required to anticipate 
new lines of argument, and accordingly seek, organise and make accessible any 
potentially relevant information to the defence.  
Clearly, there is a tension between two sets of interests: while on the one hand 
disclosure rules seek to avoid injustice, discretion on the part of the state/prosecution to 
determine the extent to which unused material should be disclosed is equally important. 
The scope of discretion enjoyed by state agencies has been a contentious issue, to which 
courts have offered different answers over time. 
                                                
4 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619, 642 (Glidewell LJ). And the quote continued: “and even with the benefit 
of hindsight, it will often be difficult to say whether or not an undisclosed item of evidence might have 
shifted the balance or opened up a new line of defence.” 
5 See for example Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 415. 
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The issues surrounding the prosecution’s duties to disclose unused material are not 
specific to the area of sensitive information, and for this reason, this Section will only 
act as a general overview. However, an assessment of whether, and to what extent, 
sensitive information must be supressed to protect national security can only be 
addressed where the existence and content of that information is ‘known’ to the court.  
Until the early 1990s, the rules and exceptions surrounding pre-trial disclosure of 
unused material were exclusively developed under the common law in both Australia 
and the UK.6 This lack of legislation can be explained historically by the professional 
expectation that Crown lawyers would always act in the interest of fairness, and hence 
should be allowed a wide discretion as to when disclosure to the defence was 
necessary.7 This expectation, however, has always sat uncomfortably with the fact that 
neither the police nor prosecutors consider themselves to be trustees of national security 
information.8  
The downside of this broad, unreviewable discretion became apparent in the UK in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, in a series of miscarriage of justice cases, most of which 
related to the conflict in Northern Ireland (including the Guildford Four, the Maguire 
Seven Judith Ward).9 As the appeals and reviews revealed, the miscarriages had been 
caused or related to the suppression of unused material that would cast serious doubt 
over the convictions.10 At the same time, another English criminal trial, concerning the 
                                                
6 See for example R v Bryant and Dickson (1946) 31 Cr App R 146 (31 December 1946). This case is 
considered as one of the earliest cases on disclosure rules stating a duty of the prosecution to make a 
credible witness available to the defence, who is not called by the prosecution, but has information 
inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. 
7 David Corker and Stephen Parkinson, Disclosure in criminal proceedings (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 2, 133. This attitude was for example reflected in the Attorney-General’s Guidelines 1981 (UK), 
which provide the prosecution with an enormous amount of discretion.  
8 Ben Emmerson et al, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2012) 472-73. 
9 See Kent Roach and Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of justice in the war against terror” (2005) 109(4) Penn 
State Law Review 973-988. 
10 For a discussion of the string of miscarriage of justice cases see John Niblett, Disclosure in criminal 
proceedings (Blackstone Press, 1997) Chapter 3. See also Corker and Parkinson, above n 7, 11. 
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illegal export of weapons to Iraq by Matrix Churchill Ltd. in the early 1980s, exposed 
similar concerns. In that case, it was neither the police nor prosecution who sought to 
suppress the sensitive information, but government Ministers intending to conceal their 
knowledge of ‘inconvenient’ information relating to approvals of the illegal exports on 
the basis of PII.11  
 
6.1.1   Disclosure duties of the prosecution in the United Kingdom 
As a reaction to the high profile disclosure scandals in the early 1990s, both Parliament 
and the judiciary in the UK removed prosecutorial discretion (thereby widening the 
prosecution’s disclosure obligations) and increased judicial control over disclosure 
decisions. This unforeseen, yet significant increase in the judiciary’s workload of 
hearing pre-trial disclosure requests meant that a number of adjustments to the 
disclosure process were required to redress the balance between the interests of the 
various stakeholders.  
Ultimately, the discretion of the police and prosecution has been reinstated, justified in 
part by the introduction of guiding principles and procedures governing disclosure, laid 
down in judicial decisions, prosecutor guidelines and legislation. Most importantly, 
courts have clarified that - as a general rule - the prosecution must disclose “all material 
evidence which the prosecution had gathered and from which the prosecution have 
made their own selection”12 and is likely to be of assistance to the defendant. 
Furthermore, when assessing PII requests, it is the courts, rather than the prosecution, 
                                                
11 The trial ultimately collapsed, but the events surrounding the trial caused an uproar that eventually led 
to an inquiry undertaken by Sir Richard Scott, “The Report of the Inquiry in to the Export of Defence 
Equipment and Dual Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions” (HC 115, 1995-96), commonly 
referred to as the ‘Scott Report’. See also Dawn Oliver, “The Scott Report” (1996) Autumn Public Law 
357; Niblett, above n 10, 27. 
12 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619, 645 (Glidewell LJ) referring to Lawton LJ's judgment in R v Hennessey 
(1978) 68 Cr App R 419, 426. 
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who have to decide (i) whether, and to what degree, the information is considered 
sensitive, (ii) the use the defendant may have of the information and as such (iii) 
whether disclosure is required.13 These principles alone have turned the prosecution into 
a “temporary custodian” of information.14 Unsurprisingly, courts initially struggled to 
identify how to define and classify ‘material’ evidence. After a number of attempts,15 
this is now defined in a single, objective test in s 3(1)(a) CPIA 1996,16 requiring the 
prosecution to disclose any material, which “might reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for 
the accused”.17 In the landmark case of H and C, the House of Lords described this 
obligation as ‘the golden rule’.18 The legislation clarifies that the prosecution must keep 
its disclosure decisions under continuous review.19 
The general principles and obligations are further specified by the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines on Disclosure 200520 and the Crown Prosecution Service, Disclosure 
Manual for investigations started on or after 4 April 2005.21 They regulate how the 
police and prosecution interact to process sensitive information. In such cases the 
                                                
13 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619, 680-81. 
14 Corker and Parkinson, above n 7, 135. 
15 Crucial in the process of defining the materiality of evidence was R v Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746 (14 
March 1994). Ibid, 752 - adopting a test suggested by Jowitt J in R v Melvin (unreported), 20 December 
1993 – it was held that documents are to be considered as material, “which can be seen on a sensible 
appraisal by the prosecution: (1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; (2) to raise or 
possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence which the prosecution 
proposes to use; (3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on evidence 
which goes to (1) or (2)”. The definition was also confirmed in R v Brown (Winston) [1998] AC 367 (24 
July 1998) 376 (Lord Hope) stating that these obligations have to be interpreted widely. The 
impracticality of the test then led to the introduction of disclosure obligations in the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996 (UK), which itself became the target of much criticism. See Mike Redmayne, 
“Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its discontents” (2004) June Criminal Law Review 441, 
442-44; Corker and Parkinson, above n 7, 19-20. 
16 as amended by s 32 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK). For a general overview on these amendments see 
Andrew Keogh, Criminal Justice Act 2003: A guide to the new law (Law Society Publishing, 2004) 43. 
17 See also the leading Scottish case McInnes v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 7 (10 February 2010). 
18 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 147. 
19 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK), s 7A. 
20Available at www.gov.uk/attorney-general-s-guidelines-on-disclosure-2005-and-2011 (last visited 15 
July 2016). Hereafter referred to as the 2005 Guidelines. 
21 Available at www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/ (last visited 15 July 2016). Hereafter 
referred to as the 2005 Manual. 
Chapter 6: Sensitive information in criminal proceeding 
 202 
Guidelines require that an appointed Disclosure Officer prepares a list, with reasons, of 
material that could jeopardise the public interest if disclosed.22 The final decision on 
disclosure rests with the prosecution,23 who must be prepared to justify to the court why 
the risk of harm occasioned by disclosure was assessed to be real and not fanciful.24 In 
this assessment, although each piece of information has to be individually considered,25 
the anticipated harm caused by disclosure may be direct or incremental, which 
considerably widens the scope of protection.26 Importantly, before making a PII 
application the prosecution should aim to disclose as much as is possible, which could 
include providing summarised, redacted or otherwise edited documents.27 
Despite these developments, the police and prosecution retain their wide discretion,28 
with internal administrative guidelines acting as the principal safeguards against abuse. 
Quirk criticises this internal oversight for failing to counteract police and prosecutor 
cultures and working practices which operationalise (and neutralise) these principles.29 
This criticism foregrounds the importance of ensuring that all branches of government - 
judiciary, executive and legislative - are committed to upholding and protecting the 
                                                
22 2005 Manual, [6.4] and [8.2]. The list is referred to as Schedule MG6D. Examples of sensitive material 
are material relating to national security, intelligence agencies, intelligence from foreign sources or given 
in confidence, relating to informants, undercover officers endangered by the material, revealing 
investigation techniques or hinders the prevention of or facilitates crime. (2005 Manual, [8.4] referring to 
the Code of Practice, [6.12.]) In circumstances where disclosure may potentially cause loss of life, 
material will not be included in the Schedule, but brought to the prosecutor’s attention separately (2005 
Manual, Chapter 9). 
23 However, the prosecution can also be obliged to make a PII application, if the police or any other 
agency disagrees with the judgment of the prosecution to disclose sensitive material in whole or in part 
(2005 Manual, [13.3.]). 
24 2005 Manual, [8.17]; 2005 Guidelines, [20]. 
25 Blanket claims relating to a ‘class’ of information cannot be relied upon: 2005 Manual, [8.18]. See also 
Sir Richard Scott, “The acceptable and unacceptable use of public interest immunity” (1996) 4 Public 
Law 427. 
26 2005 Manual, [8.14]. 
27 2005 Guidelines, [20]. 
28 The Guidelines, for example, list additional reasons supporting non-disclosure, including the 
overburdening of the parties, misleading information, and information that would cause unjustified delays 
(2005 Guidelines, [6]). Such material, together with neutral or material damaging to the defendant, is 
immune to PII claims: “It is only in truly borderline cases that the prosecution should seek a judicial 
ruling on the disclosability of material in its possession.” See 2005 Guidelines, [20]. This wording has 
been adopted from R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155. 
29 Hannah Quirk, “The significance of culture in criminal procedure reform: why the revised disclosure 
scheme cannot work” (2006) 10 Int'l Journal of Evidence & Proof 42. 
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ideals of fairness in the administration of justice.30 This duty, first and foremost, must 
be reflected in legislation, and embedded in police and prosecution decision processes. 
Concerns as these about the operation of the disclosure regime have prompted a number 
of reviews and enquiries.31 While they have identified room for improvement 
particularly on the part of the prosecution and the police, and supported by robust case 
management system of the judiciary, they have not triggered any wider legislative 
reforms. 
   
6.1.2   Disclosure duties of the prosecution in Australia 
In Australia, the prosecution’s disclosure obligations were traditionally also governed 
by the common law, which necessitated “disclos[ure of] all relevant evidence to an 
accused, and a failure to do so may, in some circumstances, require the quashing of a 
verdict of guilty.”32 As in the UK, the prosecution has traditionally been allowed a wide 
discretion, based on the assumption that the prosecution is independent to the Crown, 
and acting in the interests of justice. The duty of disclosure however has been conceived 
of as one that is owed to the court, and not to the defendant.33 In the absence of a clear 
disclosure duty owed to the defence, there must be concern whether this assumption 
holds true.  
Spared the high profile miscarriage of justice cases occurring in the UK, Australian 
courts have not seen the need to further define the content and scope of the disclosure 
                                                
30 See above at 4.4. 
31 See Lord Justice Gross, “Review of disclosure in criminal proceedings” (Judiciary of England and 
Wales, September 2011); Lord Justice Gross and Lord Justice Treacy, “Further review of disclosure in 
criminal proceedings: sanctions for disclosure failure” (Judiciary of England and Wales, November 
2012); Sir Brian Leveson, “Review of efficiency in criminal proceedings” (Judiciary of England and 
Wales, January 2015). 
32 Mallard v R (2005) 224 CLR 125, 133 (Gummow, Hayne,  Callinan and Heydon JJ) referring to Grey v 
R (2001) 75 ALJR 1708. 
33 Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317 (13 June 2002) [57]-[58]; see also R v Hennessey (1979) 68 Cr App 
R 419, 426 (Lawton LJ). 
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obligations. That said, some State Parliaments have recently enacted statutory rules 
dealing with disclosure,34 with Directors of Public Prosecution (DPPs) adopting and 
developing their own disclosure guidelines or policies to fill the regulatory gaps.35  
It is beyond the scope of this Section to review and compare the various guidelines and 
policies. Although varying in content and scope, they have at least introduced some 
minimum standards. It is also difficult to determine authoritatively how, if at all, the UK 
developments have influenced the development of State and Territory DPP guidelines 
and policies. In R v Reardon, Hodgson JA considered the English cases discussed 
above, and argued that the principles laid down in Keane and Brown should be equally 
applicable in NSW.36 His Honour recognised that the few Australian authorities that 
have referred to these English cases “have not suggested they are not applicable in 
Australia”.37 In the absence of any authoritative High Court rulings on the issue, it is 
likely that English cases will remain persuasive among lower courts. 
 
6.1.3   Comparative observations 
Miscarriage of justice cases in the UK precipitated ongoing discussions about the 
prosecution’s obligations, discretion, and police cooperation, in relation to disclosure. 
As a result of these debates, the courts now have the responsibility to determine whether 
it is in the public interest to suppress the information in order to protect national 
                                                
34 See in particular Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic); Criminal Procedures Act 1986 (NSW) as 
amended by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Mandatory Pre-trial Defence Disclosure) Act 2013 No 
10 (NSW); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). Criminal law is a state power as not listed in s 51 of the 
Australian Constitution.  
35 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Statement on prosecution disclosure (2006); Director 
of Public Prosecutions, Guidelines 2007 (NSW) Guideline 18; Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Guidelines 2005 (NT) Guideline 8; Director of Public Prosecutions, Director’s guidelines 2013 (Qld) 
Guideline 29; Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution policy 2005 (SA) Guideline 9; Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Directors policy on disclosure 2014 (Vic); Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Statement of prosecution policy and Guidelines 2005 (WA) [101]-[118]. 
36 R v Reardon (2004) 146 A Crim R 475, 488. 
37 Ibid, 489. 
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security, as soon as information is considered to be ‘material’. But what is considered to 
be ‘material’ is still, to a large extent, a matter within the discretion of the prosecution 
and the police.   
In Australia, the drivers for law reform have been the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory Offices of the DPP rather than the courts. Before the events of 9/11 and the 
Bali bombings, Australia did not have to deal with the comparable political pressure to 
secure convictions, often to the detriment of the RFT, such as was created by ‘the 
Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Later Australian cases such as Haneef have however 
revealed that Australia is not immune from such pressures and that under certain 
conditions, counter-terrorism investigations and prosecutions can become heavily 
politicised.38 This vulnerability increases the importance of clarifying the content and 
scope of disclosure obligations placed upon both the police and prosecution.  
The difficulties of regulating the disclosure of unused material from outside state 
agencies, means that it is vital that the policies, guidelines and legislation counter 
institutional cultures of excessive secrecy within state agencies, as well as implement 
internal safeguards to minimise the risks of miscarriage of justice from non-disclosure. 
The challenge is aggravated in situations where state agencies, such as intelligence 
services, are in possession of information that may be relevant to the defence (ie 
‘material’), but are reluctant to disclose it even to the prosecution. In this situation, the 
information is equally likely to be withheld from the court, never to be subjected to any 
disclosure decision, and unfairness to the defence will simply never be known. 
  
                                                
38 See John Clarke, “Report of the inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef” (21 November 2008); 
Michael Head, “What the Haneef inquiry revealed (and did not)” (2009) 34(4) Alternative Law Journal 
243; Stephen Keim, “Dr Haneef and me (2008) 33(2) Alternative Law Journal 99. 
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6.2   Suppression of sensitive information 
Today, under the common law, the suppression of sensitive information is generally 
sought under the doctrine of PII. However, until the middle of the last century, PII was 
a legal doctrine that applied solely in civil proceedings. This did not mean that there 
were no means to suppress sensitive information in criminal proceedings. For example, 
prosecutors and police frequently sought to suppress the disclosure of information 
relating to the identity of police informers. In the 19th century, the doctrine was framed 
as a ‘Crown privilege’, a distinct rule under the common law, under which non-
disclosure of the informer’s identity was subject to a mandatory exception in cases 
where disclosure of that information was considered necessary to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice.  
The two doctrines of PII and Crown Privilege continued to develop in parallel, though 
the application of PII to criminal proceedings meant that the differences between the 
two needed to be reconciled. On the one hand the ‘rule and exception’ approach 
characterised the informer privilege, whereas on the other hand the balancing approach 
had developed in civil proceedings to resolve claims of PII. While the balancing 
approach originally gained ascendance, the courts have always been aware that 
requirements of fairness in criminal proceedings – which developed apace during the 
19th and 20th centuries – deserved special (perhaps even paramount) attention.  
Given that the Australian courts, for a long time, relied upon English common law 
decisions, by comparing the legal tests, their rationale and the weight attached to the 
RFT, it is possible to determine the precise point in time at which the two systems 
diverged. While distinct historical conditions may explain some of the divergence, in 
recent times, the differing human rights frameworks and conceptions of judicial roles 
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and responsibilities have been more influential in shaping particular approaches. As this 
legal divergence occurred in a linear manner gradually over time, this Section is 
structured chronologically, beginning with the formative 19th century cases recognising 
police informer privilege, and establishing the guiding principles that have come to 
shape the law in Australia.  
 
6.2.1   Police informers, crown privilege and public interest immunity  
In criminal trials, the rule governing the suppression of information was first applied to 
protect the identity of police informers. This is unsurprising given that in the early 19th 
century an organised professional police force emerged that needed to gather 
information on the criminal classes, and ensure a steady flow of information. Exposing 
the identity of police informers in legal proceedings would not only endanger 
informants, but also deter others from coming forward with relevant information.39 
With contemporary PII cases still referring to early expressions of the informer 
privilege, it is worth examining its development and underlying rationale under the 
common law.  
Originally, the common law applied the absolute rule that the defendant had no right to 
know the name of an informer.40 However, as early as the Hardy case in 1794, the 
courts recognised an exception to this rule, if it were “really and truly […] necessary to 
                                                
39 For example Arthur Stanley Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308, 311. 
40 R v Akers (1790) 6 Esp 127 (Lord Kenyon), as cited in Henry Mares, “Balancing public interest and a 
fair trial in police informer privilege: a critical Australian perspective” (2002) 6 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 94, 96. The protection of the information was originally referred to as Crown 
privilege. However, the term was not an accurate description as a privilege generally refers to a protection 
of a litigant, which can be relied on or waived. See Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624, 
641; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 19. 
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the investigation of the truth of the case”.41 At this stage, the burden of satisfying this 
threshold remained with the defence. In Hardy itself, the exception was ultimately not 
applied by the court. Despite the significance of the Hardy case for the development of 
the common law rule in late 19th and 20th century, this exception was rarely invoked, 
and when it was, it was rarely successful.42  
The exception to the informer rule was formulated more clearly in the leading case of 
Marks v Beyfus (1890) where Lord Esher held: 
“if upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of 
the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to shew the prisoner's 
innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that 
which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be 
proved is the policy that must prevail.”43 
Again, the court held that the exception was not applicable on the facts of that case, 
although this fact is rarely noted in later citations. Mares has attributed the outcome in 
Marks v Beyfus to the still very basic understanding of the presumption of innocence at 
the time,44 as well a heavy reliance on informers in general. But as the presumption of 
innocence became more firmly entrenched,45 so did the application of the informer rule. 
Whereas in the earlier cases disclosure could only be triggered when it was necessary to 
prove the defendant’s innocence, after Woolmington (1935) a reasonable doubt raised 
                                                
41 R v Hardy (1794) 24 State Trials 199, at p 808 (Eyre CJ) as cited in Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co 
Ltd [1942] AC 624, 634. Although in this case it was the recipient of the information rather than the 
informant that was protected, it was the beginning of the common la rule. 
42 See Mares, above n 39, 98. 
43 Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494, 498. It may be mentioned that Marks v Beyfus was not a criminal 
case, but a civil action for malicious prosecution. 
44 Mares, above n 40, 101-102. 
45 See Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462 (23 May 1935); Brown v The King (1913) 17 CLR 570, 584 
(Barton ACJ). 
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by the defence became sufficient to apply the exception.46 This can be seen in more 
recent leading UK cases on the subject, such as R v Hallett where the Court of Appeal 
(CA) held that disclosure would be ordered where the defendant may “be deprived of 
the opportunity of casting a doubt upon the case against him”.47 Based on this approach, 
a conviction on appeal in R v Agar was quashed as the suppression of the informer’s 
identity had prevented the defendant from inquiring as to whether the informer had 
worked together with the police.48  
Modern Australian cases on police informers 
In Australia, although courts originally followed the English authorities in relation to 
the suppression of informers’ identities, with the expansion of the PII doctrine, the 
approach to disclosure decision-making shifted towards a discretion based on balancing 
competing interests. While some cases still applied the 19th century ‘rule and exception’ 
of the police informer privilege, ‘balancing’ has become the preferred approach. 
One Australian case, which endorsed the ‘rule and exception’ approach, was Cain v 
Glass (No 2), 49 a murder trial arising from a shooting between two rival motorcycle 
groups that killed seven people. McHugh JA, with whom Kirby P agreed, applied the 
court’s reasoning in Marks v Beyfus, explicitly rejecting the ‘balancing’ approach due to 
the special nature of the informer rule.50 McHugh JA not only distinguished between the 
requirements of the informer rule in criminal and civil cases, but also between informers 
providing ‘intelligence’, as considered in Alister v The Queen.51 In such cases he 
                                                
46 See above at 6.1.1 the case of Ward. In some situations it may be difficult to determine when the 
threshold of a reasonable doubt is reached and what constitutes a “real, and not a fanciful” possibility that 
the information is beneficial to the defendant. However, such questions are unavoidable, occur regularly 
in legal proceedings and are ultimately for the court to decide. 
47 R v Hallett [1986] Crim LR 462, 7D as cited in R v Agar (1990) 2 All ER 442, 447. 
48 R v Agar (1990) 2 All ER 442, 448. 
49 Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 (19 November 1985). 
50 Ibid, at 246-48.  
51 Ibid, 247 (McHugh JA). For more discussion on Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 (13 February 1984).  
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suggested that a wider balancing test may be justified to better protect national security 
information, with the effect that “evidence [is] not necessarily disclosable even though 
it established innocence.”52    
Not all State Supreme Courts, however, followed the approach in Cain v Glass (No2). 
In Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick, the Supreme Court of Victoria 
unanimously adopted the balancing approach, taking wider principles of PII into 
consideration.53 Nonetheless, Brooking J’s leading judgment recognised that as soon as 
the informer’s identity is considered to be of “substantial” rather than merely “slight 
assistance”, the defence’s interest in disclosure will necessarily prevail over the state’s 
interest in non-disclosure.54 While this approach endorses undertaking a balancing 
exercising, its structure is reminiscent of the old informer rule.  
The introduction of s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (EA) codified the PII doctrine, 
and its application to police informers,55 finally settling upon the balancing approach as 
the correct methodology, at least in federal law.56 In his study on police informers in 
Australia, however, Mares interprets the conflicting authorities to indicate that s 130 EA 
may not properly reflect the common law position, and suggests that the balancing test 
was introduced “perhaps erroneously”.57 In fact, Mares dismisses any reference to the 
balancing approach in case law as merely “lip-service”, arguing that judges in substance 
follow the rule of non-disclosure.58 While the analysis below will support Mares’ 
conclusions, it is sufficient at this stage to point to the tension between the language and 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick [1995] 1VR 84, 88 (Brooking J, with whom 
Southwell and Teague JJ agreed). 
54 Ibid, at 90. 
55 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 130(4)(e). 
56 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence: Volume 1 (Report 26 (Interim), 1985) [864]. 
57 Mares, above n 40, 110. 
58 Ibid, 112. 
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content within the Australian authorities of police informers. 
 
6.2.2   Public interest immunities in criminal proceedings in the UK 
6.2.2.1   The roots of PII in civil proceedings 
Under the common law, suppressing material that may jeopardise national security falls 
within the scope of PII - a concept that had developed in the context of civil trials.59 
Assuming that the state is best placed to assess the implications of disclosing sensitive 
information, until the 1960s, PII certificates signed by a Minister of the Crown were 
seen as ‘conclusive’ and automatically prevented any related disclosure. Illustrating this 
point, in the leading UK authority Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942],60 the 
plaintiff requested that the state disclose plans of submarines. Occurring against the 
backdrop of WWII, it is unsurprising that the Crown opposed disclosure on national 
security grounds, relying upon a Ministerial certificate as conclusive proof of this claim. 
On appeal, the authority of the certificate without more was upheld by House of Lords.  
In Conway v Rimmer, to limit its potential abuse of PII certificates,61 the House of 
Lords recognised that judges could review the evidence before ruling on disclosure, in 
circumstances where the party challenging the Ministerial certificate had persuaded the 
court that the information concerned was relevant.62 After satisfying this initial hurdle, 
the court could then balance the competing interests to determine whether, or to what 
extent, the information should be disclosed.63 It is important to emphasise that while 
having to convince the court of its relevance, the evidence remained undisclosed to the 
                                                
59 For a more extensive overview see for example Simon Brown, “Public interest immunity” (1994) 
Winter Public Law 579. 
60 Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 (27 April 1942). 
61 William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative law (Oxford University Press, 10th ed by 
Christopher Forsyth, 2009) 719. 
62 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (2 May 1968). 
63 Ibid, 943.  
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defence.64 Although subsequent English authorities have affirmed that Ministerial 
certificates are no longer conclusive in themselves, judges continued to attach great 
weight to them in PII claims. For example, in the Air Canada case, Lord Denning MR 
stated that certificates should not be  
“overridden unless the court is of the opinion that the disclosure of the document 
is necessary for fairly disposing of the matter, or to put in another way, 
necessary for the due administration of justice”.65 
Obscured by the language of ‘fairness’, we see that the scales remain tilted in favour of 
the Minister’s certificate.  
 
6.2.2.2   Applying PII to criminal cases 
As a result of the prosecution’s expanding disclosure duties during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the question arose as to whether the use of PII could similarly be applied in 
criminal proceedings, beyond those matters involving police informers? If this were the 
case, would the rules developed in civil proceedings be the same in criminal 
proceedings?  
A priori, the approach taken in civil proceedings sits uncomfortably with some of the 
general principles applied in criminal proceedings. In particular, many of the procedures 
governing disclosure tend to limit the principle of adversariness and the equality of 
arms. Whereas in criminal proceedings, judges can exercise their discretion to order the 
disclosure of relevant information, the Conway v Rimmer approach would limit this 
                                                
64 See for example Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Governor and Co of the Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, 1117 
(Lord Wilberforce); Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394, 411-12 (Lord Denning 
MR). The House of Lords confirmed that it would not inspect unless the documents are likely to give 
substantial support to the defendants’ case and not helping the defendant on a ‘fishing’ expedition. 
65 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394, 408. 
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power to cases where the defendant had convinced the court that this was necessary.66 
For this reason, some earlier civil cases cautioned that the principles applied under PII 
may not be the same in criminal cases.67  
These issues were first addressed by Mann LJ in ex parte Osman,68 who commented in 
obiter that, as the underlying rationale for non-disclosure is the same in civil and 
criminal proceedings, there was no reason why PII should not apply equally to both.69 
Although he cited in support of this position the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
decision of R v Robertson, ex parte McAulay,70 which itself relies primarily upon cases 
grounded in UK civil authority,71 his judgment importantly goes on to qualify that 
“the application of the public immunity doctrine in criminal proceedings will 
involve a different balancing exercise to that in civil proceedings [...] In those 
cases, which establish a privilege in regard to information leading to the 
detection of crime, there are observations to the effect that the privilege cannot 
prevail if the evidence is necessary for the prevention of a miscarriage of justice. 
No balance is called for. If admission is necessary to prevent miscarriage of 
justice, balance does not arise.”72 
Despite this later clarification bearing strong similarities to the original rule-exception 
approach, ex parte Osman is generally cited as good authority in favour of applying the 
                                                
66 Ian Leigh, “Public Interest Immunity” (1997) 50(1) Parliamentary Affairs 55, 57. 
67 See for example Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624, 633-4 (Viscount Simon LC): 
“The judgment of the House in the present case is limited to civil actions and the practice, as applied in 
criminal trials where an individual's life or liberty may be at stake, is not necessarily the same.” 
68 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR 281(14 November 1990). 
69 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR 281, 288 (Mann LJ). 
70 (1983) 71 FLR 429 (2 June 1983). 
71 In Robertson the Court refers to Conway v Rimmer and Sankey v Whitlam - the former was a civil case 
(see above at 6.2.1) and the latter a private prosecution in Australia, which grounded its authority equally 
on UK civil cases: see R v Robertson, ex parte McAulay (1983) 71 FLR 429, 436-37. For a detailed 
discussion of Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978) see below at 6.2.3.1. 
72 R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR 281, 288-290 (Mann LJ) (emphasis 
added). 
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PII doctrine more generally in criminal trials, and, prima facie, of reaching non-
disclosure decisions through judicial discretion and balancing. Yet as this analysis 
reveals, ex parte Osman preserves to some degree, the ‘rule and exception’ approach 
underlying the informer rule.73 The tension inherent between these approaches provides 
an uncertain foundation for importing PII into criminal proceedings.  
A clear distinction between the application of PII in civil and criminal proceedings was 
emphasised in the “Report of the Inquiry in to the Export of Defence Equipment and 
Dual Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions” (‘Scott Report’).74 Reviewing 
established principles of fairness, and leading authorities on the informer rule, the Scott 
Report characterised disclosure issues in cases involving sensitive information as 
revealing a tension between two public interests: the first is the interest to protect 
national security, and the second, the need to protect a criminal defendant’s RFT, and an 
innocent person’s right against wrongful conviction. Finding the suggestion “grotesque” 
that the latter “would ever have to give way in a balancing exercise”,75 Scott states that 
disclosure must prevail where “there is a real possibility that withholding of the 
documents may cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice.”76  
As this formulation indicates a rather low threshold as to when ‘material’ evidence must 
be disclosed to the defence, the question of whether particular information is ‘material’ 
                                                
73 See for example R v Keane [1994] 1 WLR 746, 751-752 (Lord Taylor CJ); R v Brown (Winston) 
[1994] WLR 1599, 1607-8 (Steyn LJ). 
74 ‘Scott Report’, above n 11. See also Richard Scott, “The Use of Public Interest Immunity Claims in 
Criminal Cases” (1996) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues; Scott, above n 25; Oliver, above n 11.  
This criticism was made as part of a wider inquiry into the Matrix Churchill trial and its subsequent 
collapse in 1992. In the trial three directors of Matrix Churchill Ltd. were charged with violating export 
regulations when delivering weapons to Iraq in the early 1980s. During the trial the relevant Minister 
made a number of PII claims. Some of them were rejected and eventually it turned out that the company 
had informed the Government about the deals. Given that the export were made with ministerial approval 
it became clear that that PII claims were misused to suppress this information. 
75 Scott, above n 74, 8. 
76 Ibid, 10 (emphasis added). 
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must be addressed a priori.77 Additionally, the collateral question arises of whether 
every non-disclosure of material evidence will necessarily lead to a miscarriage of 
justice. As this thesis demonstrates, on this point the courts have seen some scope to 
manoeuvre, by perceiving the threshold for miscarriage of justice as a higher one.  
In this same period, the courts developed the PII doctrine further. The case of R v 
Brown held that the court has a duty to inspect PII material before determining its 
relevance,78 and that any non-disclosure order must be kept under continual review 
throughout the trial.79  
The defendant’s involvement in non-disclosure proceedings also underwent change. In 
R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson the unanimous English CA distinguished between three 
types of proceedings, depending on the information’s sensitivity, available to protect 
information.80 The first type (Type I) or the ‘standard approach’ requires the 
prosecution to notify the defence of its intention to make a PII application, and specify 
the category of material concerned. This approach allows the defendant to make 
relevant submissions to the court. In the second type (Type II), the prosecution has an 
obligation to inform the defendant of the ex parte hearing, but does not have to specify 
the category of the material discussed, on the basis that this itself would disclose the 
protected information. In the third type of proceedings (Type III), reserved for 
exceptional cases, the prosecution need not notify the defence of the PII application as 
this alone would alert the defence to the existence of suppressed information, thereby 
prejudicing national security.81  
                                                
77 This emphasis has been re-enforced in R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134: see below at 6.2.2.3. 
78 R v Brown (Winston) [1994] WLR 1599, 1607-8 (Steyn LJ); this has also been confirmed in R v H and 
C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155. 
79 R v Brown (Winston) [1994] WLR 1599, 1607-8 (Steyn LJ); also Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (UK), s 15(3)(4). 
80 R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson [1993] 1 WLR 613, 617. 
81 This has now also been put into legislation: see Rule 22.3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2013 (UK). 
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These three procedural variations to disclosure proceedings must be viewed in light of 
two important obligations. The first is the prosecution’s duty to aim to disclose as much 
information as possible prior to making a PII claim, which may require summarising or 
providing redacted or edited copies of documents.82 The second obligation, under s 16 
CPIA 1996, is that the defendant be heard in PII decisions.83 Given their incompatibility 
with these obligations, Type II and Type III proceedings may constitute serious 
deviations from the adversarial principle of the criminal trial.84 Type III closed hearings 
are particularly problematic as the defendant, unaware of the hearing, is not in a 
position to challenge or appeal any non-disclosure decision.85 Despite the secrecy and 
the appearance of illegitimacy, Type III proceedings at least guarantee that an 
independent judge will exercise oversight functions, a criterion emphasised by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),86 and which should be further intensified 
under such circumstances.87 
As we have seen, the extension of PII from civil to criminal proceedings also introduced 
the language of discretionary balancing to non-disclosure decisions. This development, 
which was at odds with earlier decisions on police informers, coincided with a series of 
miscarriage of justices in the UK in relation to non-disclosure of relevant information. 
As a reaction to this systemic failure, the police/prosecution discretion was curbed, 
increasing the courts supervisory role over non-disclosure decisions. In light of the 
common law development of disclosure rules, the next section examines how the 
                                                
82 Attorney-General’s Guidelines on Disclosure 2005 (UK) [20]; R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155. It is 
important to point out that this concerns information that is not relied on by the prosecution. This in 
contrast to the NSIA, which allows the prosecution to admit edited evidence in support of the 
prosecution’s case. 
83 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 156. 
84 The proceedings have been discussed in some of the subsequent disclosure cases; see also Ian Leigh, 
“Reforming public interest immunity” (1995) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 11. 
85 See also , above n 15, 455. 
86 See above at 4.3.2. 
87 See below at 8.2.2. 
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doctrines have been influenced by decisions of the ECtHR, and its rigorous efforts to 
ensure that the RFT under art 6 ECHR is not unduly infringed.  
 
6.2.2.3   The Strasbourg case law and R v H and C 
In the early 2000s, the ECtHR passed a series of judgments on non-disclosure arising 
out of individual complaints from the UK, which have offered guidance to the UK 
judiciary on the approach to take to protect the RFT under art 6 ECHR. Given the 
detailed discussion of art 6 case law in Chapter 4, a brief summary will be sufficient.88 
In these decisions, the ECtHR held that the defendant’s right to full disclosure of 
sensitive but relevant material is the starting point, but is not absolute. The right can be 
restricted where ‘strictly necessary’ to protect certain public interests, such as national 
security. Importantly however, any restrictions on these grounds that impair the rights 
of defence must be counter-balanced by adjusting the procedural rules.89 Operating to 
protect the essence of the RFT, the approach has been described as proportionality  
sui generis. Whereas the informer privilege rests on a default position of non-disclosure 
(rule) subject to an exception in the interest of fairness, the ECtHR reverses this 
approach, giving priority to RTF individual.  
The ECtHR has underscored that the trial judge is best placed to apply these principles 
and maintain ongoing review of any non-disclosure decisions.90 Judicial supervision 
was stated to particularly play a key role in ‘compensating’ for the deviations in Type II 
                                                
88 For a more detailed discussion on the position of the ECtHR including the UK cases above at 4.3.1. 
89 Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 28901/95 (16 February 2000) [61]; 
Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [51]; Fitt v the 
United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 29777/96 (16 February 2000) [45]. 
90 Rowe and Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 28901/95 (16 February 2000) [63]-
[65]; Dowsett v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 39482/98 (24 June 2003) [47]-[50]; Atlan v 
the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 36533/97 (19 June 2001) [45]. 
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disclosure proceedings.91 A procedural adjustment available is the appointment of a 
special advocate.92 While usually a matter of discretion, the ECtHR has ruled that where 
the judge has to decide an ‘issue of fact’, procedural adjustments must be made.93 Any 
shortcomings in the trial process can only be cured on appeal by newly inspecting the 
relevant information, or by disclosing it to the defendant.94 
While the evolving Strasbourg jurisprudence did not seem to have an immediate impact 
on the UK case law, R v H and C offered the House of Lords an opportunity to review 
this area of law.95 Charged with conspiracy to supply prohibited ‘Class A’ drugs, the 
defendants in that case made far-reaching disclosure requests for the supply of 
documents to assist their defence that evidence had been planted and the operation had 
lacked appropriate authorisation. The police however claimed PII as the requested 
undercover observation logs contained sensitive operation techniques and procedures. 
Referring to the ECtHR judgement in Edwards and Lewis, the trial judge appointed a 
special advocate for the PII hearing concerning the police material. On appeal, the CA 
agreed that while such an appointment is possible, the appointment at this stage of the 
proceeding was “premature”.96  
When the House of Lords was subsequently called upon to clarify the compatibility of 
the special advocate regime with art 6, their Lordships also reviewed the domestic and 
                                                
91 Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [55]; Fitt v the 
United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 29777/96 (16 February 2000) [48]. 
92 Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [55]-[56]; Fitt v 
the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 29777/96 (16 February 2000) [48]-[49]; for discussion on 
the dissenting opinions see above at 4.3.1.2.  
93 Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application nos 39647/98 and 40461/98 (22 July 
2003) [57]-[59]. 
94 Edwards v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 13071/87 (16 December 1992) [36]-[37]; IJL, 
GMR and AKP v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications nos 29522/95, 30056/96 and 30574/96 (19 
September 2000) [114]; Dowsett v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 39482/98 (24 June 
2003) [46]. See also Table 4.1 above at 4.3.1.2. 
95 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134 (5 February 2004). For a general case comment see also Chris Taylor, 
“The courts and applications for public interest immunity: R v H and C” (2004) 8(3) International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 179. 
96 R v H and C (2003) 1 WLR 3006, 3019. 
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European law on disclosure, consolidating the relevant principles into a series of 
questions designed to guide the prosecution and trial judge in PII cases.97 Importantly, 
their Lordships re-affirmed the ‘golden rule’ that the prosecution is under an obligation 
to disclose all evidence that weakens its case or strengthens the defendant’s case.98 
Nonetheless their Lordships recognised that exceptions may be justified, and may not 
result in an unfair trial.99 To limit deviations from the rule, two factors must be taken 
into account: The court must first be satisfied that disclosure would entail a “real risk of 
serious prejudice” to the public interest. This requirement implies some sort of 
justification to convince the court that the threshold is met, which coincides with 
                                                
97 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155-56, worth citing in full: 
“When any issue of derogation from the golden rule of full disclosure comes before it, the court must 
address a series of questions: 
1. What is the material which the prosecution seek to withhold? This must be considered by the court in 
detail. 
2. Is the material such as may weaken the prosecution case or strengthen that of the defence? If No, 
disclosure should not be ordered. If Yes, full disclosure should (subject to (3), (4) and (5) below be 
ordered. 
3. Is there a real risk of serious prejudice to an important public interest (and, if so, what) if full 
disclosure of the material is ordered? If No, full disclosure should be ordered. 
4. If the answer to (2) and (3) is Yes, can the defendant's interest be protected without disclosure or 
disclosure be ordered to an extent or in a way which will give adequate protection to the public 
interest in question and also afford adequate protection to the interests of the defence? 
This question requires the court to consider, with specific reference to the material which the 
prosecution seek to withhold and the facts of the case and the defence as disclosed, whether the 
prosecution should formally admit what the defence seek to establish or whether disclosure short of 
full disclosure may be ordered. This may be done in appropriate cases by the preparation of 
summaries or extracts of evidence, or the provision of documents in an edited or anonymised form, 
provided the documents supplied are in each instance approved by the judge. In appropriate cases the 
appointment of special counsel may be a necessary step to ensure that the contentions of the 
prosecution are tested and the interests of the defendant protected (see paragraph 22 above). In cases 
of exceptional difficulty the court may require the appointment of special counsel to ensure a correct 
answer to questions (2) and (3) as well as (4). 
5. Do the measures proposed in answer to (4) represent the minimum derogation necessary to protect the 
public interest in question? If No, the court should order such greater disclosure as will represent the 
minimum derogation from the golden rule of full disclosure. 
6. If limited disclosure is ordered pursuant to (4) or (5), may the effect be to render the trial process, 
viewed as a whole, unfair to the defendant? If Yes, then fuller disclosure should be ordered even if 
this leads or may lead the prosecution to discontinue the proceedings so as to avoid having to make 
disclosure. 
7. If the answer to (6) when first given is No, does that remain the correct answer as the trial unfolds, 
evidence is adduced and the defence advanced? 
It is important that the answer to (6) should not be treated as a final, once-and-for-all, answer but as a 
provisional answer which the court must keep under review.” 
98 See Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK), s 3(a). 
99 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 148. 
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‘deference as respect’, discussed in Chapter 4.100 Secondly, the court must consider the 
possibility of disclosing parts of the information or in an edited form. In assessing these 
two factors, the House of Lords noted that the court may need to appoint a special 
advocate.101  Consideration of the impact of any non-disclosure on the overall fairness 
of the trial was stated to be paramount, and the House of Lords emphasised that if a fair 
trial could not be assured, disclosure of more information must be ordered, or the 
proceedings must be stayed. This series of questions is illustrated in Figure 6.2. below. 
 
      Figure 6.2: chain of relevant disclosure questions in R v H and C 
The court in R v H and C avoided the word ‘balancing’ entirely, finally acknowledging 
it as both unhelpful and illusory in protecting the RFT. While an important clarification, 
this acknowledgement arguably did not amount to a significant development in the law. 
The real innovation in the case was its inversion of the ‘rule and exception’ approach to 
upholding art 6 ECHR compared to the informer privilege. Following Marks v Beyfus, 
non-disclosure on public interest grounds was accepted (the rule), unless non-disclosure 
would render the trial unfair (the exception). Since R v H and C however, the ‘golden 
                                                
100 See above at 4.2.1. 
101 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 150. The common law power of a court to appoint a special advocate 
on an ad hoc basis in a civil trial if it is necessary in the interest of justice was first pronounced by the CA 
in Rehman. As the SIAC Rules were not applicable on appeal, the Court flagged the possibility to appoint 
a special advocate by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction to control the fairness of its proceedings 
analogically to the SIAC Rules. Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2000] 3 WLR 
1240, 1251. For more information on SIAC see below at 7.1 and 7.2. 
Duty	to		inspect	(Q1)	 Golden	rule		of	disclosure	(Q2)	
real	risk	of		serious	prejudice	to	public	interest	=	justi<ication		(Q3)	
maximum		disclosure	(partial	disclosure/edited			information)	(Q4/5)	
Assess	overall	fairness		of	the	trial	(Q6)	
Duty	of	continuous	review		(Q7)	
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rule’ and the individual’s RFT has become the starting point in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality.  
Despite being heralded as a “major step forward”,102 R v H and C has been also 
criticised on a number of grounds. First, a principal drawback is that discretion and 
responsibilities have again been shifted to the prosecution without the imposition of 
additional safeguards. Secondly, the case failed to resolve the uncertainty surrounding 
the process of appointing of special advocates. These aspects will be discussed in turn.  
The judgement implies that if the prosecution were to apply the law properly, a judicial 
ruling on non-disclosure would only be necessary in “truly borderline cases”.103 The 
House of Lords emphasised in particular that there is no requirement for the prosecution 
to disclose evidence that is regarded as “neutral” or has an adverse effect on the 
defendant’s case,104 but that there is an obligation to maximise disclosure, and include 
edited information where necessary.105 As there have been no more recent cases on 
disclosure before the Supreme Court, it can be assumed that the reasoning in R v H and 
C  has helped both trial judges to resolve PII claims and the state to fulfil its disclosure 
obligations according to the law. With the prosecution only held to account by 
professional and ethical duties to act in the interests of justice,106 some scholars believe 
that the wide discretion may even be contrary to Article 6 ECHR.107 An additional 
criticism of the increased pressure on the prosecution “to get disclosure right”,108 is that 
                                                
102 Taylor, above n 95, 185 
103 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155. 
104 Ibid, 148 and 154. 
105 Ibid, 155; see also 2005 Guidelines, [20]. 
106 Ibid, 146. 
107 Emmerson et al, above n 8, 474. 
108 Corker and Parkinson, above n 7, 143. 
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even when made in good faith, decisions on whether information is ‘relevant’ are not 
always easy and prosecutors may need the assistance of the court.109  
Another issue side-stepped by the House of Lords was the extent to which additional 
safeguards, and importantly the judicial power to appoint special advocates, are needed 
to preserve the adversarial nature of the trial.110 Although UK law allows for the 
appointment of special advocates, the Law Lords in R v H and C did not engage closely 
with the implications of ECtHR ruling in Edwards and Lewis, which required 
procedural adjustments when deciding on ‘issues of fact’ in a closed hearing.111 Beyond 
agreeing with the CA that the appointment of a special advocate prior to assessing the 
necessity of disclosure was premature,112 no principled rule was formulated to govern 
the circumstances when an additional adversarial element must be considered. The 
question of when a contention will fall under an ‘issue of fact’ for the purposes of 
requiring a special advocate was not considered by the House of Lords. In R v H and C, 
evidence surrounding the covert policing operation was clearly relevant both to the 
defendants’ claim that evidence had been planted and any decision of whether to stay 
the proceedings. The same is true of Edwards and Lewis where the case turned upon the 
defendant’s argument of entrapment.113  
Unfortunately, there was no need to address this issue as it was not formally included in 
the appeal. Hence, the decision as to whether or not a special advocate should be 
appointed rests entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. The only elaboration on 
this point given by the Court was that such an appointment would only occur in 
                                                
109 Redmayne, above n 15, 457-458: this is particularly the case when the true relevance of this evidence 
only becomes obvious during the course of the trial. 
110 However, see below at 8.2.2 for a discussion about introducing inquisitorial elements to closed 
proceedings. 
111 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 154.  
112 Ibid, 156. 
113 Edwards and Lewis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application nos 39647/98 and 40461/98 (22 July 
2003).
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“exceptional circumstances”.114 This prediction seems to have been accurate.115 
 
6.2.3   Suppression of sensitive information in Australia 
In their approach to PII claims, the Australian courts have tended to follow early 
English authority. In particular, they have agreed that it is up to the courts to decide 
whether information should be disclosed, and where the public interest lies.116 As such, 
although a Minister’s certificate always attracted considerable weight,117 the Australian 
courts rejected claims that it alone was conclusive.118  
It is noteworthy that beginning in the 1970s, several years ahead of the UK, PII had 
been applied to criminal proceedings in Australia. The extension of PII from the civil to 
the criminal sphere was relatively uncontroversial and, as such, when the question arose 
of how to approach non-disclosure requests in criminal proceedings, the balancing 
approach that had been hitherto applied in the civil context, was adopted.119 Since the 
common law provided the starting point for the statutory formulation of PII in the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), further discussion of the earlier Australian cases and their 
approach to non-disclosure decisions is necessary.  
                                                
114 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 150. Given the ethical and practical issues involved, the court has to 
demonstrate a need for the appointment in the in the interest of justice. “Such an appointment will always 
be exceptional, never automatic; a course of last and never first resort. It should not be ordered unless and 
until the trial judge is satisfied that no other course will adequately meet the overriding requirement of 
fairness to the defendant.” 
115 The precise number is actually unknown, but there are indications that it is reasonably low. See Eric 
Metcalfe, “Secret Evidence” (Justice Report, June 2009) 168. 
116 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 38-39 (Gibbs CJ); 58-59 (Stephen J). 
117 In Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 43, Gibbs CJ referred to the amount as “full weight”; see also 
Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 412 (Gibbs CJ), 435-36 (Wilson and Dawson JJ) which was affirmed in 
Watson v AWB Limited (No 2) [2009] FCA 1047 (17 September 2009) [52]. 
118 Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230, 234; see also Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 59 
(Stephen J); Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 413 (Gibbs CJ). 
119 This also explains why Mann LJ has referred to Australian cases in R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex 
parte Osman [1991] 1 WLR 281 (14 November 1990). See above at 6.2.2.2. 
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In the aftermath of 9/11, concerns about the protection afforded to sensitive information 
in legal proceedings led the Australian Government to introduce the National Security 
Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (NSIA). Although invoked 
infrequently, this complex legislation has an enormous impact on the trial procedures. 
As the NSIA guarantees the Executive and its security agencies greater control over the 
management and suppression of sensitive information, this Section enquires in 
particular whether the NSIA has increased the ability of the state to supress information 
without violating the RFT as it was intended? 
 
6.2.3.1   PII in criminal proceedings and the Evidence Act 1995 
The law governing the use of PII in criminal proceedings was tested in two high profile 
High Court cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s: Sankey v Whitlam,120 and Alister v 
R,121 respectively. 
In Sankey v Whitlam, Mr Sankey claimed that former Prime Minister Whitlam and 
several of his cabinet Ministers had illegally conspired to borrow money from overseas 
without appropriate approval from the Loan Council, thus committing offences under 
the Financial Agreement Act 1927 (Cth).122 PII claims were made in relation to a 
number of Cabinet documents that Mr Sankey had requested during the trial. Although 
the High Court held that there was no basis for the charges against Whitlam, the 
decision allowed the Court to review the principles in relation to PII claims. Firstly, the 
Court rejected the conclusiveness of ‘class claims’ (in this case, protection was claimed 
for Cabinet papers as a class of evidence), and held that the particular documents should 
be produced before the Magistrate for determining where the balance of public interest 
                                                
120 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978). 
121 Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 (13 February 1984). 
122  Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978). 
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lies.123 The Court further affirmed the balancing approach as governing non-disclosure 
decisions in criminal proceedings.124  
In Alister v R, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to murder and attempted 
murder, being the alleged perpetrators of the Sydney Hilton bombing.125 At trial, the 
defendants claimed that the leading Crown witness, a police informant who had 
infiltrated the group, was an ASIO employee. They requested all ASIO documents 
relating to the informant, but the Attorney-General objected on the grounds that 
disclosure would be prejudicial to national security. The High Court held that the courts 
must have the power to review ASIO documents that are potentially relevant to both 
establishing an accused’s innocence, and undertaking a meaningful balancing exercise 
of competing public interests.126 After inspecting the documents, the Court found that 
the requested ASIO files were not relevant to the case and as such, disclosure was 
unnecessary.127  
 
General disclosure rule and preparedness to inspect sensitive material 
In Sankey the High Court confirmed the courts’ jurisdiction to inspect documents ex 
parte, after it has been established that “on balance” it is “desirable” or even “essential” 
to reaching a decision on disclosure.128 Considering the issue further, Alister 
                                                
123 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 46-47 (per Gibbs CJ). As the PII claim was based on the class of 
documents (namely, Cabinet in confidence), rather than their content, a large part of the discussion was 
centred around the question of whether it is necessary for the proper functioning of the government to 
keep those documents out of the public eye. Accordingly, there was less analysis of whether their content 
– if disclosed - would damage the public interest. Although the decision distinguishes between class 
claims and content claims, the overall findings suggest that their treatment of both types of content is 
rather similar. See also Andrew Ligertwood and Gary Edmond, Australian Evidence (LexisNexis 
Butterworth, 5th ed, 2010) 502. 
124 The case was in fact a private prosecution. However, Stephen J held that this fact had no impact on the 
question of crown privilege. See ibid, 67. 
125 Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 (13 February 1984). 
126 Ibid, 414 (Gibbs CJ). 
127 Ibid, 469 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennen and Dawson JJ). 
128 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 46 (Gibbs CJ); see also ibid, 96 (Mason J). 
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emphasised that before the question of disclosure arises, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the information bears some relevance to matters in dispute. In their 
reasoning, the High Court relied upon Air Canada and Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., decisions 
where the House of Lords held that it would inspect documents only when it was 
convinced that the disclosure request was more than a ‘fishing expedition’ for 
evidence.129 Indeed, the information should be likely to support the party requesting 
disclosure. Nevertheless, given that these precedents related to civil rather than criminal 
proceedings, the court held that “special weight [must be attached] to the fact that the 
documents may support the defence of an accused person in criminal proceedings,”130 
and as such inspection should occur as soon as “it appears ‘on the cards’ that the 
documents will materially assist the defence.”131 In Alister, although the defendant 
merely suspected that the prosecution witness worked for ASIO, this was sufficient to 
convince the court that the defendant was not simply ‘fishing’ for evidence, in spite of 
the highly sensitive nature of the material concerned.132 Seen in this light, the burden of 
convincing the court of the information’s relevance for the purposes of inspection 
appears lower than that required to obtain disclosure, bearing stronger parallels to the 
threshold of the prosecution’s general obligation to disclose all ‘material’ evidence in 
the first place.  
 
                                                
129 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Governor and Co of the Bank of England [1980] AC 1090, 1117 (Lord 
Wilberforce); Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394, 411-12 (Lord Denning MR), 
438 (Lord Wilberford). 
130 Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 414 (Gibbs CJ), also 439 (Wilson and Dawson JJ), 
131 Ibid; see also ibid, 456 (per Brennan J); for further discussion of the issues see Attorney-General 
(NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536, 551-553 (Beazley JA, with whom James and Kirby JJ 
agreed). cf Commonwealth of Australia v Northern Land Council and another (1993) 176 CLR 604 (21 
April 1993); in this civil litigation the High Court upheld the immunity claim of the Government in 
relation to Cabinet documents even without inspection.  However, the Court recognised that “in criminal 
proceedings the position may be different” (at 618). 
132 See Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 412 (Gibbs CJ). This approach also aligns with the general 
presumption under the common law that access to documents shall be given as long as the party seeking 
the document is able to identify sufficiently its direct or indirect relevance. If the evidence is also 
admissible, it should be also discoverable. See Ligertwood and Edmond, above n 123, 502. 
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The balancing exercise 
In both Sankey and Alister, 133 the High Court introduced the rhetoric of balancing into 
PII decisions, with the court in Sankey paying particular attention to the earlier English 
decision of Conway v Rimmer. It was held that even where evidence is both admissible 
and relevant, suppression is generally justifiable when disclosure would harm national 
interests.134 In this respect, the national (security) interest must be weighed against the 
competing public interests of the RFT, and the risk of obstructing the administration of 
justice by withholding relevant documents from the defence.135 
However, even in Sankey some comments made indicate that the balancing approach is 
not always straightforward, and that criminal proceedings may necessitate additional 
rules to safeguard the RTF. As Stephen J emphasised, there is a 
“need to consider the particular nature of the proceedings in which the claim to 
Crown privilege arises in order to determine what are the relevant aspects of 
public interest which are to be weighed and what is to be the outcome of that 
weighing process.”136 
To illustrate this point, his Honour pointed to the fair trial exception to the informer 
rule, suggesting that in circumstances where the information is pivotal to establishing 
the defendant’s innocence, the balance would fall in favour of disclosure.137  
The High Court authorities discussed above demonstrate that Australian judges have 
encountered the same difficulties as their English counterparts in reconciling national 
security interests with the RFT. While resorting to rhetoric of balancing, they are in fact, 
                                                
133 See in particular, Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 412-414 (Gibbs CJ). 
134 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 38 (Gibbs CJ). 
135 Ibid, 43 (Gibbs CJ), 56 (Stephen J). 
136 Ibid, 60 (Stephen J). 
137 See also Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 431 (Murphy J dissenting). 
Chapter 6: Sensitive information in criminal proceeding 
 228 
upon close scrutiny, following a structure akin to the general rule and exception 
approach. Although in criminal proceedings, the High Court gives precedence to the 
RFT and sets a higher threshold test to justify non-disclosure, they have not clearly 
articulated how it should be given effect.  
Again, an inconsistency lies in the weight attached to a Minister’s certificate declaring 
that disclosure is against the public interest. While courts have held that these 
certificates are never conclusive, the public importance of suppressing individual 
documents of a sensitive nature is equally recognised, with some members of the 
judiciary suggesting that “the court’s acceptance of the claim [by the Minister] may 
often be no more than a matter of form.”138 Other judges, by contrast, suggest that 
“those who urge Crown privilege for classes of documents regardless of particular 
contents carry a heavy burden”.139 Mason J reasons that this is because 
“[a]n affidavit claiming Crown privilege should state with precision the grounds 
on which it is contended that documents or information should not be disclosed 
so as to enable the court to evaluate the competing interests.”140 
These statements indicate that once the information has been established to be relevant, 
the party objecting to disclosure bears the onus of convincing the court otherwise.141 
Even so, the conflict between attaching great weight to the Minister’s PII claim and 
requiring a clear justification remains unresolved.142 The mediating concept of 
balancing was (and continues to be) a judicial tool for concealing discrepancies  and 
                                                
138 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 59 (Stephen J); see also Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 435 
(Wilson and Dawson JJ),  
139 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 62 (Stephen J). 
140 Ibid, 96 (Mason J). This is exactly what did not happen in this case according to Mason J. 
141 This also seems to be the reading of Ligertwood and Edmond of the case Ligertwood and Edmond, 
above n 123, 504. 
142 See above at 4.2: if great weight is given to the PII claim, because it is properly justified, the reference 
to the Minister would be redundant as the weight is actually given to the argument itself. 
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differences in judicial approaches to PII. 
 
The enactment of the s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) 
In early 1990, following the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Report on Evidence, the Australian Parliament enacted s 130 Evidence Act 
1995 (Cth) (EA). As this section aimed to codify the common law governing PII,143 the 
common law authorities continue to inform how the courts approach disclosure. This 
section confirms that trial judges must engage in a balancing exercise when considering 
requests to supress “a document that relates to matters of state” in the public interest,144 
such as national security.145 While there are no directions as to how to balance the 
interests involved, s 130 EA states that “the court may inform itself in any way it thinks 
fit”.146 It further specifies that the court may order production of the document for the 
purpose of inspection,147 and includes a (non-exhaustive) list of factors that may be 
taken into consideration.148 These factors include: the importance of the information; 
whether the proceedings are criminal; the nature of the offence; whether the information 
has already been published; and the consequences of a potential non-disclosure. 
Although silent on where the burden of proof lies, if common law decisions are to be 
                                                
143 Australian Law Reform Commission, Evidence: Volume 1 (Report 26 (Interim), 1985) [864]; see also 
Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [No 2](2000) 100 FCR 229, 246 (von Doussa J). 
144 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 130(1). Legislation only applies to the trial. Otherwise, in particular in the 
pre-trial phase, the CL continues to apply, although the burden to trigger disclosure may be higher outside 
the actual trial. See for example Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230, 251. The term “matters of 
state” was intended to emphasise that these documents are important to the functioning of government 
and not to other interest even if the may align with the public interest. See Young v R (1999) 107 A Crim 
R 1, 10-11 (Spigelman CJ). 
145 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 130(4)(a). 
146 Ibid, s 130(3). 
147 Ibid, s 133. 
148 Ibid, s 130(5). This list is not exclusive.  
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informative, the burden will rest with the party claiming  non-disclosure.149 
 
The case of R v Lappas & Dowling 
The next milestone in the development of non-disclosure rules in Australia was the 
ACT Supreme Court case of R v Lappas & Dowling in 2001.150 Although the decision 
did no more than apply established principles, its impact on the policy development 
surrounding disclosure cannot be overestimated. Given its significance and the 
questions it raised, it is worth reviewing the case in detail. 
Mr Lappas was an analyst at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), who 
allegedly passed on confidential documents to Ms Dowling, intending for them to be 
sold in settlement of his debts to her. Having reported his own behaviour to the Security 
Officer of the DIO, Mr Lappas was charged with multiple counts relating to espionage 
offences.  
The second count required that the prosecution prove that Mr Lappas shared the 
documents “for a purpose intended to be prejudicial to the safety or defence of the 
Commonwealth”.151 It is of significance however that in confessing to a friend, Mr 
Lappas claimed that the documents did not include “any information that would harm 
anyone”.152  Since the DIO had claimed PII for the documents, and had opposed 
production in court, the prosecution had to prove that Mr Lappas had the requisite mens 
rea without access to the documents, which could confirm or deny their prejudicial 
                                                
149 Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Lawbook, 8th ed, 2009) 655. Odgers refers to Sankey v 
Whitlam and Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, and also 
follows the general legal principle that the party who claims a certain circumstance also has to prove it.  
150 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001). 
151 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 78(1); The section has since been repealed and included in Division 91 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
152 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [21]; see also R v Simon Lappas 
[2003] ACTCA 21 (31 October 2003) [76]. 
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nature. At the same time the defendant claimed that he could prove his lack of requisite 
intention, and therefore innocence, by accessing the content of the documents. Hence, 
this was a rare case where the information subject to a PII claim by the Executive (DIO) 
was not only needed by the defence to establish innocence, but also by the prosecution 
in order to prove the defendant’s guilt! 
In deciding the PII claim, Gray J applied the balancing process, as required by s 130 
EA, 153 finding, even without having engaged in a security assessment, that the interests 
of security prevailed:  
“If that is the view taken by the appropriate government representative, I have 
no reason to go behind it. I certainly do not arrogate to myself a decision as to 
whether the claimed possible consequences of any greater publication of the 
document than the claimant would permit would, in fact, not take place.”154 
Given the importance of the documents for both parties, a number of compromise 
strategies were suggested by the prosecution that would enable partial disclosure of the 
documents.155 One proposal rejected by the Court was the ‘empty shell’ strategy, which 
would allow the prosecution to present a document that had all the features of the 
original - including the ‘top secret’ designation on its cover - except for its content.156 
Furthermore, Gray J rejected the proposed use of a document summary, which “by 
reason of its generality, would not have assisted the prosecution to draw any inferences 
                                                
153 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [26]. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Due to the nature of the offence, the issue here was not to keep the information secret from the 
defendant, which would be a regular concern in counter-terrorism procedures. Mr Lappas in his capacity 
as an analyst had of course seen the content previously. In fact the documents were presented in a closed 
hearing at the committal stage, in which the defence counsel was included. R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] 
ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [3]. Furthermore, it should be clarified that the fact that the judge 
granted immunity to the documents does not allow an inference that the content could be useful for a 
foreign power, as the criteria are different: R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 
2001) [22]. 
156 Ibid, [3]. 
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to support the intent that the prosecution would seek to prove in respect of the 
charge.”157 Equally a submission that included substantial sections of ‘blacked out’ text 
was rejected on the basis that it would not allow the prosecution to draw the relevant 
inferences.158    
Another (failed) attempt by the prosecution to remedy deficiencies in their case was to 
call a witness to testify as to the ‘character’ of the document’s content, relying on the 
argument that the original document was “not available”.159 Gray J confirmed that a PII 
claim did not make the document “impractical to produce”; the document is of course 
“available”, PII merely prevents its disclosure. Furthermore, such a witness could only 
provide an interpretation of the evidence, which would be impossible to challenge 
without disclosing the content.160 Such a process, his Honour concluded, would be 
“redolent with unfairness”.161 
Ultimately Gray J denied that the government could have its ‘cake and eat it’- namely, 
to suppress relevant information, and integrate (untested) assumptions about its content 
and nature to support their own case for conviction.162 In upholding the PII claim, and 
refusing to order its disclosure, Gray J also accepted that the procedural unfairness 
could not be remedied, and ordered that the proceedings be stayed in the interests of the 
due administration of justice.163 
                                                
157 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [8]. The summary did not identify 
any names nor described any events.  
158 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [9].  
159 The strategy was based on s 48(4) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which allows such a procedure in cases 
where the particular document is “not available to the party”. The prosecution further argued that 
according to cl 5 of Part 2 Dictionary of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) a document is “not available” when 
“it would be impractical to produce the document […] during the course of the proceedings.” 
160 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [14] 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, [24]. 
163 Ibid, [30]. 
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Due to the availability of alternative charges and the low level nature of the security 
breach, Gray J was able reach such a ‘compromise’ result in this particular case. 
However, as has been stressed by the CA, the offences in general committed by the 
accused, such as espionage, are of severe gravity,164 which causes some serious concern 
for the Government. It realised that under particular circumstances it may have to 
choose between the public interest in keeping sensitive information secret, or pursuing a 
criminal conviction. Considering this choice to be made is unsatisfactory, the 
Government began searching for a legal solution making it possible to comply with the 
requirements of the court to adduce information that respects the defendant’s RTF, and 
still protect national security sufficiently.165 As a result the Australian Government 
tasked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) “to inquire into and report on 
measures to protect classified and security sensitive information in the course of 
investigations and legal proceedings”,166 while concurrently drafting legislation to 
address the concerns.167  
 
6.2.3.2   The National Security Information Act 2004 (Cth) 
In 2003, the ALRC published the Background Paper Protecting Classified and Security 
Sensitive Information,168 which was soon followed up with a Discussion Paper169 and a 
Final Report in 2004.170 Following the US approach, the ALRC recommended that new 
                                                
164 R v Simon Lappas [2003] ACTCA 21 (31 October 2003). 
165 See Explanatory memorandum to the NSIA. 
166 Australian Law Reform Commission, Protecting classified and security sensitive information 
(Background Paper 8, July 2003) [1.1]. 
167 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 2004, 29311 
(Mr Ruddock). 
168 Australian Law Reform Commission, Protecting classified and security sensitive information 
(Background Paper 8, July 2003). 
169 Australian Law Reform Commission, Protecting classified and security sensitive information 
(Discussion Paper 67, January 2004). 
170 Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping secrets: The protection of classified and security 
sensitive information (Report 98, May 2004). 
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legislation be enacted regulating the non-disclosure process in legal proceedings of 
information likely to prejudice national security.171 The National Security Information 
(Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (NSIA) received Royal Assent on 14 December 
2004 and became effective on 11 January 2005.172 
As the legislation does not automatically apply to particular offences, but rather 
becomes effective after the DPP has given notice to the court and defence that the Act 
applies,173 it runs parallel to the common law rules of PII claims and the relevant 
provisions in the EA. In relation to the suppression of information, the NSIA has 
introduced a ‘notification system’. This system requires that any potential use of 
sensitive information by any party must be brought to the attention of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General as early as possible in the proceedings. Additionally, 
the NSIA lays out a procedure according to which non-disclosure requests are 
determined in mandatory closed hearings. The legislation also provides instructions for 
courts as to how to determine disclosure orders. Most importantly, the underlying 
rationale of the NSIA is 
“to provide a procedure in cases where information relating to, or the disclosure 
of which may affect, national security could be introduced during federal 
criminal proceedings. The aim of the [Act] is to allow this information to be 
introduced in an edited or summarised form so as to facilitate the prosecution of 
                                                
171 The NSIA has been modelled on the Classified Information Procedure Act 1980 (US); for comments 
on the Act see for example Brian Tamanaha, “A critical review of the Classified Information Procedures 
Act” (1986) 13 American Journal of Criminal Law 277; Jeff Jarvis, “Protecting the nation's national 
security: the Classified Information Procedures Act” (1995) 20 Thurgood Marshall Law Review 319. 
172 The Act was originally only applicable in criminal proceedings, but amended in 2005 to also included 
civil proceedings. See National Security Information Legislation Amendment Act 2005 (Cth). Since then 
its full title is National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
173 NSIA, s 6; in civil proceedings the Attorney-General must give notice that the Act applies, irrespective 
of whether he is a party to the case or not (NSIA, s 6A). 
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an offence without prejudicing national security and the right of the defendant to 
a fair trial.”174 
As is immediately evident, the NSIA seeks to remedy the rejection of edited and 
summarised information that occurred in Lappas. The question therefore arises as to 
whether other innovations introduced by the NSIA, designed to modify and extend the 
common law of PII, were warranted and importantly, whether the process works 
effectively to address the implications of Lappas. Before answering these questions, the 
following Section will provide a brief overview of the NSIA, upon which the 
subsequent analysis will be based.  
 
Overview: Non-disclosure certificates, mandatory closed hearings and instructions on 
balancing 
A primary aim of the NSIA was to increase the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s 
control over potentially sensitive information, compared to that available under PII.175 
Accordingly, the NSIA requires both the defence and the prosecution to report to the 
Attorney-General if they know or believe that they, or witness they are calling, will 
disclose sensitive information in the course of the proceedings.176 A failure to do so 
constitutes a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment of up to two years.177 After 
such notice has been given, the judge is obliged to adjourn the proceedings, providing 
the Attorney-General with the option to issue a non-disclosure certificate. Importantly, 
the certificate is not limited to requesting total suppression of the information, but - 
                                                
174 Explanatory Memorandum (2004) to the NSIA.  
175 This concerns in particular information that is known by the defendant, who attempts to profit from 
making threaten of disclosing it. In the US this was labelled “graymailing” and was a driving force for the 
introduction of the Classified Information Procedure Act 1980 (US). See for example Richard Salgado, 
“Government secrets, fair trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act” (1988) 98 Yale Law 
Journal 427. 
176 NSIA, ss 24-25.  
177 NSIA, s 42. 
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unlike certificates under the PII doctrine - may also propose both partial or edited 
disclosure.178 Thereafter, the certificate is considered to be conclusive and valid until a 
final court order is made in relation to disclosure.179 Any disclosure of information 
governed by the certificate constitutes a criminal offence.180 
In order to determine whether to follow the Attorney-General’s certificate or not, the 
court must hold a hearing. Such hearings are closed,181 and must satisfy the 
requirements of s 29 NSIA,182 which restricts attendance at such hearings to (a) the 
magistrate, judge or judges of the proceedings, (b) court officials, (c) the prosecutor, (d) 
the defendant, (e) any legal representative of the defendant, (f) the AG and any legal 
representative of the AG, and (g) any witnesses allowed by the court.183 Furthermore, 
the court has the discretion to exclude the defendant, his/her legal representative and 
court officials, if it expects that sensitive information will be disclosed during the 
hearing and that this disclosure would be likely to prejudice security.184 While legal 
representatives and the court officials can avoid any possibility of exclusion from closed 
hearings by gaining an appropriate security clearance,185 the defendant’s participation is 
not dependant upon obtaining security clearance.186 Nevertheless, the defendant or 
his/her legal representative may still make a submission in favour of disclosure.187 
                                                
178 See below at 6.3.2. 
179 NSIA, ss 26(5), 27(1); this can have a potential impact on committal as well as bail hearings. See 
Patrick Emerton, “Paving the way for conviction without evidence: a disturbing trend in Australia’s ‘anti-
terrorism’ laws” (2004) 4(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 129, 155. 
180 NSIA, ss 43-44; for the sake of completeness, it is also a criminal offence to disclose information 
covered by the notice to the Attorney-General, but before the issue of a non-disclosure certificate (NSIA, 
ss 40-41). All these offences are punishable with imprisonment for up to two years. 
181 NSIA, ss 25(4), 27(5) and 28(5).  
182 Equally the requirements of s 29 NSIA are applicable to hearings under s 25 (3) concerning the 
evidence of a witness.  
183 NSIA, s 29(2). This section expressively excludes the jury (if there is any) from the hearings.  
184 NSIA, s 29(3). 
185 NSIA, s 29 read in combination with s 39(3)(4). If there has been a timely application the court must 
adjourn the proceedings to allow the legal representative to gain security clearance.  
186 NSIA, s 29(3)(a). 
187 NSIA, s 29(4). 
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Section 31 is the central provision of the NSIA, setting out the court’s power to issue 
non-disclosure orders following a closed hearing.188 The court can either order non-
disclosure in the form sought by the Attorney-General,189 or it can disagree with the 
Attorney-General’s certificate and order that the sensitive information be disclosed in 
full or in part.190 In order to make this decision, s 31 requires the court to consider any 
risk of jeopardising national security expressed in the Attorney-General’s certificate, the 
effects of non-disclosure on the defendant’s RFT, as well as any other matters the court 
considers relevant.191 Although it is for the court to undertake this balancing exercise, 
the NSIA tilts the balance in favour of national security as it states: “In making its 
decision, the Court must give greatest weight to the [Attorney-General’s certificate].”192 
The court must give reasons decision in a written statement, which must be provided to 
the parties and the Attorney-General.193 However, the prosecutor and the Attorney-
General (the statement recipients) must be given an advance (draft) copy of this 
statement to allow them the opportunity to request alterations where disclosure of the 
written statement itself is likely to prejudice national security.194 The court has to make 
a decision on any alteration request,195 which may itself be subject to an appeal by the 
statement recipients.196 
                                                
188  s 27(3) hearing (in relation to the disclosure of information) or a s 28(5) hearing (in relation to the 
exclusion of witness). 
189 NSIA, s 31(1)(2)(4). Nevertheless, the court’s order can differ in terms of the disclosure of the 
summary or statement of the Attorney-General’s certificate.  
190 NSIA, s 31(5). This is of course under the condition that the information is admissible otherwise. 
191 NSIA, s 31(7). 
192 NSIA, s 31(8) (emphasis added). 
193 NSIA, s 32. 
194 NSIA, s 32(3). 
195 NSIA, s 32(4). 
196 NSIA, s 33. 
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The court’s final (non)disclosure order can also be challenged by the prosecutor, the 
defendant and the Attorney-General.197 Both the defence and the prosecution, in 
determining whether or not to appeal in such cases, may apply for an adjournment to the 
court, which must be granted.198  
Although the balancing exercise set out under the NSIA considers the defendant’s 
RFT,199 though ‘greatest weight’ is attached to security interests, s 19 NSIA specifies 
that unless it “expressively or implied provides otherwise”, the Act does not affect the 
general power of the courts “to control the conduct of […] federal proceeding[s], in 
particular with respect to abuse of process”.200 Section 19 also expressly clarifies that 
issuing a non-disclosure order,201 does not prevent the court from later exercising its 
power to stay proceedings as a result of that particular order having “a substantial 
adverse effect on a defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing”.202  
It is not obvious whether s 19 NSIA is merely stating an obvious implication, or 
whether s 19 is intending to limit the circumstances in which the court can rely on its 
inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuses of process. The interaction between ss 19 and 31 
therefore raises complex and troubling issues surrounding the constitutionality of 
legislative attempts to constrain judicial independence and fetter judicial duties to 
uphold the RFT through the legal process.  
 
                                                
197 NSIA, s 37. In accordance with s 30, the Attorney-General is called an intervener and treated as a 
party to the proceeding. 
198 NSIA, s 36.  
199 NSIA, s 31(7)(b). 
200 NSIA, s 19(1). 
201 This is an order under s 31 NSIA, following the Attorney-General certificates. 
202 A substantial adverse effect is defined by the s 7 NSIA as an effect that is adverse and not 
insubstantial, insignificant or trivial.  
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The impact of the NSIA on the RFT I: balancing interests under the NSIA 
By tilting the balance in favour of the Attorney-General’s certificate, s 31(8) NSIA has 
arguably modified the doctrine of PII, as formulated under the EA. This step has been 
heavily criticised for creating the impression that the Attorney-General’s certificates are 
conclusive. 203 In Lodhi it was argued that such legislative direction effectively strips 
the court of its discretion, thereby constituting an impermissible limitation on the 
judicial power under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.204 As the Constitution 
itself does not provide a substantive RFT, in order to be successful, the plaintiffs in 
Lodhi needed to demonstrate that the direction was in fact a usurpation of judicial 
power that would infringe Chapter III.  
In Lim, the High Court held that Parliament is barred from enacting legislation that 
“direct[s] the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of their 
jurisdiction.”205 What constitutes an impermissible direction was further clarified in 
Nicholas by Brennan CJ’s explanation that:  
“[a] law that purports to direct the manner in which judicial power should be 
exercised is constitutionally invalid. However, a law which merely prescribes a 
Court’s practice or procedure does not direct the exercise of the judicial power 
in finding facts, applying law or exercising an available discretion.”206 
                                                
203 See for example International Commission of Jurists, Assessing damage, urging action (Report of the 
Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 2009) 153; Law Council of 
Australia, Anti-terrorism reform project (Report, November 2008) 81. 
204 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006). The constitutional challenge, which ultimately 
failed, was put forward by some representatives of the media acting as an interest group.  
205 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 37 
(Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
206 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188 (footnote omitted). 
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Whealy J upheld the constitutional validity of the NSIA by effectively reading down the 
section,207 stating that  “[t]he use of the expression ‘greatest weight’ appears to be 
grammatically correct since the legislation is contemplating three (or more) 
considerations”.208 It followed that, “[t]he mere fact that the legislation states that more 
weight, that is the greater weight, is to be given to one factor over another does not 
mean that the other factor is to be disregarded.”209 Tilting the balance in such a nuanced 
manner was held to be legitimate guidance of the judicial process, and thus did not 
violate the separation of powers.210 In fact, the expression “greater weight” had already 
been used in Alister by Wilson and Dawson JJ.211 Supporting this conclusion, the Court 
also noted that the NSIA does not limit the court in considering other factors, and in 
particular the defendant’s absolute right to be heard and call and examine evidence.212 
Hence, Whealy J concluded that “there is no suggestion, on the proper construction of 
ss 31(7) and (8) that the certificate is conclusive or determinative of the issue”.213 Given 
the limited impact that s 31(8) NSIA has had on the judicial exercise of discretion, the 
INSLM recommended that it should be repealed on the ground that it has “produce[d] 
no perceptible benefit in the public interest”.214 
In prescribing how to undertake the balancing exercise, Australian courts have not only 
upheld the constitutional validity of the NSIA, they have furthermore indicated that the 
                                                
207 Bret Walker, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Annual Report” (7 November 
2013) 137. 
208 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [108]. 
209 Ibid. This has been affirmed on appeal; see Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCCA 360 (20 December 2007) 
[36]-[39] (Spigelman CJ). Special leave has been refused: Lodhi v The Queen & Anor [2008] HCA Trans 
225 (13 June 2008). 
210 Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCAA 360 (20 December 2007) [57] (Spigelman CJ). Spigelman CJ even 
indicated that even without such a reading the tilting would have been in constitutional. Like in Nicholas 
he accepted that although the discretion has been limited by legislation that alters the balancing process, it 
does not go as far as constituting an usurpation of judicial power, as it does not alter the ‘essential 
character’ of the court. Ibid, [66]-[69]. 
211 Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 435 as it was also pointed out by the Counsel for the Government. 
See R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [109]. 
212 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [107]. 
213 Ibid, [105]. 
214 Walker, above n 207, 139. It seems that the INSLM is generally opposed to any tilting of the balance. 
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approach taken to PII should apply equally to hearings under the NSIA.215 That being 
said, s 31 NSIA is susceptible to an alternate, more restrictive interpretation. In an 
article critiquing Australia’s terrorism laws, the retired High Court Justice, McHugh 
offered the following assessment of the impact of the reforms introduced by the NSIA: 
“[I]n theory the [Act] does not direct the Court to make the order which the 
Attorney wants. But it goes as close to it as it thinks it can. It weights the 
exercise of the discretion in favour of the Attorney-General and in a practical 
sense directs the outcome of the closed hearing.”216  
Assuming that the Attorney-General has a strong influence on the extent of disclosure, 
and the court retains its jurisdiction to avoid a miscarriage of justice, it is submitted that 
the NSIA model governing disclosure, somewhat paradoxically, resembles the approach 
adopted under the common law rule governing police informers. By tilting the balance 
in favour of non-disclosure, non-disclosure has effectively become the ‘rule’, and 
disclosure the ‘exception’. The latter is required only when necessary in the interest of 
justice, or in the words of the NSIA, where non-disclosure has a substantially “adverse 
effect on a defendant’s right to receive a fair trial”.217 It can further be argued that the 
tilting of the balance does not even constitute a modification to the approach under the 
EA, where as discussed above, uncritical acceptance of the Minister’s certificate has 
become common practice.218 On this view, the courts may have been correct in their 
assessment that the NSIA reforms effected limited change to both the process and 
outcome of determining disclosure matters.  
                                                
215 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [96], [108], which was affirmed in Lodhi v R [2007] 
NSWCAA 360 (20 December 2007) [36] (Spigelman CJ); see also Walker, above n 207, 127. 
216 Michael McHugh, “Constitutional implications of terrorism legislation” (2007) 8 The Judicial Review 
189, 209. 
217 NSIA, ss 19(2) and 31(7)(b). 
218 See above at 6.2.3.1. 
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But if it is true that the NSIA has not significantly changed the law or its practice, the 
question then arises as to what purpose the new balancing provisions under the NSIA 
serve?219 Some would argue that either extending the sections in the EA,220 or inserting 
existing EA provisions into the NSIA would have been both easier and more effective, 
allowing EA case law to be incorporated into interpretations of the NSIA. 
The above analysis suggests that much of the common critique in relation to the NSIA 
and its attempt to ‘tilt the balance’ in favour of non-disclosure misses its target. The real 
issue is at what stage the exception (disclosure) prevails over the rule (non-disclosure, 
relying upon the Attorney-General’s certificate). Section 19 emphasises, albeit 
awkwardly, that although courts retain their power to take all steps necessary to ensure 
the fairness of the trial, there may be some limitations upon their inherent power to stay 
proceedings to avoid an abuse of process. Section 3(1) NSIA, outlining the legislative 
objectives, is even more explicit about the effect of such limitation. It states that 
information, which is likely to prejudice national security, should be suppressed, 
“except to the extent that preventing the disclosure would seriously interfere with the 
administration of justice”.221 The way in which these terms interrelate, has been 
explained by Spigelman CJ.222 His Honour held that circumstances, which would have a 
“substantial adverse effect on the right to receive a fair hearing” (s 31(7) NSIA), would 
equally constitute a “serious interference with the administration of justice” (s 3(1) 
NSIA).  
As such, while ss 3 and 19 NSIA ‘minimise’ the interference of s 31(8) on the court’s 
ability to stay proceedings in the interests of the administration of justice, the legislation 
                                                
219 Andrew Palmer, “Investigating and prosecuting terrorism: the counter-terrorism legislation and the 
law of evidence” (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 373, 394. 
220 Emerton, above n 179, 160. 
221 NSIA, s 3 (emphasis added). 
222 Lodhi v R [2007] NSWCAA 360 (20 December 2007) [25]-[27] (Spigelman CJ). 
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leaves a ‘gap’ of circumstances where the non-disclosure impacts negatively upon the 
fairness of the trial, but is not sufficiently ‘serious’ to warrant a stay of proceedings.  An 
important issue therefore arises as to the degree of unfairness that will constitute a 
serious interference with justice.  
Our understanding of demands of justice and fairness has changed significantly since 
Marks v Beyfus was decided at the end of the 19th century.223 The general legal trend, 
reflected in common law development, statutory reforms and international law, has 
favoured the expansion of the scope and range of protections for the RFT.224 The NSIA 
in contrast, is an aberration, designed to lower the minimum due process standards 
necessary for ensuring a fair trial. This is evidenced firstly in the provisions which 
allow edited information to be adduced as evidence without rendering the trial unfair,225 
and secondly, in the statutory construction of the NSIA. The encouragement of judges 
to defer (or more precisely, attach greatest weight) to the Attorney-General’s certificate, 
is not problematic per se. The real concern in the operation of s 31 NSIA, is that once 
the judge has undertaken the balancing exercise, it seems to imply that the interests of 
fairness have been sufficiently considered, and there is no continuing obligation to 
review the non-disclosure decision. A closer examination of ss 3 and 19 NSIA, and 
reading the Act as a whole, however, suggest that there is a duty to engage in ongoing 
review of non-disclosure decisions and that the initial balancing exercise is only the 
starting point, since negative impact upon the fairness of the trial caused by that non-
disclosure has not yet been determined. 
                                                
223 Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 (9 July 1890). 
224 See above at 2.2. 
225 This concern is based on the assumption that edited evidence does not have the same strength as 
unedited evidence. In particular, because the NSIA does not provide for any safeguards concerning edited 
evidence. 
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Addressing these concerns, it is submitted that courts should interpret s 31 NSIA as a 
model that aligns more closely with a ‘rule and exception’ approach. Non-disclosure 
appears to be the default position to protect the interests of national security. In 
determining whether to allow disclosure, ss 3 and 19 NSIA should be read into the 
balancing exercise. Of particular relevance is s 31(7)(b), which requires the court to 
consider any substantial adverse effect on the defendant’s RFT. As was the case under 
the police informer rule, disclosure should only be ordered where the suppression of 
information would result in unfairness to the defendant, and lead to an abuse of process. 
In addition to allowing access to information that is needed to establish the defandant’s 
innocence, under the NSIA, access to information should also be granted where it would 
facilitate proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This is particularly 
necessary in cases where the Minister’s certificate requests the use of edited evidence.  
 
The impact of the NSIA on the RFT II: the position of the defence under the NSIA 
While the defendant can be excluded from non-disclosure hearings where the court 
expects that sensitive information will be disclosed that would prejudice national 
security, the NSIA allows for the defendant’s counsel to be present if they possess 
appropriate security clearance. Although Australia has not opted for a system of special 
advocates, they are available under the common law, and their appointment would not 
be inconsistent with the NSIA.226 
Commentators have generally applauded the advent of the ‘security-cleared lawyer’ 
who, drawn from the independent profession and retained by defence counsel, is best 
                                                
226 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 586 (21 February 2006) [28]; see also Anthony Whealy, “Difficulty in 
obtaining a fair trial in terrorism cases” (2007) 81 Alternative Law Journal 743, 750. 
Chapter 6: Sensitive information in criminal proceeding 
 245 
placed to represent the defendant in an ex parte hearing.227 Such a system can be 
distinguished from more restrictive schemes of ‘special advocates’. However, the 
effectiveness of security-cleared lawyers also depends heavily upon how the system is 
regulated. For example, if security-cleared lawyers are prevented from discussing topics 
relevant to defence strategy with their clients after participating in a closed hearing, it 
will create ethical dilemmas, particularly where disclosure constitutes a criminal 
offence. Furthermore, by controlling the process of security clearance, the government 
could effectively control the pool of lawyers able to act in national security trials. This 
in turn would not only impede upon the defendant’s right to retain a lawyer of his/her 
own choosing, which is one of the minimum guarantees of the RFT under the ICCPR,228 
but would also threaten “the independence of the legal profession”.229 
It is important to note that the processes governing non-disclosure certificates and 
closed hearings can be circumvented by relying upon s 22 NSIA. This section, entitled 
“Arrangements for the federal criminal proceedings about disclosures relation to or 
affecting national security”, allows the parties to agree, subject to judicial approval, on 
how to handle issues of disclosure outside of the method prescribed by the NSIA.230 
Given the desirability of such an agreement, this consensus model has become common 
practice, and both defence counsel and prosecutors routinely “attempt to negotiate 
detailed orders under s 22 as part of the pre-trial process”.231 The underlying rationale of 
                                                
227 See Kent Roach, “Secret evidence and its alternatives” in Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the 
state of permanent legal emergency: security and human rights in counter terrorism (Springer, 2012) 
179, 188. 
228 ICCPR, Art 14(3)(d): “… defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”. 
For a general comment on the aspect see David Weissbrodt, The right to a fair trial under the UDHR and 
the ICCPR (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 115. 
229 Law Council of Australia, Anti-terrorism reform project (Report, November 2008) 80. 
230 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [29]. 
231 NSIA, s 22 has been described by the INSLM as the “most often used, and in some senses the most 
important, provision in the NSI Act”: Walker, above n 207, 127-128; see also Whealy, above n 226, 749; 
Stephen Donaghue, “Reconciling security and the right to a fair trial: The National Security Information 
Act in practice” in Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in 
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this section seems to have been the possibility of negotiating the use of information 
stemming from foreign intelligence agencies, which is subject to international 
agreements of how to use this information. However, the frequent use may also point to 
the impracticality of the NSIA in general. Skeptics may argue that the benefits for the 
government of opting for the ‘tailored’ consensus processes extends even further. Not 
only can these agreements determine the extent of disclosure, but parties can also agree 
to depart from crucial aspects of procedural fairness. Given that the state and defendant 
typically have unequal access to resources, the ‘consensus’ reached may considerably 
disadvantage the defendant. Due to a presumption against bail in terrorism offences, 
defendants generally remain in pre-trial detention.232 This could strongly motivate the 
defendant to proceed with the trial as soon as possible, clearly placing the prosecution in 
the favourable bargaining position.233 This threat to the principle of adversariness raises 
concerns about the potential prejudice caused by ‘negotiated justice’, which may be 
difficult for the trial judge to identify and address. That said, the court does retain some 
supervisory role, since agreements under s 22 must be judicially approved.  
 
The impact of the NSIA on the RFT III: alterations to the trial dynamic under the NSIA 
Once the NSIA is taken to apply to a proceeding, it has a significant impact on the 
dynamic of the adversarial trial.234 The obligation placed upon the defence to alert the 
Minister to broad categories of sensitive information (i.e falling under the wide 
                                                                                                                                          
the War on Terror (Federation Press, 2007) 87, 92. In practice these negotiations will be led by the 
Attorney-General’s representative and the defence.  
232 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 15AA. 
233 Thanks to Teneille Elliott, advisor to the INSLM, who pointed this valuable aspect out to me. 
[although the INSLM did not follow this position in his report]. 
234 In Lodhi, it was argued by the defendant that some of the disruptions would actually alter the character 
of the NSW Supreme Court.  
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umbrellas of ‘likely [to] prejudice’ and ‘national security’),235  allows the Attorney-
General not only to assess potential sensitivities related to particular material, but also 
confers upon the Attorney General and relevant security agencies considerable 
surveillance powers and influence over the trial process. Furthermore, the risk of serious 
penalties for breaching this obligation has the effect that defence lawyers make general 
and frequent warnings about potentially sensitive information informing the defence 
case. Some defence lawyers, reluctant to reveal the defence strategy in advance of the 
trial, may seek to discharge their ‘reporting’ obligations under the NSIA in general and 
abstract terms.236 This tactic, which could include notifying the Attorney-General of an 
entire brief of evidence, would in practice make it difficult for the Attorney-General to 
identify relevant issues. 237 It would similarly be unhelpful to the prosecution’s case and 
result in significant delays, as receipt of notices, even those referring to immaterial 
sensitive information, automatically adjourns proceedings, and potentially leads to 
closed hearings and interlocutory appeals.238 Whealy J regarded these disruptions to the 
proceedings as the “most significant potential problem” of the NSIA.239 Considering 
that these trials by their nature already involve complex offences, evidential problems 
and lengthy pre-trial proceedings, the NSIA’s procedures may cause serious detriment 
to a defendant’s right to a trial without undue delay.240 In practice, major disruptions to 
                                                
235 NSIA, ss 8 and 17; in particular, “national security means Australia’s defence, security, international 
relations or law enforcement interests.” This wide definition has been heavily criticised as nearly 
meaningless. See for example Mark Rix, “Counter-terrorism and information: the NSI Act, fair trials, and 
open, accountable government” (2011) 25(2) Continuum 285, 287; Emerton, above n 179, 151. However, 
the definition is arguable not much wider as the one used under PII and the s 130 Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth). See  R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [112] (Whealy J). 
236 Donaghue, above n 231, 89.  
237 Ibid, 89. 
238 The prosecution or the defendant may appeal all decisions made by the court, that relate to the 
disclosure or non-disclose of information generally in court (s 31), to the information included in the 
record of the closed hearing (s 29) or to the information included in the statement giving the reasons of a s 
31 order (s 32). In all these cases the court has to adjourn the proceedings until the appellant court has 
heard and settled the issue  
239 Whealy, above n 226, 748.  
240 ICCPR, art 14(3)(c); the Human Rights Committee emphasised in its General Comment No 32, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) [35] that the right to be tired without undue delay does not only 
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the trial process have been avoided by trial judges, who have sought to resolve issues 
during the pre-trial stage, and by the widespread use of s 22 arrangements.241 However, 
avoiding delays requires the willing cooperation of all parties.242 The restrictive impact 
of adjournments and closed hearings upon the judge’s ability to control proceedings was 
also argued in Lodhi to amount to an unconstitutional restriction of judicial power by 
the legislature.243 However, Whealy J observed that even in the worst case scenario, the 
trial judge could still bring the trial to an orderly end by granting a stay of 
proceedings.244  
Compared to the process prescribed by the EA for dealing with ordinary PII claims, 
NSIA hearings have a number of disadvantages. Primarily, whereas the NSIA makes 
adjournments and closed hearings mandatory, under PII the trial judge retains the power 
to determine whether adjournments and the use of in camera proceedings are 
necessary.245 Secondly, PII claims do not necessarily require the Attorney-General’s 
involvement, and may be handled by either senior departmental officials or the heads of 
the relevant intelligence agency, which simplifies the process.246 The intervention of the 
Attorney-General under the NSIA changes the adversarial dynamic of an ordinary 
criminal trial. It would be wrong to assume that the Attorney-General’s representative 
and the DPP, as public office holders, have identical interests in relation to the 
disclosure of sensitive material. In Australia, as in the UK, the DPP is an independent 
                                                                                                                                          
include the time between the charge and the trial, but also the time until the final judgement. For a general 
comment on the aspect see Weissbrodt, above n 228, 125. 
241 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [85]. See also Roger Gyles, “Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into control order safeguards: Part 2” (13 April 2016) 4. 
242 Whealy, above n 226, 749. 
243 There is it was argued that the NSIA provisions have “the effect of altering the character or nature of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in that its effect is to obliterate an essential attribute of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales namely its power to discharge, without interference, its fundamental 
object of determining guilt or innocence.” R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [24]. 
244 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [88]. See further discussion of this issue, Whealy, 
above n 226, 749.  
245 Donaghue, above n 231, 90. 
246 Ibid. 
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statutory office-holder, and there may well be cases where the prosecution proposes to 
rely on information it considers to be critical for achieving a conviction, that the 
Attorney-General intends to suppress.   
 
6.2.3.3   Evaluating the NSIA – a success or failure? 
The NSIA is complex in terms of its structure and operation. Whealy J in his scathing 
comment ex curiae suggested that the NSIA “gives the appearance of having been 
drafted by persons who have little knowledge of the function and processes of a 
criminal trial”.247 It is unsurprising that the use of non-disclosure certificates has been 
fairly limited.248 
As noted above, there is a certain redundancy in the NSIA provisions, as the judiciary 
has interpreted them to be consistent with the balancing approach prescribed by the 
EA.249 To this effect, the INSLM concluded that “[t]he NSI Act is by no means a radical 
novel departure in the law, as the[] statutory aims and purposes […] fit comfortably 
within previous (and continuing) common law notions of the public interest.”250 This 
brings us back to the key question of whether the NSIA serves a distinct purpose. As 
discussed above, the NSIA can be interpreted as an attempt to lower the standards of 
what constitutes a fair trial. Such fears have been rejected by experienced judges.251 
More likely, the NSIA was a legislative attempt to re-structure non-disclosure processes 
to prioritise security without infringing upon Chapter III of the Constitution, which 
                                                
247 Whealy, above n 226, 745. Whealy J was the first judge, who had to deal with the NSIA in NSW. 
248 Until 2013, thirteen criminal non-disclosure and witness exclusion certificates have been issued by the 
Attorney-General under the NSIA: see Walker, above n 207, 283. These certificates covered only three 
trials (Lodhi, Khazaal and Baladjam and others) between 2004 and 2013. Ten out of the thirteen 
certificates were issued in the Lodhi trial. 
249 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571 (7 February 2006) [96] and [108]; reaffirmed in Lodhi v R [2007] 
NSWCCA 360 (20 December 2007) [36] (Spigelman CJ).  
250 Walker, above n 207, 127. 
251 Whealy, above n 226, 749. 
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itself establishes a low threshold for upholding the RFT. It is arguable therefore, that the 
‘unsuccessful’ constitutional challenge in Lodhi was in fact a ‘success’ for the RFT as it 
lead the courts to both reject the conclusiveness of certificates, and reserve for 
themselves, rather than the Executive or Parliament, the responsibility to determine 
what constitutes ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ proceedings. The major deficiency in reserving such 
power to the Australian courts is that attributes of the RFT are developed on an ad hoc, 
case-by-case basis. 
It must be conceded that the purpose of the NSIA was to prioritise the protection of 
sensitive information in legal proceedings, not to provide guidance on how best to avoid 
unfairness to the defendant resulting from non-disclosure decisions. The NSIA is a 
strong policy statement that the government prioritises the interests of national security, 
leaving no doubt about what judges are expected to do when performing the balancing 
exercise. It is submitted however, that the NSIA constitutes a ‘missed opportunity’ to 
clarify the balancing process in light of jurisprudential developments in international 
human rights law that offer a more structured approach to weighing competing rights 
and interests.252 Instead of drawing from these developments, the proponents of the 
NSIA were satisfied with a ‘black box’ approach to the disclosure processes. The 
inevitable lack of transparency that this entails has meant that courts are left with the 
task of reconciling the public policy interests with the requirements of fairness. The 
NSIA provisions allowing the use of edited evidence underscore this issue, as partial 
accounts may distort the assessment of the evidence and prejudice the jury. Under these 
circumstances, determining for the judges when the trial becomes unfair is a difficult 
                                                
252 This is particularly so in a country without a legislated bill of rights. The assumption would be that 
while there is no general protection, the individual statutes would reflect the human right standards of the 
society.   
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exercise,253 compounded by the additional challenges presented by potential disruptions 
and delays inherent in counter-terrorism trials. 
 
6.2.4   Comparative observations 
Until the 1990s, the common laws of England and Australia developed similar 
approaches to governing the non-disclosure of information in the public interest, and 
were frequently informed by each other’s leading authorities. Under the PII doctrine, 
the balancing approach was adopted, with the courts acknowledging that the weight 
attached to competing values may differ between civil and criminal proceedings. In the 
UK in the 1990s, responding to RFT challenges before the ECtHR, the House of Lords 
in R v H and C reframed the law around a ‘principled model’. In contrast, Australian 
cases have continued to apply the unmodified common law ‘balancing model’, that 
inform both the EA and NSIA. Practically, this means that while the UK courts must 
follow a number of steps before making any disclosure decisions, the Australian courts 
may take into account any interest they consider to be relevant, with only limited 
guidance as to how to weigh the interests in the balancing exercise.  
Given that courts generally defer to the security assessment offered by the government, 
the main difference is that in practice in Australia, judges apply a ‘rule and exception’ 
approach that prima facie favours non-disclosure on security grounds. The inquiry then 
asks whether disclosure is necessary to avoid an unfair trial and potential miscarriage of 
justice. In contrast in the UK, at least in theory, the judges apply a ‘principled approach’ 
that prima facie favours the RFT of the defendant. Under this model, non-disclosure is 
only permitted where justified and strictly necessary. In this respect, the default 
                                                
253 For the importance of jury instructions see below at 8.2.4.2. 
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positions in both jurisdictions are polar opposites, sending very different messages 
about the perceived importance of the RFT. 
Other differences concern the ways of how to ‘compensate’ for forensic disadvantages 
caused to the defence case as an outcome of non-disclosure. In Australia, although the 
NSIA prescribes closed hearings, the defendant must always be given notice and be 
permitted to make submissions. This requirement has been seen as crucial by the 
ECtHR, even when strong dissents have noted that the right to be informed and make 
submissions can be symbolic. While UK judges enjoy a wider discretion as to the mode 
of proceedings, the fact that ex parte hearings can be allowed, of which the defendant 
will not be informed, constitutes a much more severe restriction upon the defendant’s 
ability to assert his/her RFT. It is in this context that the need for special advocates has 
been debated vigorously.  
The final difference between the approaches taken in Australia and the UK lies in the 
novel provisions of s 22 NSIA, which allows the parties in Australia to circumvent the 
statutorily prescribed process regulating non-disclosure. While s 22 is routinely relied 
upon, the ‘consensual’ model requires close trial judge supervision, as the unequal 
bargaining power of the parties (prosecution, defence and Attorney-General) may 
adversely impact upon fairness in a particular trial. 
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6.3 - The partial use of sensitive information in criminal procedures 
In both Australia and the UK, there is widespread acceptance among both politicians 
and the judiciary that a criminal conviction cannot be based on evidence inspected by 
the court, but withheld from the defence (‘secret evidence’). In 2004, the UK 
Government’s proposal to allow secret evidence to be admitted was met with strong 
resistance from the legal community,254 who argued that it violated the internationally 
recognised rights of the defendant to cross-examine witnesses,255 and to have all 
evidence “produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to 
adversarial argument”.256  
However, without the ability to rely upon secret evidence to secure convictions, the 
state may be confronted with tough choices as exemplified in Lappas:257 to withdraw 
the charges and protect the sensitive information, or to disclose the information to 
secure a conviction, risking any prejudice that disclosure may entail to national 
security.258 
                                                
254 See Press Association, “Blunkett anti-terror proposals condemned” (The Guardian, 2 February 2004). 
Six special advocates, Nicholas Blake QC, Andrew Nicol QC, Manjit Singh Gill QC, Ian Macdonald QC, 
Rick Scannell and Tom de la Mare, even wrote an open letter to The Times on 7 February 2004, stating 
that their experience suggests that such proposals would not be compatible with the fundamental right to 
have a fair trial and would refuse to participate in such proceedings. See also Audrey Gillan, “Lawyers 
attack Blunkett anti-terror plan” (The Guardian, 7 February 2004). 
255 Sir Ivor Richardson of the NZ Court of Appeal expressed this by stating that “The right to confront an 
adverse witness is basic to any civilised notion of a fair trial. That must include the right for the defence 
to ascertain the true identity of an accuser where questions of credibility are in issue.” R v Hughes [1989] 
2 NZLR 129,148-149 as cited in R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 1140 (Lord Bingham). 
256 Kostovski v The Netherlands [ECtHR] Application no 11454/85 (20 November 1989) [41]; see in 
particular art 6(3)(d) ECHR; art 14(3)(e) ICCPR; see also Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) [55].    
257 See above at 6.2.1. 
258 Whereas in the previous section, the focus was on information necessary for the defendant to raise 
doubts about the charges, the focus here is on information, the prosecution needs to prove all elements of 
the offence beyond reasonable doubt.  
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One way to side-step this dilemma is to enact legislation that allows the court to rely 
upon edited evidence, modified in such a way so as not to disclose sensitive information 
in open court.259  
Depending on its type, there are various methods of editing evidence. In relation to 
documents, these include redacting the sensitive parts, or summarising texts that 
excludes the sensitive information. Where secretive evidence would come to light 
through witness testimony (in either written or oral form), cross-examination may be 
prohibited on particular sensitive topics, or identities of witnesses concealed. Most 
anonymous witness cases concern intimidated witnesses, who are either in fear of 
reprisal or of facing their aggressor.260 Where proceedings raise national security issues, 
it may be in the public interest to order the suppression of evidence of the identity of 
state officials, such as security officials, police officers and undercover agents, or of 
particular aspects of their work, such as surveillance techniques. Non-disclosure in these 
circumstances not only protects the agencies’ working methods and strategies, but also 
shields individuals from reprisal and allows for their continued employment in field 
operations. 
Closely related to anonymous witnesses is the framework governing absent witnesses.  
Although out-of-court statements from absent witnesses are generally treated as 
hearsay, the issues raised are similar, in so far as they severely limit the defence’s 
ability to challenge the evidence. For a number of reasons, there is limited scope to 
argue that the use of absent witnesses serves the public interest of national security. 
Firstly, witnesses in the possession of sensitive information are, strictly speaking, not 
                                                
259 As defined in the introduction of this Chapter, to “edited evidence” is referred to in this thesis as any 
evidence that is stripped of parts of its content and therefore creates limitations to be fully tested by the 
defence. 
260 The latter category mainly concerns children; see for example Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 (UK). 
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“unavailable” to testify. Secondly, establishing the reliability of the evidence, as is 
needed in cases of absent witnesses, is compounded by the need to suppress that very 
same evidence. Nonetheless, the underlying similarities between the principles applied 
to absent and unavailable witness allow some analogies to be drawn. 
While the use of edited evidence appears to be a viable compromise between the RFT 
and national security, the defence’s ability to examine the evidence will often be 
significantly limited in scope or in effect. After discussing the potential for using edited 
evidence in the UK and Australia, this Section considers how its reliability can be 
meaningfully tested, and what safeguards are needed to be put in place to protect the 
RTF and mitigate the limitations placed on the defendant’s right to confrontation - a 
right that would ordinarily facilitate the robust challenge of any witness testimony or 
documentary evidence tendered by the prosecution.  
 
6.3.1   The use of edited evidence in the United Kingdom 
In the UK, there is no comprehensive legislation allowing for the use of edited evidence 
in criminal proceedings, on public interest grounds such as national security. 
Nonetheless, such use is permissible to a certain extent under the common law, and 
more recently, under specific legislation. 
 
6.3.1.1   Edited documents 
As the common law generally allows documents of any form to be submitted as 
evidence, edited documents are not per se inadmissible. However, it is crucial that the 
undisclosed information is not relevant to the material issues in the case. If its relevance 
is suspected and the information is requested by the defence, the prosecution will need 
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to justify its non-disclosure through a PII claim. Furthermore, edited prosecution 
evidence may be excluded by the judge, exercising a discretion under s 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) in circumstances where it “would have 
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it.”261 With the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013 (UK), the UK 
Parliament introduced a general “closed material procedure” allowing otherwise ‘secret 
evidence’ to be adduced by the prosecution in a summarised form – a process that is 
commonly known as ‘gisting’.262 However, the Act explicitly excluded the application 
of the closed material procedure from criminal proceedings,263 an exclusion suggesting 
that gisting would involve too grave a departure from the right to confrontation 
ordinarily applied in criminal proceedings. 
 
6.3.1.2   Anonymous witnesses 
The common law 
In the UK, witness intimidation first emerged as a policy concern in the 1970s during 
the Northern Ireland conflict. Two major reports published at that time rejected 
legislative proposals to facilitate anonymous witnesses to give evidence on the ground 
that it would alter the criminal trial in an unacceptable way. 264 That said, the courts in 
                                                
261 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), s 78(1) is also complemented by the more general 
provision in s 82(3) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), which allows “the court to exclude 
evidence […] at is discretion.” The section was intended to preserve the common law powers, but is 
rarely relied on today. See generally Ian Dennis, The law of evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2002) 
74. 
262 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 2007) [42], [66], 
[85] and [90].  
263 Justice and Security Act 2013 (UK), s 6(11). On the Act generally see Adam Tomkins, “Justice and 
security in the United Kingdom” (2014) 47(3) Israel Law Review 305. 
264 Diplock Commission, Report of the Commission to consider legal proceedings to deal with terrorist 
activities in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5185, December 1972) [7(b)] and [20] (“Diplock Report”). As a 
consequence the continuation of extra-judicial detention as well as trials without a jury had been 
recommended. See also Gilbert Marcus, “Secret witnesses” (1990) Summer Public Law 207, 210-12; 
Report of a committee to consider, in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal 
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Northern Ireland relied upon their inherent power to act in the interests of justice to 
introduce modifications, allowing witnesses some degree of anonymity.265  
This is illustrated in Murphy and Maguire, a trial concerning the murder of two British 
soldiers at an IRA funeral in 1988.266 The trial judge, Hutton LCJ, permitted the eye-
witnesses, journalists who had already received death threats, to testify from behind a 
screen, visible only to the court, the prosecution and the defence lawyer, but not to the 
defendants. Although the case was initially criticised for its questionable use of 
authorities to support the modifications,267 it was later acknowledged that there was 
only minimal impact upon the fairness of the trial. Importantly, the defence counsel did 
not object to the judge’s order, the witnesses’ credibility was not questioned, and 
ultimately the journalists’ testimonies were not the sole or main source of evidence 
identifying the defendants.268  
Over the course of the following two decades, trial judges in the UK made further in-
roads to the principle of confrontation.269 Most of these derogations are of limited 
relevance for the purpose of this thesis, being neither applicable to criminal 
proceedings, nor required to protect witnesses from retaliation nor the public interest in 
national security.270 However these ad hoc in-roads fostered a sense of legal insecurity 
                                                                                                                                          
with terrorism in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 5847, 1975) [55] (“Gardiner Report”) as cited in Ian Dennis, 
“The right to confront a witness: meanings, myths and human rights” (2010) 4 Criminal Law Review 255, 
269. 
265 A case regularly cited as a reference is Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (5 May 1913). However, it is 
important to point out that this case concerned the principle of open justice more generally and does not 
propose to keep information from the defendant. 
266 R v Murphy and Maguire, Northern Ireland Crown Court (April 1989, unreported). The decision was 
upheld by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. 
267 The authority cited in Murphy and Maguire was a case where only the public was excluded, but not 
the defendant himself. See R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 1142 (Lord Bingham); also Marcus, above n 
264, 214-17. 
268 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 1142 (Lord Bingham with whom Lord Mance agreed) and 1255 (Lord 
Carwell). 
269 Metcalfe, above n 115, 145-146. 
270 See for example R (Al-Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556 (17 December 2001), 
which concerned a extradition hearing; R v Watford Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Lenman [1993] Crim 
LR 388, which was a committal hearing; or R v X (1989) 91 Cr App R 36; R (D) v Camberwell Green 
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around the principle of confrontation, which was directly addressed by the House of 
Lords in the landmark case of Davis in 2008.271  
The Davis case was also a murder trial, but the facts were significantly distinct from 
those in Murphy and Maguire: firstly, the testimonies of the intimidated witnesses, who 
were able to identify the accused as the gunman, were decisive in the case. Secondly, 
the anonymity orders granted by the trial judge were more extensive, allowing the 
witnesses to use pseudonyms, testify from behind a screen and have their voices 
electronically altered. In addition to the witnesses remaining unseen by the defendant, 
the defence lawyer was restricted from asking questions that would identify them.272 
Lastly, the case was further complicated by Davis’ suspicion that one of the witnesses 
was his ex-girlfriend, who he argued, may have accused him out of vengeance and 
encouraged others to do the same. Here, the use of the anonymous witnesses not only 
limited the defence’s ability to test the accuracy of their statements, but also went to the 
issue of credibility. The appeal provided the House of Lords with the opportunity to 
undertake a detailed review of the common law, as well as international authorities 
including those from the ECtHR.273 Emphasising the longstanding principle of 
confrontation, their Lordships observed that many of the cases deviating from the 
principle in the UK had not satisfactorily addressed its fundamental nature and as a 
result, “[b]y a series of small steps, largely unobjectionable on their own facts, the 
courts have arrived at a position which is irreconcilable with the long-standing 
                                                                                                                                          
Youth [2005] 1 WLR 393 (27 January 2005), which allowed the use of video links for protecting child 
victims. Statutory provisions for such cases were later included in the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (UK). 
271 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128 (18 June 2008). 
272 Although the defence counsel was not barred from seeing the witnesses, he chose not see them as he 
would have received information he was not allowed to discuss with his client, which he regarded as 
incompatible with the client-counsel relationship. 
273 For a discussion of the ECtHR case law see above at 4.3.1.1. 
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principle.”274 Given the severe limitations imposed upon the defence case, the House of 
Lords held unanimously that the departure from the common law principle of 
confrontation was unjustified.275 Furthermore, the modifications were seen as likely to 
be inconsistent with the requirements laid down by ECtHR to uphold art 6 ECHR, as 
the measures had not been sufficiently ‘counter-balanced’ to protect the principle of 
confrontation,276 and the evidence had been ‘sole or decisive’ in identifying the 
perpetrator.277 Since Davis was unable to ascertain whether his ex-girlfriend had in fact 
been a prosecution witness, Lord Bingham famously described the modifications to the 
common law principle as requiring the defendant to “take a blind shot at a hidden 
target”, with the effect that “[a] trial so conducted cannot be regarded as meeting 
ordinary standards of fairness.” 278 
Although the ruling in Davis did not claim that the principle of confrontation is 
absolute, their Lordships made it clear that any exceptions, recognised by the common 
law, were extremely limited, and that further derogation would require Parliamentary 
approval.279 Since the scope of these limited exceptions was unclear, the Government 
represented Davis as having identified a gap in the law,280 and swiftly enacted the 
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 (UK), which has since been replaced, 
                                                
274 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 1148 (Lord Bingham); see also ibid, 1152, where Lord Rodger 
emphasised the persistency of the principle over time: “[I]t is axiomatic that the common law is capable 
of developing to meet new challenges. But threats of intimidation to witnesses and the challenge which 
they pose to our system of trial are anything but new. In theory, the common law could have responded to 
that challenge at any time over the last few hundred years by allowing witnesses to give their evidence 
under conditions of anonymity. But it never did—even in times, before the creation of organised police 
forces, when conditions of lawlessness might have been expected to be far worse than today.” 
275 Ibid, 1148-49 (Lord Bingham). 
276 Ibid, 1172 (Lord Mance) with whom Lord Bingham agreed at 1148. 
277 Ibid, 1147 (Lord Bingham), 1158 (Lord Carswell), and 1172 (Lord Mance). For a discussion of these 
principles see above at 4.3.1.1. 
278 Ibid, 1149 (Lord Bingham). 
279 Ibid, 1148 (Lord Bingham), 1153 (Lord Rodger), 1173 (Lord Mance). 
280 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debate, House of Commons, 26 June 2008, vol 478, no 119, col 523-
524 (Mr Jack Straw). 
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without substantive modification, by new provisions in the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 (UK).281  
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) 
Under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) (CJA), the court can make an order to 
supress a witness’ identity,282 upon meeting the following three conditions:283 
• Condition A: the order is necessary to protect the safety of the witness or 
another person, prevent serious harm to property or real harm to the public 
interest.284  
• Condition B: the order would not render the trial unfair.  
• Condition C: the testimony is needed to pursue the interests of justice, but the 
witness would not testify without the protection of an anonymity order.285  
Although the court may take into consideration any matter it regards as relevant in 
determining whether these conditions have been met, the legislation also sets out a non-
exhaustive list of criteria that are particularly important for safeguarding the RFT.286 
The CJA is not an invitation for the court to balance one set of interests (Conditions A 
and C) against another (Condition B), it requires all three conditions to be satisfied. 
                                                
281 See Donovan and another v R [2012] EWCA Crim 2749 (29 November 2012) [3]. The 2008 Act was 
criticised for having been rushed through Parliament in less than two weeks. See Liberty, Liberty briefing 
on the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill (July 2008) 9. However, the law-makers took some 
recommendations of human rights groups on board and added a sunset clause to the Act, which 
eventually required the renewal of the provisions in the 2009 Act. 
282 The court can apply various measures to supress the identity of the witness from the defendant, such as 
withholding the name or other identifying details of the witness, the use of a pseudonym, the restriction of 
questions in cross-examination, which could identify the witness, the use of screens as well as voice 
modulation (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 86(2)). These measures, however, cannot be applied 
in relation to the judge or the jury (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 86(4)). 
283 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 88(2)-(5). 
284 In relation to the necessity requirement the Act clarifies that the fear of the witness must be reasonable. 
(Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 88(6)). See also R v Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915, 
1926: “necessary” is more that “desirable” or “convenient”. 
285 R v Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915, 1926: “reluctance” is not enough. 
286 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 89(2)(a)-(f), 
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Thus, the fairness of the trial (Condition B) must be addressed independently.287 The 
CJA however does not provide guidance on how to apply these three conditions in 
assessing whether the threshold for anonymity has been met.288 Compared to the 
position articulated in Davis, the CJA has significantly deviated from the common law 
approach. Under the Act, although ‘sole or decisive’ reliance on the anonymous 
statement is one consideration to be taken into account by the court, it is no longer 
determinative of the question of fairness.289 These legislative reforms imply that a trial 
may be fair in cases where there are no or few concerns about the honesty and reliability 
of the evidence to be given by the anonymous witness.290  
The CA first commented on the CJA in the case of Mayers,291 confirming that although 
the use of anonymous witnesses does not automatically produce unfairness,292 the 
making of an anonymity order should still be considered a measure of last resort.293 
Importantly, the CA emphasised that the prosecution shares the duty to ensure the 
                                                
287 In Taylor and Crabb Court of Appeal Criminal Division (22 July 1994, unreported) the CA suggested 
that after taking into consideration the grounds of fear, the importance of the evidence, the evidence of 
credibility and the prejudice to the defendant, the court must balance “the need for protection […] against 
the unfairness”. The approach has been subsequently labelled as inconsistent by Lord Hutton in Al-
Fawwaz, which was endorsed by Lord Bingham in Davis: if accepted that there are only rare exceptions 
to the right of confronting a witness, balancing cannot be asked for. See R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 
1144. 
288 R v Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915, 1923; see also Corker and Parkinson, above n 7, 234. 
289 The common law in this area has been abolished explicitly by the s 1(2) Criminal Evidence (Witness 
Anonymity) Act 2008. However, the provisions in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK ) do not affect 
the law in relation to PII (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 95) and also the authority of H and C 
remains undiminished. This also includes the potential use of special advocates. See R v Mayers and 
others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915, 1920. 
290 Coincidently, the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on witness anonymity continue to mention 
that any application for an anonymity order is likely to fail in cases where the witness testimony is the 
sole or decisive evidence against the defendant: see Crown Prosecution Service, The Director’s guidance 
on witness anonymity 2009 (UK) [5]. 
291 R v Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915 (12 December 2008). The case joined four separate 
cases on appeal. Before addressing those cases individually, the Court discussed the general functioning 
of the new provisions in great detail. 
292 Ibid, 1929. 
293 Ibid, 1920. See also Crown Prosecution Service, The Director’s guidance on witness anonymity (2009) 
para 6 emphasising the duty of the prosecution to explore all available alternatives. 
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fairness of the trial, which includes proactively investigating the credibility of its 
witnesses.294  
In their interpretations of the ‘sole or decisive’ rule, the CA has favoured an approach 
similar to that used under common law.295 As a result, while the CJA did not widened 
the exceptions to the principle of confrontation in criminal proceedings to the point 
where it would contradict the prior decision in Davis, it is uncertain how a court would 
decide a case where credibility of the anonymous witness was accepted or some 
examination (counter-balancing) was possible, but the statement constitutes the sole 
evidence of a conviction. 
In resolving this uncertainty, some guidance may be drawn from the case law 
surrounding absent witnesses. Although not directly relevant to national security,296 
analogies can be made due to the comparable nature of both the interests involved and 
underlying rationales behind the rules.297 
 
Absent witnesses and hearsay evidence 
Similar to the problems created by anonymous witness evidence, the main difficulty of 
                                                
294 R v Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915 (12 December 2008) 1921. See also Crown 
Prosecution Service, The Director’s guidance on witness anonymity 2009 (UK) [11]; this includes: 
potential relationships to the victim or the defendant, past convictions or dishonesty in the police 
investigation or any other reasons to believe that the witness may be untruthful in its statement.   
295 See for example R v Glasgow and R v Bahmanzadeh, which were both included in the appeal of R v 
Mayers and others v R [2009] 1 WLR 1915 (12 December 2008). In both cases the complaint was 
rejected as the anonymous witness was not considered as decisive and the defence was able to cross-
examine to test the accuracy of the testimony; see also Donovan and another v R [2012] EWCA Crim 
2749 (29 November 2012): in this case the conviciotn was quashed on appeal as the anonymous witness 
was considered decisive and there were doubts about the credibility of the witness. 
296 While the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) could theoretically be drawn upon, its relevant provisions, 
ss 114 and 116, setting out the cases in which hearsay evidence is admissible, are very unlikely to apply 
in national security cases. 
297 In Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 
(15 December 2011) [46], [49] and [137], the ECtHR referred both to Davis and the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 (UK); see also R v Horncastle and Others [2010] 2 AC 373, 441: “The critical question is 
whether, in either case [anonymous and absent witnesses], the demands of a fair trial require that a sole or 
decisive test should apply regardless of the particular circumstances and, in particular, regardless of the 
cogency of the evidence.” 
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‘absent witness’ evidence (although prima facie hearsay) is to ascertain its reliability, as 
it potentially undermines the defendant’s RTF. This is particularly the case where the 
absent witness’ testimony is the ‘sole or decisive’ evidence against the defendant.298 In 
Horncastle, the UK Supreme Court addressed this particular question and rejected the 
ECtHR’s strict approach to the ‘sole or decisive’ rule299 on the ground that it lacked a 
proper justification.300 It held that since the ultimate aim is to guarantee safe 
convictions, there is scope for exceptions provided that reliability is otherwise 
guaranteed.301 
The unanimous decision in Horncastle thoughtfully engaged with the ECtHR’s case 
law, suggesting that the Supreme Court was seeking an ongoing dialogue with 
Strasbourg over the scope of the RFT under art 6.302 The case of Al-Khawaja and 
Tahery303 allowed the ECtHR the opportunity to respond and although in substance the 
arguments put forth in Horncastle were dismissed,304 the ECtHR did not insist on strict 
application of the ‘sole or decisive’ rule. Observing that it was never understood to be 
absolute, exceptions to the rule were held to be permissible under art 6 provided that 
any disadvantages suffered by the defence are counterbalanced by ensuring the 
                                                
298 Similarly to s 89(2) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), the fact that the case is solely or to a 
decisive extent based on the absent witness is just one criteria for the judge to consider, albeit not 
determinative. Under s 125(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) the court must only direct the jury to 
acquit the defendant or discharge the jury for a retrial, where the decisive statement is in addition 
considered unconvincing. Hence, under both sets of statutory provisions, the overall fairness of trial may 
still be upheld in cases provided that reliability is sufficiently demonstrated or tested by the defendant. 
299For example Luca v Italy [ECtHR] Application no 33354/96 (27 February 2001) [40]. Which was 
affirmed in the Chamber’s decisions of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Applications nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 (20 January 2009) [36]. For a discussion of these cases see 
above at 4.3.1.1. 
300 R v Horncastle and Others [2010] 2 AC 373 (9 December 2009) 433 and 453. 
301 According to the Supreme Court these safeguards are now provided by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
(UK). See R v Horncastle and Others [2010] 2 AC 373 (9 December 2009) 438 and 455. The Supreme 
Court also referred to other common law countries, including Australia, which do not apply the ‘sole or 
decisive’ rule. See Ibid, 439 and 459 (Annex 1). 
302 Brice Dickson, Human rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 214; see also R v Horncastle and Others [2010] 2 AC 373 (9 December 2009) 432.  
303 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Applications nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 (15 
December 2011).  
304 Ibid, [129]-[142]. 
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reliability of the evidence.305 Given their similarity, the ECtHR’s implicit confirmation 
of the Supreme Court’s approach to absent witnesses can likely be expected to also 
apply in relation to the evidence of anonymous witnesses.  
 
6.3.2   The use of edited evidence in Australia 
In Australia, all types of evidence adduced in an edited format to protect the interest of 
national security is now largely regulated by the NSIA. The statute allows for the 
introduction of edited documents, as well as the suppression of sensitive information 
concerning witnesses. In cases where the NSIA does not apply, the common law and 
more recently, specific legislation also allows the use of anonymous witnesses in 
particular situations. Under the common law, exceptions to the general rule (that a 
defendant may confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses) continue to be 
governed by the doctrine of PII. Similar to the UK, although there is no general rule in 
Australia that would exclude redacted documents missing irrelevant information, where 
relevant information is withheld, PII is attracted and the documents are deemed 
inadmissible.306 
 
6.3.2.1   Edited evidence under the NSIA 2004 
As mentioned above, in response to the conflict prompted by Lappas, one of the main 
objectives of the NSIA was to allow the admissibility of edited evidence in criminal 
procedures.  
When issuing a non-disclosure certificate under the NSIA, the Attorney-General now 
has the options to request the partial disclosure of a document. The NSIA expressly 
                                                
305 Ibid, [147]. For a more detailed discussion see Mike Redmayne, “Hearsay and human rights: Al-
Khawaja in the Grand Chamber” (2012) 75(5) Modern Law Review 865. 
306 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 134. 
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identifies the following options as acceptable ways of editing evidence: (i) deleting 
sensitive information; (ii) deleting sensitive information, while attaching a summary of 
the concerned information; or (iii) deleting information and attaching “a statement of 
facts that the information would, or would be likely to, prove”.307 The content of the 
certificate will be examined at the s 31 hearing,308 and, if the court makes an order, the 
prosecution will be able to admit and rely on the edited document, rather than having to 
choose between adducing or suppressing the whole document.309 
Where witness evidence is concerned, the Attorney-General can issue a certificate 
requesting that a particular witness not be called.310 Although not expressly mentioned 
in the NSIA, the legislation has been interpreted to allow the certificate to alternatively 
request the suppression of a witness’ identity. This can be achieved by screening or 
placing restrictions on particular questions directed to the witness.311 Again, instead of 
seeking a certificate, the parties can also agree to such measures under s 22 NSIA. 
At the time of its enactment, concerns were voiced that the NSIA would be a ‘gateway’ 
to using secret evidence in criminal proceedings.312 The Government denied that this 
was a risk, and thus far, there are no indications that the prosecution has attempted to 
interpret the provisions in such a fashion.313 Nonetheless, the increased scope for 
adducing edited evidence in criminal proceedings, particularly in the form of summaries 
or statements of facts, comes close to sanctioning convictions based on secret evidence. 
These measures raise concern not only as to the reliability of the edited evidence, but 
                                                
307 NSIA, s 26(2)(a)(i)-(iii). 
308 See above at 6.2.3.2. 
309 NSIA, s 31(2)-(3). 
310 NSIA, s 28(2). 
311 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 596 (15 March 2006) [59]; see also Lodhi v R [2006] NSWCCA 101 (4 
April 2006). In Lodhi an order was made that certain ASIO witnesses would be screened from everyone 
except the court and the legal representatives. 
312 Julian Burnside, “The Dreyfus affair” (2006) 137 Victorian Bar News 29, 31; see also Emerton, above 
n 179, 129. 
313 Walker, above n 207, 125, 140. 
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also the difficulties, which the defendants experience, in challenge its admissibility. An 
important safeguard is that the NSIA does not allow the prosecution to withhold 
sensitive evidence from the judge. Donaghue, who has appeared as counsel for the 
Commonwealth in several terrorism cases, has pointed out that “the accuracy and 
adequacy of any summary of statement of facts is subject to verification by the court in 
any proceedings relating to the certificate”.314 Despite this important safeguard, some 
sort of ‘judgment’ as to the evidence’s quality and effect must be made, which, 
however, may be just one possible interpretation of the document. Without knowing the 
content of the information personally, any interpretation as to its importance is 
extremely difficult for a defendant to challenge, and for a jury to assess. In the INSLM’s 
report on the NSIA, Bret Walker SC preferred the approach of the Classified 
Information Procedure Act 1980 (US) (CIPA) adopted in the US,315 which includes an 
additional safeguard that edited evidence should only be allowed by the court, if the 
defendant has “substantially the same ability to make his defence as would disclosure of 
the specific classified information.”316 
The question then arises as to whether the application of the NSIA will avoid 
encountering such ‘stalemates’ as arose in Lappas.317 In Lappas the redacted document 
was held to be covered by PII and as such, was not admissible in accordance with s 134 
EA. The NSIA could address the issue of admissibility. However, Mr Lappas never 
conceded that the content of the leaked documents would have been useful to a foreign 
power. The prosecution claimed that the sensitive character of the document would 
allow an inference to prove intent regarding this fact. Gray J held that the defendant 
must have an opportunity to challenge the claim that the document permits such 
                                                
314 Donaghue, 1n 230, 91. 
315 Walker, above n 207, 146. 
316 Classified Information Procedure Act 1980 (US), s 6(c). 
317 For a discussion of the Lappas case see above at 6.2.3.1. 
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inference.318 Hence, even if the edited document – whether redacted or summarised – 
would be admissible, as long as the relevant parts are not disclosed, this opportunity 
would be equally denied under the NSIA.319 On this analysis, it is highly likely that 
even applying the provisions of the NSIA, the court in Lappas would have reached a 
similar outcome. Emerton observed that the court in Lappas granted a stay not because 
of their ruling on disclosure, but rather because the prosecution had failed to prove its 
charges.320 The only way to avoid such a situation would be to rely on suppressed 
evidence, ie granting the use of secret evidence. While edited evidence is now 
admissible, where it cannot be properly tested due to its altered format, a conviction 
should not, as a matter of fairness, be permitted. 
 
6.3.2.2   Anonymous witnesses under the common law 
Until the 1990s, the Australian common law recognised only a limited judicial power to 
permit the use of anonymous witness evidence. The leading authority on this point was 
the Queensland case, Ex parte Gibson.321  In this case, the Magistrate did not consider 
himself competent to make an order that would conceal the witness’ identity from either 
the court, the defendant or the defendant’s legal representatives, as he believed it would 
constitute a denial of natural justice.322 The decision particularly relied upon the 
authority of the New Zealand case of Hughes,323 and aligns very much with the findings 
in Davis.324 However, the decision was not followed in a number of other Australian 
                                                
318 R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [21]. 
319 Ibid, [14], [24]. 
320 Emerton, above n 179, 146. 
321 R v Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687 (9 December 1991). 
322 Ibid, 690 (Williams J). The case that was primarily concerned with the question of whether an 
undercover officer was an informer within the meaning of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) formerly ss 
46-48, now ss 119-121. 
323 R v Hughes [1989] 2 NZLR 129. 
324 See above at 6.3.1.2. 
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jurisdictions, and provoked legislative reform in Queensland to permit undercover 
officers to testify anonymously.325 
In the Victorian case of Jarvie, the CA overruled a lower court decision that reached a 
similar conclusion to that in ex parte Gibson. The CA held unanimously that a 
magistrate has the jurisdiction to permit undercover police officers to testify 
anonymously during committal proceeding.326 This power is subsumed within the PII 
doctrine, and is justified by the same rationale that allows courts to suppress the identity 
of police informers in the public interest. Manifestly, there is a public interest in 
maintaining both an undercover police officer’s personal safety and ability to undertake 
covert operations.327 To resolve the tension between this public interest and the RFT, 
the CA held that a balancing approach must be applied.328 Importantly, Brooking J 
clarified that the balancing approach under the PII doctrine not only applies to 
undercover officers, but needs to be undertaken for all witnesses where disclosure of 
their identity would place them ‘at risk’.329  
Reaching the same conclusion in Gee, 330 the Supreme Court of South Australia granted 
anonymity to a witness who was neither an informer, nor an undercover police officer, 
but who otherwise would not have testified.331 In support of this decision, Gray J relied 
                                                
325 Part 2 Division 5, Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). The provisions allow the head of agencies to issue a 
certificate to protect the identity of a covert operative. The court may make orders it sees fit to protect the 
officer’s identity. More generally, Queensland police officers cannot be required to disclose information, 
if that would prejudice an investigation or the general effectiveness of the law enforcement, or jeopardises 
a confidential source unless disclosure is necessary for the fairness of the trial or in the public interest. 
See Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 803. 
326 Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick [1995] 1VR 84, 91. 
327 Ibid, 88, 91. Cf Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands [ECtHR] applications nos 21363/93, 
21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93 (23 April 1997) discussed above at 4.3.1.1. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria at Brunswick [1995] 1VR 84, 99. 
330 Gee v Magistrates Court (SA) (2004) 89 SASR 534 (1 October 2004). 
331 However, it is important that the fact of the witnesses being threatened is established on a solid basis: 
Ibid, 556-57. 
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on PII authorities rather than on case law dealing with anonymous witnesses.332 In 
contrast to Lord Bingham’s judgment in Davis that recognised limited exceptions to the 
principle of confrontation and the right to confront one’s accusers,333 Gray J’s 
understanding of the principle in Gee is considerably narrower. In his Honour’s reasons, 
the DPP - rather than the witness - is the accuser, who the defendant has a right to 
confront. In order to retain the fairness of the trial, the DPP only has a duty to disclose 
the case to such an extent that it can be meet by the defence.334 
In sum, in the absence of specific legislation, the Australian judiciary has seen fit to 
apply the doctrine of PII and the balancing approach to facilitate the reliance on 
anonymous witnesses in criminal proceedings. This is despite the fact that s 130 EA, 
which governs the PII doctrine and was intended to restate the common law position, 
does not expressly provide for the use of anonymous witnesses.335 
 
6.3.3   Comparative observations 
The scope for using edited evidence in criminal proceedings in Australia and the UK 
has expanded significantly. This expansion over the last two decades has been 
facilitated by the development of common law principles, as well as legislative reform. 
                                                
332 Gray J referred in particular to referred to Sankey v Whitlam where Stephen J noted “relevant aspects 
of the public interest are not confined to strict and static classes.” Stehpen J himself referred to Lord 
Hailsham in the British case of D v The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] 
AC 171 (2 February 1977), where he stated that “the categories of public interest are not closed.” 
333 R v Davis [2008] 1 AC 1128, 1144. Lord Bingham endorsed Lord Hutton in R (Al-Fawwaz) v 
Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556 (17 December 2001).  
334 Gee v Magistrates Court (SA) (2004) 89 SASR 534, 553 (Gray J). 
335 Finally, it should be mentioned that Part 3.2 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) now comprehensively set out the 
rules about the use of hearsay and thus of absent witnesses. However, as stated above, the scope for 
suppressing of sensitive information under these provisions is limited. In particular, under s 65 Evidence 
Act 1995 (Cth) a representation of a person is admissible, if that person is unavailable and the 
representation was made when made in circumstances “that make it highly probable that the 
representation is reliable”. Both aspects are difficult to meet. First, a person, who requires protection, is 
not unavailable. An argument to same effect has been made in Lappas in relation to documents and has 
been rejected. See R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [13]. Secondly, it 
would be difficult to prove reliability, if in addition to the absence of the witness parts of the 
representation would be withheld in the interest of national security. 
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It is now possible in Australia and the UK to preserve the anonymity of witnesses in 
criminal trials, protecting both the individual and their families from repercussions, as 
well as promoting the public interest in facilitating ongoing police operations.  
In Australia, under both the common law and NSIA, judges must balance the interests 
involved in any non-disclosure decision. By contrast, in the UK, courts must apply a 
number of statutorily mandated conditions, following a seemingly more principled 
approach. In striving for a more coherence in non-disclosure decisions, judges in the 
UK have adopted the proportionality sui generis approach, consistent with the ruling in 
R v H and C, as well as ECtHR jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the decisions concerning 
the ‘sole or decisive’ rule demonstrate that UK courts retain some flexibility and edited 
information can be admitted where its reliability is considered to be sufficiently strong. 
Whether this qualification operates as an additional corrective (or ‘compensatory’ 
measure), or simply reverts to a traditional balancing-type approach applied in PII 
cases, remains to be seen. 
In relation to edited documents, Australia has more options in place, allowing the 
prosecution to submit summaries of redacted documents as well as a statement of facts 
of what the supressed information would prove or be likely to prove. Whether this 
presents an advantage to the prosecution in criminal proceedings is still questionable. In 
all instances where edited documents are used, the prosecution must persuade the trier 
of fact that despite the alterations, the evidence is both accurate and credible. While 
credibility may be assessed and challenged with regard to the circumstances 
surrounding the document’s creation, any summaries or statements of fact may reflect a 
distorted, biased interpretation making it difficult to assess their accuracy. Judicial 
supervision over admission of edited documents can provide an important safeguard, 
however the approval of the edited document is still based on the judge hearing only 
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one side. A jury, who must be convinced of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, may be 
unsure of how to assess the value of edited evidence. This is particularly dangerous in 
the absence of an additional corroboration requirement. Australia has never endorsed an 
equivalent to the ‘sole or decisive’ rule. Any such consideration would only form part of 
the court’s general duty to protect fairness of the trial, and would only serve as one 
relevant factor (among others) to be considered in the balancing exercise.  
Despite recent developments in the UK, suggesting that the ‘sole or decisive’ rule has 
been relaxed, it is submitted that anonymity is an exception permissible only in 
situations where reliability is clearly demonstrated, and the defendant is afforded an 
opportunity to challenge the evidence. In terms of developing and shaping the law in 
this area, the courts in the UK have been much more active than their Australian 
counterparts. There have been a number of high profile cases in the UK, which closely 
engaged with the rights of the defendant. As noted above, the productive and ongoing 
dialogue between the UK Supreme Court and the ECtHR,336 has caused the UK 
judiciary to engage and think critically with the standards of fairness required (under the 
common law, specific legislation and art 6 ECHR) in cases where evidence cannot be 
properly tested by the defendant. It is unlikely that the UK Supreme Court, without the 
need to justify deviation from settled ECtHR case law on art 6, would have engaged to 
the same extent with this issue in Horncastle. While it remains to be seen how 
exceptions to the ‘sole or decisive’ rule will apply and evolve over time, the close 
evaluation of new legislation and the discussion of processes have strengthened the 
fundamental values argued for in this thesis: namely, legitimacy, clarity and 
transparency.337  
                                                
336 See Marny Requa, “Absent witnesses and the UK Supreme Court: judicial deference as judicial 
dialogue?” (2010) 14(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 208. 
337 See above at 4.4. 
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With a limited pool of appeals in Australia, it is unsurprising that there have been few 
opportunities for higher courts to refine and develop these rules and principles. Despite 
Executive concerns over the decision in Lappas, the NSIA can hardly be described as a 
‘demand-driven’ measure. Rather, it must be considered to a large extent to be a 
political and symbolic response to the heightened sense of insecurity within government 
following 9/11. The fact that the onerous NSIA processes are routinely bypassed by 
‘consensus’ between the parties underscores the symbolic rather than instrumental 
importance of the reform. Although the NSIA now permits the wide use of edited 
evidence, there is no indication that it constitutes a significant break from the 
established common law approach. In fact, the judicial preparedness to defer to the 
Executive on matters of national security is matched by their resistance to lowering the 
threshold of RFT, and what is considered to be a miscarriage of justice.  
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6.4 – Comparative aspects between Australia and the United Kingdom 
The ‘golden rule’ in criminal law, that all relevant evidence must be produced, is under 
threat in both Australia and the UK from an expanding range of public interest 
exceptions, including, most significantly for this thesis, the public interest in 
suppressing sensitive information on national security grounds.  
In relation to the suppression of unused information, this expansion has occurred 
through extending the doctrine of PII from civil proceedings into the realm of the 
criminal proceedings. While originally there were few specific common law rules 
governing the suppression of information pertaining to certain classes of evidence, such 
as police informers, it is now accepted that the classes that justify non-disclosure are not 
closed, and that courts have a duty to balance these interests with established principles 
of fairness. To provide further guidance to courts in how to resolve, and prioritise these 
interests, parliaments have increasingly legislated into this field. The law has moved 
beyond a binary determination of whether to ‘admit’ or ‘exclude’ evidence in the public 
interest,  and now encompasses ‘compromise’ strategies such as permitting the use of 
edited evidence or summaries. Despite increased legislative guidance and alternatives to 
full disclosure, judges continue to attach considerable weight to the fundamental rights 
of the defendant (RFT), in particular the principle of confrontation, when deciding 
whether to suppress (wholly or partially) sensitive information. In determining whether 
(or to what extent) that evidence should be suppressed, the courts must determine first, 
the relevance of that evidence and whether it can be excluded in the public interest 
without risking an unsafe conviction; and secondly, the reliability of any evidence in its 
edited or summary form. Although relevance and reliability are generally safeguarded 
by adversarial procedures, proceedings concerning sensitive information limit the scope 
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for proper examination, making the process of arriving at a non-disclosure decision 
crucial. 
While legal developments in this field share similarities both in the UK and Australia, 
there are differences in how the rules – including safeguards - have expanded, the 
methodology applied in non-disclosure decisions, and the extent of involvement of the 
defendant in the decision-making process. These differences often hinge upon different 
understandings of the RFT, and the extent to which limitations are legitimate and 
permissible in the public interest. In the UK, PII is still governed by the common law, 
which has been strongly influenced by both high profile miscarriage of justice cases, as 
well as the growing influence of ECtHR’s case law on art 6. Although legislation has 
played a limited role, it has been relied upon to both clarify and extend the common law 
in the area of anonymous witness evidence. Overall the courts have been actively 
engaged in locating compromise solutions that recognise the public importance of 
protecting sensitive information as well as defining and upholding the scope of 
defendant’s RFT. In Australia, the courts have played a less prominent role in shaping 
this field of law. One of the main reasons for this more limited judicial role was that 
once the overarching PII principles were imported into criminal proceedings, Australian 
courts have not engaged in further doctrinal refinement. The EA was intended to reflect 
the existing common law, and the NSIA, although facilitating the admissibility of edited 
evidence, has been interpreted to align with the predominant balancing approach under 
the common law. Although the Australian courts could have outlined a clearer structure 
for the balancing approach (as occurred in the UK), further judicial development of the 
fair trial standard has been resisted. Such a clarification has neither been considered to 
be part of their constitutional duty nor consistent with their understanding of the 
separation of powers, which requires Parliament to engage in such reforms. In a 
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practical sense, the limited number of appeals contesting the law in the field in Australia 
also provided the courts with fewer opportunities to test, refine and develop legal 
doctrine. 
There are also differences in terms of the methodology applied to non-disclosure 
decisions in the UK and Australia. Over time, the UK courts abandoned the balancing 
model, replacing ‘blackbox’ decision-making with a more transparent and principled 
approach. Although principles per se are not foreign to the common law, the courts in 
fact applied the novel ‘proportionality sui generis’ approach advocated by ECtHR. Even 
in cases concerning anonymous witnesses, where legislation has replaced the common 
law, the CJA 2009 requires that the decision requires compliance with three specific 
conditions, rather than the traditional common law balancing approach.  
In Australia, both the common law and legislation governing non-disclosure require the 
courts to engage in a balancing exercise. Although fairness is always a consideration, 
there is no clear guidance on how to weigh each of the competing public interests. This 
has meant that Australian courts have tended to follow the government’s assessment of 
the document’s sensitivity over the public interest in upholding the RFT. However, the 
NSIA provision ‘tilting the balance’ in favour of security in non-disclosure applications 
has been ‘read down’ by the courts. As a result, non-disclosure is now ‘the rule’ unless 
the interests of justice require that disclosure be ordered to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice - a threshold that remains poorly defined in non-disclosure cases. But the 
threshold for preventing a miscarriage of justice, which serves to protect the integrity of 
the court, is substantially lower than what is required to protect the RFT as interpreted 
by the ECtHR. As such, art 6 ECHR has been interpreted to require at least some 
involvement of the defendant in the hearing, for the purpose of counterbalancing any of 
the limitations placed on the right. While the NSIA certainly leaves room for such an 
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approach, no explicit criteria or conditions have been laid down to determine what is 
required to ensure the fairness of the trial. This Australian approach therefore differs 
from a ‘proportionality sui generis’ approach under the ECHR, where (i) limitations are 
based on the principle of strict necessity, and (ii) the ‘golden rule’ of disclosure means 
that suppression of information is instead treated as the exception rather than the rule. 
Admittedly, it is possible in national security cases that the test of strict necessity is 
easily met given the traditional deferential attitude by the judiciary in such cases. That 
said, there are fundamental differences in relation to how Australian and UK courts 
approach fairness. The principled approach aims at a minimising the limitation to the 
RFT (proportionality in the narrow sense), which may be achieved by use of 
compensation measures. In contrast, balancing factors all competing interests into a 
single overall judgement as to whether the necessary standards of fairness have been 
satisfied. Hence, while balancing addresses a minimum standard directly, the principled 
approach is based on more elaborate and structured decision-making, where compliance 
with steps and conditions is mandated to ensure that the minimum standards of fairness 
are never compromised. The starting point of the principled approach is the RFT, which 
demonstrates a much stronger commitment to respecting, to its full extent, the rights 
and interests of defendant.  
Another difference in their decision-making methods is that in the UK, courts have a 
distinct duty to keep any non-disclosure order under continuous review. Although there 
is no similarly defined corresponding obligation in Australia, it is conceivable that such 
an obligation could be read into s 19 NSIA, in light of the overarching judicial duty to 
stay proceedings where they would otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.  
A related point is how the defendant is informed of, and included in, these processes. 
Under the NSIA, any hearing involving a non-disclosure decision must necessarily be 
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held in camera and, on request, ex parte. Although the UK courts have retained 
discretion in this regard, in exceptional circumstances the defendant may not even be 
informed of the ex parte hearing (type III). As discussed above, only the UK’s 
principled approach explicitly requires the court to consider adopting ‘compensatory 
measures’ where limitations have been imposed upon the defendant’s RFT. These 
considerations have centred on the use of special advocates.338 While courts can 
similarly appoint special advocates in Australian proceedings,339 this measure is 
considered to be available only in “exceptional circumstances”.340  The need for special 
advocates in the Australian context may be less pressing, as defence counsel are 
permitted to attend a closed hearing, where they possess the appropriate security 
clearance. This approach, however, raises serious ethical issues for the defence lawyer, 
who is obliged to withhold certain information from their client.  
In terms of protecting human rights, the UK has benefited from falling under the 
scrutiny of the ECHR. In fact, the Supreme Court’s more active engagement with art 6 
jurisprudence may be attributable to the requirement imposed by s 2 HRA to interpret 
all legislation in conformity with the ECHR.341 This is not to say that Australian courts 
do not have access to similar interpretive principles.342 Indeed, the UK courts have often 
highlighted the common law origins of rights and principles now championed by the 
ECtHR.343 The judicial inertia in Australia to further develop the balancing approach in 
                                                
338 For more detailed discussion about the use of special advocates see below at 7.2.2. 
339 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 586 (21 February 2006). 
340 Ibid, [45]. In Lodhi the appointment of a special advocate was considered as premature. See also 
Whealy, above n 226, 750-751. 
341 Whether this can be interpreted as a true dialogue between the branches of government as well as 
between the British courts and the ECtHR is beyond the scope of this thesis. For discussion see for 
example Alison Young, “Is dialogue working under the Human Rights Act 1998?” (2011) October Public 
Law 773; Tom Hickman, “The courts and politics after the Human Rights Act: a comment” (2008) Spring 
Public Law 84; Richard Clayton, “Judicial deference and “democratic dialogue”: the legitimacy of 
judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2004) Spring Public Law 33; For the main 
provision of the HRA see also above 5.1.1.  
342 See Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 
343 The Scott Report equally addressed the common law rather than the ECHR. 
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non-disclosure decisions can be attributed in part to the judges’ understanding of their 
role in Government. Developing the scope of rights by interpreting legislation in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality is generally perceived as an 
encroachment into executive power.344 Interestingly, critics of the ECHR system in the 
UK often flag this point. The fact that Australian courts are reluctant to engage in 
defining the scope of defendants’ rights will not be an issue when there is a culture of 
rights protection prevalent in Parliament when new legislation is enacted. 
Unfortunately, although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is clear that there is 
inadequate scrutiny of the effect of legislation on human rights in Australia. This is 
illustrated in provisions of the NSIA which not only prescribe mandatory closed 
hearings and allow edited evidence to be adduced, but by ‘tilting the balance’ also send 
a clear message to trial judges to follow non-disclosure requests in the public interest of 
national security, rather than maximise the protection of the RFT. 
The balancing approach per se does not contradict the ECHR. Where applied, the 
ECtHR would review each individual case to determine whether relevant issues had 
been addressed. The prominent requirement in the ECtHR’s art 6 case law - that the 
judge remains in control over proceedings - has been established in early Australian 
disclosure cases, and has not (yet) been abolished by Parliament. Even the statutory 
requirement for judges to ‘tilt the balance’ in favour of security has been read down to 
avoid placing limitations on the court’s ability to make balanced non-disclosure 
decisions.  
It may be argued that the differences between the UK and Australian disclosure 
frameworks are largely semantic, as ultimately, judges in both jurisdictions have the 
                                                
344 Gerald Brennan, “The Parliament the executive and the courts: roles and immunities” (1997) 9(2) 
Bond Law Review 136. 
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power to determine whether the trial, as a whole, has been conducted fairly. However, 
having a clear process that maximises the extent of disclosure, requiring justification for 
any non-disclosure and considering counter-balancing measures can avoid abuse, will 
strengthen the individual RFT, and promote the values of legitimacy, clarity and 
predictability in the law. All of these attributes are enormously important in times of 
insecurity and increasing pressure to secure convictions.  
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Chapter 7: Sensitive information in quasi-criminal 
proceedings 
 
The trend towards increased secrecy in criminal proceedings is also apparent in civil 
and administrative counter-terrorism proceedings. The latter proceedings do not end in 
the imposition of punishment following a finding of criminal guilt, but are justified by 
reference to other purposes such as prevention. Hence, rather than punishing a person 
for past behaviour, these civil and administrative measures aim at preventing conduct 
which may lead to a terrorist attack in the future, which is typically based on a risk 
assessment.1 Given this difference, courts have generally held that a lower standard of 
fairness is acceptable in these proceedings than would ordinarily apply in a criminal 
trial.2 This includes not only a lower standard of proof, but also relaxed rules of 
evidence, which can allow secret evidence to be admitted in ex parte proceedings. 
The benefit of lowering fair trial standards is that the proceedings may be conducted 
with more speed and efficiency, which is essential where the resulting orders are 
intended to prevent imminent harm.3 An alternative process, which would allow more 
rigorous scrutiny of evidence, would undermine the preventive purpose of such 
measures. However, in the context of counter-terrorism, the civil and administrative 
measures available have coercive effects not dissimilar to those applied in the criminal 
                                                
1 For example, the objective of the Australian CO regime is “to allow obligations, prohibitions and 
restrictions to be imposed on a person by a control order for the purpose of protecting the public from a 
terrorist act”; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.1. 
2 See for example Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 (31 
October 2007) [23]-[24] (Lord Bingham); Lord Hoffman in agreement at [48]; Baroness Hale agreeing at 
[65] and Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 (6 August 2004); cf Douglas Husak, “Preventative 
detention as punishment? Some possible obstacles” in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and Patrick 
Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the limits of the criminal law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 178.  
3 See Packer, who characterized due process as obstacles. See Packer, Herbert, “Two models of the 
criminal process (1964) 113(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 13. 
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justice system, with the potential to impose severe limitations on the liberties of 
individuals, such as preventive detention, house arrest or forced relocation. This creates 
a tension between the public interest in conducting speedy and efficient proceedings, 
and the general requirements of fairness, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Although one could assume that the differing rationales behind punishment and 
prevention would apply to distinct types of conduct, there is a considerable overlap 
between the situations that trigger preventive measures and criminal offences. Counter-
terrorism laws have introduced a range of new preparatory, inchoate and status-based 
offences, covering a wide range of situations and behaviours that might also provide the 
legal and evidential basis for imposing preventative measures. In Australia, for 
example, providing training to, or receiving training from, a listed terrorism 
organisation is both a basis for a control order (CO),4 and a criminal offence.5 Because 
of this potential overlap, and coercive effect, these preventive measures have been 
labelled as ‘quasi-criminal’.6 Moreover, breach of these civil orders is typically a 
criminal offence,7 which further blurs the distinction between criminal, civil and 
administrative measures. 
As these quasi criminal measures invoke a lower standard of proof and allow the wider 
use secret evidence, they may be preferred to criminal charge, where the prosecution 
                                                
4 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s104.2 (2)(b). 
5 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s102.5. 
6 In Australia, COs are even regulated with the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). For an overview of the 
civil/criminal law overlap in Australia see Simon Bronitt and Sue Donkin, “Australian responses to 9/11: 
new world legal hybrids?” in Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the state of permanent legal 
emergency: security and human rights in counter terrorism (Springer, 2012) 223, 231. 
7 Because these civil orders are tailored to restraining specific conducts of individuals, for example 
attending specific places of workship, they have been described as a form of “personalised criminal law”: 
Roger Leng, Richard Taylor and Martin Wasik, Blackstone’s Guide to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(Blackstone Press, 1998) 13. Although this description was coined in relation to Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBO) in the UK, it applies equally to CT preventive measures, such as preventive detention and 
COs.  
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has to deal with the potential issues that sensitive information is either (a) inadmissible,8 
(b) admissible but cannot be disclosed under any circumstances on public interest 
grounds, and thus leaving the prosecution only with (c) admissible but weak evidence, 
which may not fulfilling the standard of beyond reasonable doubt.9 As such, there is a 
real danger that civil and administrative measures will be favoured over criminal 
prosecution to achieve similar outcomes in a quicker and more efficient manner.10 This 
potential for bypassing the criminal process and due process safeguards underscores the 
importance of extending analysing the use of sensitive information in these ‘alternate’ 
civil and administrative proceedings. 
This Chapter concentrates on CO-type proceedings in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (UK), which are the most prominent form of administrative, preventative 
counter-terrorism measures.11 While there are a number of different models, CO can be 
generally defined as an administrative measure (although reviewed or issued by a 
court), which allows a suspect’s behaviour to be controlled where it poses a danger to 
the public.12 It is also worth pointing out that there is a general trend towards relying on 
preventative measures, which fall outside the usual criminal process, but limit the 
                                                
8 In the UK this includes the use of intercept evidence, which is not admissible in regular criminal trials. 
The general exclusion of intercept evidence from legal proceedings in s 17 Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (UK) has been expressly exempted for CO and TPIM hearings: see Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), sch para 9 and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 
(UK), sch7 para 4(2); see also the Thomas case in relation to statements made under duress: Jabbour v 
Thomas (2006) 165 A Crim R 32, 34. 
9 See for example David Anderson QC, “Examination of witness” (Joint Committee on the Draft 
Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, HC 495-I, 11 July 2012) 9 (Q 22). In 
Australia, the INSLM has emphasised that both insufficient evidence to prosecute, and sufficient, but 
highly sensitive evidence, cannot in itself be a justification for the CO regime as this would blatantly 
circumvent the criminal law. Rather COs must always be future orientated. See Bret Walker, 
“Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Declassified Annual Report” (20 December 2012) 
31-33.  
10 Lucia Zedner, “Seeking security by eroding rights: the side-stepping of due process” in Benjamin 
Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 257; check Joint 
Committee on HR 2006. 
11 Other measures are asset freezing and preventative detention. However, CO-type proceedings 
distinguish themselves, as they are the most severe in terms of both the degree of the limitation on liberty, 
as well as the lengthy time period they can be applied for. 
12 As there are now variations of CO proceedings. The term “control order-type proceedings” (CO-type) 
is used to describe of the variants that have been developed. 
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subject’s personal liberty.13 These developments have attracted both academic and 
public debate, with significant media attention in the UK focusing on Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)14 and Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (SOPOs)15, and in 
Australia on indefinite detention for dangerous sexual offenders.16 Some references will 
be made to wider developments in those related fields, and analogies will be drawn 
particularly to the case law governing the Australian CO regimes targeting organised 
crime, which are to a large extent based on the terrorism CO legislation. However, an 
in-depth analysis of the full range of preventative measures would exceed the scope of 
this thesis.17 
The questions addressed in this Chapter differ from those asked in Chapter 6. In 
criminal trials, the focus is generally on the information needed to establish each 
element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt or to raise some doubt as to the 
defendant’s guilt. Given that secret evidence can be taken into consideration when 
making a CO decision, these minimum guarantees of fairness are mostly irrelevant. In 
civil proceedings, questions of fairness hinge upon the extent to which the process may 
                                                
13 For a general analysis of preventive measures in the UK see Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, 
Preventive justice (Oxford University Press, 2014). Preventative measures have been equally applied in 
the area of health and safety, as well as immigration measures. 
14 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK), s 1. Upon conviction the ASBOs have been replaced by Criminal 
Behaviour Orders: see the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (UK). 
15 Sexual Offences Act 2002 (UK), s 104. 
16 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13.  
17 Some types of preventative measures are imperfect analogies since they differ from counter-terrorism 
COs in their nature, legal set-up or the type of risk assessments applied. For example, anti-social or 
dangerous individuals are assessed on their past criminal/disorderly behaviour and psychological 
evaluation, rather than intelligence and secret evidence. See for example Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), ss 13, 44, 45. In immigration proceedings, secret evidence is regularly used to 
limit personal liberties based on risk assessments. However, from a legal perspective, a key distinction 
appears to be that the individual subject to these controls is not a citizen: see generally Rayner Thwaites, 
The liberty of non-citizens: indefinite detention in Commonwealth Countries (Hart Publishing, 2014).  
The use of secret evidence in ordinary civil proceedings must also be distinguished. Despite the fact that 
the claimant may suffer a disadvantage as a consequence of such proceedings, the state does not 
ostensibly applies its coercive powers in order to limit individual liberties. Therefore justifications for fair 
trial standards as a consequence of the use of coercive powers, as discussed in Chapter 2, are not 
applicable. Cf  Ryan Goss, “Balancing away Article 6 in Home Office v Tariq: fair trial rights in closed 
material proceedings” in Martin et al (eds), Secrecy, Law and Society (Routledge, 2015) 58. Goss 
criticises that making such distinctions causes inconsistencies in how the ECtHR and the UK Supreme 
Court’s approach to the issues of fairness. 
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compromise the judge’s independence and ability to exercise his/her discretion as to 
whether or not to supress information, as well as the level of adversariness and 
involvement of the controlee in that process. 
After explaining the main mechanism of CO-type proceedings in the UK and Australia, 
this Chapter will separately assess the extent to which secret evidence can be used in 
both jurisdictions. It will then compare (a) the position of the controlee in the 
proceedings, (b) the requirements of an adversarial process, and (c) the judicial 
approach to ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, to determine (d) the levels of 
legitimacy, clarity and predictability of the measures.18   
                                                
18 There is a growing body of scholarship offering general legal comparisons between UK and Australia 
in this field. While many of these comparisons focus on the usefulness, efficiency and legality of CO, the 
validity of these findings must be regarded with some degree of caution due to the high number of 
variables between the Australian and the UK legal systems: see in particular Clive Walker, “The 
reshaping of control orders in the United Kingdom: time for a fairer go, Australia!” (2013) 37 Melbourne 
University Law Review 143; Lisa Burton and George Williams, “What future for Australia's control order 
regime?” (2013) 24 Public Law Review 182; Andrew Lynch, “Control orders in Australia: a further case 
study in the migration of British counter-terrorism law” (2008) 8(2) Oxford University Commonwealth 
Law Journal 159; Andrew Lynch, Tamara Tulich and Rebbecca Welsh, “Secrecy and control orders: the 
role and vulnerability of constitutional values in Australia and the United Kingdom” in David Cole, 
Frederico Fabbrini and Arianna Vedashi (eds), Secrecy, national security, and the vindication of 
constitutional law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 154; Bronwen Jaggers, “Anti-terrorism control orders 
in Australia and the United Kingdom: a Comparison” (Research Paper No 28, Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of Australia, 29 April 2008); Sue Donkin, The Evolution of Pre-emption in Anti-Terrorism 
Law: A Cross-Jurisdictional Examination (Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Griffith University, Brisbane, 
2011) 106; Sasha-Dominik Bachmann and Matthew Burt, “Control orders post 9/11 and human rights in 
the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada: a Kafkaesque dilemma?” (2010) 15(2) Deakin Law Review 
131.  
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7.1   General aspects of control orders19 
In the UK, the CO regime was introduced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(UK) (PTA) to replace the indefinite (immigration) detention regime,20 which had been 
declared incompatible with arts 5 and 14 ECHR by the House of Lords.21 The Civil 
Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2005 (UK), which accompanied the PTA, set out 
the procedure to govern closed hearings. However, this procedure was not novel in the 
UK. Closed hearings had previously been introduced in matters before the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) to overcome the problem of disclosing 
sensitive information that had formed the basis of a deportation order.22 Since then, the 
procedures regulating these closed hearings have been adopted in a number of 
administrative processes involving sensitive information.23 Rather than being creatures 
of statute, the requirements and safeguards ensuring that closed hearings are consistent 
with art 6 ECHR, have largely been developed by the courts. Even when the CO regime 
was replaced with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), to be 
more targeted and human rights-friendly,24 the procedures governing the use of secret 
evidence remained in place.25 Consequently, judicial rulings on the fairness of CO 
                                                
19 In the following section – unless further specified - the term “control order” will be used as a generic 
term, which covers also covers Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). 
20 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), Part 4.  
21 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004); 
Many of the detainees were subsequently put under COs.  
22 For further discussion see below at 7.2. 
23 It is now used by over 22 authorities dealing with sensitive information; see United Kingdom, 
Parliamentary Debate, House of Commons, 1 March 2010, vol 506, no 47, col 739 (Mr Andrew 
Dismore). For an overview of counter-terrorism prevention outside the criminal process see also 
Ashworth and Zedner, above n 13, 181. 
24 This was a result of the Home Office (UK), Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: 
Findings and Recommendations (Cm 8004, January 2011); see ibid at 3 and 6; see also United Kingdom, 
Parliamentary Debate, House of Lords, 5 October 2011, vol 730, col 1134 (Lord Henley, Minister of 
State). 
25 Now regulated in Part 80 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK). 
Chapter 7: Sensitive information in civil and administrative proceedings 
 287 
procedures under the repealed legislation are still relevant for the current TPIM 
regime.26 
The Australian Government introduced the CO regime into the Criminal Code 1995 
(Cth) (CC 1995) as a reaction to the London 7/7 bombings and the general perception of 
an increased threat from home-grown terrorism.27 Although the UK regime served as a 
template, the Australian Parliament made a number of modifications, two of which are 
of particular interest. Firstly, whereas in the UK the court’s function is limited to 
reviewing a Minister’s decision to grant CO, in Australia the court is the issuing 
authority.28 Secondly, the CC 1995 only expressly authorises the use of secret evidence 
during the interim stage of CO proceedings, with the implication that secret evidence is 
inadmissible in subsequent hearings that confirm (or revoke) the CO.29 My analysis 
below, however, reveals this segregation is not complete, and that secret evidence 
(albeit in modified form) may still influence the final outcome of the confirmation 
hearing. While these two significant modifications appear to be designed to enhance 
both the adversarial nature and judicial oversight of these preventive measures, critics 
                                                
26 Given that the PTA was read down, ie interpreted in a way compatible with the HRA, rather than 
declared incompatible, it was possible to use the same process for the TPIM regime without concerns 
about a renewed challenge in this respect. See Home Office (UK), Review of Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Powers: Findings and Recommendations (Cm 8004, January 2011) 39. Although TPIMs are less 
severe, the High Court confirmed that the same requirements of art 6 ECHR apply. See Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v CC [2013] 1 WLR 2171, 2220. 
27 The actual need for such severe measures has been doubted and the introduction of the CO regime 
therefore has been regularly criticised. See Andrew Lynch, “Control orders in Australia: a further case 
study in the migration of British counter-terrorism law” (2008) 8(2) Oxford University Commonwealth 
Law Journal 159, 180; Andrew Lynch, “Thomas v Mowbray: Australia's ‘war on terror’ reaches the High 
Court” (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law review 1182, 1184. 
28 It is worth noting that both systems have been criticised for different reasons: the UK for not giving 
judges enough control to safeguard human rights and Australian for potentially violating the integrity of 
the judges by engaging to such a close extent in what is essentially an executive process. See Burton and 
Williams, above n 18, 182. 
29 In the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2015 (Cth), the Government proposed an 
amendment to the NSIA, which would explicitly allow the use of secret evidence in CO proceedings – 
including the confirmation stage. See in Schedule 15 of the Bill the proposed s 38J(2)(e) and (3)(d) NSIA. 
The legislation lapsed in April 2016 at prorogation of Parliament, but seems likely to pass in the future. 
The thesis explores the law as it stands at the time of writing. But while the proposed legislation would 
eliminate the ambiguity of the law in relation to the use of secret evidence, it would not alter the 
conclusions made in this thesis about the threats to the fair trial standards in CO proceedings in Australia.   
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have noted that the Australian legislation did not give sufficient weight to the distinctive 
constitutional arrangements in the UK,30 in particular, the fact that the UK regime 
operates under the ECHR. Although these UK developments would have been hard for 
Australian law-makers to predict, the Australian CO regime has not since been 
amended, nor has its interpretation reflected the shifting approach taken in the UK 
following litigation under art 6 ECHR. 
 
The main mechanisms of CO proceedings 
In Australia,31 after having obtained the Attorney-General’s consent, a senior police 
officer may request that an interim control order (iCO) be issued by the court in relation 
to a particular person.32 The request can be based on a number of grounds, which can be 
divided into two categories:33 the senior police officer  
• suspects on reasonable grounds that the order would substantially assist in 
preventing  
o a terrorist act; or 
o the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or 
• suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has  
o provided training to, received training from or participated in training 
with a listed terrorist organisation; or 
o engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country; or 
o been convicted in a foreign country of an terrorism offence; or 
                                                
30 Lynch, Tulich and Welsh, above n 18, 163. 
31 For a more detailed description of the Australian CO regime see for example Burton and Williams, 
above n 18, 182; Jaggers, above n 18; Lynch, above n 18, 159. 
32 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.3; issuing courts are the Federal Court of Australia, the Family 
Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Ibid, s 100.1)  
33 Ibid, s104.2 (2); in urgent cases the senior police officer can directly apply to the court without the 
consent of the Attorney-General.   
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o provided support for or otherwise facilitated the engagement in a hostile 
activity in a foreign country. 
Before issuing an iCO, the court must consider the available supporting material and be 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities: (1) that the ground claimed in the request is 
fulfilled;34 and (2) that the measures requested are  
“reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose 
of (i) protecting the public from a terrorist act; or (ii) preventing the provision of 
support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or (iii) preventing the provision of 
support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign 
country.”35  
A confirmation hearing is then to be held “as soon as practicable”.36 While the iCO will 
in most cases be issued ex parte, the subsequent confirmation hearing is meant to be 
adversarial.37 The CC 1995 provides an exhaustive list of measures the controlee can be 
subjected to, which range from ‘minor’ restrictions, such as an order to remain in the 
country or to be fingerprinted, to extremely intrusive measures, such as house arrest or 
                                                
34 Ibid, s 104.4 (1)(c). 
35 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.4 (1)(d); In doing so the court must also take the person’s 
personal circumstances into consideration. 
36 This is qualified by an overall time limit set by the legislation: the iCO must be served as soon as 
practical, but at least 48 hours before the confirmation hearing (s 104.12); the confirmation hearing must 
also be held as soon as practical, but no later than 72 hours after the iCO has been issued. (s104.5 (1A)); 
the senior AFP member who requested the CO must decide at least 48 hours before the time of the 
confirmation hearing (which has to be set in the iCO), whether he wants the CO to be confirmed or not (s 
104.12A (1)); no CO can last longer than 12 months from the day the iCO has been issued (s 104.5 
(1)(f)). However, the 12 months limit can be circumvented by making “successive control orders in 
relation to the same person.” (s104.16 (2)). Despite the apparent legislative intention that iCO 
proceedings would be expedited, none of the iCOs issued in Australia were confirmed quickly. Thomas’ 
iCO was valid for 12 months due to the legal challenge and Hicks’ iCO for three months, which was 
agreed to by Hicks in order to be able to properly prepare for the confirmation hearing. Two other iCOs 
expired after a year and one was confirmed after six months. The final iCO, issued 10 September 2015 
has not been confirmed at the time of writing.  
37 While section 104.14 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) suggests an adversarial nature of the 
confirmation hearing, my analysis is highly critical of such a characterisation. See below at 7.3.1. 
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the wearing of a tracking device.38 Any violation of a CO constitutes a punishable 
offence attracting up to 5 years imprisonment.39 
In the UK, the original CO regime40 was replaced by TPIMs in 2011.41 The main  
differences between the two regimes concern the severity of the measures imposed.42 As 
the grounds and mechanisms for issuing orders as well as the procedures governing the 
use of secret evidence have remained reasonably similar, a rigorous distinction between 
the CO and the TPIM regimes is not essential for the purposes of this thesis.43 In 
contrast to the Australian regime, in the UK the Home Secretary may issue a TPIM 
provided the following conditions are met:44 firstly, the Home Secretary must be 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the concerned individual is or has been 
involved in a terrorism-related activity; secondly, the Home Secretary must reasonably 
consider the measure to be necessary to protect the public and prevent the individual 
from further involvement in terrorism-related activities; finally, with the exception of 
cases requiring urgency, the Home Secretary must also seek permission from the 
                                                
38 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.5(3). 
39 Ibid, s 104.27. 
40 Under that regime there were two types of COs: derogating and non-derogating ones. Derogating COs 
were assumed to impact on the rights of the individual in such a way that a derogation from art 5 ECHR 
would have been necessary. Such an order has never been issued and is therefore not relevant here. The 
term ‘control order’ in the UK context always refers to non-derogating ones. 
41 The Act received the Royal Assent on 14 December 2011. For a more detailed discussion of the TPIM 
system see for example Ben Middleton, “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: constitutional 
evolution, not revolution?” (2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 562; Walker, above n 18, 143. 
42 Changes in particular concern the maximum length a CO can remain in place, the limitation of 
measures a person can be subjected to and the stricter standard of proof. See also below Table 7.1. It 
should be noted that parallel to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK) 
another Bill was prepared containing more severe measures (Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Bill), which would essentially re-introduce all more severe measures previously 
available under the CO regime. The Bill is ready to be passed in case exceptional circumstances demand 
it. See further: Helen Fenwick, “Designing ETPIMs around ECHR review or normalization of 
‘preventative’ non-trial-based executive measures?” (2013) 76(5) Modern Law Review 876. 
43 In the following, references are only made to the current regime. References to the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) will only be made where the requirements differ significantly. 
44 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), ss 3(1)-(5). There is also a condition 
that the terrorism-related activity has to be “new”. This condition is only relevant in cases where the 
person has been previously subjected to a TPIM. 
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court.45 While the court applies the principles of judicial review to assess whether the 
conditions have been satisfied, it can only refuse its permission where the Home 
Secretary’s decision was “obviously flawed”.46 The threshold for obtaining the TPIM 
does not appear to be onerous, and there is no evidence of a court ever rejecting an 
application.47 Although not mandatory, the ‘permission’ interim hearing is held ex 
parte.48 After a TPIM has been issued, the court must engage in a mandatory review of 
the decision to ensure that the circumstances have not changed, and the conditions are 
still satisfied.49 The legislation again directs that the principles of judicial review are to 
be applied,50 and states expressly that the process must comply with art 6 ECHR.51 
Although under the repealed CO regime, the courts had interpreted their role in 
reviewing a CO as one requiring the application of “intense scrutiny”,52 the court is 
under an obligation to protect sensitive information and conduct the proceedings ex 
parte.53 Finally, the TPIM Act 2011 exhaustively lists twelve measures that can be 
imposed by the Home Secretary.54 An individual violating a TPIM may be liable to a 
maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.55 
                                                
45 Ibid, ss 3(5) and 6. The relevant courts are the High Court in England and Wales, the Outer House of 
the Court of Session (for Scotland) and the High Court in Northern Ireland (Ibid, s 30(1)). 
46 Ibid, s 6(3)(6)(7). 
47 Walker, above n 18, 162. 
48 See Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), s 6(4); Walker, above n 18, 165. 
49 The date for the review hearing must be determined in a direction hearing, which itself is to be held 
within seven days after the TPIM has been served, unless the court decides otherwise. The direction 
hearing is generally also open to the controlee; see Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011 (UK), s 8. Within the review hearing the court can quash the order or any measure or give directions 
to the Home Secretary directions of how to alter the order (ibid, s 9(5)). If the court does not exercise any 
of these powers, if has to at least decide on the continuation of the order (ibid, s 9(6)). 
50 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), s 9. 
51 Ibid, sch 4 para 5(1). 
52 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140 (01 August 2006) [65] 
(Lord Phillips CJ). Although the decision was made in relation to COs, the wording in the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK) is 
almost identical.  
53 See in particular Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 4 para 2; Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) pt 80. 
54 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 1 part 1. 
55 Ibid, s 23. 
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Table 7.1 below offers a comparison of the main features of the CO regimes in 
Australia and the UK. It clearly shows that the original CO in the UK was not only the 
harshest one in terms of its extensive measures and a low standard of proof, but was 
also applied the most despite the obligation to prosecute if possible.  
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Table 7.1: comparison of control order regimes in Australia and the UK 
 Control Orders Australia 
Control Orders  
United Kingdom56 TPIMs United Kingdom 
Judicial involvement Issuing authority Reviewing authority Reviewing authority 
Standard of proof for 
issuing 
Balance of 
probabilities Reasonable suspicion 
Reasonable belief / balance 
of probabilities57 
Obligation to prosecute 
if possible No Yes Yes 
Use of secret evidence At interim  stage only At any stage At any stage 
Special advocate for 
closed hearings Possible Mandatory Mandatory 
Severity of measure  12 exclusive measures58 
No limitation (incl. curfew 
and relocation)59 
12 exclusive measures 
(no relocation)60 
Maximum length 12 months  (not renewable) 
12 months  
(indefinitely renewable) 
12 months  
(once renewable) 
Direct involvement in 
terrorism Not necessary Necessary Necessary 
Maximum penalty for 
violation 
5 years 
imprisonment 
5 years  
imprisonment 
5 years  
imprisonment 
# of orders made 661 52 (2005-2011)62 10 (2012-2015)63 
                                                
56 The table considers only non-derogating COs. 
57 The raise of the standard of proof in relation to the individual’s involvement in counter-terrorism 
activity has been introduced by Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (UK), s 20(1). This amendment 
has already been proposed by the JCHR in the first review of the CO regime. See Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, “Counter-terrorism policy and human rights: Draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2006” (12th Report of Session 2005-06, HC 915, 14 
February 2006) [66]. 
58 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s104.5(3); the Australian legislation does not provide for any limitation 
of the particular measures and there is also no case law that held that limitations would be required for 
measures such as curfews or the ban of telecommunication devices.  
59 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 1(3) set out a non-exhaustive list of measures. Home 
Secretary could impose any measures he or she considered as appropriate. However, the courts have 
introduced some limitations. See for example Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others 
[2007] UKHL 45 (31 October 2007); Secretary of State for the Home Department v E and another [2007] 
UKHL 47 (31 October 2007). One of most controversial measures was requiring the forced relocation of 
the controlee, which was intended to break up local associations. The measure was used in almost every 
second CO case: see David Anderson QC, “Control orders in 2011” (Final report of the Independent 
Reviewer on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, March 2012) 36. 
60 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 1 part 1; curfew has been 
reduced to an “overnight residence measure” and a total ban of telecommunication devices is not 
permissible. 
61 Roger Gyles, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into control order 
safeguards: Part 2” (13 April 2016) 5; According to the INSLM, 23 COs more were considered until 
2013: see Bret Walker, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Annual Report” (7 
November 2013) 13. 
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7.2   Secret evidence in control order and TPIM hearings in the UK 
The UK TPIM regime enables the Executive to impose restrictions on individuals with 
the objective of preventing terrorism. Much like its predecessor, the TPIM regime 
allows the use of secret evidence at all relevant stages. As noted above, TPIMs are 
issued by the Home Secretary, subject to receiving the court’s permission after an initial 
review.64 The concerned individual is neither informed nor involved in this initial 
process, 65 and as such the TPIM is issued entirely on the basis of secret evidence.  
Even in the subsequent review processes, which are designed to be adversarial, the 
individual and his/her legal representative can be excluded where the court finds it 
“necessary […] in order to secure that information is not disclosed contrary to the 
public interest”.66 This applies to both the first review hearing before the High Court 
and any subsequent hearings on appeal,67 which are regulated by special rules in the 
Civil Procedures Act 1998 (UK).68  
In order to avoid disclosing sensitive information to the individual, the Home Secretary 
must first apply to the court,69 presenting the sensitive information, and provide reasons 
justifying non-disclosure.70 The court must hold a closed hearing to consider any 
                                                                                                                                          
62 David Anderson QC, “Control orders in 2011” (Final report of the Independent Reviewer on the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, March 2012), 29-30; 10 were in force when the regime expired. Most 
of them were then put under TPIMs.  
63 Anderson, David QC, “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2014” (Third report of the 
Independent Reviewer on the operation of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, 
March 2015) 2.  
64 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), 3(5). 
65 Ibid, 6(4). 
66 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) 80.18. 
67 This could also concern the direction hearing, where the respondent could be included. 
68 The Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2011 (UK) introduced Part 80 into the Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998 (UK); Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), s 80.22 explicitly excludes other relevant parts of 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) (Parts 31-33) on the use of evidence and in particular the use of 
hearsay evidence. 
69 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), 80.24(1)(a) 
70 Ibid, 80.24(2)(b) 
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application made,71 and where it agrees that disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest, it must give permission to the Home Secretary to suppress the information.72 
Importantly, and in contrast to PII in criminal procedures, such permission does not 
prevent the court from relying on the sensitive information in reviewing the TPIM. 
While the public interest is the primary criteria, the TPIM Act also provides that any 
rule governing the proceedings must conform with art 6 ECHR.73 This notwithstanding, 
the Home Secretary cannot be forced to disclose information to the defendant, even 
where the court decides that disclosure, either in full or in a summarised form, is 
necessary. In these circumstances, the suppressed evidence cannot be relied upon in the 
proceedings.74 
An additional mandatory prerequisite for the use of secret evidence is the appointment 
of a special advocate who will be present in the ex parte hearing.75 In general terms, 
special advocates are security-cleared lawyers appointed by the Attorney-General to 
represent the individual’s interests in ex parte hearings.76 However, the legislation 
expressly states that the special advocate is neither retained by nor responsible to the 
individual and therefore does not enter into an ordinary lawyer-client relationship.77 
Once appointed, the special advocate receives all of the open (non-sensitive) 
                                                
71 Ibid, 80.25(2); this also applies in cases where the Secretary of State has objected to a request by the 
special advocate to communicate certain information with the respondent; however certain exceptions 
apply. 
72 Ibid, 80.25(8); see also Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 4, s 
4(1)(c). 
73 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 4, s 5. 
74 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), 80.25(7). 
75 Ibid, 80.24(1)(b); Whenever a hearing is held ex parte, the Attorney-General must appoint a special 
advocate Ibid, s 80.19. 
76 Ibid, s 80.20; Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-I, 3 
April 2005) 58. “The Special Advocate examines closed passages in statements and closed documents to 
ascertain whether, for example, no possible or no real harm could arise from disclosure, or the material in 
question is already in the public domain.” This function of arguing for further disclosure is often 
overlooked, but essential. Blake J, who acted as a special advocate for 10 years before joining the bench, 
stated that he could not recall a case where no document had been removed from the non-disclosure list. 
MH and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 2524 (admin) [36] as cited 
in Eric Metcalfe, “Secret evidence” (Justice Report, June 2009) 170. 
77 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 4 s 10(4). 
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information that can be discussed with the individual. If the Home Secretary makes a 
request to suppress information, the special advocate has to be notified and provided 
with the sensitive information and any supporting material.78 In closed hearings, the 
special advocate can make submissions, adduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses, 
as well as request further disclosure.79 However, once the special advocate has been 
given access to the sensitive information, he/she is barred from discussing it with the 
individual unless the court’s permission is granted,80 which effectively precludes the 
advocate from seeking further instructions from the individual.  
The use of secret evidence in legal proceedings, subject to the appointment of special 
advocates, dates back to the establishment of the SIAC in 1997.81 The use of special 
advocates in these closed SIAC hearings followed from the ECtHR decision of 
Chahal,82 which constituted a challenge to the UK immigration authorities’ use of 
secret evidence as a basis to deport allegedly dangerous foreigners.83 The ECtHR 
upheld the challenge, noting that the use of secret evidence violated arts 5(4) (access to 
court) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) ECHR. In its reasons, the ECtHR referred to 
the special advocates scheme ‘used in Canada’ which, it observed, could guarantee both 
fairness in proceedings as well as non-disclosure of sensitive information. Although the 
Canadian regime was mischaracterised to some degree by the ECtHR,84 the British 
                                                
78 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), 80.24(2). 
79 Ibid, s 80.20. 
80 Ibid, s 80.21. 
81 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK). 
82 Chahal v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 22414/93 (15 November 1996). 
83 One particular issue was that, due to the sensitivity of the information, some courts were unable to 
review the Minister’s evidence and thus could not provide effective judicial oversight. Although in 
national security cases an advisory panel to the Home Office could be called to review the decision 
(colloquially known as the ‘Three Wise Men’), the ECtHR in Chahal v the United Kingdom held that the 
advisory panel and its procedure were not an adequate substitute for a court. The ECtHR was also critical 
of the fact that the respondent was neither afforded legal representation nor full access to the allegations 
against him: at [130]. 
84 The ECtHR most significantly failed to note that in Canada special advocates were not used in judicial 
proceedings. Rather, these special advocates appeared ad hoc before a Governmental Committee, which 
mainly reviewed the activities of the Canadian Security intelligence Services. Furthermore, Canadian 
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Government established its new regime along the lines of the Chahal decision and thus 
effectively introduced the use of secret evidence into the British court system.85  
The decision in Chahal also gave rise to the assumption that these new procedures 
would satisfy the requirements of art 6 ECHR,86 and the SIAC model subsequently 
became the blueprint for numerous procedures where the use of sensitive information 
was required.87 While early cases confirmed this assumption,88 the compatibility of the 
SIAC regime with art 6 was later successfully challenged in the courts, recognising a 
need to further develop its procedural safeguards.89 But rather than declaring the regime 
to be incompatible with the ECHR,90 English courts read down the legislation to ensure 
compatibility.91 This approach has also allowed the legislature to reproduce the 
provisions originally enacted under the CO regime in the TPIM without making 
significant changes. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
special advocates had no legal restrictions placed upon their communications with the defendants. They 
were still obliged not to disclose any of the information, but this was the advocates responsibility. For 
more detail on the Canadian system see John Ip, “The rise and spread of the special advocate” (2008) 
Winter Public Law 717, 718; Metcalfe, above n 76, 173-177; Craig Forcesse and Lorne Waldman, 
“Seeking justice in an unfair process: Lessons from Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand of 
the use of “special advocates” in national security proceedings” (Report, August, 2007) 5. 
85 See for example United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debate, House of Lords, 23 June 1997, vol 580, col 
143 (Lord Lester of Herne Hill). 
86 No violation found in earlier SIAC cases; see for example A, X and Y, & Ors v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 (25 October 2002) [57] (Lord Woolf CJ); see also 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 2007) [51]-[54] (Lord 
Hoffman), who based his whole dissent on this presumption; explanatory memorandum of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), s 7(2). 
87 Closed procedures were/are now used in more than 22 different types of proceedings, including the 
indefinite detention regime under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), the CO regime 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), as well as the TPIM under the Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK). Other tribunals using secret evidence relevant in relation to 
CT are the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (introduced 2000) or the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal (introduced 2000); see United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debate, House of Commons, 1 March 
2010, vol 506, no 47, col 739 (Mr Andrew Dismore); see also Metcalfe, above n 76, 36.  
88 See for example Rehman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 47 (11 October 
2001); Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45 (7 July 2005). 
89 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004; A 
and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] application no 3455/05 (19 February 2009) [209]. 
90 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 4. 
91 Ibid, s 3; see also above at 5.1.1. 
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7.2.1   The irreducible minimum of information 
After its introduction, the 2005 CO legislation was quickly criticised for authorising the 
use of secret evidence. In its first review for renewal, the British Parliament’s Joint 
Committee of Human Rights (JCHR) expressed concerns whether special advocates 
alone were adequate safeguards of art 6 ECHR.92 This notwithstanding, the legislation 
remained unchanged, leaving questions of compatibility with the ECHR to be 
determined by the courts.  
The fundamental importance of disclosure to the RTF has never been doubted. As Lord 
Phillips expressed: 
“The best way of producing a fair trial is to ensure that a party to it has the 
fullest information of both the allegations that are made against him and the 
evidence relied upon in support of those allegations.”93 
However, as the right to a fair trial (RFT) has never been accepted to be absolute, it was 
unclear how limitations upon the right could be sufficiently counter-balanced.  
The first case to challenge CO procedure was MB in 2006.94 MB was placed under a CO 
restricting his movement under suspicion of intending to travel to Iraq to join the fight 
against the Coalition.95 He denied the allegations and appealed to the High Court. 
Sullivan J sitting in first instance held that as there was no open evidence, not even in a 
summarised form, supporting these allegations, the claims were impossible for the 
                                                
92 Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter-terrorism policy and human rights: Draft Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2006” (12th Report of Session 2005-
06, HC 915, 14 February 2006) [76]-[78]. The Committee recommended not to renew the PTA without 
further serious debate. 
93 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[64]. 
94 Re: MB [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin) (12 April 2006). 
95 Ibid, [18]. 
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controlee to challenge effectively.96 As a result, his Honour issued a declaration of 
incompatibility under s 4 HRA, stating that s 3 PTA, which governed supervision of the 
CO by the court, was inconsistent with the RFT. As this declaration had no immediate 
effect upon the respondent’s rights, the CO remained valid,97 and Sullivan J’s ruling 
was appealed. The crucial question for the Court of Appeal (CA) was whether the 
court’s supervisory role in reviewing orders and the appointment of a special advocate 
are sufficient to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, in circumstances where all 
substantial evidence supporting the CO has been withheld from the respondent. The CA 
answered this question in the affirmative, overruling the declaration of incompatibility 
made at first instance.98 
The same issue was discussed in AF, a case where the respondent was suspected of 
associating with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.99 AF provided innocent 
explanations of how he knew certain people considered to be extremists, but could not 
address the undisclosed material that had founded the Minister’s ‘reasonable suspicion’, 
and as a result, the allegations against him. On this basis Ouseley J quashed the CO,100 
but in light of the CA ruling in MB, refrained from making a declaration of 
incompatibility, instead granting AF’s application to appeal directly to the House of 
Lords.101   
The House of Lords considered both AF and MB in a joint appeal.102 The Law Lords 
first clarified that art 6 ECHR applied to CO proceedings, but confirmed that they were 
                                                
96 Ibid, [66]-[67]. 
97 Ibid, [103]-[104]. see above at 5.1.1 on the relationship between ss 3 and 4 Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK). The disadvantage of a declaration of incompatibility is, as can be seen in this case, that the 
defendant does not receive a direct remedy. 
98 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140 (01 August 2006) [86]. 
99 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF [2007] EWHC 651 (Admin) (30 March 2007). 
100 Ibid, [131] and [176]. 
101 Administration of Justice Act 1969 (UK), s 12(3)(b). 
102 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 2007). 
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not of a criminal nature, since the court’s function was to evaluate the risk of future 
conduct, rather than judge the appellants’ past behaviour.103 Although this meant that 
neither controlee could rely on rights relating specifically to criminal trials in art 6(3) 
ECHR, they were entitled to such procedural protection “as is commensurate with the 
potential consequences.”104 With Lord Hoffman dissenting,105 the majority the House of 
Lords upheld the appeals, finding a violation of art 6 ECHR, and referred the cases back 
to the first instance for reconsideration. Rather than issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility, the majority applied s 3 HRA and read down the relevant provisions of 
the PTA 2005.106 However, the majority judges disagreed on whether proceedings could 
be fair in cases where, despite the involvement of a special advocate, the main evidence 
is withheld from the controlee.107 Delivering the leading judgment, Lord Bingham 
acknowledged the important function of the special advocate, but emphasised that the 
“task of the court in any given case is to decide, looking at the process as a whole, 
whether a procedure has been used which involved significant injustice to the controlled 
person.”108 Given that none of the substantial evidence had been disclosed, he 
considered that there had been such an injustice, violating “the very essence of the right 
to a fair hearing”.109 Lord Bingham also adopted the approach that “the concept of 
fairness imports a core, irreducible minimum of procedural protection.”110 Although not 
explicitly stated, his Lordship’s opinion implies that the presence of a special advocate 
                                                
103 Ibid, [23]-[24] (Lord Bingham); Lord Hoffman in agreement at [48]; Baroness Hale agreeing at [65]. 
104 Ibid, [24] (Lord Bingham). 
105 Lord Hoffmann held that in cases where the judge decides that disclosure is not in the public interest, 
the participation of a special advocate is sufficiently compensating of the disadvantage experienced by the 
controlee. Ibid, [51]-[55], following the Chahal decision. 
106 Ibid, [44], [70]-[72]. JCHR expressed its surprised about the decision of the House of Lords to add 
words to the statute in order to achieve compatibility. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter-
Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Eighth Report): Counter-Terrorism Bill” (9th Report of Session 
2007-08, HC 199, 7 February 2008) [46]-[47]. 
107 See in particular Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 (31 
October 2007) [74] (Baroness Hale). 
108 Ibid, [35]. 
109 Ibid, [41] (MB) and 43 (AF). 
110 Ibid, [43]. 
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does not in itself counterbalance the lack of disclosure.111 Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell 
and Lord Brown did not go this far, ruling that through the combined effort of the judge 
and the special advocate, it will usually be possible to afford the sufficient standard of 
fairness to the controlee.112 Since the judge conducting the hearing is best placed to 
evaluate the fairness of the trial, appeal courts should be hesitant to interfere with a 
decision made at first instance.113 Baroness Hale, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown 
stopped short of stating that there is a requirement under art 6 that a controlee must 
always be provided with a minimum of information.114  
Given the lack of a coherent approach by the majority of the House of Lords, the judges 
at first instance struggled to apply the law laid out in MB and AF.115 More guidance was 
needed and provided by the House of Lords in another joint appeal, including again the 
case of AF. In AF (No 3) the CA formulated the crucial question of whether in cases 
relying upon the use of secret evidence, the appointment of a special advocate may be a 
sufficient safeguard as determined by the judge, or whether a core irreducible minimum 
of evidence must always be provided to the controlee. The majority of the CA 
considered the former position to be in line with the House of Lord’s dicta in MB and 
AF and held that any assessment of fairness rests with the trial judge who must consider 
all circumstances of the case.116 
                                                
111 Ibid, [35]. Lord Bingham cites Lord Woolf in Roberts that a special advocate is “never a panacea for 
the grave disadvantages of a person affected not being aware of the case against him.” In relation to MB 
he did not engage in a discussion of whether the secret evidence was challengeable. For his Lordship the 
decisive factor was that the controlee was not even aware of the thrust of the case. Ibid, [41]. 
112 Ibid, [66] per Baroness Hale.  
113 Ibid, [67] (Baroness Hale); [86]-[87] (Lord Carswell);  
114 See in particular ibid Lord Brown at [90], who indicated that there may even be the rare occasion 
where the judge would come to the conclusion that the proceedings are fair despite no disclosure of the 
essential evidence as the evidence must be considered as unanswerable. 
115 Baroness Hale admitted herself that the opinions were “enigmatic”: Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) [100]. 
116 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and Others [2008] EWCA Civ 1148 (17 October 
2008) [64]; Sedley LJ dissenting, at [119]. 
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Two weeks before AF (No 3) came before the House of Lords, the ECtHR handed down 
its decision in A and others v the United Kingdom.117 Although this landmark case dealt 
with the legality of the indefinite detention regime in the UK,118 its scrutiny of the use 
of secret evidence against the requirements of art 6 ECHR,119 was of direct relevance to 
the House of Lords’ decisions in AF (No 3).120 The ECtHR noted that although special 
advocates provide an important safeguard, this function, however, cannot be properly 
performed unless the controlee has been “provided with sufficient information […] to 
give effective instructions to the special advocate”.121 What is considered to be 
sufficient information is a question for the individual judge, but the ECtHR clarified 
that in cases where “the open material consisted purely of general assertions” and the 
decision to detain an individual was based “solely or to a decisive degree on closed 
material, the procedural requirements of Article 5 § 4 would not be satisfied.”122 In this 
case, the ECtHR found violations of art 5(4) ECHR in relation to four out of the eleven 
applicants. 
AF (No 3) did not concern indefinite detention, but rather non-derogating COs - 
measures which fall just short of detention.123 Their Lordships followed the ECtHR 
ruling, with varying degrees of enthusiasm.124 In separate but concurring speeches, their 
                                                
117 A and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] application no 3455/05 (19 February 2009). 
118 See above at 5.1.2. 
119 The ECtHR examined the requirements of art 5(4) ECHR in relation to detention hearings, though, in 
this particular case, the Court imported the art 6 ECHR minimum guarantees applicable to criminal 
proceedings since these hearing, though civil in character, involved the severe deprivation of liberty: A 
and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] application no 3455/05 (19 February 2009) [217]. 
120 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 2(1)(a), stating that ECtHR decisions have to be taken into 
consideration; see also Aileen Kavanagh, “Special advocates, control orders and the right to a fair trial” 
(2010) 73(5) Modern Law Review 836, 843. 
121 A and others v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] application 3455/05 (19 February 2009) [220]. 
122 Ibid, [220]. For further interpretation of this aspect in the UK see AT v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] EWCA Civ 42 (07 February 2012) [47].  
123 Although Lord Phillips in AF (No 3) at [57] generally accepted a relationship between the 
requirements of fairness and of what is at stake in the trial, he did not assume that the ECtHR would make 
a distinction “when dealing with minimum of disclosure necessary for a fair trial”. 
124 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[59] (Lord Phillips); at [81] (Lord Hope); Lord Hoffmann at [70] followed the ECtHR’s decision as he 
felt obliged, although he considered the outcome as “wrong”. 
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Lordships held that the controlee must always be provided with sufficient information 
to give effective instructions to the special advocates, irrespective of how compelling 
the closed evidence might be,125 and “notwithstanding that sometimes this will be 
impossible and national security will thereby be put at risk”.126  
Judicial concerns expressed in AF (No 3) that the decision may destroy the CO 
system127 or make it unsustainable,128 have not been realised.129 That said, the 
practicality of the governing principle of a “core irreducible minimum” remains 
questionable.130 In cases, where the government must rely heavily on sensitive 
information, the minimum summary of information with which the controlee needs to 
be provided, is now known as a ‘gist’. Early reports on the process of ‘gisting’ indicated 
that the government remains reluctant to disclose information. In some cases, gisting 
has even become a strategy to provide the absolute minimum amount of information. 
Following AF (No 3) the government potentially provides less disclosure than it 
otherwise would have, only incrementally releasing further information upon judicial 
request.131  
Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the decision in AF (No 3) has been welcomed. The 
JCHR, for example, stated that the decision to increase disclosure would address some 
unfairness.132 In AF (No 3), the three COs were sent back to the High Court for 
                                                
125 Ibid, [59], (Lord Phillips). 
126 Ibid, [116] (Lord Brown). 
127 Ibid, [70]. 
128 Ibid, [87]. 
129 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, “Covert derogations and judicial deference: redefining liberty 
and due process rights in counter-terrorism law and beyond” (2011) 56(4) McGill Law Journal 863, 910. 
130 For example Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 
June 2009) [85] (Lord Hope); [106] (Baroness Hale). 
131 Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): 
Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010” (9th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 395, 26 
February 2010) [50]-[53]. 
132 Ibid, [53], 
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reconsideration,133 with the government further reviewing several others and, in some 
cases, the orders were revoked on the ground that the supporting information could not 
be disclosed.134 The effect of AF (No 3) has been that in disclosure cases, the focus has 
shifted away from determining which principle must be applied, considering now how 
to apply those principles. As these are predominantly questions for the trial judge,135 
few cases have been reviewed on appeal since AF (No 3).136 As the next Section reveals, 
expert opinions on the effectiveness of special advocates as a means of safeguarding the 
rights of the controlee are divided. 
 
7.2.2   The use of special advocates and their effectiveness 
Since their introduction in SIAC proceedings, special advocates have become the 
principal safeguard of the RTF, justifying the use of closed procedures and secret 
evidence in the UK. Their presence in these proceedings is intended to counterbalance 
any disadvantage that flows from excluding the controlee from the closed hearing, and 
to ensure that the fairness of the proceeding is not unduly compromised. The use of 
special advocates however is not beyond controversy.137 In December 2004, Ian 
MacDonald QC resigned as a special advocate, describing his role as providing:  
                                                
133 AF and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[69]. 
134 This included revoking one of the COs in AF (No 3): Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–
Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 
2010” (9th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 395, 26 February 2010) [25]-[27]. 
135 And the trial judge is in the best position to consider the necessary extent of disclosure; see Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) [121] (Lord 
Brown]. 
136 See for example AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 42 (07 February 
2012); BM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 366 (05 April 2011); 
Mohamed (formerly CC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] 1 WLR 4240 (2 May 
2014). 
137 See for example Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 
28 days, intercept and post-charge questioning” (19th Report of Session 2006-07, HC 394, 30 July 2007) 
[210]. 
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“ […] a fig leaf of respectability and a false legitimacy to indefinite detention 
without knowledge of the accusations being made and without any kind of 
criminal charge or trial.”138 
There are several limitations inherent within this system, including the fact that special 
advocates do not act on behalf of the individual, and are barred from contacting the 
individual after they have been given access to the sensitive information. The use of 
special advocates also raises ethical concerns as they are “acting in a way hitherto 
unknown to the legal profession”,139 interfering with the conventional relationship 
between lawyer-client, where the lawyer is guided by, and acts in accordance with, 
client instructions.140 Special advocates themselves have raised concerns relating to the 
challenges of their role, airing some of these grievances in public statements and in 
testimonies before Parliamentary Committees.141 As a result, special advocates now 
receive administrative support,142 are able to call their own witnesses, make submissions 
and adduce evidence.143 In certain situations, they may even communicate with the 
controlee after judicial permission has been granted in consultation with the Home 
Secretary.144 The Court’s conclusion in AF (No 3) that the appointment of a special 
advocate, without more, would not necessarily counter-balance any unfairness has been 
                                                
138 Ian MacDonald QC, “Police State?” (2005) 3 Counsel 16, 17. 
139 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 150. 
140 This difficulty facing the special advocate is particularly apparent in cases involving secret intercept 
evidence or witness testimony, where the defendant may be best person, or indeed the only person, who is 
in a position to comment, explain or refute incriminating inferences drawn from that material.. 
141 Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-II, 3 April 2005) Ev 2 
(Neil Garnham QC); Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-
I, 3 April 2005) [52]. 
142 For example Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-I, 3 
April 2005) [97]; A Secretariat has been introduced to support the special advocates in their work. The 
Special Advocates Support Office, located in the Treasury Solicitor’s Department, helps with 
administrative as well as legal matters. All staff working in that Office are security cleared and thus able 
to examine the sensitive information. 
143 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), s 80.20. 
144 Ibid, s 80.21. 
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crucial in supporting these ‘concessions’. The Court also cautioned that, despite their 
important functions, the effectiveness of special advocates should not be 
overestimated.145 
While the system of special advocates has improved, it is far from perfect and the 
changes made to date, have arguably not gone far enough in resolving the main 
concerns. Although special advocates may seek permission to communicate with the 
controlee after having accessed sensitive information, it seems that the more relevant 
the information, the less likely it is that permission will be granted due to the higher 
risks associated with disclosure.146 Furthermore, any application by a special advocate 
to the court to communicate with the defendant on a particular topic would reveal to the 
government, whose representative would be present in such a hearing, any defence 
strategy. Despite recommendations by the JCHR,147 the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee,148 and the Independent Monitor of the UK Terrorism Legislation149 further 
relaxation of the communication restriction has not been considered.  
Furthermore, a special advocate’s ability to adduce evidence and call witnesses has 
brought little improvement in practice,150 due to the difficulty of locating suitable 
witnesses with the necessary security clearance. In cases where the witness has been 
security-vetted, their independence from the government and therefore their value to the 
                                                
145 Baroness Hale admitted in AF (No 3) that she had previously, and in particular in MB, overestimated 
the capabilities of special advocates in ex parte CO hearings; see Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) [101], [104]-[106]. 
146 Metcalfe, above n 76, 195. 
147 Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): 
Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010” (9th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 395, 26 
February 2010) [72]. 
148 Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-I, 3 April 2005) [86]. 
149 David Anderson QC, “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013” (Second report of 
the Independent Reviewer on the operation of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011, March 2014) 58 (Recommendation 10). 
150 Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): 
Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010” (9th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 395, 26 
February 2010) [57]. 
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defence case may be questionable.151 This makes it virtually impossible for special 
advocates to have access to independent experts.152 Intelligence Officers, on the other 
hand are treated as experts in their field, always available to strengthen the 
government’s case.153 This inequality of arms constitutes an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to successfully challenging government evidence in closed proceedings.154 
Overall, opinions are divided as to the effectiveness of the regime. While there are 
positive voices pointing to the achievements and usefulness of special advocates,155 
including their vital role in achieving a proportionate approach to protecting the various 
interests,156 some reject the use of special advocates altogether. Critics argue that their 
appointment creates an illusion of fairness, incapable of being maintained in reality. In 
Roberts v Parole Board, Lord Steyn stated: 
“It is not to the point to say that the special advocate procedure is "better than 
nothing". Taken as a whole, the procedure completely lacks the essential 
characteristics of a fair hearing. It is important not to pussyfoot about such a 
                                                
151 Martin Chamberlain, “Special advocates and procedural fairness in closed proceedings” (2009) 28(3) 
Civil Justice Quarterly 314, 319 
152 Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-II, 3 April 2005) [75] 
and [87]; Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth 
Report): Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010” (9th Report of Session 2009-10, HC 395, 
26 February 2010) [54] and [57]; see also Anderson, above n 149, 58 (Recommendation 10). 
153 See above at 3.2.1.2. 
154 Chamberlain, above n 151, 320; Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Counter–Terrorism Policy and 
Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): Annual Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010” (9th Report of 
Session 2009-10, HC 395, 26 February 2010) [57]. 
155 AHK and others v SSHD [2012] EWHC 1117 Admin (2 May 2012) [44], [78]; see also Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v AR & Ors [2008] EWHC 2789 (Admin) (14 November 2008) [3]; A, X 
and Y, & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 (25 October 2002) 
[89] (Brooke LJ). 
156 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 1 SCR 350, 398 citing Kent Roach, “Ten 
ways to improve Canadian anti-terrorism law” (2006) 51 Criminal  Law Quarterly 102, 120; See also 
Kent Roach, “Secret evidence and its alternatives” in Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the state of 
permanent legal emergency: security and human rights in counter terrorism (Springer, 2012) 179, 198. 
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fundamental matter: the special advocate procedure undermines the very essence 
of elementary justice. It involves a phantom hearing only.”157 
Lord Steyn’s position, while highly principled, is impractical as secret evidence 
continues to be used, and an outright rejection of the use of special advocates seems 
unproductive, and ultimately self-defeating. The better position, I would submit, is that 
the effectiveness of special advocates should be measured against what they can 
realistically deliver, and on this approach, special advocates have a positive influence 
on the level of fairness in closed proceedings. Although there is much scope for 
improvement,158 it seems that there is limited political will in the UK to improve the 
existing system,159 which is particularly regrettable given that the use of closed hearings 
is constantly increasing.160 
 
7.2.3   Rules of evidence in closed hearings 
As mentioned earlier, due to their civil nature, CO-type proceedings are not bound by 
the strict rules of evidence that would apply in criminal trials, presenting further 
challenges for special advocates in closed hearings. Much of the classifed information 
that can be relied upon in closed proceedings would not be sufficiently reliable to 
adduce in criminal proceedings.161 Deviations from the ordinary rules of evidence are 
                                                
157 Roberts v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45 (7 July 2005) [88] (Lord Steyn). 
158 See below at 8.2.4.1. 
159 Home Office, “The Government response to the Report by David Anderson QC on Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013” (December 2014). 
160 Now used in more than 22 different types of proceedings: see United Kingdom, Parliamentary 
Debate, House of Commons, 1 March 2010, vol 506, no 47, col 739 (Mr Andrew Dismore). A discussion 
of the spread of secret hearings and special advocates is beyond the scope of this thesis. See Angus 
McCullough et al, “Response to consultation” (Collective response to the “Justice and Security Green 
Paper” from special advocates, 2011). 
161 These concerns can be overstated, since there has been extensive reform and increasing number of 
statutory exceptions to the common law rules of evidence in criminal proceedings.  
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expressly permitted by legislation, including the admission of intercept evidence,162 as 
well as hearsay evidence.163 Hence, the usual assumptions around unreliability are to a 
certain extent displaced or at least neglected, blurring the line in CO proceedings 
between decisions based on suspicion and those requiring proof.164 
The use of intelligence can have further ramifications. In cases where information stems 
from foreign intelligence agencies, it is sometimes difficult to determine the real 
source.165 In the UK, the use of foreign intelligence led to controversy when it was 
revealed that some information relied upon in closed hearings may have been obtained 
through torture or inhuman treatment.166 Of course, the issue of evidence obtained by 
torture or inhuman treatment is not new in the UK, having arisen in the context of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland. The Diplock courts in terrorism cases (sitting without 
juries) relied heavily on confessions, though the common law still required the 
prosecution to demonstrate that the making of the confession had been voluntary.167 
Section 6 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (UK) modified the 
common law by allowing the admission of any statements by the accused (including 
                                                
162 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), s 18(1)(dd), as amended by Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK), sch 7, s 4. 
163  Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK), s 80.22(1), displacing part 33 of the Rules; this may even concern 
the use of second or third-hand hearsay evidence; see Metcalfe, above n 76, 51. 
164 See above at 3.3. 
165 The involvement of foreign intelligence agencies in securing this information may of course provide 
the grounds for non-disclosure. Foreign agencies in order to protect their sources and methods of 
intelligence will only provide information under the condition that these will not be disclosed. This is 
referred to as the control principle. See for example R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 (10 February 2010) [5] 
166 This concerned mainly intelligence services from countries where the use of torture was known. 
However, there were equally allegations of MI6 being involved in such interrogations. See Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, “Allegations of UK complicity in torture” (23rd Report of Session 2008-09, 
HL Paper 152/HC 230, 4 August 2009); see also Ian Cobain, “Tony Blair knew of secret policy on terror 
interrogations” (The Guardian, 18 June 2009). Cobain and Karim, “UK linked to notorious Bangladesh 
torture centre.” (The Guardian, 17 January 2011). 
167 Diplock Commission, Report of the Commission to consider legal proceedings to deal with terrorist 
activities in Northern Ireland (Cmnd. 5185, 1972) Para 87 as cited in John Jackson and Sean Doran, “ 
Conventional trials in unconventional times: the Diplock Court experience”, (1993) 4(3) Criminal Law 
Forum 506. 
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confessions) in criminal proceedings for scheduled offences.168 In addition the section 
clarified that the court was not excluding these statements, unless the defence could 
point to evidence, prima facie, that their statement had been made under conditions of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.169 Where the prima facie threshold was met, 
the onus then shifted to the prosecution to establish the voluntary nature of the 
confession beyond reasonable doubt.170 While these reforms to the rules of evidence 
were enacted in the context of terrorism prosecutions, it reveals that the UK had been 
prepared to risk relying upon evidence that may have been tainted by torture or inhuman 
treatment.  
In the current context, the SIAC began to hear and admit such ‘tainted’ evidence, 
though it conceded that the weight attached to the evidence would need to be adjusted in 
light of the circumstances in which it was obtained.171 Rejecting this approach, the 
House of Lords unanimously held that evidence obtained through torture or inhumane 
treatment could never be heard.172 However, its ruling did not alter the burden of proof, 
which rests upon the party claiming that the evidence was obtained by torture. 
Requiring the controlee to discharge this burden seems inappropriate in closed hearings, 
                                                
168 Scheduled offences are those terrorism offences listed in the Schedule 4 of the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (UK). See also People v Coffey, 39 LRNS, 704, 706 (1911). 
169 In the US context, Miranda v Arizona [1966] USSC 143 (13 June 1966) [71] emphasised that a 
statement made by a defendant without the presence of a lawyer, the burden lies with the prosecution to 
prove that the statement was made freely. 
170 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (UK), s 6(1)(2). See also generally Steven Greer, 
“The admissibility of confessions under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978” (1980) 
31 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 205. The provision was transferred into s 76 Terrorism Act 2000 
(UK). However, as located in Part VII, it is only applicable to Northern Ireland. 
171 Ajouaou and A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKSIAC 1/2002 (29 
October 2003) [81]; under particular circumstance the weight of the evidence could even be reduced to 
nil. SIAC argued that it was not a criminal court and only required to assess reasonable grounds for 
suspicion  
172 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 (8 December 2005) [51] 
(Lord Bingham). In English law, the process of securing confession by torture was abolished along with 
the Star Chamber, with its prohibition recognised under common law, art 3 ECHR and the UN 
Convention Against Torture (CAT), to which the UK is a party. However the CAT is not directly 
incorporated into UK law as it has been considered as sufficiently protected by the common law. In 
particular art 15 CAT states that statements made as a result of torture shall not be admitted as evidence 
in any proceedings. 
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where the individual may be unaware of the source, the circumstances and even the 
exact content of a statement.173 Nonetheless, the House of Lords maintained that 
evidence is admissible, unless the SIAC is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that 
it had been obtained by way of torture.174 Although it is the pronounced policy of the 
Home Secretary not to use evidence allegedly obtained by torture,175 the issue has 
highlighted the difficulties associated with secret evidence and the limitations of special 
advocates.  
 
7.2.4   Judicial level of scrutiny 
The difficulties with the lower standards of evidence applied in such special hearings 
are also related to the judge’s role in both scrutinising the evidence and determining 
how much disclosure is necessary to comply with art 6 ECHR as required by AF (No 3). 
In hearings where proceedings are largely one-sided, fairness will crucially depend on 
judicial involvement. Generally, when it comes to the human right compatibility of 
counter-terrorism measures, UK judges – with a tailwind from the ECtHR – have 
largely stood up to the challenge and resisted temptations to defer to the government 
over security matters.176 This marks to some extent a break with the past and traditional 
judicial behaviour. The Law Lords have now taken on a dual role of not only upholding 
the security of the population, but also of protecting the liberties of individuals.177 Their 
Lordships’ references to the HRA have made it clear that they are not engaging in 
                                                
173 Ibid, [55], [59] (Lord Bingham). 
174 Ibid, [121] (Lord Hope). 
175 Home Office (UK), The Government Reply to the twenty-third Report of the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights 2008-09 (Cm 7714, October 2009) 3. 
176 See for example Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 129, 863; cf Cian Murphy, “Counter-terrorism and 
the culture of legality: the case of special advocates” (2013) 24(1) King’s Law Journal 19. 
177 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[76] (Lord Hope). 
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political judgments on the wisdom of counter-terrorism policies, but are rather carrying 
out their strict judicial function of scrutinising proceedings according to law.  
The courts have described in abstracto what a core irreducible minimum of procedural 
fairness requires in the context of secret evidence in counter-terrorism proceedings. 
However, these descriptions do not clarify the extent to which the court in a particular 
case is capable and willing to scrutinise the reliability of the intelligence. Judges 
regularly point to the expertise of the executive in matters of national security.178 
Expressing a more nuanced view, Lord Bingham accepted that while great weight must 
be given to the executive, the more political the matter, the more deference is owed to 
the executive.179 The judicial preparedness to scrutinise intelligence assumes less 
importance in the context of a lowered standard of proof: the government need only 
establish that the Minister’s suspicion (not belief) is reasonable, which limits judicial 
intervention to cases where the decision is “obviously flawed”.180 This lowered 
threshold of proof prompted Lord Phillips’ concern that  
“[r]easonable suspicion may be established on grounds that establish an 
overwhelming case of involvement in terrorism-related activity but, because the 
threshold is so low, reasonable suspicion may also be founded on 
misinterpretation of facts in respect of which the controlee is in a position to put 
forward an innocent explanation. A system that relies upon the judge to 
                                                
178 See for example Rehman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 47 (11 October 
2001) [31] (Lord Steyn); [62] (Lord Hoffmann). 
179 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004) 
[29]. 
180 Terrorism Prevention and Investigoation Measures Act 2011 (UK), s 6(3)(6)(7); so far there is no 
evidence that a court has ever rejected a Minster’s request. See Walker, above n 18, 162. 
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distinguish between the two is not satisfactory, however able and experienced 
the judge.”181 
This concern has now been partially addressed by raising the standard of proof in 
establishing whether an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity 
to the civil standard of ‘balance of probabilities’.182 The amendment is certainly an 
important step towards improving procedural fairness, and increasing the scope for 
more robust judicial scrutiny of TPIM decisions. However, in establishing whether 
measures are necessary to prevent future risks to the public, the standard of proof is still 
a reasonable belief.  
 
7.2.5   Conclusion 
In the UK, the legal principles governing the use of secret evidence in quasi-criminal 
proceedings have been reasonably settled as a result of the AF (No 3) decision.183 The 
starting point, as in criminal proceedings, is the importance of respecting the 
individual’s RFT. This right however is not absolute and both the threat of terrorism 
and the need for secrecy are accepted justifications for imposing restrictions on access 
to information that disturb the usual informational equilibrium required by the ‘equality 
of arms’ principle. However, any limitations to the RFT must be ‘compensated’ as far 
as possible to achieve the minimum of level of fairness required by art 6 ECHR.To meet 
this threshold in CO hearings, the proceedings require the involvement of a special 
                                                
181 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009 
[63] (Lord Phillips). The statement was still in relation to the CO regime, where the standards was still a 
reasonable suspicion, but amendment to a reasonable belief under the TPIM regime seem insignificant in 
practice.  
182 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (UK), s 20(1). 
183 However, the use of secret evidence in civil proceedings - now regulated by the Justice and Security 
Act 2013 (UK) - is still ongoing.  
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advocate, judicial supervision, and that the controlee is provided with a ‘gist’ of the 
evidence, sufficient to inform the controlee of the main reasons for imposing a TPIM.  
The cases discussed above demonstrate that the courts have played an important role in 
defining the scope of the RFT.184 With the HRA, the UK courts have gained a statutory 
reference point against which they can directly apply and develop common law 
constitutional values. Despite acknowledging the executive’s expertise in the area of 
national security, courts have expressly reserved, and at times exercised, their power to 
review the decisions of the executive.185 This development was also accompanied by 
minor policy changes. Compared to the measures available under the repealed CO 
legislation, TPIMS are more restrained in scope, avoiding some of the more intrusive 
measures that were previously available. In addition, the recent amendment to raise the 
burden of proof constituted an important step to improving procedural fairness, 
indicating that TPIMs are designed to be more proportionate in their approach. 
However, once secret evidence is used, the fairness of the trial is still heavily dependant 
upon both the effectiveness of the special advocate system and the willingness and 
capability of the courts to meaningfully review and scrutinise intelligence. The 
importance of these safeguards must be seen in light of the ruling in AF (No 3) which 
has unintentionally encouraged the government to provide the defence with no more 
than the minimum threshold of information, rather than disclosing as much information 
as possible. 
  
                                                
184 Adam Tomkins, “National security and the role of the court: a changed landscape?” (2010) 126 
(October) Law Quarterly Review 543; Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 129, 916. 
185 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140 (1 August 2006) [48]. 
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7.3   Secret evidence in Australian control order hearings 
In Australia, the CO regime allows for the suppression and admission of sensitive 
information to varying degrees at both the interim and confirmation stages. This can 
happen either in accordance with the provisions as set out by the CO legislation or by 
applying the provision of the NSIA. However, there is still some uncertainty as to the 
extent to which secret evidence can be used, and its impact upon the character of 
proceedings. In particular, the question arises whether CO proceedings are, or perhaps 
are required to be, adversarial in nature. In the absence of a bill of rights, courts are not 
able to read fairness guarantees into the CO legislation. The only remedy available to 
the courts is to rule that the legislation infringes the separation of powers inherent 
within Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution.186  
The constitutionality of the CO regime was challenged in Thomas and eventually 
upheld by the High Court. However, the suppression and use of sensitive information 
was only indirectly addressed. The Court held that issuing a CO was a judicial function, 
and that provisions in the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) (CC) did not authorise courts to act 
in a non-judicial manner, including the ex parte hearing. Gleeson CJ clarified that 
although “particular information is not made available to the subject of a CO or his/her 
lawyers”, the case before the Court was not about particular aspects of procedural 
fairness.187 Rather, such questions must be decided in the context of the particular facts. 
It is noteworthy that the decision in Thomas only determined the constitutionality of the 
interim stage of the CO regime, and not the confirmation stage.188 However, the 
majority implied that the regime has to be regarded as one set of proceedings. 
Limitations may be acceptable at the interim stage bearing in mind higher standards of 
                                                
186 See above at 5.2.1. 
187 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 335 (Gleeson CJ). 
188 Ibid, 358. 
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procedural fairness applied at the confirmation stage, 189 which indicated that the 
majority judges did not anticipate any claims of unconstitutionality to arise at this later 
stage. However, no Australian CO authority has conclusively clarified at which stages, 
and to what extent, secret evidence can be used. One of the reasons is that in neither of 
the published cases sensitive information emerged as an issue, since in both cases 
significant amounts of information had already been revealed in the respective previous 
legal proceedings.190 And also in the more recent four CO cases, it has also been 
reported that no information has been withheld from the controlees.191  
The next Section sets out the various stages at which sensitive information can be 
withheld from the controlee, focusing on the confirmation stage in order to assess the 
overall standing of the controlee. Given the dearth of CO cases in Australia, 
comparisons will be drawn from Australian serious crime order regimes, which allow 
the suppression of criminal intelligence at a state level.192  
 
7.3.1   The use and suppression of sensitive information in CO proceedings 
The interim hearing  
The first step in requesting an interim CO (iCO) requires the senior Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) member to obtain written consent of the Attorney–General. Attached to 
this application must be all relevant information, both in favour and against the iCO, as 
                                                
189 Ibid, 335 (Gleeson CJ). 
190 In Thomas the AFP relied on the interrogations records conducted in Pakistan, which had been 
declared inadmissible during his criminal trial: ibid. In Hicks the AFP relied predominantly on letters 
Hicks wrote to his family, while training in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Jabbour v Hicks [2008] FMCA 
178 (19 February 2008). 
191 Roger Gyles, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into control order 
safeguards: Part 1” (29 January 2016) 4. 
192 Comparisons drawn with serious and organized crime legislation must take account of the different 
constitutional frameworks at state and federal level. For a more detailed explanation see below at 7.3.2. 
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well as a draft of the proposed restrictions on the controlee.193 However, s 104.2(3A) 
CC makes it clear that the summary of the grounds in this draft request need not include 
any information that is likely to prejudice national security within the meaning of the 
NSIA. If the Attorney–General consents, the senior AFP member can then make a 
request to the issuing court to grant an iCO,194 again attaching the relevant information 
and draft request as amended by the Attorney-General.195  The issuing court must 
consider the information received and may even request further information196 in order 
to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the ground claimed in the request has 
been met,197 and that the measures requested are reasonably necessary and 
appropriate.198  
The decision to issue an iCO is made ex parte.199 The issuing court is only obliged to 
include a summary of grounds for its decisions to the controlee.200 However, the Code 
clarifies – again – that the summary does not require any information to be included if it 
is likely to prejudice national security.201 Hence, the court can rely on sensitive 
information when issuing an iCO without revealing this information to the controlee. 
This can create a situation where a controlee is subjected to a coercive measure without 
having been provided with any real justification.  
                                                
193 Exceptions apply in urgent cases, see Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.6. 
194 According to the definition section of Part 5.3 (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 100.1) an “issuing 
court means: (a) the Federal Court of Australia; or (b) the Family Court of Australia; or (c) the Federal 
Circuit Court of Australia.”  
195 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.3. 
196 Cf Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 418 (KirbyJ). 
197 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.4(1)(c); 
198 Ibid, s 104.4(1)(d); 
199 The legislation does not expressly specify these are ex parte hearings. See Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 
233 CLR 307, 338 (Gummow and Crennan JJ) and 371 (Kirby J); however, David Hicks was actually 
notified of the iCO hearing, but chose not to adduce evidence that would challenge the claim that such an 
order was necessary to substantially assist in preventing a terrorist attack. The iCO must be personally 
served by an AFP member and its terms explained to the controlee before it takes effect and is legally 
binding: see Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.12. 
200 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.5(1)(h). 
201 Ibid, s 104.5(2A); “likely to prejudice national security” has to be understood within the meaning of 
the NSI Act, which as mentioned above has a very broad meaning. See above at 6.2.3.2. 
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The process of issuing an iCO is driven exclusively by one party, the senior AFP 
member, which deviates from the usual principle of adversariness applied in civil 
proceedings. In Thomas the use of ex parte proceedings to issue the iCO was justified 
by the urgency of the situation, as well as the fact that the iCO was a merely ‘stop-gap’ 
measure prior to the confirmation hearing. This later hearing, being inter partes, would 
then offer the controlee sufficient opportunities to contest the evidence.202 Importantly, 
the majority also found that the judge at all times during the interim stage retained 
discretion in deciding what information must be included in the summary of grounds.203 
However, the question of whether the controlee was sufficiently informed to fairly 
contest the order was not raised in the case. Kirby J in his dissent in Thomas found the 
iCO process to be unconstitutional. He reasoned that the sensitive information adduced 
by the AFP and relied upon by the court had not been made available to the controlee, 
and could not therefore be challenged.204 In these circumstances, Kirby J considered 
that the issuing court was merely acting as a “rubber stamp” of the government.205 
Unlike the majority, Kirby J did not view the provisional nature of the iCO decision as 
justification for derogating from the usual requirements of fairness.  
 
The confirmation hearing  
The legislation requires a confirmation hearing to be held as soon as practical to issues a 
formal CO. For this to occur, the senior AFP member must notify the court as well as 
the controlee of their intention to proceed to a hearing. At this stage the controlee must 
be given the documents, as presented to the Attorney-General, setting out the reasons 
                                                
202 For example Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 335 (Gleeson CJ); 355 (Gummow and 
Crennan JJ). 
203 For example ibid, 335 (Gleeson CJ). 
204 Ibid, 436. 
205 Ibid. 
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for and against issuing the order and the necessity to impose any specific conditions.206  
Furthermore, the controlee must be informed about “any other details required to enable 
the person to understand and respond to the substance of the facts, matters and 
circumstances which will form the basis of the confirmation of the order”.207 However, 
the legislation expressly permits information to be suppressed from the controlee where 
it is likely to prejudice national security.208 
The requirement to provide the controlee with these details can be compared to the 
introduction of ‘gisting’ in AF (No 3).209 But unlike the UK position, the Australian 
legislation does not require the government to disclose to the controlee a core 
irreducible minimum of information.210 Consequently, if the CO is based on sensitive 
information, the controlee will not know the case against him/her in its entirety, or, 
perhaps, at all.211 This would seriously impair the controlee’s ability to meet the case, 
and therefore constitutes a severe deviation from the standard of fairness applied in 
criminal proceedings.212 Although the controlee and his/her legal representative can 
adduce evidence and make submissions during the confirmation hearing,213 the 
                                                
206 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.12A (2)(ii). 
207 Ibid, s 104.12A (2)(iii) (emphasis added). 
208 Ibid, s 104.12A (3). The section goes even further in clarifying the scope by including information that 
is likely:  
“(a) to prejudice national security (within the meaning of the 
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004); or 
(b) to be protected by public interest immunity; or 
(c) to put at risk ongoing operations by law enforcement agencies or intelligence agencies; or 
(d) to put at risk the safety of the community, law enforcement officers or intelligence officers.” 
[This kind of clarification is of course more or less redundant, as paragraphs (b) to (c) could all be 
subsumed under paragraph (a).] 
209 See above at 7.2.1. 
210 See Tamara Tulich, “Adversarial intelligence? Control orders, TPIMs and secret evidence in Australia 
and the United Kingdom” (2012) 12(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 341, 359. 
211 This seems also be the understanding of the COAG Review, which recommended the introduction of 
clause requiring a minimum amount of information to enable an effective defence. Council of Australian 
Governments, “Review of counter-terrorism legislation” (Final Report, 2013) [233]-[235] 
(Recommendation 31). 
212 Burton and Williams, above n 18, 199 mention that this deviates from the common law rule to be 
informed about the case citing Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 and Jarratt v Commissioner of Police 
(NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 44. 
213 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.14(1). 
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legislation provides that the absence of such representation is not a hindrance for 
confirming the CO.214 
 
Limitations to the adversarial character of the confirmation hearing 
While at the stage of issuing an iCO, the AFP may choose to suppress sensitive 
information upon which the court may rely, the legislation does not expressly authorise 
its use at the confirmation stage.215 The lack of such authorisation, combined with the 
requirement that the AFP provide additional information at this later stage, implies that 
the confirmation hearing was intended by the legislature to be fully adversarial. Such an 
implication would bring the hearing into conformity with the process of administrative 
hearings in general, where decisions can only be based on evidence produced in court. 
Drawing on broader fairness arguments, the dicta in Thomas suggests that the 
confirmation hearing will ‘compensate’ for any disadvantage suffered by the controlee 
where secret evidence has been used at the interim stage.216 
There are strong arguments to suggest that the confirmation hearing should be fully 
adversarial,217 though such a perception is challenged by (a) the potential ‘spill over’ of 
                                                
214 Ibid, s 104.14(4); this is the case as long as the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the 
order has been served correctly. 
215 Lacking a statutory authorisation, the UK case of Al Rawi may become relevant, in which the Supreme 
Court held that a court cannot itself introduce a scheme for secret evidence under the common law. See Al 
Rawi & Ors v Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34 (13 July 2011). Given that the decision was based 
on the common law and not on the HRA, it is very likely that the High Court would pay attention to that 
case. An essential feature of the common law trial (both civil and criminal) is that the party know the case 
against him or her and be able to cross-examine opposing witnesses. This is based on the principle of 
natural justice. See ibid, [12]-[13] (Lord Dyson). Although it was held that the courts possess the inherent 
power to regulate their own proceedings and develop procedural rules, there were no sufficient reasons to 
introduce a closed material procedure. As a consequence the UK Parliament introduced the Justice and 
Security Act 2013 [UK]. See Adam Tomkins, “Justice and security in the United Kingdom” (2014) 47(3) 
Israel Law Review 305. 
216 See for example Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 335 (Gleeson CJ); 355 (Gummow and 
Crennan JJ). 
217 As already mentioned above, the High Court in Thomas avoided ruling on the constitutionality of 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.12A(3), which sets out the amount of information that must be 
provided to the controlee before the confirmation hearing. The Chief Justice explained that the case was 
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secret evidence from the interim stage; (b) the use of redacted documents and 
summaries under the NSIA; and (c) the high level of judicial deference likely to be 
given to executive assessments of security risks based on intelligence.  
(a) The potential ‘spill over’ of secret evidence from the interim stage  
When confirming or amending an iCO, the legislation requires the judge to take the 
original interim application into account,218 which need not have been shared with the 
controlee.219 This raises the following questions:   
• To what extent should secret information from the interim stage be taken into 
consideration in the confirmation hearing?  
• Is there an obligation for the judge to bring previously secret information to the 
attention of the controlee before it can be relied upon?  
In an academic comment, Tulich interpreted the requirement to consider the original 
application at the confirmation stage as a way in which “the Criminal Code facilitates 
reliance upon secret evidence in the confirmation of a control order.”220 But even if the 
requirement is read in the more favourable way to the controlee that only disclosed 
information from the original application can be taken into account, in practice the 
controlee may still be disadvantaged, as the provision must be read in the context of 
civil procedure. Here the trier of fact is the judge, who had originally received the secret 
evidence during the interim hearing, and it seems unconvincing that this would not 
operate as an influence on the judge’s final assessment. Members of the judiciary are 
certainly trained and accustomed to consider facts and arguments selectively, but the 
requirements for the judges to assess national security risks and the relatively low 
                                                                                                                                          
not about procedural fairness, as these requirements must be decided in the particular circumstances of 
the case.  
218 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 104.14 (3)(a). 
219 Ibid, s 104.12A (3). 
220 Tulich, above n 210, 359. 
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standard of proof would make it difficult for a judge to determine precisely which facts 
have informed his/her final assessment.   
(b) The use of redacted documents and summaries under the NSIA  
The government may also suppress information or rely upon secret information in CO 
proceedings, by notifying the court and the controlee that the NSIA shall apply to the 
confirmation CO hearing. While the NSIA applies to both civil and criminal 
proceedings in broadly similar terms,221 the provisions differ in relation to the balancing 
exercise. Rather than considering whether the suppression or partial use of sensitive 
information would have “a substantial adverse effect on the defendant’s right to receive 
a fair trial”, in civil proceedings the judge must consider whether there would be “a 
substantial adverse effect on the substantive hearing.”222 This altered wording implies 
that a lower standard of fairness is acceptable in civil proceedings. Furthermore, it is 
likely that, consistent with the ruling in Lodhi,223 the provisions are not to be understood 
as limiting the court’s inherent jurisdiction to determine the fairness of the hearing.224 In 
light of the alternate balancing exercise, the AFP would be permitted to adduce redacted 
documents, summaries of facts and statements relating to the sensitive information. This 
is where the full force of the NSIA is revealed. In the previous Chapter it was argued 
that in criminal proceedings such evidence may have limited forensic value since it may 
not convince a jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in 
proceedings with a lower civil standard of proof, where the judge is the trier of fact, 
such edited evidence could reasonably persuade the court to confirm a CO. This again 
                                                
221 For a general discussion about the working of the NSIA see above at 6.2.3.2. 
222 NSIA, s 38L(7)(b). 
223 See discussion above at 6.2.3.3. 
224 See also Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) 
and Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 82 ALJR 454 (7 February 2008) 
discussed below at 7.3.2. 
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means that a CO could be based on information that is unavailable to and thus difficult 
to challenge by the controlee. 
(c) Judicial deference 
Finally, there is concern as to whether judges are capable of assessing and dealing with 
risks effectively. In Thomas, Gleeson CJ addressed these concerns, drawing attention to 
similar risk assessments routinely undertaken by judges to deny bail or issue 
apprehended violence orders. Although acknowledging these to be imperfect 
analogies,225  Gleeson CJ considered the involvement of judges in this task was “good 
thing”, pointing to the traditional judicial role in protecting individual rights, and acting 
impartially and independently, in situations where the liberty of individuals are 
affected.226  
However, the perceived benefits of impartiality depend upon the courts’ ability to 
meaningfully scrutinise the evidence brought before them. As Kirby J noted in his 
dissent, involving the judiciary in this risk assessment “becomes a bad thing if the 
powers are granted in vague and inappropriate terms.”227 It can even become “a very 
bad thing if the judge concerned is required to act in exceptional ways in private and 
subject to constraints not normal or proper to the judicial office.”228 Both dissenters, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ, claimed that it was not part of the court’s normal function “to 
determine what is reasonably necessary for the protection of the public”,229 but rather a 
function of the executive or legislature, since such assessments require the expert 
prediction of risk based on police and intelligence work - a framework that does not 
                                                
225 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 128-29. In Thomas the question was dealt with in relation to 
whether issuing a CO is a judicial function or not. See also Andrew Lynch and Alexander Reilly, “The 
constitutional validity of terrorism orders of control and preventative detention” (2007) 10 Flinders 
Journal of Law Reform 105; and Lynch, above n 18, 172. 
226 Ibid, 329. 
227 Ibid, 437. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid, 417 (Kirby J), (emphasis in original); ibid, 468 (Hayne J). 
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provide the judge with clear legal standards to apply. Hayne J discussed the issue in 
depth, pointing out that when judges are required to predict future outcomes, they make 
use of expert evidence.  
“Intelligence information, gathered by government agencies, presents radically 
different problems. Rarely, if ever, would it be information about which expert 
evidence, independent of the relevant government agency, could be adduced. In 
cases where it could not be tested in that way (and such cases would be the norm 
rather than the exception) the court, and any party against whose interests the 
information was to be provided, would be left with little practical choice except 
to act upon the view that was proffered by the relevant agency.”230 
The fact that the court’s only choice, practically speaking, is to defer to the executive 
damages the appearance of impartiality.  
Although the majority in Thomas found that courts can issue COs as a legitimate 
exercise of judicial power, the dilemmas presented to the courts set out by Hayne J are 
real, and continue to challenge how judges can be expected meaningfully to scrutinise 
sensitive information. Put bluntly, even though judges can issue COs, does not mean 
that they will be any good at it. In the context of CO proceedings, there is a concern that 
judges tend to defer to the government’s request even though they may not have seen all 
the information. The same is true in the case of edited evidence, where although it may 
have been seen, it has not been subjected to proper scrutiny. Although relying upon 
edited evidence offers more transparency than the use of secret evidence, in practice, 
both types cast doubt over whether the confirmation hearing is truly adversarial.231 
                                                
230 Ibid, 477.  
231 On adversariness as a relevant criterion for determining the fairness of a trail in Australia see below at 
7.3.2 and for the comparison in relation to the UK below at 7.4. For a discussion of the idea that if 
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Dyzenhaus and Thwaites agree with the dissenting judgments in Thomas. However, 
rather than suggesting that the courts leave the field entirely to the executive, the 
authors propose instead institutional evolution. In particular, Dyzenhaus and Thwaites 
claim that Hayne J’s position overlooks efforts that have been made so far to 
“accommodate intelligence in the evidence-based legal process”,232 and innovations 
introduced elsewhere to strengthen the adversarial nature of the process.233 My thesis 
aligns with this approach, and will also contribute to this development by making 
further suggestions for institutional evolution below.234 
In sum, there are a number of concerns surrounding the adversarial character of the 
confirmation hearing, which remain unclarified in the legislation or judicial decisions. 
Above all, there is ambiguity as to whether secret evidence is permitted in confirmation 
hearings. Even if this was not the legislative intent, the regime does not provide 
adequate safeguards to guarantee the necessary level of adversariness in the face of a 
lower standard of proof, the judge’s initial exposure to secret evidence, and the 
difficulties that the courts face in scrutinising sensitive information. Functioning under 
the potentially erroneous assumption that judges are capable of both assessing, and 
distinguishing between, sensitive information to be either taken into account or ignored, 
the current regime does not seem to allow for the usual oversight model of an 
independent and impartial judge ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
adversariness plays a lesser role, the inquisitorial powers of the judge will have to increase see below at 
8.2.2. 
232 David Dyzenhaus and Rayner Thwaites, “Legality and emergency: the judiciary in a time of terror” 
Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(Federation Press, 2007) 9, 21.  
233 For example the use of special advocates. See ibid; also David Dyzenhaus, The constitution of law: 
legality in a time of emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 205-220; See also above at 4.2.3. 
234 See below at 8.2. 
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7.3.2   Serious crime legislation and the use of criminal intelligence in state courts 
Ultimately, neither of the two published Australian CO cases determined the 
constitutionality of using secret evidence in CO proceedings. However, a number of 
cases dealing with the use of ‘criminal intelligence’ in the context of serious crime 
prevention orders, may provide further guidance on how the High Court is likely to 
approach the legality of secret evidence, the limits imposed by the principle of fairness 
and the requirements of adversariness.     
There are currently statutes in six Australian jurisdictions aimed at disrupting and 
restricting serious and organised crime, and in particular declared criminal 
organisations, or ‘bikie gangs’.235 Although the Acts differ slightly from each other, 
they are all similarly modelled on the provisions of Division 104 of the Crimes Code 
1995 (Cth).236  They authorise the relevant State Commissioner of Police to apply to the 
State Supreme Court for a declaration that an organisation engages in serious crime. 
Once a declaration has been granted, the State Commissioner of Police may then 
request that a CO order be issued relating to a person who is either a member of a 
declared organisation, associates with a member of a declared organisation or engages 
in serious criminal activity. Although such COs may restrict the association, movement 
                                                
235 Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA); Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 
(SA); Serious Crime Control Act 2009 (NT); Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld); Criminal 
Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic); Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW). 
236 See Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, “When extraordinary measures become normal: pre-
emption in counter-terrorism and other laws” in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams 
(eds), Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 131; SA 
Premier, Mike Rann, at time referred to organised crime groups as “terrorists within our community”. 
Cited ibid, 143; see also Nicola McGarrity, “From terrorism to bikies: control orders in Australia (2012) 
37(3) Alternative Law Journal 166; only the WA Act is structured differently, where the courts only have 
the function of reviewing decisions issued by the Corruption and Crime Commission. 
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and possession of certain items,237 they do not include the more restrictive measures 
included in the counter-terrorism legislation.238 
Before discussing the relevant aspects of these cases, it is important to point out that 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, which is the primary source for the 
requirement of fairness in federal proceedings,239 is not directly applicable, as the Acts 
dealing with serious crime were legislated by the States. That said, State courts still 
have “a constitutionally mandated position in the Australian legal system”,240 since they 
are regularly called upon to exercise federal power. In order to perform this function, 
State courts are required to uphold the same (minimum) standards of justice, 
impartiality and integrity as those implied in Chapter III.241 Where an Act requires the 
State Supreme Court to deviate from this standard, it must be declared to be 
unconstitutional. This is now known as the Kable principle.242 The reason why a clear 
distinction must be drawn is because there is no entrenched separation of powers on a 
state level.243 The consequence for the following analysis is that any findings in this 
area can only be applied by analogy to the federal counter-terrorism CO regime. 
Relevant for the present purpose is that these state legislative schemes allow certain 
information to be used and suppressed where it is declared to be criminal intelligence, 
                                                
237For example Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 19(2); Serious and Organised Crime (Control) 
Act 2008 (SA), s 22(5); Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic), s 47(2). 
238 In particular they do not go as far as including house arrest or the wearing of tracking devises; see 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s104.5(3). 
239 See above at 5.2.1. 
240 Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617 (Gummov J). 
241 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 189 CLR 51, 104 (Gaudron J). 
242 Ibid. 
243 Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575, 614 (Gummov J). 
Hence, the strict separation of power can be overridden by statute allowing State judges to take on certain 
tasks, which federal judges cannot. For the relevance of Kable in the context of serious crime legislation 
see further Anthony Gray, “Due process, natural justice, Kable and organisational control legislation” 
(2009) 20 Public Law Review 290; Steven Churches and Sue Milne, “Kable, K-Generation, Kirk and 
Totani: validation of criminal intelligence at the expense of natural justice in Ch III courts” (2010) 18 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 29; Tarasha Gavin, “Extending the reach of Kable: Wainohu v 
New South Wales” (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 395; Mirko Bagaric, “Editorial: The revived Kable 
doctrine as a constitutional protector of rights?” (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 197. 
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which is defined by the various statutes in broadly similar terms across Australia.244 In 
South Australia, for example, criminal intelligence is defined as any information, 
“relating to actual or suspected criminal activity (whether in this State or 
elsewhere) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice 
criminal investigations, to enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a 
confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement or to endanger a 
person's life or physical safety.”245 
Once such information is declared, criminal intelligence enjoys special protection from 
disclosure.246 Crucially, rather than excluding the information from the proceedings, the 
statutes specifically allow criminal intelligence to form the basis of substantive 
orders!247  A priori, this declaration of information as criminal intelligence gives 
consideration exclusively to security interests. Given the consequences of such special 
protection and secret use, the question of fairness must be considered. Over the past 
seven years, the High Court has had to rule on the constitutionality of such provisions in 
a number of cases.248  
 
Constitutional challenges to criminal intelligence 
The latest in a series of cases challenging the constitutionality of the serious crime 
                                                
244 The statutes differ of whether the police or the courts may declare criminal intelligence.  
245 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA), s 3 (definition); see also Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 59; Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA), s 4; Crimes (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2012 (NSW), s 3. The definition has been developed under the Counsel of Australian 
Governments (COAG) in relation to the restriction of particular firearms. 
246 For example Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 78. 
247 For example ibid, s 60;  
248 See in particular South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (11 November 2010), Gypsy Jokers 
Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 82 ALJR 454 (7 February 2008), Assistant 
Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013), Wainohu v New South 
Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 (23 June 2011. 
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legislation is Pompano.249 The case challenged an application by the Queensland Police 
in 2012 to declare Pompano Pty Ltd to be part of a criminal organisation.250 During the 
proceedings, the respondent argued before the High Court that certain provisions of the 
Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) (COA 2009) were unconstitutional. Most 
importantly the respondent claimed that the provisions of the COA 2009, which permit 
the Supreme Court “to receive and act upon material which must not be disclosed to a 
respondent”,251 substantially impaired the integrity of the Supreme Court.  
The High Court unanimously upheld the legislation to be valid, on the basis that none of 
the provisions in the Act limit the Supreme Court’s capacity to act fairly and 
impartially.252 The majority conceded that the procedure of mandatory closed hearings 
departed from the established judicial process, but held that this did not result in 
unconstitutionality.253 The issue framed by the High Court was whether the process 
envisioned by the COA 2009 as a whole compromised institutional integrity, and this 
was held not to be the case.254 French CJ, concurring with the majority, emphasised that 
the Supreme Court’s decision to declare and use criminal intelligence is 
discretionary.255  
Although the COA 2009 explicitly recognises this judicial discretion,256 in order to 
preserve the integrity of the Supreme Court and avoid a violation of the Kable principle, 
the High Court has interpreted similar state legislation to be of the same effect, even in 
the absence of explicit recognition. Under a number of these state Acts, the 
                                                
249 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013). 
250 It was alleged that Pompano Pty Ltd was associated with the Finks Motorcycle Club. For further 
details on the case see Greg Martin, “Pompano and the short march to curial fairness” (2013) 38(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 118. 
251 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [98]. 
252 Ibid, [167] and [88] (French CJ). 
253 Ibid, [138]. 
254 Ibid, [157]. 
255 Ibid, [32] (French CJ). 
256 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 72. 
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Commissioner of Police is authorised to declare criminal intelligence, which then 
triggers the protection of the information.257 However, the inclusion of the words “could 
reasonably be expected” within the definition of criminal intelligence has been 
understood as sufficient to make the Commissioner’s declaration reviewable.258 
Critical for the outcome in Pompano was the High Court’s finding that these 
proceedings do not have to be adversarial in order to be fair.259 In particular, the 
majority rejected arguments that adversarial process is essential to ensuring procedural 
fairness. The judges pointed out that a respondent would rarely be in a position to 
meaningfully challenge any information about actual or suspected criminal activity. As 
such, the suppression of such information would not necessarily result in unfairness.260 
Furthermore, the decision in Pompano explicitly allowed the courts to take fairness into 
account in making a declaration that information was criminal intelligence.261 The 
majority clarified that these criminal intelligence provisions only cover information that 
would otherwise be admissible, though is not adduced due to the security risks. The 
protection afforded to criminal intelligence does not cover information “that would 
otherwise be irrelevant or inadmissible.”262    
There is a contrary view that impartiality cannot substitute adversariness as a safeguard 
for fairness,263 and that adversariness is deeply ingrained in the common law 
                                                
257 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA), s 29(2); Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA), s 
28A(1); similarly Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), 76(2). 
258 K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501 (2 February 2009) at [135]-[136] 
and [143]; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (11 November 2010) at [124] per Gummow J; 
similarly the use of statutory interpretation in Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of 
Police (2008) 82 ALJR 454 (7 February 2008) at [30]-[33]. See also Churches and Milne, above n 243, 
30-31. 
259 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [120]. 
260 Ibid, [160] 
261 Ibid, [162] majority; [32] per French CJ; see Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 72(2). 
262 Ibid, [148]. It must be noted that the Act allows for the admission of hearsay evidence!!!! 
263 For example Steven Churches, “How closed can a court be and still remain a common law court?” 
(2013) 20 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 117; Stephen Odgers, “The High Court on crime in 
2013: analysis and jurisprudence” (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 4. 
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tradition.264 In Al-Rawi, Lord Kerr famously described as a fallacy the assumption that 
because the judge can see everything, this will guarantee a fair result: 
 “To be truly valuable, evidence must be capable of withstanding challenge. I go 
further. Evidence which has been insulated from challenge may positively 
mislead.”265 
The majority in Pompano did not address the question of how a court can compensate 
for the lack of adversarial proceedings.266 French CJ pointed out that in order to avoid 
an abuse of process, the court has the inherent power to inform itself, which includes the 
power to call witnesses.267 However, he stops short of demanding such inquisitorial 
inquiry mandated in cases where the controlee has no access to criminal intelligence. 
One additional aspect of the Queensland legislation is the use of a Public Interest 
Monitor (COPIM) in closed hearings.268 While the COPIM can access all information269 
and is able to make submissions,270 the position is not meant to work for,271 or even 
together with, the respondent.272 While the role of the COPIM has been held to be 
                                                
264 Churches and Milne, above n 243, 41-42. They argue that the common law is based on the idea that 
parties present evidence to the court and not that the court has to make efforts to inform it. Consequently 
the authors consider the review of a one-sided or self-informed judge in an adversarial system no more 
than a “sniff test”. 
265 Al Rawi & Ors v Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34 (13 July 2011) at [93]. 
266 Odgers, above n 263, 4. 
267 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [44] 
(French CJ). 
268 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), Part 7: Criminal Organisation Public Interest Monitor 
(COPIM); a similar model has been also introduced in NSW under Crimes (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2012 (NSW), Division 2: Criminal Intelligence Monitor. 
269 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 88(1). 
270 Ibid, s 89(2). 
271 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [54] 
(French CJ); [112] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); [208] (Gageler J) 
272 This is implied in the fact that the monitor cannot make submissions when the respondent or his/her 
legal representative are present and even may be excluded by the court from such parts of the 
proceedings. Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 89(3)(4) and Crimes (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2012 (NSW), s 28F(3)(4). Although are also no explicit restriction of communication 
between the Monitor and the respondent, the position clearly differs from the model in the UK, where the 
communication of the special advocate with the respondent is clearly regulated. See below at 8.2.4.1 
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important in ensuring that the Court observes procedural fairness,273 these limitations 
have been described as a “minimalist approach to the protection of the respondent’s 
interests”.274 Gageler J pointed out that the COPIM’s presence alone could not 
guarantee fairness.275 To assure the independence of the office, the COPIM must be 
qualified for appointment to a higher Australian Court,276 and is excluded from the role 
if he or she has affiliations with the police.277 The criteria for appointment indicate that 
the primary role of COPIM is to independently monitor the judicial role, not that 
exercise a monitoring role over the police.278 Given that assessing prospective security 
risks, rather than maintaining procedural fairness, is the most difficult aspect for the 
judiciary, the selection criteria for the COPIM are, it is submitted, a misfit for 
safeguarding the public interest.279 Although Gageler J concurred with the majority in 
Pompano, he placed more emphasis on the importance of allowing the respondent the 
opportunity to challenge the basis of an order. As denying the respondent such an 
opportunity would be unconstitutional,280 he perceived that the criminal intelligence 
provisions threatened procedural fairness.281 In contrast to the other members of the 
bench, Gageler J concluded that constitutional validity can neither be based on the 
presence of the COPIM, nor on the judicial discretion to declare the material to be 
criminal intelligence or to refuse granting the final CO. Validity is preserved only by the 
                                                
273 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [65] 
(French CJ), [208] (Gageler J). 
274 Ibid, [65] (French CJ). 
275 Ibid, [208] (Gageler J). 
276 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), s 84(1); those are any State Supreme Court, the Federal Court 
of Australia or the High Court of Australia.  
277 Ibid, s 84(3)(d). 
278 Explanatory notes to the Criminal Organisation Bill 2009 (Qld) 3. 
279 See below at 8.2.2 for the proposal of introducing Security Review Advisors assisting to the judge in 
closed hearings. 
280 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [177]-
[178] (Gageler J).  
281 Ibid. 
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inherent power of the court to stay proceedings “where practical unfairness becomes 
manifest”.282 
Gageler J’s dicta indicates that his Honour accepts the possibility that a lack of 
information can cause unfairness. Once such a situation occurs, the question of fairness 
is then considered separately from the question of disclosure, making the process much 
clearer.283 However, it is submitted that in Pompano, both the majority and Gageler J 
shared the same general attitude towards fairness. Gageler J’s approach did not add 
further procedural protections for the respondent. The only difference is that the 
majority conflated the issues of fairness and security, making it harder to assess the 
relative weight to be attached to each of these interests. The High Court decisions in the 
‘bikie’ cases highlight that the constitutionality of provisions allowing the use of 
criminal intelligence relies upon upholding the integrity of the judicial process. So long 
as the court is not forced to make decisions, or compelled to make unfair decisions, 
constitutional validity is maintained.284  
The decisions discussed above recognise the need to rely upon secret evidence in 
administrative proceedings, but fail to articulate the minimum criteria for procedural 
fairness in the circumstances. Limitations to the adversarial process and position of the 
respondent are not always an impediment for the fairness of the proceedings. Although 
judges must take fairness into account in making non-disclosure decisions,285 the extent 
of that duty – particularly when those limitations undermine the integrity of the court – 
remains unclear. 
                                                
282 Ibid, [178]; see also [212]. 
283 The separation does not mean that rights have no effect at the stage of declaring criminal intelligence. 
[199] But Gageler J points out the differences of balancing under s72(1) and the balancing deciding on 
PII [204]. 
284 Cf South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (11 November 2010); French Court is pushing the 
concept of institutional integrity – see Kirk (pointed out by Dominique) – see G+T article. 
285 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [162] 
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The Australian judiciary has been criticised for upholding procedural fairness through 
statutory interpretation, rather than through the application of constitutional values.286 
The High Court has avoided engaging more closely with the question of capability,287 
and the necessity of compensation, or in other words, with the question of substantive 
fairness.288 
There are differences between the serious crime and terrorism CO schemes. First, the 
serious crime COs applied under serious crime legislation are not as far reaching as 
those relating to terrorism.289 Secondly, since the serious crime CO schemes are 
governed by state law, there is a different understanding of the separation of powers 
applies under the state constitutions. Hence, the cases can only serve as analogies. 
However, the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to regulate and protect the integrity of 
its judicial processes in order to prevent an abuse of process, as well as the duty to 
uphold procedural fairness through applying the principles of natural justice are likely 
the same under for all Australian Courts .290 If anything, it is submitted that as the 
federal counter-terrorism CO scheme imposes more serious measures and is governed 
by a stricter understanding of the separation of powers under the federal Constitution, 
higher standards of fairness should be upheld in federal courts. 
Although the High Court has not reviewed the use of secret evidence in counter-
terrorism CO proceedings, it is likely that such legislation would not be viewed as 
limiting the discretion of the judges, thus upholding its constitutionality under Chapter 
                                                
286 For example Gabrielle Appleby and John Williams, “The anti-terror creep: law and order, the States 
and the High Court of Australia” in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), 
Counter-terrorism and beyond: the culture of law and justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 150, 159. 
287 See above at 7.3.1. 
288 See Dyzenhaus’ discussion on the veneer of legality in David Dyzenhaus, “Cycles of legality in 
emergency times” (2007) 18 Public Law Review 165. 
289 Gageler J indicated in Pompano that the requirements of natural justice can vary. Cf Home Office v 
Tariq [2011] UKSC 35 (13 July 2011) in the UK. 
290 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [125]. 
Chapter 7: Sensitive information in civil and administrative proceedings 
 335 
III. As the High Court’s approach in Pompano is likely indicative of the future 
development of the law in this area, it is disappointing that the judgment did not provide 
more guidance on what ‘substantive fairness’ precisely requires in this context.   
 
7.3.3 – Conclusion 
In Australia, the necessary safeguards for guaranteeing a fair trial in quasi-criminal 
procedures using sensitive information are assessed according to the standards of 
judicial integrity. Provided that the judge is in the position to act fairly and impartially, 
and retains control over the court process, there will be no violation of any 
constitutional principles. This reserved attitude towards potential violations of fairness 
and the lack of guidance included in the relevant statutes on what fairness demands 
means that, like in the case of balancing, the approach taken lacks consistency and leads 
to what can be termed ‘ad hoc’ justice. 
Understandably, many members of the judiciary are uncomfortable with questioning the 
executive’s assessments of sensitive information and prospective security risks. This 
can be seen in the approach taken to the use of secret evidence as well as to summaries 
of sensitive information, that are almost impossible for the controlee to challenge. 
However, without such independent scrutiny, the effect of an impartial judge in 
ensuring fairness is seriously diminished. At the interim stage of the counter-terrorism 
CO regime, the RFT is significantly restricted. An iCO can be issued ex parte and 
sensitive information can be suppressed when setting out the reasons to the controlee. In 
determining whether to use secret evidence, the principle of fairness is completely 
overlooked and there are no additional ‘compensating’ safeguards. In order to preserve 
the legitimacy of the proceeding, the subsequent confirmation hearing must 
unambiguously compensate for the shortcomings of the iCO. But as the above analysis 
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demonstrates, although the use of secret evidence is not explicitly authorised at this later 
stage, there is uncertainty as to whether confirmation hearings can be characterised as 
truly adversarial. From a human rights perspective, some additional protection would be 
desirable, but as the ‘bikie’ cases reveal, the Australian Constitution does not require 
such protection. Adversariness of the trial is not a criterion for constitutionality. 
The INSLM recommended to abolish the current CO regime altogether, as it is “not 
effective, not appropriate and not necessary”.291 If it was to be retained, he suggested it 
should be restricted to CO ‘Fardon-type’ cases, hence only applied to convicted 
terrorists, who having served their sentences, but are still considered to be a danger to 
the community.292 While the court in such hearings would still have to undertake a risk 
assessment as to the likelihood of future criminal conduct, the decision could be based 
upon the firm legal foundation of the previous commission of a serious criminal 
offence.293 The risk assessment could further consider evidence of an unsuccessful 
rehabilitation process. Under such an approach, preparatory terrorist actions, including 
receiving and providing training, could be exclusively covered by the criminal law. 
While these modified COs would still encompass the Hicks-scenario, who had been 
convicted preceding the CO, the government would be prevented from ‘forum 
shopping’ as occurred in Thomas, where a prosecution lapsed due to inadmissible 
evidence. To date, the INSLM’s recommendations have been ignored. 
The COAG Review did not recommend abolishing the regime, but advocated for 
additional safeguards “to ensure that a fair hearing is held”.294 Their suggestions 
included a national special advocate scheme, and a guarantee that a minimum amount of 
                                                
291 Walker, above n 9, 4, 44. 
292 Ibid, 44. See Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575 (1 October 
2004).  
293 See above at 3.1. 
294 Council of Australian Governments, “Review of counter-terrorism legislation” (Final Report, 2013) 
[215], (Recommendation 26). 
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information be disclosed to the controlee.295 Although the federal Criminal Code does 
not provide for the use of special advocates, as noted above, they may be still appointed 
under the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to ensure a fair process.296 However, precisely 
when this measure will need to be taken to protect the RTF against non-disclosure is 
unclear.  
Finally, even if it is accepted that in some cases the effect of limiting information to a 
respondent may constitute an abuse of process, under the present law, the precise 
threshold triggering the remedy (stay of proceedings) remains unclear. The High Court 
has not been prepared to provide this guidance. And while state and federal legislation 
have withstood constitutional challenges, the CO regimes continue to suffer from a lack 
of (i) legitimacy (since the limitations to the RFT are not sufficiently justified), (ii) 
transparency (since information is withheld), and (iii) predictability and consistency 
(since consistent approaches to the use of secret evidence and risk assessment processes 
to justify intrusive CO measure have not been developed). 
  
                                                
295 Ibid, Recommendations 30 and 31.  
The proposed Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2015 (Cth), allowing the use of 
secret evidence also at the confirmation CO hearing, does not include an obligation to provide the 
controlee with a minimum of information. While the COAG Report seems to recommend such a 
requirement, the new INSLM, Roger Gyles, did not support such a recommendation, but placed more 
trust in the judicial oversight to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. See Gyles, above n 61, Part 9.  
296 This possibility was mentioned by Whealy J in R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 586 (21 February 2006). 
Although this was a criminal trial, this obiter is generally understood as applying to all proceedings 
dealing with suppressed information; see also Kirby J in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 435; 
and Council of Australian Governments, “Review of counter-terrorism legislation” (Final Report, 2013) 
60, (Recommendation 30). 
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7.4 - Comparative observations  
In both Australia and the UK, administrative counter-terrorism measures have been 
introduced, enabling the executive to impose coercive measures on individuals to 
prevent anticipated terrorist attacks. While the main mechanisms work in a similar 
fashion, the regimes differ considerably in how judges safeguard the RFT, which 
impacts upon the admissibility of secret information, as well as the standing of the 
individual within the proceedings. The following comparative observations can be 
made: 
Judicial tools 
In CO-type proceedings, the different human rights frameworks in the UK and Australia 
determine the tools available to the judiciary to ensure the fairness of trials using secret 
evidence. In the UK judges apply the HRA, and thus values, previously considered to 
be common law in nature, that are now widely regarded as constitutional. The judicial 
interpretation of ‘minimum standards’ of fairness under domestic law is further guided 
by ECtHR’s case law, which places the individual’s RFT as the starting point of any 
fairness analysis. By contrast, fairness in Australia is exclusively determined by the 
courts (applying legislation and common law), and is only protected indirectly through 
the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. Rather than focusing on the 
impact of legislation on the individual, the Australian approach seeks to shield 
institutions of government, specifically the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary. While these criteria are important to protect procedural fairness, the 
institutional approach is necessarily narrower in scope than the individual approach to 
the RFT.  
In Australia, the implications of these differences are apparent in the High Court 
decision of Thomas and subsequent cases relating to serious and organised crime 
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legislation. These cases demonstrate that there is a gap between what is protected under 
constitutional law and what may be required to uphold the individual’s RFT. This area 
is subject to the judges’ discretion and lacks clear guidance either through legislation or 
case law, which promotes an ad hoc approach to fairness. 
In the UK, the judiciary’s recognition of constitutional rights and values has not only 
strengthened the position of the individual, but has also established a common 
vocabulary and framework upon which Parliamentary Committees, independent 
reviewers, NGOs and the media can rely when debating the essential attributes of 
fairness and the necessity and scope for compensatory measures. A similar debate is 
missing in Australia, which has not adjusted its understanding of fairness to a new 
security environment. 
 
The role of the judge 
These differences have also impacted on the roles that judges have assumed in defining 
the extent to which secret evidence can be used, as well as developing and improving 
mechanisms to protect procedural fairness. UK judges have expressed their competence 
and responsibility in the area by reading down the provisions in the CO legislation 
rather than declaring it to be incompatible with the ECHR. By interpreting legislation in 
the light of the requirements of art 6 ECHR, the courts have significantly reshaped the 
regime of secret evidence.  
In Australia, the constitutional framework arguably prevents judges from playing an 
overt role in developing and applying substantive standards of fairness. The scope for 
judicial development is therefore constrained, leaving the courts with limited tools 
(beyond statutory interpretation) to restrict the use of secret evidence. Consequently, 
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such a system relies upon prospective parliamentary vigilance to ensure that proposed 
legislation respects the RFT. This however has not occurred and Australian CO 
legislation now allows for the largely unrestricted use of secret evidence at the interim 
stage, and is highly ambiguous as to its use at the confirmation stage. The role of 
upholding fairness has fallen predominantly to the judges, who thus far have refrained 
from elaborating further rules that might interfere with the will of Parliament. In 
rejecting the use of a special regime providing for the use of secret evidence in CO 
hearings, the Australian regime was perceived to be less severe than its UK counterpart. 
However subsequent developments have challenged this assessment. While UK judges 
have tempered the original scheme by gradually inserting additional fairness safeguards, 
the Australian system remains stuck with its original design and flaws.  
 
The level of adversariness 
Both Australia and the UK have been challenged by the need to reconcile pre-emptive 
counter-terrorism measures, which rely heavily upon secret evidence, with established 
standards of adversarial justice.297 The UK jurisprudence has now established that the 
state must appoint a special advocate in closed hearings as well as provide a ‘gist’ of the 
content of the secret evidence to the controlee. These counter-balancing measures allow 
the proceedings to maintain a minimum of adversariness and as such a core irreducible 
minimum of fairness to the controlee at the review hearing. In Australia, the one-sided 
nature of the interim stage of the proceeding is said to be counter-balanced by an 
adversarial confirmation hearing. Not only has the analysis above demonstrated that 
there must be serious doubt about the adversarial character of these proceedings, but in 
relation to serious crime legislation COs, it has been held that adversariness per se is not 
                                                
297 Tulich, above n 210, 346-347. 
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determinative for the fairness of the proceedings.298 As such, despite the practical 
difficulties that the government faces in providing a ‘gist’ of the sensitive information 
to the controlee, the UK provides a much clearer minimum standard of protection for 
the individual’s RTF.  
Given the prominence of the judge in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, the 
Australian position bears strong resemblance with some of the opinions expressed in 
earlier the UK cases of MB299 and AF.300 There, it was discussed whether judicial 
supervision – even when assisted by a special advocate – can be a sufficient 
safeguard.301 While accepted in these early decisions, this has been ultimately rejected 
in the UK as a violation of the individual RFT.302 Hence, even in cases where a gist 
might not provide the controlee with a solid chance to challenge the evidence, in the 
UK, keeping the controlee informed is regarded as an important independent value. The 
same cannot be said for the Australian position. 
 
General comparison and potential for improvement 
Thus far, my analysis may appear to favour the UK model governing the use of secret 
evidence. This is certainly true in terms of its general approach to acknowledging the 
RFT, clearly defining its guiding principles, and according greater respect to the 
individual. However, the use of secret evidence in the UK has now become 
commonplace in CO hearings notwithstanding the fact that mandatory safeguards are in 
place to mitigate any negative impact upon the fairness of the trial.  
                                                
298 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013). 
299 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 2007). 
300 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and Others [2008] EWCA Civ 1148 (17 October 
2008). 
301 See above 7.2.1. 
302 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009). 
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In Australia, although flaws in the statutory scheme may allow secret evidence to affect 
a decision to confirm an interim control order, this seems to be an unintentional feature 
of the legislation. While this affords the judge a wider discretion of protecting the 
controlee from the use of secret evidence, the fairness of the trial becomes entirely 
reliant upon the proper exercise of judicial oversight. As such, there are compelling 
reasons to clarify the legislation and incorporate additional safeguards to effectively 
protect values of fairness as well as the integrity of proceedings from the misuse of 
secret evidence. So far the use of sensitive information has not had any impact on the 
Australian CO decisions. However, this should not be a reason for refraining from 
introducing necessary improvements.  
Although there is equally a scope for improvement in the UK, the system has 
incrementally incorporated safeguards into SIAC proceedings, which appear to be 
working reasonably well. This workability of the system now depends heavily on the 
actors involved (lawyers, special advocates and judges) to keep secret evidence to a 
minimum. At this stage, an alternative seems to be either a wide-scale review and 
reform of the scheme, or its abandonment, instead reinstating the previous PII doctrine. 
Both options are highly unlikely in the current climate.  
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Chapter 8: The Future of disclosure of sensitive information 
in Australia and the United Kingdom 
 
The present Chapter ties together the conclusions of the two case study Chapters with 
the theoretical discussion in the first part of the thesis. The concluding analysis will first 
make some general comparative observations between the approaches to non-disclosure 
of sensitive information in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK). Based on the 
findings of the thesis, it will then make some proposals for the improvement of non-
disclosure regimes with reference to those two jurisdictions.  
 
8.1   General comparative observations 
Some of the differences in the approach to disclosure decisions and safeguards between 
Australia and the United Kingdom – as described in the previous two Chapters – may 
be explained by reference to the distinct human rights regimes operating in those two 
jurisdictions. In particular, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA) in the UK now 
requires the express protection of the individual right to a fair trial (RFT) under art 6 
ECHR, which admits scope for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law 
to shape the development of domestic law: as a result, UK law applies a proportionality 
sui generis approach, which crucially requires the counter-balancing of the limitations 
suffered by the individual in order to avoid a violation of art 6 ECHR. This 
sophisticated approach, which aims to maximise the individual RFT, has no analogue in 
Australia. In Australia, the protection of fairness derives from the common law, which 
focuses on the protection of the integrity of the court, rather than the rights of the 
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individual. This emphasis may also explain why the balancing approach, which had 
been adopted by the common law in disclosure decisions and which is now also 
required by the relevant legislation on disclosure, has not evolved under this common 
law model. Hence, the only real safeguard for the defendant in Australia lies with the 
inherent judicial power to stay its proceedings as an abuse of process – a drastic and 
rarely used remedy.  
But examining the available legal sources (‘law in books’) alone does not explain the 
judicial behaviour (‘law in action’).1 This thesis has identified a number of UK 
decisions where the courts relied on the common law rather than ECHR.2 This 
preference for using the common law underscores the authority of the English common 
law as a foundational source of individual rights, as well as asserting the continuity of 
the UK’s autonomous system of rights protection distinct from those ‘imported’ from 
the ECHR.3  
Of course, the common law sources would be equally accessible for the judges in 
Australia as part of its British legal inheritance. While they are not binding upon 
Australian courts, they can certainly be persuasive. Furthermore, Australian judges 
could rely on the rule of law and the common law constitution (CLC), which crucially 
support the importance of fairness of the legal process, as potential sources for the 
ongoing development of the law governing non-disclosure decisions.4  
However, this trend of gradual convergence is not inevitable. There is a diverging 
understanding of the constitutional duties of the courts. In the UK, the HRA has 
                                                
1 This gap between the ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ was first identified by American Legal Realist, 
Roscoe Pound in his influential article, “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 American Law 
Review 12. 
2 See for example A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004) [42] (Lord Bingham) as discussed above at 4.2.1. 
3 See for example R v Horncastle and Others [2010] 2 AC 430 (9 December 2009). 
4 See David Dyzenhaus, “Cycles of legality in emergency times” (2007) 18 Public Law Review 165, 184. 
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provided courts with a reason to consider the implicit constitutional values in their 
decisions.5  For example, in relation to counter-terrorism legislation, the courts have 
become involved in the process of fine-tuning the level of rights protection, engaging in 
an ongoing dialogue with parliament.6 Examples of such dialogue relevant to this thesis 
are the general rules of non-disclosure and the law of anonymous witnesses. This 
dialogue in UK has had more impact in promoting legislative amendment than the 
numerous reviews and recommendations of independent review bodies and 
parliamentary committees,7 which only seem to provide supporting footnote references 
in leading judgments.8  
In Australia, the case law on the NSIA and ‘anti-bikie laws’ have clearly demonstrated 
that the High Court does not recognise a comparable constitutional duty to uphold the 
individual’s RFT. Neither the Constitution nor other relevant statutory provisions 
impose such a duty on Australian courts or provide such protection for individual rights. 
Rather, within Australian law, there are few judicial constraints imposing on 
Parliamentary supremacy, as well as general resistance amongst politicians and the 
wider population towards an entrenched bill of rights.9 While there are many examples 
where Australian courts show concern for the fairness of the trial, judicial respect (or 
deference) for the political branches means that the level of judicial protection is a 
baseline minimum standard necessary to ensure the fairness of the trial. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the balancing test applied by the courts for determining disclosure 
                                                
5 See for example A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004). 
6 While there is certainly a lively debate on this topic and about the characterisation of the institutions, 
there is also some judicial recognition of a constitutional supremacy as counterweight to Parliamentary 
supremacy: see for example International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158 (22 February 2002) [71] (Lord Laws). 
7 Numerous reports pointing to weaknesses had been ignored for years. See also above at 5.1.1. 
8 See for example A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 
December 2004; or Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46 (31 October 
2007). 
9 See above at 5.2.1. 
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will defer to the executive’s expertise in national security matters (the rule) unless in the 
particular case fairness requires otherwise (the exception). Deference, not balancing, is 
a more accurate description of this judicial behaviour.10 Judges claim to have the duty to 
uphold the RFT, which is said to be an evolving standard, yet do not engage in a 
dialogue with other branches of government, as has occurred in the UK.  
It would be wrong to argue that the Australian position is inherently worse. It simply 
means that Parliament and the executive bear greater responsibility in protecting human 
rights according to their proclaimed commitment as a liberal democracy. However, 
there is a risk. If Parliament is mainly driven by other concerns or interests – in this case 
national security concerns about sensitive information – it may neglect or sacrifice the 
protection of individual rights – in this case, the RFT. In Australia, the NSIA provides 
an example of the government’s intention to widen the options for non-disclosure, while 
at the same time ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. This was done by tilting the 
balance towards non-disclosure, without further defining the requirements necessary for 
protecting the RFT. The courts have read down this approach, as they did not consider 
themselves limited in terms of their decision-making powers. However, the wording of 
the NSIA does not suggest that Parliament intended to legislate for a ‘balanced’ 
procedure in relation to sensitive information. It simply preserved, as is customary in 
many statutes that interfere with rights, the common law power of the court to stay 
proceedings in order to avoid miscarriage of justice. And even this was done in an 
ambiguous fashion.11 In this regard, the Australian constitutional design, as described 
above, which puts the political branches in charge of ensuring human rights 
                                                
10 See for example Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404, 435 (Wilson and Dawson JJ): “Questions of national 
security naturally raise issues of great importance, issues which will seldom be wholly within the 
competence of a court to evaluate. It goes without saying in these circumstances that very considerable 
weight must attach to the view of what national security requires as is expressed by the responsible 
Minister.” 
11 See above at 6.2.3.3. 
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compatibility of statutes, has failed. Neither the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor (INSLM) nor the Parliamentary review mechanisms had an impact 
on the development of the National Security Information Act 2004 (Cth) (NSIA). 
The ruling in Lodhi that the NSIA survived constitutional challenge – and did not 
infringe Chapter III - may be viewed as a success for the Executive and Legislature 
concerned to protect national security, but the ruling also signalled that judges 
ultimately retained powers and remedies for protecting the fairness of their proceedings. 
A concern is of course that without courts engaging more robustly and directly with the 
threats to the RFT, this approach will provide only for a minimum level of protection – 
a ‘veneer’ of legality - for the RFT.12 
There are also further downsides where judges do not actively engage in the 
development of human rights protections. One is that it reduces the strength of the 
system of a checks and balances. As argued in Chapter 4, checks and balances may 
provide for a better control of the use of power than the concept of separation of 
powers. Here, it may be important to note again that in the UK the courts still do not 
have the power to overrule Parliament. And as we have seen in the case of absent 
witnesses, the courts went to great length to defend UK legislation against the 
application of the ‘sole or decisive’ rule, as applied by the ECtHR at the time.  
While it is possible that in certain cases the outcome is the same in UK and Australian 
courts, it is submitted that the Australian standard will be lower over the long term. 
Hence, the logical question is how to improve the Australian legislation regime to 
                                                
12 A judicial strategy that upholds the appearance of legality while not actually engaging with the issue 
directly avoids establishing negative precedents for the future. Dyzenhaus described this as the “powder 
dry” approach: Dyzenhaus, above n 4, 167; David Dyzenhaus, The constitution of law: legality in a time 
of emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 18. 
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incorporate or better protect the fairness values examined by this thesis while respecting 
its distinct legal tradition?  
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8.2   Propositions for the improvements of non-disclosure regimes 
When it comes to judicial non-disclosure decision of sensitive national security 
information, the courts have always stressed that consideration has to be afforded to 
both national security interests and the fairness of the legal procedures.13 These valuable 
interests are often difficult to reconcile and challenge the judges in balancing what has 
been deemed incommensurable interests.14  
What makes these decisions particularly difficult are the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the disclosure of national security information. Furthermore, there is a 
widespread argument – held both by politicians and judges - that the judiciary should 
simply not interfere with security decisions. While some of these concerns may be 
overstated, there are nonetheless certain realities about security, which have an 
influence on non-disclosure decision-making and must be taken into consideration by 
the courts. At the same time, there are also principles of fairness, which are vulnerable 
to being reduced to mere rhetoric. A sophisticated legislative regime to accommodate 
between the various interests at play must certainly pay genuine respect to both security 
and fairness.  
 
8.2.1   Political realities of security and the principle of fairness 
As Chapter 3 has demonstrated, correctly assessing the true value and potential 
consequences of disclosing sensitive information can be difficult. This difficulty stems 
from a number of reasons, which must be considered as political realities. These 
include:  
                                                
13 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978). 
14 “It is like asking whether one object is longer than another object is heavy.” James Jacob Spigelman, 
“The principle of open justice: a comparative perspective” (2006) 29(2) University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 147, 158. 
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First, the executive is highly protective of sensitive information. On the one hand, this 
stems from the objective to guarantee the future flow of information, which often comes 
from foreign agencies and may be described as an ‘international comity’ between 
security agencies. On the other hand, it reflects an attitude best expressed by the mosaic 
theory, which assumes “[a] scrap of information which, in itself, might seem to have no 
bearing on national security may, when put together with other information, assume a 
vital significance.”15  
Secondly, most national security experts are placed within the Executive. Assessing 
risk is a highly complex process, which has been developed in intelligence 
organizations and thus requires a particular skill-set. 
Thirdly and closely related, since judges often lack or are said to lack this skill-set, they 
seem less equipped to either make or evaluate effectively risk assessments.16 As they 
are equally aware of the security risks and the need to prosecute and convict, they are 
generally reluctant to challenge the Executive’s decisions in this area.17 However, 
without properly assessing the relative weight of any security risk, it can be difficult to 
assess its importance and impact on the trial. 
 
Equally, there are some important principles of fairness, established over centuries that 
should not be abrogated without proper justification.  
First, while judges experience difficulties in assessing security issues, they are better 
equipped to rule on matters of procedural fairness and uphold traditional liberties and 
                                                
15 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 51; Watson v AWB Limited (No 2) [2009] 
FCA 1047 (17 September 2009) [33]. 
16 This assumption is also not always accurate as judges can equally acquire the appropriate skills. 
17 See for example R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001) [26]: “If that is the 
view taken by the appropriate government representative, I have no reason to go behind it.” 
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freedoms. As judges have repeatedly noted, “Courts are specialists in the protection of 
liberties.”18 Moreover, courts have a constitutional duty in a liberal democracy to 
protect liberties against unjustified coercive measures of the state.19 Therefore any 
decision about the (un)fairness of the process should entirely rest in their hands. 20  
Secondly, from a judicial perspective a trial can only be assessed to be either fair or 
unfair in the particular circumstances of the case. The latter is considered a miscarriage 
of justice, underscoring the importance of courts ensuring that a minimum of fairness be 
observed. In Australia, no free standing RFT has been accepted under the 
Constitution.21 However, the courts have always required proceedings to be fair in order 
to protect the integrity of their own processes (abuse of process doctrine). And under the 
common law, there is no positive RFT, but rather an institutional duty on the court to 
prevent the defendant being subject to an unfair trial.22 This is a higher standard than a 
duty to make the trial as fair as possible within the procedural and evidential limitations 
established by the legislature and executive, which potentially does not deliver a fair 
trial! 
Thirdly, under the law of evidence it has been described as the ‘golden rule’ that 
material evidence should always be disclosed.23 Any deviation from that rule carries the 
                                                
18 RJR-MacDonald Inc v Attorney General of Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, 277, which has been cited with 
approval in A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 
2004) 178 (Lord Rodger). 
19 See for example R v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380-381 (Kitto J); R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53 
(25 October 2001) [1] (Lord Nicholls). For the relationship between Parliament and an independent 
judiciary see for example Peter Bailey, The human rights enterprise in Australia and internationally 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009) 110; Ahron Barak, The judge in a democracy (Princeton University 
Press, 2006) 56; Lord Steyn, “Dynamic interpretation amidst an orgy of statutes” (2004) 35(2) Ottawa 
Law Review 163, 165. 
20 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (16 December 2004) [39] 
(Lord Bingham), [178] (Lord Rodgers). 
21 Lodhi v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 360 (20 December 2007) [74] (Spigelman CJ). 
22 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (13 November 1992). 
23 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 147.  
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risk of miscarriages of justice.24 Hence, the suppression of material information should 
be considered an exception to this golden rule, and requires justification. The onus of 
whether sensitive information should not be disclosed rests with the party claiming non-
disclosure and thus generally with the Government. Although s 130 of the Evidence Act 
1995 (Cth) is not explicit, the provision is generally understood in the same way.25 This 
is also in line with more general liberal principles that any limitations upon the liberties 
of the individual by the state needs to be justified and kept to its absolute minimum. 
Without denying or belittling current risks to national security, this area should not be 
excluded from this principle. As Lucia Zedner pointed out, it is important not to forget 
that security itself is simply a means to create liberty.26  
 
8.2.2   Consequences for a non-disclosure regime 
These realities and principles have the following consequences for any non-disclosure 
regime seriously committed to fair proceedings: 
First, as outlined above, judges may face difficulties in determining the risks associated 
with the disclosure of sensitive information. At the same time, they have a 
constitutional duty in a liberal democracy to prevent arbitrary acts of the state. 
Therefore, judges find themselves in a difficult situation, particularly when legislation 
explicitly favours national security over fairness. The result can be ‘legal grey holes’, ie 
situations where the impression is created that proper judicial oversight is provided, but 
there is actually none.27 Hence, legislation - typified by the s 31(8) NSIA - should 
                                                
24 Ibid; See also Edwards v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 13071/87 (16 December 1992) 
[36]. 
25 Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Lawbook, 8th ed, 2009) 655. (referring to Sankey v Whitlam 
and Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs). 
26 Lucia Zedner, “Seeking security by eroding rights: the side-stepping of due process” in Benjamin 
Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and human rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 257, 258. 
27 See Dyzenhaus, above n 12, 50. 
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refrain from directing that the balance should favour security over other interests. Such 
an approach does not only tip the balance, but removes any balance entirely with the 
aim to achieve a particular outcome, a strategy that has provoked judicial backlash.28 
Simply because judges are challenged in how they should attach weight to national 
security assessments, it does not follow that this task should be entirely removed from 
the judges’ hands. In line with the analysis in Chapter 4, judges should rather be in a 
position where they are able to ‘defer as respect’, which then also retains a functioning 
system of checks and balances. In order to be in such a position, a legislative regime is 
needed that adapts regular procedures to assist judges in fulfilling these duties.29 
One way to provide such assistance to the judicial decision-makers to evaluate these 
assessments is through the appointment of Security Review Advisors (SRA). Inspiration 
and guidance for the roles, characteristics and qualities of such advisory positions can 
be gained from examining the operation of related positions such as the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)30 and the British Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC).31 SRAs must have substantial experience in the field of 
national security and intelligence. They are security cleared to the necessary level and 
possess all the necessary understanding of, and experience in, evaluating the 
information and arguments of why non-disclosure is necessary, including the propriety 
of the intelligence-gathering methods. Crucially, they enjoy a certain level of 
independence from the current administration. Members could be drawn from retired 
                                                
28 See above at 6.2.3.3. 
29 See above at 4.4. 
30 Website of the Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee: www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/index-
eng.html.  
31 Website of the British Special Immigration Appeals Commission: 
www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/special-immigration-appeals-commission. SIAC members are drawn from 
different backgrounds providing different skill sets to the commission. “As specified in the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK), the SIAC panel consists of three members. One must 
have held high judicial office; and one must be - or have been - a senior legally-qualified member of the 
Asylum & Immigration Tribunal (AIT). The third member will usually be someone who has experience 
of national security matters.” 
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police, security and intelligence personal, and in particular from former or current 
Inspector Generals for Intelligence and Security.32 These positions share similarities to a 
system of internal review, and there is a danger that, given that SRAs are closely 
connected to the executive branch of government,33 such advisory positions within the 
court structure conflict with traditional understandings of the separation of powers. 
However, the judge still has the final say on the evaluation of the intelligence products, 
and this approach reassures the defendant that decisions, which cannot be made publicly 
for security reasons, are not arbitrary and have been subject to informed judicial 
independent scrutiny. It is submitted that a successful approach guaranteeing both 
security and liberty entails strong cooperation between the branches of government and 
is guided by the same values of a liberal democracy.34  
Secondly, since limitations on civil liberties should be justified in a liberal democracy, 
and the general rule of the law of evidence is that all material information should be 
disclosed, it follows that fairness needs to be maximised. This claim has two aspects: 
one is that the suppression of such information should be limited to only what is 
reasonably necessary; the other is that any limitations of fairness ought to be 
compensated as much as possible.35 
In relation to the first aspect, it must be accepted that judges sometimes have only a 
limited capacity to increase disclosure of sensitive information. This is not only due to 
their judicial capacities, but also that they are dependant on the proper functioning of 
the disclosure processes, a function that rests with both the police and prosecution.36 
                                                
32 Website of the Inspector General for Intelligence and Security: www.igis.gov.au.  
33 This connection is generally based on prior professional association and thus also extend to similar 
backgrounds, attitudes, operational culture etc. 
34 Barak, above n 19, 40. 
35 In relation to this second aspect, a number of measures, which may compensate for the limitation of the 
equality of arms will be discussed further below at 8.2.4.  
36 See above at 6.1.  
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But as the suppression of information relevant to the defence can lead to serious 
injustice,37 in particular when there is political pressure to secure a particular result, 
further external safeguards may be considered necessary. For example, comparable to 
the criminal offence for disclosing sensitive information covered by the Attorney-
General’s certificate under the NSIA, it is submitted that the legislature should enact a 
criminal offence – directed primarily to law enforcement officials and prosecutors – 
who knowingly supress information that is ‘material’ to a criminal trial. Although it 
may be difficult to enforce such an offence - as it would generally require an internal 
investigation, and the word ‘material’ is open to interpretation – this offence sends a 
clear message that that those public officials responsible for (non)disclosure decisions 
should proceed with an ‘abundance of caution’, and that the degree of disclosure (or 
conditions imposed) should be a matter for the courts and not solely the executive. 
Furthermore, the enactment of this offence as an ‘obstruction of justice’ would reinforce 
as a criminal law obligation the already existing ethical and professional obligation to 
disclose all material evidence. Without such enactment, there could not be an offence 
carrying a penalty for non-compliance. In the UK further sanctions for disclosure 
failures on behalf of the prosecution have been considered in an enquiry, but were 
ultimately rejected.38   
                                                
37 See for example the miscarriage of justice cases in the UK during the 1980s and 90s. These included 
most prominently the cases of the Guildford 4, the Maguire 7 (See Sir John May, “Interim Report on the 
Maguire Case: The Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the convictions arising out of the bomb 
attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974” (9 July 1990)) the Birmingham 6 and Judith Ward; see 
above at 6.1. 
38 Lord Justice Gross and Lord Justice Treacy, “Further review of disclosure in criminal proceedings: 
sanctions for disclosure failure” (Judiciary of England and Wales, November 2012) 9-11. The authors 
considered that staying proceedings in order to avoid an abuse of process, as well as the measures of 
adjournment, exclusion of evidence under s 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) and 
the attribution of costs to the prosecution to be sufficient. See above at 6.3.1.1. 
Chapter 8: The Future of disclosure of sensitive information in Australia and the United Kingdom 
 356 
Finally, the role of the trial judge is crucial for the fairness of the trial. It is now 
generally accepted that the judge needs to be in charge at all stages of the proceedings.39 
This enables the judge to determine the appropriate level of fairness and ultimately stay 
proceedings if necessary.  
However, in any part of the proceedings in which the defence is excluded, it is 
submitted that these judicial duties must be extended. This is particularly suggested for 
type III hearings in the UK.40 Acknowledging that the adversarial character of the 
proceeding has been disturbed, the judge must assume a more active inquisitorial role in 
order to compensate for the inequality of arms. This should not replace any appointment 
of a special advocate, but should rather serve as an additional safeguard. It is also 
important to stress that this should not be an alternative for an otherwise open trial, but 
limited to questions of whether sensitive information is material to the case and the 
extent of its disclosure.  
While there are some individual members of the judiciary, who have embraced such an 
attitude in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings,41 the majority of the judges in both 
Australia and the UK is likely to resist such a changes. In the common law world, 
inquisitorial proceedings are generally conceived as being non-judicial or administrative 
processes. Thus the introduction of ‘inquisitorial powers’ would potentially challenge 
the traditional understanding of the judicial role.42.  
Despite such a general attitude there are also a number of examples, where 
                                                
39 See for example Jasper v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 27052/95 (16 February 2000) 
[56]; Fitt v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no 29777/96 (16 February 2000) [49]; Rowe and 
Davis v the United Kingdom [ECtHR] Application no. 28901/95 (16 February 2000) [58]. Although the 
current NSIA regime requires a number of proceeding to be held mandatorily in private, which goes 
against such full discretion of the judge, the issue concerns the principle of open justice and thus is only 
related to the main concern of this thesis.  
40 See above at 6.2.2.2. 
41 See for example Secretary of State for the Home Department v AE [2008] EWHC 132 (Admin) (01 
February 2008) [27] 
42 See for example Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] 2 All ER 182 (15 December 1976) 
[208]; R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 (19 February 1984) 576. 
Chapter 8: The Future of disclosure of sensitive information in Australia and the United Kingdom 
 357 
‘inquisitorial’ approaches – in the continental European sense of ‘investigatory’ - have 
been adopted or suggested within common law systems. In Canada, for example, the 
Supreme Court in Charkaoui discussed the adoption of a ‘pseudo-inquisitorial role’ of 
the Federal Court in reviewing the in camera and ex parte hearings under the 
immigration regime of the time.43 The court valued the active role of the judge 
positively and rejected claims that such an approach would endanger their position of 
impartiality. However, it had concerns about the accuracy of the decisions given that the 
court was not provided with the full powers of an inquisitorial court or any adversarial 
challenge.44 This is why the relevant procedures were held unconstitutional45 and a 
regime of special advocates was introduced as a consequence.46.  
In Israel, the courts have adopted a ‘judicial management model’ in administrative 
detention cases, where only limited information is disclosed:47 “In the framework of 
these proceedings the judge is required to question the validity and credibility of the 
administrative evidence that is brought before him and to assess its weight.”48 
Moreover, the judge has a duty to consider the material from the defendant’s 
perspective, who is excluded from the proceedings.49 
Another example of inquisitorial judges in the common law world stems from Northern 
Ireland. As a consequence of the Diplock trials, there was the concern that a judge 
sitting without a jury would alter the adversarial character of the trial. Jackson and 
Doran demonstrated that judges in Diplock courts ‘compensated’ for the loss of the jury 
                                                
43 Charkaoui v Canada [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350. 
44 Ibid, at [50]-[51] and [63]. 
45 Ibid at [65]. 
46 Of course it has to be kept in mind that Charkaoui was an immigration case and thus the court was not 
limited to questions of disclosure, but decided on the matter. 
47 For a discussion see Daphne Barak-Erez and Matthew Waxman, “Secret evidence and the due process 
of terrorist detentions” (2009) 48(3) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 3, 18. 
48 CrimA 6659/06 - A et al. v. The State of Israel [2008] at [43] 
49 Ibid. See also Shiri Krebs, “The secret keepers: judges, security detention and secret evidence” in Liora 
Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning rights: comparative judicial 
engagement (Hart Publishing, 2014) 179. 
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by adopting a more inquisitorial approach to its functions.50 While the authors were 
unable to quantify the trend precisely, their empirical study clearly showed an increased 
level of judicial questioning and intervention than ordinarily occurred in a normal jury 
trial. Interestingly, concerns were expressed that although the character of the trial 
changed, the roles of the judge formally remained the same.51 Hence, in a legislative 
non-disclosure regime, it would be preferable to signal explicitly that judges were under 
a duty to adopt a more inquisitorial role within ex parte hearings.  It could also be 
mentioned that inquisitorial powers are also not entirely alien to Australian judges. 
However, cases where judicial bodies have been provided with formal or informal 
inquisitorial powers limited to certain Commissions, Tribunals52 and the Coroners 
Courts.53 
These examples demonstrate that a more inquisitorial approach in non-disclosure 
proceedings is feasible. It is also clear that any advantages from such an approach must 
be weighed against weakening the ‘purity’ of a legal system based on adversarial 
justice, and that significantly altering the well-established role of parties to the judicial 
process may create some damage to public confidence. However, as long as they are 
limited to situations where the regular principles of adversariness are disturbed anyway, 
the advantage of an additional safeguard becomes more convincing.  
 
                                                
50 Their findings were based on an empirical study into the behaviour of judges in Northern Ireland 
conducting ordinary trials and Diplock trials. This was possible because the two systems ran parallel – 
depending on the offence – and each judge in Northern Ireland had to take on some Diplock trials. John 
Jackson and Sean Doran, “Conventional trials in unconventional times: the Diplock Court experience”, 
(1993) 4(3) Criminal Law Forum 503. See also John Jackson, Sean Doran and Michael Seigel, 
“Rethinking adversariness in nonjury criminal trials” (1995) 23(1) American Journal of Criminal Law 1 
and John Jackson and Sean Doran, Judge without jury: Diplock trials in adversary system (Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 287. 
51 Jackson and Doran (1993), above n 50, 520. 
52 Narelle Bedford and Robin Creyke, Inquisitorial processes in Australia's tribunals (Australian Institute 
of Judicial Administration Incorporated, 2006). 
53 Brian Mills, The criminal trial (Federation Press, 2011) 7. 
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8.2.3   Questions of security and questions of fairness in non-disclosure decisions 
In 2004 the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) Report on sensitive 
information54 suggested that in particular situations the Attorney-General’s certificate 
should be conclusive, and that it is then for the court to decide what the consequences of 
non-disclosure would be.55 In this context, Palmer has commented 
“[A]s the ALRC’s proposals recognise, and the as R v Lappas demonstrated, the 
question as to whether information should be disclosed, and the question as to 
whether – if the information is not to be disclosed – the accused can receive a 
fair trial, are fundamentally separate questions.”56 
Given the different nature of these questions and recognising the respective expertise 
and competence of the two branches of government, it is submitted that in any non-
disclosure decision the court must clearly distinguish between two types of questions:  
(a) security questions, which relate to the necessity (and the extent) of the non-
disclosure. Here is has to be accepted that only a very basic level of judicial scrutiny is 
applied; and 
(b) liberty questions, which deal with the consequences of any non-disclosure for the 
fairness of the trial. Being guided by the concept of proportionality sui generis, the aim 
should be to minimise the impact on the fairness of the trial by installing appropriate 
safeguards. At this stage the judges are in charge and no level of deference should be 
applied. 
                                                
54 Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping secrets: The protection of classified and security 
sensitive information (Report 98, May 2004). 
55 Ibid, [11.166]-[11.167]. 
56 Andrew Palmer, “Investigating and prosecuting terrorism: the counter-terrorism legislation and the law 
of evidence” (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 373, 394. Palmer referred to 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Protecting classified and security sensitive information (Discussion 
Paper 67, January 2004) and R v Lappas & Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115 (26 November 2001). See also 
Gaegler J approach in Pompano discussed above at 7.3.2. 
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Such a view rejects that security and liberty can be sensibly balanced against each other. 
Rather than creating a ‘black box’ of decision-making, distinguishing between these 
two types of questions provides a clear structure for the decision-making, promoting 
more considered and consistent outcomes. This distinction is arguably more important 
for the Australian balancing approach, but it is equally informative for the UK 
approach, where decision-making is guided by principles.  
 
(a) The security question and the need to supress sensitive information  
Unlike the ALRC Report, the thesis does not support the position that the Attorney-
General’s certificate should be conclusive. In order to safeguard against arbitrary 
decisions, checks and balances are still required. As under the current regime, judges 
should review the information in question to determine whether it is withheld for 
legitimate reasons.57 This is a prerequisite for any a non-disclosure order. In order to 
strengthen the capability of the judges, as suggested above, a SRA or the like should 
support the trial judges in this inquiry. The onus would still rest with the party claiming 
non-disclosure and thus generally with the Government. However, it is assumed that 
this is not a heavy burden to discharge.58 
The question of what constitutes a legitimate reason for non-disclosure remains. Not 
only has it been accepted that certain types of information or particular witnesses 
deserve protection where a credible and serious danger or threat has been established, 
but that protection should also apply where information has been received from foreign 
intelligence agencies and where information could expose the methods (modus 
operandi) used by intelligence agencies. In those particular cases, the risk to national 
security by disclosure may be remote, but non-disclosure would nevertheless be 
                                                
57 See Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 (13 February 1984). 
58 Also ibid, 435 (Wilson and Dawson JJ). 
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regarded by the state as vital to the continuation/sustainability of the work of Australia’s 
security agencies internationally. Hence, it seems that the threshold is rather low. 
Illegitimate reasons for non-disclosure could be adduced in cases where the information 
is already public, withheld for political reasons (for example to avoid political 
embarrassment), or for other mala fides or bad intentions. However, even in these cases, 
specialist expertise is still needed to evaluate the material. In the UK, the threshold for 
non-disclosure is already set higher requiring a ‘real risk’ to security.59 However, what 
this threshold means in practice is hard to say. In particular, it seems likely that judges 
would be challenged to distinguish between a ‘risk’ and a ‘real risk’ without some 
informed opinion from security experts (for example SRAs). Despite potential 
assistance from SRAs, it is important for the trial judge to review all relevant 
information periodically in order to assess its importance for the question of fairness, 
which can also change over the course of the trial.60 For example, the need for 
protecting certain information may disappear, for example, because a particular 
operation has been completed. 
(b) The liberty question and determining the fairness of the trial 
Considering the principles described above, which seek to maximise the fairness of the 
trial and establish a minimum threshold of fairness that cannot be balanced away, 
determining the impact on the fairness of a trial of a (potential) non-disclosure involves 
addressing two questions: the first question relates to safeguarding the fairness of the 
trial – including ex parte hearings - and thus how to limit the impact of the non-
disclosure. These safeguards should be at the disposal of the judge and will be discussed 
further below. The second question is whether – given any non-disclosure with or 
without the additional safeguards – the overall fairness of the trial continues to be 
                                                
59 R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155 [36(3)] 
60 This is already a requirement in the UK. 
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guaranteed. In other words, whether the limited disclosure of information requires a stay 
of proceedings. This second aspect is not exclusively related to a non-disclosure order 
of a particular piece of information, but needs to be monitored continuously throughout 
the process.61  
The crucial aspect is of course the importance of the information for the case. On the 
extreme end is that the information is not material at all. Certainly this is a question that 
can be addressed before thinking about non-disclosure.62 However, thematically, this 
question fits here, as a priori there will be no issue for fairness arising in cases where 
the information does not need to be disclosed. On the other end of the spectrum are 
cases where the information is crucial in proving innocence or guilt. A fair trial seems 
difficult to imagine without disclosure of such material. Either the prosecution has to 
drop the charges or the judge has to stay the proceedings. More difficult are cases where 
information is found to be material, but it is unclear to what extent. Sir Richard Scott 
commented in this context: 
“As to documents which appear to have the potential to assist the defence, could 
a situation ever arise in which disclosure could be refused on PII grounds? This 
is, to my mind, a fundamental but conceptually simple, question. The answer to 
it, both on authority and on principle should, in my opinion, be a resounding 
'No'. In the context of a criminal trial how can there be a more important public 
interest than that the defendant should have a fair trial and that documents which 
might assist him to establish his innocence should not be withheld from him.”63 
                                                
61 See R v H and C [2004] 2 AC 134, 155-56. 
62 This concerns only cases where the information is requested by the defence.  
63 Richard Scott, “The use of public interest immunity claims in criminal cases” (1996) 2 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues. (emphasis added). Sir Richard Scott was the author of “The Report of the Inquiry in 
to the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions” (HC 115, 
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In Australia, given that the NSIA intended to allow the use of edited sensitive 
information, the question of whether such a use of information contributes to or 
hampers the fairness of the process adds another layer of complexity. In particular, it 
emphasises the use of safeguards and requires constant judicial monitoring of the 
overall fairness of the trial.64  
This independent judicial enquiry into the standard of fairness has also been mentioned 
by the INSLM in his report on the NSIA. There the Monitor described the power of the 
courts in relation to making non-disclosure orders under s 31 NSIA, which is worth 
citing in length: 
“[T]his independent power of the court is not, in the opinion of the INSLM, in 
the nature of non-merits judicial review, but is rather the full power to consider 
all relevant evidence, weigh all relevant considerations and exercise judicial 
discretion as to the appropriate outcome. It is not an inquiry into whether the 
Attorney-General was justified or not in giving a certificate, but rather an 
inquiry into whether there should be disclosure or not, and if so on what if any 
restricted basis.”65 
 
8.2.4   Safeguards for the individual to maintain an equality of arms 
A number of measures have been developed under the common law or through 
legislation in order to compensate for any limitations upon the fairness of the trial, 
either during ex parte hearings or in cases when sensitive information is used in edited 
                                                                                                                                          
1995-96), commonly referred to as the Scott Report. One of the issues of concern identified during the 
inquiry was the use of PII certificates. 
64 Without the overall fairness in mind, there would be the risk that pieces of sensitive information, which 
were individually authorized to be suppressed, collectively still render the trial unfair.  
65 Bret Walker, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’s Annual Report” (7 November 
2013) 135. 
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form. However, their effectiveness is not always guaranteed. In the following section, a 
few aspects will be addressed, which seem particularly important and should be part of 
comprehensive legislation.  
 
8.2.4.1   Special advocates 
One of the most frequently discussed safeguard measures in relation to ex parte 
hearings is the use of special advocates. The use of security-cleared lawyers arguing for 
an excluded party was first used in Canada and then imported and developed in the UK. 
Even in Australia, the use of special advocates has been mentioned as an option by 
Whealy J, but has never been adopted. In Lodhi, it was described as a means of ‘last 
resort’ and not considered necessary in that case. Other than this cursory examination, 
the use of special advocates has not been a major point of discussion in Australia.66 And 
in none of the control order (CO) cases the defendants were excluded from the 
proceedings.67 
In the UK, where special advocates were used regularly in control order cases as a fixed 
component of securing the rights of the defendant, those barristers acting as special 
advocates have highlighted numerous issues.68 The major complaint about the regime is 
that special advocates, with few exceptions, are not allowed to talk to the defendant 
after they have seen the classified information. This restriction has been considered so 
                                                
66 There is now a special advocates scheme proposed in relation to CO for young people. However, the 
legislation has not passed at the time of writing. See Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 
1) 2015 (Cth) Schedule 2.  
67 In two prominent CO cases of Hicks and Thomas a lot of information had already been public (see 
above at 7.3.1). See also Roger Gyles, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into 
control order safeguards: Part 1” (29 January 2016) 4. 
68 Constitutional Affairs Committee, “The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates” (7th Report of Session 2004–05, HC 323-I, 3 April 2005) Parts 
4 and 5; The Committee interviewed a number of special advocates for the report; see also Martin 
Chamberlain, “Special advocates and procedural fairness in closed proceedings” (2009) 28(3) Civil 
Justice Quarterly 314; and Martin Chamberlain, “Update on procedural fairness in closed proceedings” 
(2009) 28(4) Civil Justice Quarterly 448. 
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severe that many commentators have not recommended an equivalent regime in 
Australia.69 The Bret Walker as INSLM commented that “[i]t is a fallacy to suggest a 
special advocate could represent the accused”,70 the new INSLM, Roger Gyles, appears 
to be open to the introduction of a special advocate scheme in light of the proposed 
legislative amendments to the CO regime.71  
However, it is submitted that a ‘new and improved’ special advocate regime could be an 
important safeguard for an ex parte hearing, including those used in criminal trials. 
Improvements could include the following adjustments. First, in situations where a 
defendant is excluded, a special advocate should always be mandatory on request of the 
defence, as it is already the case in UK TPIM proceedings. Secondly, the special 
advocate should be able to contact the defendant after the closed hearings under certain 
conditions. Although some sort of oversight could be allowed, the main responsibility 
should rest with the special advocate. Thirdly, the special advocate should be able to 
call witnesses, have access to their own experts,72 and thus have similar rights to a 
defence lawyer. Although making sufficient funding available for special advocates can 
solve many of the issues, the question of communication has turned out to be a 
stumbling block for improving the current regime in the UK. The risk that sensitive 
information could be communicated to the defendant (and potentially to other members 
of criminal organisations) after a special advocate has accessed such information must 
be acknowledged. But this risk does not seem insurmountable. It is submitted that 
special advocates would have a task very similar to those of police officers who in the 
                                                
69 Walker, above n 65, 151; Sue Donkin, The Evolution of Pre-emption in Anti-Terrorism Law: A Cross-
Jurisdictional Examination (Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Griffith University, Brisbane, 2011). 
70 Walker, above n 65, 152. This is also why the INSLM did not recommend the adoption of a special 
advocate regime in the NSIA. 
71 Roger Gyles, “Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Inquiry into control order 
safeguards: Part 2” (13 April 2016) Part 8 and 9. For the proposed changes see also above at 7.1, n 29.  
72 Martin Chamberlain, “Special advocates and procedural fairness in closed proceedings” (2009) 28(3) 
Civil Justice Quarterly 314, 326. 
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course of an investigation is apprised of national security material. They face similar 
issues on a regular basis, when they conduct interviews in which they aim to retrieve 
new information from a suspect of witness without disclosing information they have 
already received. Presumably, special advocates are highly trained and have experience 
with handling sensitive information. At the least, such criteria should be considered 
when appointing a person as a special advocate. Most importantly, it must be added that 
special advocates should not have any interest in disclosing sensitive information to the 
defendant. It is part of the definition of a special advocate that they are not acting for the 
defendant (in the sense of the lawyer-client relationship), but only represent the interest 
of the defendant in closed hearings. Rather, special advocates have particular 
obligations to ensure that the fairness of the trial is maintained in closed hearings for the 
benefit of the defendant. Hence, they are still installed and funded by the government 
and remain at all times responsible to the court. These professional duties of the special 
advocate would need to be clearly delineated in legislation and professional codes. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish clearly between special advocates and other 
actors intended to improve the adversariness and thus fairness of the ex parte hearing.  
(a) Security cleared lawyers: under the NSIA defence lawyers can apply for security 
clearance in order to be allowed to participate in ex parte hearings. While they have the 
advantages of knowing the case very well, and being able to contact and continue to 
represent the defendant, the regulation has been criticised for creating an ethical 
dilemma for the lawyers. While they still represent their client, they are limited in what 
they can discuss (and threatened with a criminal offence if disclosing sensitive 
information). As a consequence many lawyers have chosen not to apply for security 
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clearance or not to participate to avoid this situation.73 Special advocates do not face 
this dilemma, as they are not exercising a representative role for the client.74 
Furthermore, special advocates could be presumed to have more experience dealing 
with sensitive information and thus are less likely to be deterred by disclosure offences.  
(b) Public interest monitors: While the nature of statutory public interest monitors 
PIMs) differ across various jurisdictions, these positions do not have any direct or close 
contact with defendant. In Pompano, Gageler J pointed out that the Queensland PIM’s 
presence alone could not guarantee fairness.75 While PIMs have access to all the 
information and are able to make submissions, they rather their task is predominantly to 
‘monitor’ the proceedings as a whole.76  
(c) SRA: a security review panel as suggested above is also different from the task of a 
special advocate. It does not argue for disclosure, rather it helps the judge to understand 
the risks involved in relation to national security.  
Given their different functions and characteristics, the various actors discussed above, 
should be designed to work in an integrated and coordinated manner. This would 
optimise the best of their abilities, and avoid executing various tasks concurrently. 
However, such an approach has the consequence that these actors occupy the same 
‘regulatory’ space, running in parallel according to the requirements of the particular 
trial. Hence, it is submitted that while defence lawyers should be committed to their 
clients, special advocates, with their different obligations to the court, should have 
                                                
73 Stephen Donaghue, “Reconciling security and the right to a fair trial: The National Security 
Information Act in practice” in Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and 
Liberty in the War on Terror (Federation Press, 2007) 87, 92. 
74 The COAG review recommended a national system of special advocates for control order hearings. 
Council of Australian Governments, “Review of counter-terrorism legislation” (Final Report, 2013) 60. 
75 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 (14 March 2013) [208] 
(Gageler J). 
76 See above at 7.3.2. 
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wider powers to fulfil their function of ensuring an adversarial element to the ex parte 
proceedings.77 The evidence provided by special advocates suggests that they are still 
crucial for challenging non-disclosure decisions and thus increasing the legitimacy of 
closed hearings.78  
 
8.2.4.2   Jury instructions and ‘loophole reports’ 
Whenever edited or summarised evidence is used in a legal proceeding, there is a risk 
that this information will appear vague and misleading. This is because the information 
presented is either incomplete or certain parts are emphasised. This can be a problem for 
jurors in criminal trials. Of course, the jury, assuming that it discharges its tasks 
faithfully, may be left with sufficient doubt about that evidence and disregard it entirely. 
However, when viewed against the background of national security concerns, jurors 
might be tempted to ‘fill in the gaps’, interpreting parts that are not disclosed in a 
particular way or assume that there is more credible material which cannot be disclosed 
without prejudicing national security. How should jurors value such evidence? 
In such situations, it is crucial that as soon as any edited or summarised information is 
used the judge is obliged, as a matter of fairness, to give the jury directions about such 
dangers. The topic has been discussed on appeal in the Lodhi case.79 Warnings, which 
are presently optional under s 165 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), should be mandatory in 
such circumstances. 
                                                
77 See also Lisa Burton and George Williams, “What future for Australia's control order regime?” (2013) 
24 Public Law Review 182, 205. 
78 For example pecial advocates are able to point out inconsistencies, demonstrate that information is 
already in the public domain or arguing for the importance to the case. 
79 Lodhi v R [2006] NSWCCA 101 (4 April 2006) [23]. 
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Another tool to enable jurors to have greater confidence in the edited or summarised 
evidence is making an explanatory report available. The prosecution together with the 
special advocate could be requested to compose this explanatory report, to be read 
alongside a specific edited document or summary, that points out the extent of 
information excised and assesses the risks associated and the reliability of the edited 
document. The judge would oversee the process of the report writing. This process is 
comparable to DPP guidelines governing the use of police informers whose identity 
cannot be disclosed. If possible, the defendant should be informed about the motivation 
of the persons providing the information, their mental health, whether they were paid or 
otherwise rewarded for the information, whether they were imprisoned at the time and 
other issues in relation to their credibility. An obligation to prepare such a report would 
also discourage the prosecution from too readily using edited evidence unless it is 
material, and not likely to mislead the jury. 
Placing such edited or summarised evidence before the tribunal or jury may of course 
also be in the interests of the defendant, who will at least gain some access to sensitive 
information potentially relevant to their defence. Hence, it really depends on the 
specific use of the information and thus needs to be closely monitored by to judge.  
 
8.2.4.3   Limited use of edited information 
As Glidewell LJ pointed out in Ward, any “[n]on-disclosure is a potent source of 
injustice”.80 While this is an important warning and reminder, it does not solve the issue 
that sometimes the suppression of information is necessary. What should be taken from 
Glidewell LJ’s statement is that non-disclosure must be kept to a minimum. This is even 
                                                
80 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619, 642 (Glidewell LJ). And the quote continued: “and even with the benefit 
of hindsight, it will often be difficult to say whether or not an undisclosed item of evidence might have 
shifted the balance or opened up a new line of defence.” 
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more pertinent in a case where edited evidence constitutes the basis of a conviction in a 
criminal trial. For this reason, a ‘golden rule’ should apply in the sense that no 
conviction should be solely or predominantly based on edited or summarised evidence. 
This is due to the risks of distortion and the limitations to testing evidence in the regular 
adversarial manner.81 While in the UK, the Supreme Court has defended the current 
legislation allowing for exceptions to this rule in relation to absent and anonymous 
witnesses, it seems that cases where such exceptions would apply are so extraordinary 
that their application is very unlikely. Including the exceptions in the legislation only 
renders the law unnecessarily complex and confusing and thus must be characterised as 
undesirable. Admitting such exceptions rather creates the danger of a slippery slope in 
cases where the evidence is not strongly reliable or material, but the security aspect is 
nevertheless deemed to be too important to sacrifice at the altar of the fair trial.  
Reform in this area of law – the use of sensitive material in legal proceedings – can only 
be realised once other related areas have been reviewed and amended. For example, the 
rules and regulations to avoid over-classification of material must be addressed. In 
particular, procedures have to be put in place to increase the possibility of disclosing 
information that stems from foreign intelligence organisations and is only classified 
because of those origins. Furthermore, intelligence organisations have to become more 
aware that information they supply to Australia may be used in court, and adjust their 
operating protocols and ‘rules of engagement’ accordingly. 
 
                                                
81 See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping secrets: The protection of classified and 
security sensitive information (Report 98, May 2004) 502[Recommendation 11-11] and 509 
[Recommendation 11-42]. Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands [ECtHR] applications nos 
21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93 (23 April 1997) [55]. 
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8.2.4.4   Conclusion 
In sum, unless there are appropriate safeguards or ‘compensating’ measures, criminal 
trials should not proceed where information that has the potential to assist the defence is 
not disclosed. However, this issue of non-disclosure should not be finally determined 
unless the procedure allows the defendant to be confident that his/her side of the 
argument has been duly considered. This minimum requirement for the ‘equality of 
arms’ echoes the ECtHR’s approach to counter-balancing, which must at least to some 
extent include the defendant. Lord Kerr has famously expressed a similar position in Al 
Rawi:  
“The central fallacy of the argument, however, lies in the unspoken assumption 
that, because the judge sees everything, he is bound to be in a better position to 
reach a fair result. That assumption is misplaced.82 
Where there is no challenge possible to non-disclosure, compensation measures must 
still be introduced, not only for the sake of the individual (and the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial), but also in the broader interests of justice, which include preserving public 
confidence and legitimacy in the administration of justice.  
Another implication of this research is that this standard should be applied to civil and 
administrative proceedings, as well as criminal proceedings and trials. This is because 
civil/administrative proceedings often have serious potential consequences for the 
liberty of a person (for example COs/preventive detention), functioning as quasi-
criminal proceedings.83 In fact, maintaining respect for due process in proceedings 
where there is use of edited or secret evidence is fundamental, irrespective of the 
                                                
82 Al Rawi & Ors v Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34 (13 July 2011) [93]; see also R v Ward 
[1993] 1 WLR 619, 642 (Glidewell LJ). 
83 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF & Another (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 (10 June 2009) 
[57] (Lord Phillips). 
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characterisation of the proceedings as civil or criminal. The British approach of 
requiring a ‘gist’, ie providing the defendant with enough information to meet the case 
and instruct a special advocate, must be regarded as the absolute minimum standard for 
ensuring the fairness of proceedings.84  
 
 
                                                
84 See Ibid. It should be pointed out that AF was a control order case and thus according to this 
submission should have deserved a higher level of due process. Furthermore, the new Justice and 
Security Act 2013 (UK) does not require the defendant to be provided with a gist. It remains to be seen 
whether the courts will accept the lowering of the standard even in civil proceedings. 
Conclusion: Sensitive information and the right to a fair trial 
 373 
Conclusion: Sensitive information and the right to a fair trial 
 
Fairness is a highly valued principle in legal proceedings. In some jurisdictions this 
finds expression as a general constitutional right, while in others, such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Australia, the courts and legislatures have fashioned rules and 
remedies that give protection in specific contexts. In relation to both forms of 
expression, it is difficult to determine what fairness requires in proceedings where it is 
seriously challenged, as revealed in cases involving the use and suppression of sensitive 
information. Notwithstanding the general rhetoric emphasising the importance of 
respecting the right to a fair trial (RFT), only in specific contexts fairness may be so 
diminished that the particular proceedings constitute a miscarriage of justice. The thesis 
argues that given the importance of the RFT, which can be deduced from its historical 
development and evidenced by its broad articulation across various legal domains, the 
legal system must do more than adopt a de minimis position, that a trial must proceed 
unless tainted by blatant unfairness. Rather than approaching fairness from the 
perspective of determining ‘what is unfair’ (which is a negative and residual approach), 
fairness should be approached as a positive guarantee, which places restrictions on 
erosions to fairness that will be permitted only where demonstrably necessary and 
justifiable. Whereas the latter positive conception aims at maximising fairness, the 
former negative conception runs the risk that fairness is found in the residue left after 
the countervailing public interest such as security have been taken into account. This is 
particularly apparent in cases reviewed in this thesis, where sensitive information is 
used or supressed. The blurring of evidence and intelligence post 9/11 era has clearly 
caused some challenges for the fairness of counter-terrorism proceedings. While no one 
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doubts the seriousness of the threat that stems from terrorists, the importance of fairness 
as a basic value of a liberal democracy must be respected to the greatest extent possible. 
The thesis started from the premise that, while it is impossible to define what is fair in 
the abstract, it is possible to define with precision the legal methods and processes for 
securing a fair hearing. These methods and processes are dependant on both positive 
law (as found in the constitution, legislation or case law) and the rights respecting legal 
culture. In other words, a robust human rights legal framework must be supported by a 
culture of respecting rights within the courts, executive or legislature. The divergence 
between jurisdictions analysed in this thesis reveals useful contrasts and comparison. 
Australia and the UK share a legal heritage, but have diverged from one another in 
terms of how to protect human rights and thus how to deal with conflict of interests 
concerning the RFT.  
Following the trend of ‘pre-crime’ intervention by the state and the increased use of 
sensitive information both countries have enacted new legislative exceptions to the 
‘golden rule’ of disclosure. Guided by the European Court of Human Rights’ approach 
of proportionality sui generis, the UK now uses a principled approach to non-disclosure 
decisions. This aims not only at maximising the RFT, but also requires a minimum of 
adversariness through counter-balancing the limitations put on an individual. Australia 
in comparison has formally retained a public interest balancing approach to non-
disclosure decisions, although this thesis argues that behind the façade of the balancing 
test, judges apply a rule and exception in favour of non-disclosure. In this process the 
RFT is generally reduced to the requirement that a trial cannot be conducted if it is 
unfair. This common law approach emphasises the integrity of the court, rather than 
placing strong value on adversariness as a means of ensuring fairness. In fact, the 
Australian case law suggests that adversariness is not a defining criterion at all when it 
Conclusion: Sensitive information and the right to a fair trial 
 375 
comes to the overall fairness of the trial. Admittedly, in practice the results of the two 
approaches can be identical since judges must ultimately decide what is fair or what is 
not. But in cases where the security interest should be accorded less weight, under a 
principled approach, only minimal limitations to the RFT would be proportionate. 
Furthermore, the thesis argues that even with a similar result, a principled approach 
enjoys a higher amount of legitimacy in the broader community, as well as supporting 
rule of law values of clarity and predictability. 
It would be too simplistic to reduce the differences in protecting fairness to the 
application of legal form. However, this does affect the judges’ understanding of their 
role within the state. For example, it is clear that the UK courts have been closely 
involved in developing and shaping the current non-disclosure regime through 
challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). In Australia, the judges do not 
perceive themselves as competent to develop rights, which may constitute an 
interference with the will of Parliament. Rather, Australian courts see their roles as 
backstop. This is evident in the cases where the courts resist legislative direction how to 
prioritise and strike a balance between fairness and non-disclosure interests. Hence, 
while in the UK the judicial power was expanded and the courts entered in to a 
‘dialogue’ with the other organs of government, in Australia, the courts upheld the strict 
separation of powers, and granted significant deference to the other organs of 
government in relation in security matters.  
While the UK judges have demonstrated that the common law is not hostile to including 
principles in relation to non-disclosure decision, the thesis does not suggest that 
Australian judges should simply adopt such an approach. Understanding the Australian 
constitutional setting, law reform to address any deficiencies should be primarily driven 
by Parliament.  
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Given the constitutionality of the principle of fairness, the duty to guarantee fairness is 
not merely one that is imposed upon the courts. Rather all branches have an obligation 
to take it into consideration. Any legislation on the topic should therefore support 
judges in making non-disclosure decisions that are guided by clear principles and are 
evidence-based. Reflecting the values put forward in this thesis, this would mean to 
provide judges with safeguards to maximise fairness and retain as much as possible the 
adversariness of the process. It may include additional responsibilities for the executive 
to justify the suppression of sensitive information, resource for an effective system of 
checks and balances, training opportunities and procedural amendments that support the 
judiciary in dealing with questions of security. Over time all of these measures would 
also shape the cultures within all branches of government towards a heightened 
awareness of the requirements of fairness.  
While these suggestions may appear to only advance an Australian non-disclosure 
regime, many of the propositions made in the thesis of how to think about non-
disclosure and safeguards to promote fairness are equally useful to the UK, where 
closed material proceedings are more common and steadily increasing.  
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